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The establishment and constant development of social media technologies over the last 
two decades have left media scholars with a burning desire to understand their 
contribution to the formation of public opinion and its political consequences. At this very 
moment it is undeniable that public opinion fuelled by social media is a force to be 
reckoned with. At the same time, the complex information flows and communication 
practices on social media make it difficult to predict how public opinion will form. 
Research into how information and opinions are shared has created concerns that some 
parts of the public are becoming increasingly politically homogenous and polarized due 
to social media. 
This thesis project suggests a new framework to evaluate the function of public opinion, 
specifically in relation to the opportunities offered by social media. The framework is 
inclusive and conflates concepts that are usually considered separate within the field of 
media studies e.g. opinion polling and deliberation. It is a descriptive framework that 
highlights advantages and weaknesses for certain instances of public opinion. The 
framework is used to inform the development of computational methods that can be used 
to gauge public opinion with respect to political homophily and polarization. These 
methods rely on automatically calculating the cross-cutting agreement, i.e. how much 
agreement there is between people with opposing political affiliations, as they interact in 
public social media discussions. They are developed as universal methods to enable 
public opinion to be measured based on how politically homogenous the users who react 
to and share a piece of information are and how well political oppositions in the comment 
threads are able to reach agreement, in combination with topics and sentiments. The 
methods are tested on a large cross-section of public Danish Facebook pages related to 
everything from local fitness clubs to government pages and news media organization. 
Results show that high levels of political homophily and disagreement that are likely to 
cause polarization are highly dependent on context. Overall polarization does not appear 
to be increasing over a period of five years, except if moderated by certain other factors 
of which discussion topics related to refugees and immigration is one of the strongest. 
The results are furthermore an indicator that the methods developed can be used to 
effectively evaluate public opinion with respect to homophily and polarization. Since the 
methods are computational, the process is easily automated and can be used to create 
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tools that can deliver increased transparency in public opinion formation as it unfolds on 
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Social Media, Big Data and The Online Public Sphere – New Directions 
for the Formation, Function and Reaping of Public Opinion 
Social media technologies have taken a hold of the world over the last couple of decades. 
Evolving from quaint curiosities into a dominating force for the creation and spread of 
public opinion. There will always be people who shun or consciously opt out of using new 
technologies, but social media have become so ubiquitous that few people around the 
globe are able to not take account of their existence at all. As such, democratic societies 
for which an informed citizenry is preferable to one that is rife with ignorance and apathy, 
social media has become an unavoidable element in the sphere of public opinion. 
Since the Enlightenment (from a European perspective), the efficacy of public opinion has 
been viewed as an important aspect of healthy democracies (e.g. Rousseau, 2002 [1762]). 
Having public opinion be an integrated part of any democratic society seems to be 
congruent with the idea of rule by the people, rather than the public opinion being second 
to an all-powerful governmental body. Institutionalized voting, elections and 
referendums are found in most democratic societies in order to guarantee the influence 
that the public has on their government. Whether or not current voting practices best 
serve the electorate, the fostering of public opinion is an important aspect in providing 
citizens with best conditions for making informed decisions. And even so, there is little 
consensus about how to treat public opinion: how reliable or fickle is the public’s opinion 
really? Should experts bear the main responsibility of informing and setting up choices 
for the public to choose between or is the public capable of reaching a direction on its 
own? How much of the public’s opinion should be taken at face value and how much 
should it be subject to procedural or rational norms? Those are some of the questions 
which form the background for this project, though seeking to fully answer them is 
outside the scope of this thesis.  This project builds on the premise that increased and 
effective communication among citizens as well as between citizens and governing 
bodies can help improve the quality of public opinion and overall satisfaction with 
democratic rule. However, the project does not rely on predetermined normative 
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principles for evaluating the quality of public opinion per se. Rather, public opinion as a 
communicative force is examined in terms of the strength and weaknesses that manifest 
depending on how it is framed, formed and gauged. The varying functions of public 
opinion is later presented in a descriptive framework entitled: the triaxial model. 
With his seminal work on the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas (1989 [1962]) initiated a 
discussion, one that is still ongoing today, about public opinion and its function in relation 
to media technologies and political institutions in mass democracies. Discussions related 
to the role of media technologies in fostering public opinion, what is often referred to as 
the public sphere perspective, is likely to continue as long as technologies and 
communication practices are changing (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013). New possibilities and 
potential debilities of changing media technologies have to be constantly considered as 
change is occurring if democratic rule is to be enriched rather than diminished. Of course, 
the functioning of any society relies on many aspects such as social structures, political 
economy, infrastructure, education etc., however it is assumed that the use of media 
technologies and its impact on public opinion have an independent role to play, for better 
or worse. 
As with any new media technology, concerns about social media’s negative impact on 
public opinion have taken the stage; or rather, what the discussion is actually centred on 
is whether the potential deficits of social media outweigh their potential benefits. Were 
radio and television increasingly effective ways to inform the masses, or were they 
dumbing down, politically pacifying and de-socializing people? Specific media 
technologies and formats all offer their own unique features that can either help foster 
an informed citizenry or risk dividing people and making them increasingly distrustful of 
media. Misinformation and disinformation have found new life with social media, and 
social psychological biases and algorithmic filtering mechanism have been shown to 
greatly affect the way information is found, consumed and shared; all of which has been 
deemed potentially dangerous for politics in democratic societies. The role social media 
play in generating increased political polarization has become one of the primary focal 
points for studying social media and public opinion. Whether such polarization is due to 
the intentional dissemination of disinformation, structural, commercial, social, personal, 
algorithmic or even journalistic biases, there is evidence that all might have been 
impacted based on the way social media have changed the way information is curated. 
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Social media have taken on a role of their own in society, not just as social networking 
tools, but also as part of a larger category of technologies, which can best be termed online 
digital media. Social media are purely digital and connected to the global internet1. As 
such, social media have become a source of Big Data and is ultimately dependent on the 
commercial value of extracting insights from said data (Zuboff, 2018). However, the 
extraction of information from such large amounts of behavioural data is not limited to 
commercial use. Social media offer spaces for debate as well as easy ways to plan dinner 
parties. The exchange of opinions about everything from designerware to international 
politics are taking place in myriads of ways. Digital traces left behind from every single 
interaction/transaction between users and content, and among the users themselves, on 
social media platforms, provide insights into the processes behind and output of public 
opinion formation. Such insights can be used to further our understanding of public 
opinion formation but can also be repurposed and shared back to the users in an effort to 
make the process of opinion formation more transparent. This thesis project offers a 
theoretical framework as well as a specific set of methods for analysing political debates 
in public spaces on social media with respect to political homophily and the potential for 
cross-cutting agreement. 
This thesis will argue a new way to operationalise the concept of public opinion in the 
public sphere tradition with respect to the communicative potentials of social media, 
using Facebook as the main example. The formation of public opinion is related to social 
media specific characteristics and how they impact people’s ability to find, share and 
discuss politically relevant information. The concept of public opinion is coupled directly 
to methods for large-scale measuring of behaviour related to political polarization (or de-
polarization) by focusing on users’ ability to interact with people whom they do not 
politically agree with. The methods are tested on a large cross-section of public forums 
representing the Danish public on Facebook and used to show the degree to which 
political polarization exists and evolves over time on the platform as well as the degree 
to which such polarization depends on various contexts. The theoretical framework and 
methods are developed for social media in general, but the empirical case is limited to 
Facebook in Denmark. This imposes a bias on the results such that the usefulness of the 
 
1 The internet as it is known today is potentially global, but not de facto global as some countries have been 
successful in denying access to a huge part of their population (e.g. China, Syria, Saudi Arabia). 
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methods might be constrained by communicative behaviour that is specific to Danish 
culture. However, the research design for studying homophily and polarization aims at a 
general rather than specific frame when it comes to topics, types of pages, party politics 
and other categories. While not all countries have a very high degree of political 
communication on a single social media platform, as is the case with Facebook in 
Denmark, at least a few dozen other democratic countries do have similar levels of social 
media use (measured as how many percent of the population are active2). Furthermore, 
in order to show the potential for universal applicability if the methods in this project, 
some exploration is carried out on data from Facebook in New Zealand. A full comparative 
study of several countries would be outside the scope of the project. Focus is on 
developing and documenting a fairly complex set of computational techniques and then 
testing them by analysing the main patterns from Facebook in Denmark. While the 
methods show potential for universal applicability, the patterns pertaining to political 
homophily and polarization that are ultimately extracted apply only to Facebook in 
Denmark. 
The final argument is that methods, such as those developed for this project to measure 
and study political agreement/disagreement in public spaces on social media, can, due to 
them being easily automatable and relying on already existing data flows, be repurposed 
and used to let the public know itself as an enriched data-public. It offers a way to 
positively intervene in spaces that are dominated by obscurity and commercially 
motivated extraction of data.  
 
Outline of Thesis 
The academic contribution of this thesis project is to propose a new way to view the 
concept of public opinion in relation to social media that is directly coupled with methods 
to automatically measure and review the opinion formation process, specifically focusing 





In order to understand public opinion formation on social media it is necessary to start 
with a thorough review of theoretical discussions surrounding public opinion. The 
concept of public opinion itself is quite fuzzy. For this reason, public opinion is traced 
specifically through the lens of the public sphere tradition, which has become one of the 
most popular areas for media studies related to political communication (Dahlgren, 2009, 
9). Chapter 1 sets up the general theoretical boundaries for the concept of the public and 
public opinion. Publicness relates to both spaces and people, and an intuitive distinction 
such as the one between private and public becomes increasingly blurry with social 
media. The chapter discusses the relation between publics and audiences in order to 
make clear when a body of people can effectively contribute to the formation of public 
opinion.  
The study of public sphere discussions centred on online digital media and social media 
have been a popular endeavour over the last two decades, and a variety of new concepts 
for understanding public opinion and media technologies have been introduced in the 
literature. An overall framework, coined the triaxial public opinion model, is proposed in 
order to frame earlier concepts of the public. The model considers how previous concepts 
view the function of the public on three different axes, which will not be described in 
detail here: 1) Voice versus aggregation, 2) consensus vs agonism, 3) engagement versus 
ignorance. The purpose of the model is not to create an exact map that fully explains all 
previous concepts of the public, but to create an overall frame to collect and highlight 
contrasts and similarities between the concepts. The lasts parts of the chapter begin by 
tracing concepts related to public opinion starting with Habermas’ original critique of the 
changing structures of the public sphere. After Habermas, a few additional concepts are 
discussed including distinctions between formal and informal publics as well as polled 
publics and mini publics. 
Chapter 2 takes a step back in order to review how politically relevant content is 
published, shared and consumed on social media. The first part seeks to highlight the 
major characteristics of social media within the medium theory tradition; what makes 
online digital media and social media distinct from other mediated forms of 
communication. The focus is on three often studied aspects of online digital media: 1) 
media convergence, 2) user interaction, 3) mediatization and personalization. Next, the 
chapter goes into detail about how information flows and is received in the network 
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structures of social media. Two specific theoretical concepts are used to frame social 
media-specific communication practices related to political polarization as an effect of 
content sharing and participation in public discussions: curated flows and expression 
effects. Information flows can be seen as a combination of five types of curation: personal, 
social, strategic, journalistic and algorithmic; and user interaction, both between users 
and content as well as among users, can be viewed not simply as a transmission of a 
messages to other people, but also as expression effects that impact the senders 
themselves regardless of whether other users react or even receives them. 
Since public opinion relies on some instance of people coming together to form a public, 
the chapter considers how people connect and form meaningful, though potentially 
short-lived, gatherings on social media. Opinion formation relies on cross-cutting flows 
of information through social networks that can be endlessly reconfigured; thus, it is 
important to reflect on the relevance that short-lived and somewhat ephemeral 
gatherings of social media users have. The rest of the chapter mirrors the last part of the 
previous chapter by reviewing a selection of theoretical concepts related to public 
opinion in light of the triaxial model, but in this chapter the focus is on conceptions of the 
public that have been specifically used or created to analyse social media. The concepts 
being reviewed are counter publics, issue publics, networked publics, data publics, 
affective publics and acclamation publics. 
Public opinion for this project is viewed through the lens of political 
agreement/disagreement between people in the public; one of the reasons being that it 
is strongly related to the potential polarization of societies. Chapter 3 outlines previous 
findings and conceptualizations specifically related to political engagement in public 
online forums, the connection between political preferences and media consumption and 
political polarization with respect to political homophily, filter bubbles and cross-cutting 
agreement. The chapter begins with a discussion of public social media forums as spaces 
for political debate. Because of the sometimes ephemeral character of social media 
publics and the fact that politically relevant discussions can occur in spaces that are not 
overtly set up for political debate, it is necessary to frame what political engagement 
means on social media. Next, the chapter addresses how curation practices can be framed 
in relation to the political preferences of individual users. Political engagement with 
content and other users is explained with four modes: 1) the intentional engagement with 
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political content and people that are politically similar to the user herself, 2) the 
unintentional engagement with the politically similar (guided by less visible biases), 3) 
the intentional engagement with the politically dissimilar and 4) the unintentional 
engagement with the politically dissimilar. Additionally, the complexities regarding the 
political polarization of the public are discussed with respect to many divergent and 
sometimes contrasting findings that have come from studies into the actual effects of 
engagement with politically similar/dissimilar content as well as 
agreement/disagreement in discussions among people with different dispositions and 
political preferences. The chapter wraps up the theoretical framework by outlining its 
use in the empirical study. 
Chapter 4 introduces the methodological framework for the project. As mentioned 
earlier, the methods developed for this thesis have a two-fold purpose, both to investigate 
public opinion formation related to political polarization and to serve as an example of 
data analysis can be automated and made into tools that can help make public opinion 
formation more transparent to the public itself. For this reason, the methods are 
computational and Big Data-oriented, meaning they are custom-made to handle large 
data streams and extract very specific patterns from them. There is no previous research 
using the exact same set of methods, but the general approach is informed by the social 
analytics framework (Stieglitz, Mirbabaie, Ross & Neuberger, 2018). 
The empirical data that is the main interest of this project is the behavioural data 
collected from a large cross-section of Danish public Facebook pages; this includes the 
content published, who is reacting to and/or commenting on it, when each interaction 
occurs and how users interact with each other. In total more than a billion likes, 
comments, posts and replies collected from over 10.000 public pages. The study of public 
opinion is centred on the political preferences of the users. Thus, part of the methodology 
is a survey of users and their political affiliation, which is used to design methods that can 
be used to predict the political affiliation of all users in the Danish public. Having attained 
the political preferences of the users, the next step involves developing techniques to 
calculate political homophily and political agreement/disagreement based on how users 
interact with content and each other. Part of the social analytics framework involves 
using the content and some contextual features to account for behavioural patterns at a 
more fine-grained level. Thus, the last set of methods have the purpose of allowing 
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behaviour to be studied based on the type of space in which it takes place, the topics being 
discussed and the sentiment of the language used. 
Chapter 5 has a singular purpose: to show that users’ political preferences can be 
predicted to an acceptable degree of certainty based on their engagement with politicians 
and political parties on Facebook. This is done by doing a survey study in which 
respondents state which political party they voted for in the two last national elections 
as well as who they would vote for at the time of the survey. Each individual respondent 
has their answers connected to their Facebook profile. Their Facebook behavioural 
history is then used to train a machine learning classifier to predict their voting intention, 
which yields an accuracy of 70% for the multiparty level and 99% for the left/right scale. 
Chapter 6 builds directly on top of the results obtained in the previous chapter. Assuming 
that previous behaviour on political pages is a strong indicator of political preference, 
this chapter proposes a series of methods for calculating the degree of political homophily 
and agreement/disagreement in multiple steps of communication. Specifically, it seeks to 
determine how politically homogenous the participants in a given discussion are and how 
much agreement there is based on users’ reactions to the published content as well as 
their continuing interactions among each other in the comment section. Since no ground 
truth can be obtained against which to test the reliability of the calculations, it is instead 
tested against a few common-sense expectations e.g. political disagreement should on 
average be noticeably higher on discussions that have a clear political angle compared to 
those initially focused on other matters. 
Chapter 7 presents the procedures used to divide pages into categories based on the types 
of content they focus on and the model developed to sort discussions into topics based 
on the actual content in the initial Facebook post around which comments and reactions 
are made. Lastly a machine learning model is developed to determine the degree to which 
posts and comments use harsh language or not. 
In chapter 8 all the main results are presented. They show the development of political 
homophily and agreement/disagreement in the Danish public over time as well as its 
distribution in relation to spaces, topics and sentiments. While the public overall does not 
appear to become increasingly homogenous or polarized over time, there are some clear 
exceptions depending on the context. As such topics related to refugees and immigration 
and spaces dominated by supporters of the mainstream populist party elicit much higher 
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levels of political homophily that are steadily increasing over time compared to other 
topics and spaces. The same can be observed for the topic refugees and immigration 
political disagreement, especially in combination with use of harsh language. Some 
additional patterns are revealed with the overall conclusion that social media does not 
appear to, in itself, be the cause of polarization, instead any such trend seem to be very 
dependent on specific contexts.  
Chapter 9 is an in-depth discussion of the methods and the results in light of the 
theoretical framework. Focus is on how the methods developed and tested in the project 
can be used to enhance the tools that people have when engaging with content and other 
users on social media platforms. The results show that patterns pertaining to political 
homophily and agreement/disagreement can be ascertained on a micro level, which 
could potentially be done as the opinion formation is unfolding. Such techniques can be 
used to make public opinion more transparent e.g. by highlighting comments that are 
eliciting cross-cutting agreement or whole discussions that are becoming increasingly 
homogenous. Public opinion in this project is not viewed through the lens of a 
predetermined set of normative principles, different configurations of the public have 
advantages and weaknesses. However, improving the transparency of opinion formation 
processes as they occur across obscure networks of affective data publics will at least 
provide the public itself with better knowledge and increased agency. 
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Chapter 1. The Public as an Opinion 
Forming Body 
 
The Interest in Public Opinion 
Public opinion is of general interest because it represents the collective thoughts of more 
than a mere individual or small group of people. It shapes the norms that people live by. 
Knowing the opinion of the public means knowing what people want, or at least what a 
great mass of people leans toward. It is of interest to producers, employers, 
manufacturers, lawmakers and society at large, anyone who are responsible for making 
decisions that will affect the boundary conditions of significantly large groups of people. 
Public opinion research does not adhere to a strictly defined field or discipline. It is one 
of the fuzzier terms used in academic research (Donsbach & Traugott, 2008). It spans the 
areas of political science, philosophy, law, communication, marketing and more, however 
there is no doubt that it has become one of the most central topics in media research. Still 
the term public opinion is often used in a broad sense to denote the public in general, or 
what a significant part of the public, thinks about something pertaining to any category 
including science, religion, consumer products, politics etc. Especially in democratic 
societies, being mindful of public opinion functions as a “self-organizing” principle for 
social and civic relations (Calhoun, 2010, 304). 
This thesis is primarily concerned with public opinion in relation to politics and 
especially the role of media technologies as a facilitator of opinion formation. Public 
opinion as a relevant term in politics has existed in some version in Western societies as 
far back as Ancient Greece, however it was not coined until the Enlightenment (Herbst, 
2015). In the same context it should be mentioned that public opinion in politics is 
inextricably linked to democracy as a form of governance, or as Strömbäck remarks, 
“…public opinion is the main currency in democracies” (2012, 2). In the case of non-
democratic governments public opinion might be necessary to take into account, but, as 
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Machiavelli (1513/1992) has noted, it is considered something to be controlled rather 
than fostered and is not used as a basis for decision-making. Some would claim that there 
is a lot of control over the formation of public opinion, even in modern, liberal 
democracies (e.g. Habermas, 1962/1989, Herman & Chomsky, 1988), still the general 
idea is for public opinion to represent the wishes of the people and directly influence 
legislation, policy-making and overall organization of society (Aalberg & Curran, 2011). 
Thus, almost all Western, post-Enlightenment scholars have been concerned with the 
practical and theoretical principles behind the best possible implementation of public 
opinion as the basis for sustaining a healthy democracy. It is within this scholarly debate, 
which has run alongside the advancement of communication technologies, that the 
conceptualization of the public as an opinion forming body is to be sought. 
 
Outer conceptual boundaries: Multitudes and Publicness 
Two concerns must be addressed before the concept of public opinion can gradually be 
explored and put to use: 1) public opinion as multitude and singularity, and 2) public as 
different from non-public. These concerns will be examined in greater detail throughout 
the chapter, but they need to be addressed on a general level in order to have a minimal 
sense of the theoretical and practical limits pertaining to the term public opinion.  
When speaking of ‘the public’, it can refer to both people and space (Tarta, 2014, 2), and 
the right configurations of both are necessary for the formation of public opinion. A public 
as people is the simplest to conceive of. It needs to include more than two people and 
those people need to ‘come together’ in some broad sense (Childs, 1965, 13). The most 
important aspect to mind here is how the function of coming together can be fairly 
abstract. The public can take form in a physical assembly such as a town meeting or a 
parliamentary debate, but it can also be facilitated through more asynchronous and 
distributed means of communication such as the writing and reading of newspapers or 
the creating and accessing of websites. This idea builds on the notion of imagined 
communities (Anderson, 1983), which theorizes the coming together of a nation without 
the people who make up the nation ever meeting in person. Although, being in the same 
room or reading the same newspaper does not make two people part of a public. It is 
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necessary to flesh the differences between a collection of individuals and a public, and as 
such it will be discussed in detail in this section and the following.   
When is public opinion singular? One line of discussion focuses on the distinction 
between ‘the public’ and ‘a (specific) public’. However, it is possible to assume that the 
concept of ‘the public’ is mostly used as a semantic signifier to address a fluid 
constellation wherein the public can be viewed as literally everyone, a great many, a 
majority, a constituency, a representative selection etc. (Sartori, 1987, 22). This thesis is 
focused on public opinion as the product of ‘a public’, a specific gathering of people, and 
thus it will be assumed that the public is always potentially plural (Tarta, 2014, 26). There 
can be many publics each forming their own collective opinion, however the opinion 
pertaining to a certain public must be minimally singular. Minimally singular in this sense 
means that depending on how the opinion was formed, it can be either utterly simple or 
very complex, but it must be a collection of thoughts that represents a funnelling of 
individual opinions into something that can be enunciated as the collective opinion 
pertaining to the whole of a body of people. This is also a way of saying that public opinion 
on a practical level need to have some direction; it is typically in response to some 
common concern (Dewey, 1927, 11), or put a different way, it reflects the transformation 
of a multitude of opinion into ‘uniformly effective power’ (Tönnies, 1887/1957, 221). 
Depending on where it is located in the following framework, public opinion can have 
many characteristics; it can be complex, shallow, exact, fuzzy, representative etc., but it 
must have attained the status of something more than a collection in which individuals 
can be identified only by their own peculiar opinions. Even though public opinion is most 
often referred to in cases where people have come together or been collected in some 
way, such as a protest or an opinion survey, with there being some direction to the 
opinion, this thesis will not assume that people are always conscious of the direction or 
even of the fact that they are a part of the formation of public opinion. Some of these 
concerns will be reiterated later in the chapter. 
The public as space relates to the question of whether a certain place, either physical or 
virtual, can actually be considered public. The scholarly debate on this issue typically 
follows two streams: 1) the distinction between private and public lives of individuals 
(e.g. Goffman, 1959; Meyrowitz, 1986; Papacharissi, 2002) and 2) the political-economy 
perspective of whether the space represents public or private interests in terms of 
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ownership, control and access etc. (e.g. Valtysson, 2012; Fuchs, 2014; Hendricks & 
Hansen, 2014), which is what Dahlgren (2005) has referred to as the structural 
dimension of the public sphere. While the latter plays an important part for the conditions 
of public life it does not need to be conceptualized explicitly in order to create a 
framework for the practical function of public opinion and thus will be given less 
attention in this thesis. 
When is something considered public or non-public? In the most common sense, 
publicness can be attributed to that which is generally made open and visible in 
opposition to safeguarded and hidden (Splichal, 2012a). An expansion of this distinction 
can be made into a normative (Kantian) set of principles pertaining to visibility, 
accessibility and publicity (Tarta, 2014, 21-22). In this sense, the condition of publicness 
requires a space that is accessible and, at least to the highest possible degree, visible to 
all people. Publicity refers to the Kantian idea, which describes the condition of making 
the same information available to all involved parties (Clinger, 2017, 395), and not the 
more modern conception related to promotion and advertising. Publicity is different from 
accessibility as it requires not only the space of opinion to be accessible to as many people 
as possible, instead the space itself should be structured to make sharing of ideas within 
it as easy as possible among all who have vested interests. Thus, the public as space 
should try to accommodate as much visibility, accessibility and publicity as possible. 
The other popular distinction in conceptualizing the public as space is between public 
and private. Public and private are most of the time thought of as separate, but also 
permeable to each other. A private home is physically separated from the public agora, 
but private concerns might be voiced in a public forum. There is some confusion in the 
literature due to overlapping meanings of the words private and personal, which are often 
used interchangeably. However, in one of the most famous distinctions between public 
and private sphere, private and personal are very different (Habermas, 1962/1989). In 
Habermas’ version only private concerns, which include economics, trade relations and 
exchange of commodities, should be permeable to the political public, whereas personal 
affairs including domestic relations, family, hobbies, recreation etc. are preferably not 
relevant in public deliberations. Many adaptations of Habermas’ original concepts of 
public and private spheres have conflated the private and the personal (Jensen, 2010, 69). 
This thesis will build on the more recent, and more commonly used, distinction between 
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personal/private and public rather than the strict Habermasian terminology.  
The evolution of social structures and media technologies has caused significant changes 
in the relation between public and private spheres. With the proliferation of televised 
content at the turn of the millennium the connection to public life became increasingly 
situated in the home environment, sitting in front of the screen (Putnam, 2000), while the 
internet made a whole range of public activities possible from inside the physical private 
sphere (Papacharissi, 2010). This blurring of the boundaries between public matters, 
personal spaces, private interest and intimate affairs makes publicness less dependent 
on any one type of space, physical or virtual. Instead, the condition of publicness should 
apply to all acts where a high degree of visibility, accessibility and publicity is sought. In 
this sense, the condition of publicness is very much related to the ‘performance of 
publicness’ (Matheson, 2018). While traditional means of entering into the public, such 
as attending meetings or protest events are still widely pursued, the performance of 
publicness has become expanded. People can fluidly attempt to negotiate the degree of 
visibility, accessibility and publicity while engaging in communication activities from 
within a space that is primarily3 private (Papacharissi, 2010, 138-139). 
 
The Enactment and Construction of Publics 
At this stage it is necessary to address what qualifies as a public. One of the usual lines to 
draw in media research is that between audience and public, a distinction that has gained 
attention with the growing dominance of mass media. Audiences have typically been 
considered passive and only able to gain expression as a pure aggregate through ratings 
and similar measurements, whereas publics actively direct attention, typically through 
some kind of interaction or by actively coming together (Dayan, 2001). This thesis follows 
the same train of thought but seeks to be as inclusive as possible while still drawing a line. 
In this sense it is important to recognize that the line between audience and public has 
always been hard to define and has become even blurrier with online digital media (Baym 
 
3 It can be argued that issues pertaining to Big Data, lack of digital privacy legislation, the right to be forgotten 
and increased surveillance makes this primarily private space, originally conceived by Papacharissi, somewhat 
illusory. 
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& boyd, 2012, 322). All collective constructs such as nations, markets, crowds, audiences 
and publics, whatever term is used, are, after all, composed of the same people 
(Livingstone, 2005). Thus, audiences are able to morph into publics by drawing on the 
mutual recognition of being receivers of the same information and engaging in activities 
that are socially visible, in contrast to private and obscured (Dahlgren, 2009, 73). It is this 
transition to socially visible activities that constitutes the construction of a public, distinct 
from simply an audience. This is akin to saying that the construction of a public requires 
a two-step flow (from the perspective of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955)), where people first 
interact with media content4 and then interact with each other. Another way of saying 
this is that the public must have a performative dimension where communicative acts are 
carried out by the members of the very public they represent (Dayan, 2005).  
It should be recognized that the first interactive step (between audience and media 
content) is not only determined by individuals and their rational free choices in a 
marketplace of ideas but are being co-constructed by media organizations and political 
entities. Politicians will sometimes want to address their core constituency and media 
organizations their main readership/viewership, thereby seeking to influence the 
construction of a public and give it in a certain direction (Eldridge, Garcia-Carratero & 
Broersma, 2019). This co-construction is most often a tactic where powerful actors try to 
maintain the attention and favour of an audience/constituency (Ross, Fountaine & 
Comrie, 2015), but it still has an effect on how the public is potentially enacted in the 
second interaction step (among citizens). Furthermore, the continuous interaction 
between media and audience can serve as a kind of backdrop for the public by 
maintaining and organizing discourses. The circulation of texts is critical, and it is 
possible to regard it as the primary condition for the public to be able to realize itself 
(Warner, 2002, 50). However, even though a large potential public is gathered through 
discursive flows, it is useful to only consider it a public, and not simply an audience, when 
it gains some expression or direction. This so-called expression can come about in 
multiple ways: by people actively meeting and/or seeking publicity as a congregation 
with a specific direction, or by people being brought together purposely by third-party 
intermediaries. 
 
4 Dahlgren (1995) justifies calling the first step ‘interactive’ by stressing the cognitive and interpretative 
processes required of the individual viewer/reader. 
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This thesis follows the idea that an audience, which is identified only by its passive media 
consumption wherein each audience member mainly recognizes her own particular 
interests with no effort made by any party to actively bring other members together, does 
not qualify as a public. However, a critical difference is that this thesis diverges somewhat 
from previous trends by recognizing all means that bring people together, even if very 
little interaction takes place. This is where opinion polls and even television ratings can 
be thought of as the construction of a public. Television ratings as an example can have 
political relevance if they are unusually high during the showing of a critical 
documentary, thus subtly suggesting that the opinions brought forth are of particular 
interest. The transition from audience to public lies in recognizing this particularly high 
ratings level and making it known. In the same line, opinion polling takes up very little 
space in media research related to the public sphere perspective. It is often relegated to 
the field of political science, to its own sub-field or viewed only as a specific technique 
that media organizations sometimes employ (Traugott, 2012). One reason to at least 
consider the possible value of a public expressed through an opinion poll is that it very 
closely resembles the main expression of the national public in democracies, that of the 
election process (Gallup, 1971, 220).  
The difficulty in engaging with the concept of the public and its political relevance follows 
two contrasting views about the main criterion for a public: 1) that members are visible 
to each other and interacting or deliberating openly (Splichal, 1999); versus 2) that the 
opinion of people is surmised and attains a clear form such as through the technical 
process of opinion polling or other means of aggregating or summarizing. The latter view 
is built on the postulate that if public opinion is not carefully measured then it does not 
really exist (Osborne & Rose, 1999, 387). The latter focuses on measuring public opinion 
while the former is concerned with publicly fostering opinion. These two contrasting 
views can be traced through traditional enactments of publics. Bryce (1888/1995) 
envisioned that a public could be realized through one of four organs: 1) the Press, 2) 
elections, 3) public meetings and 4) citizen associations. The Press and elections can 
loosely be considered to follow aggregative audience logic while public meetings and 
citizen associations are small-scale and based on ideas about deliberation and public 
engagement. 
Instead of viewing the aggregative mode as a false, anonymous public and publics that 
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require open deliberation as an indeterminate phantom public, the functions of 
deliberation and aggregation are put on opposite sides of a spectrum that can contain 
many different conceptions of the public, each with their own strengths and weaknesses. 
One might feel tempted to post the question: ‘why even bother conceptualizing public 
opinion if the final form is so inclusive? Is not everything a public then?’ The answer is 
‘no’, there are still important distinctions between random masses of people and those 
that come together with ‘uniformly effective power’, which will be touched upon in the 
following sections. Also, one of the primary motivations for employing this more inclusive 
view of the construction and enactment of publics is that online digital media, which is a 
main focus in this thesis, offer new conflations of deliberation and aggregation practices 
that impact the formation of public opinion. Before the popularization of the internet 
people were, to a greater extent, split between either passively consuming information 
or engaging in political activities that required some effort such as attending a protest or 
a town meeting, writing letters to the editor, contacting local politicians and initiating 
dialogues with other citizens. The online and the digital also inject new problems into the 
aforementioned debate about measuring public opinion and publicly fostering opinion. 
People are no longer split into passive mass audiences whose opinion can only be 
obtained through elections, polls and surveys and small, actively deliberating 
congregations. Online digital media provide a space where socially visible interaction 
does actually take place but requires much less effort; and where the sharing, endorsing 
and discussion of political information can be more easily aggregated. 
 
Introducing the Triaxial Model 
Because of the fuzziness and wide-ranging implications of public opinion as a concept, 
this thesis finds it necessary to lay out a guiding framework through which different 
aspects of public opinion are viewed in the rest of this chapter. The public sphere 
tradition in the field of media studies has brought many theoretical perspectives on the 
function of the public, both normative and descriptive. This chapter introduces the 
triaxial model, which brings together six key terms from theories of public opinion and 
the interrelation between them by placing them across from each other on three separate 
axes. The model should not be viewed as an exact schematic for grasping all major 
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theoretical issues related to public opinion, rather it is a lens through which to view 
various conceptions of the public that can facilitate the analysis of the function of public 
opinion on social media. It is necessary in order to establish how social media platforms 
can enable new forms of public opinion, not possible before the Internet. Albeit, many 
attempts have been made to do just that. The unique contribution of the triaxial model is 
the collection of previous literature into a unifying lens that is directly connected to the 
way Big Data methods can be employed to reveal both how opinion is formed as well as 
how it can be gauged, measured and used. The triaxial model is illustrated in Fig. 1.0, 
however the complete significance of the model will only be apparent at the end of the 
chapter. The following sections will describe each of the axes in the model, and the rest 
of the chapter will begin the review of concepts from the public sphere tradition. The 
triaxial model is used to put the concepts in perspective. 
 
FIGURE 1.0 – THE TRIAXIAL MODEL. 
 
 30 
Voice versus Aggregation 
The main axis (X) puts public opinion on a continuum between aggregation and voice. 
Here, voice is tightly linked to the practice of deliberation. The term voice is used in order 
to signify the free and deliberate voicing of opinions, which is not necessarily part of a 
formal deliberation process. The axis is born from the premise that public opinion is 
construed differently when it is the result of an aggregation of predetermined 
preferences delivered privately and anonymously by individuals (Gallup, 1957, 23) 
compared to a setting where individuals first voice their opinions to each other and as a 
result of public interaction produce collective thoughts (Bohman, 2000, 195). 
The idea behind the main axis is loosely adopted from the distinction proposed by 
Splichal (2012b) and reiterated in Gayo-Avello (2015) wherein normative-critical public 
opinion is contrasted with opinion polling. The former represents the ideal 
(Habermasian) deliberative constellation with the latter simply being the typical, non-
interactive aggregation of opinion through survey statistics. In this thesis the concepts 
are expanded and put on a continuum so that public opinion comes into being containing 
either aggregative or deliberative characteristics, which roughly depends on the degree 
of complexity it can represent and the amount of interaction among agents it allows for. 
Aggregation refers to public opinion as a product of tallying, quantifying and in some 
sense simplifying the form of public opinion. The most obvious example of aggregation is 
the process of voting, where the public opinion outcome is simply a matter of counting 
how many votes have been cast for each possible choice. The main identifying feature of 
aggregation is that it requires nothing of the individual other than stating a preference 
from a selection of predetermined options. 
Deliberation in its purest form is the continued exchange of ideas and opinions until all 
participants consider the matter exhausted. From this iterative communication process 
public opinion is formulated. A critical note on the concept of deliberation; it is, in theory, 
often assumed to consist of a discourse that is rational and consensus-oriented (e.g. 
Habermas, 1984; Dryzek, 1990). In the triaxial model voice refers to the process of 
engaging in deliberation in any form however simple and does not assume that 
participants attempt to reach consensus or employ rational arguments. Thus, the main 
identifying feature of deliberation is that it requires interaction between individuals as 
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the basis for public opinion formation.  
It is important to understand that as part of having aggregation and voice be on opposite 
ends of a continuum, both terms must be applicable with a degree of fluidity. A useful way 
to elaborate what is meant by such fluidity is by invoking Zuckerman’s (2014) concept of 
participatory civics that place instrumentality and voice on opposite sides of a continuum. 
Instrumentality is associated with activities that seek to capture public participation 
within technical procedures that clearly express the public’s wishes, such as collecting 
signatures for a petition. Voice on the other hand is realized in activities that let 
individuals express themselves using their own words or actions, such as public hearings. 
In the triaxial model voice is viewed as interchangeable with voice and similarly 
aggregation as interchangeable with instrumentality. 
At the very extreme of the aggregation end of the axis one might place the referendum 
where participants are allowed only the binary choice of for/against. One might then 
place a national election in a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system just a 
little closer to voice and a standard opinion survey even closer. Opinion surveys do not 
contain any potential for actual deliberation, but since the aggregation procedure in that 
case accommodates a tiny bit more complexity (there are more choices) than a 
referendum, one would place them a closer to the middle. Voice at the extreme end of the 
axis cannot be illustrated with a clear institutionalized example from contemporary 
society. Rather it is an ideal pertaining to any decision-making process where no 
quantification of individual opinions is necessary, and the final outcome is a product of 
the consideration of every participants’ views in all their particularity into a distinct 
notion. All people who are affected by the consequences of the opinion being established 
should have their voice added to the discussion. A parliamentary debate preceding a 
political settlement is, on the surface at least, a good example of a situation that would lie 
at the voice extreme on the axis. Concepts related to both extreme ends of the voice versus 
aggregation axis will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter. The utility of the 
triaxial model depends on both aggregation and voice being somewhat fluid terms.  For 
example, deliberation pertains only to ‘engaging in the process of deliberation’ or simply 
using one’s own modes of expression with no expectations about how it is carried out. A 
main argument of this thesis holds that this separation is increasingly necessary as a 
response to changing media technologies.   
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Consensus versus Agonism 
The second axis (Y) places consensus and agonism on opposite ends. The idea behind this 
spectrum is directly derived from Chantal Mouffe’s concept of agonistic pluralism (1999; 
2000). Agonistic pluralism challenges earlier theorizations of the democratic function, 
especially those that have grown out of the Habermasian tradition of deliberative 
democracy. This is also why the term deliberation is often theoretically combined with 
an orientation towards consensus (Benhabib, 1996b, 69). As will become clear 
throughout the chapter there are good reasons for separating consensus from 
deliberation, such that deliberation, as described in the preceding paragraph, is more 
descriptive and refers broadly to voice, interaction and the continued exchange of ideas. 
Many deliberative democracy theories hold that the democratic process combined with 
an ideal form of communication (fair and rational debate) would allow differences and 
disagreements within society to be smoothed out or transcended (Benhabib, 1996a, 77). 
Agonistic pluralism claims that relying on the prospect of such transcendence will 
obscure hidden power relations within society thereby putting the hegemonic order in a 
virtually unchallengeable position (Mouffe, 2000, 100). Hegemonic order inevitably 
constrains what can be considered a meaningful consensus. From the perspective of 
agonistic pluralism, democracy can never grow beyond the borders of the dominant 
hegemony as long as it insists on chasing an illusory idea of consensus. Instead the 
struggle over hegemony should be brought to the centre of the democratic process so that 
any provisional hegemony can always be openly challenged and subverted (Ibid., 102). It 
is this constant struggle over the implementation of ethico-political principles without 
assuming that a consensus must be reached that lies at the heart of the term agonism. A 
simpler view of the consensus-agonism continuum is to see it as a trade-off between 
agreement and inclusion (Linaa Jensen, 2014). The term consensus does not apply only 
to communication that has consensus as an outcome, but to all situations that are oriented 
towards consensus (Chang & Jacobson, 2010, 644). Thus, the main determinant of the 
axis is whether public opinion is oriented towards consensus or not. 
This thesis does not assume any preference for either consensus or agonism. The main 
reason for including the axis is to emphasize that different publics can form politically 
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relevant opinions that are geared both towards agonism and consensus. 
 
Engagement versus (Rational) Ignorance 
The last axis (Z) reports on the relation between engagement and ignorance. It is 
determined by the amount of time and energy that an individual will spend on gathering 
information and engaging in activities such as political discussions, local meetings, 
campaigning etc. Engagement versus ignorance is not only related to how much political 
knowledge people have, but also encapsulates how much engagement from the public 
should be expected in the first place. The premise of this axis can be traced back to the 
notion that the public is potentially fickle. Even opinion that is supported by an 
overwhelming majority of the public might not contain any truth (Hegel, 1821/1971, 
203-204). Raw public opinion can potentially be a dangerous force as expressed by de 
Tocqueville in the notion of the tyranny of the majority (de Tocqueville, 2003/1840). This 
train of thought was further developed by Walther Lippmann in suggesting that the 
majority of the public has limited time and resources to engage in opinion forming 
activities, and thus public opinion should be guided by elites who possess the means to 
engage seriously (Lippmann, 1925/1998). On the flipside John Dewey, among others (e.g. 
Tönnies, Tarde), argues that public opinion functions best when all those who public 
opinion claims to represent are an active part in its creation and thereby making the main 
objective of democratic society to develop the structures and tools that would allow as 
many individuals as possible to participate in public opinion formation (Dewey, 1927).  
This question about the engagement and fickleness of the public has in more modern 
times turned into what Aalberg & Curran denote as the ‘rational ignorance debate’ (2011, 
9). The rational ignorance debate is contingent on a society that is saturated with 
information, much of it taking the form of entertainment or soft news (Bennett 2016). 
The quality of public opinion becomes a question of whether individuals can make 
sufficiently informed political choices without spending large amounts of time and 
resources seeking relevant information or engaging in civic activities (Kuklinski et al., 
2001). Highly engaged people might outperform the less engaged, meaning they form 
opinions that more accurately reflect realistic expectations of cause and effect in society, 
but the less engaged might still do fairly well with much less effort (Sniderman, 2000). 
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Simply said, the relationship between engagement and soundness of opinion is likely to 
be non-linear. This kind of rational ignorance has been expressed in the idea of the 
‘monitorial citizen’ (Schudson, 1998), which describes someone who is minimally 
watchful of public affairs but will spend most of her time pursuing personal goals. This 
follows from the larger scale logic that the ‘soul of democracy’ lies not with the public 
discourse of conversation and deliberation, but in the structures, processes and liberties 
ensured by democratic rule (Schudson, 1997). Still, it has been shown that without at 
least some level of critical engagement with media content, the public can be susceptible 
to mass manipulation (Jerit & Barabas, 2006), which places more emphasis on the need 
for fostering public engagement. 
The role played by ignorance in public opinion, at least in the triaxial model, must be 
understood as rational ignorance. It means knowing or doing just enough to be a 
politically efficacious citizen in a representative democracy. Public opinion as a result of 
great engagement by the people it represents has a clear advantage in that it is likely to 
come from a well-informed place, however ignorance can be of great value as well 
because it demands less from people, which can lower the entry threshold for many 
people making it more likely for them to participate at all. 
 
It is important for the purpose of this thesis that each axis in the triaxial model contains 
no implicit normative predispositions. Deliberative is not considered superior to 
aggregation and so on. Table 1.0 is a simplified illustration of the main problems and 
benefits pertaining to the endpoints of each axis. The following sections will attempt to 
place different conceptions of the public within the triaxial model. However, it is not 
relevant to meticulously go through each axis for every single concept. Some concepts are 
primarily characterized by their position on one of the axes while remaining flexible on 
the other two. It should be mentioned that the purpose of the triaxial model is not to 
quantify or create a grand theory of the public, but to help bring theoretical focus to the 
many disjoint conceptions of the public. 
 
 35 
TABLE 1.0 – PROS AND CONS OF EACH ENDPOINT IN THE TRIAXIAL MODEL . 
 
Point of Departure: The Bourgeois Public Sphere and Related Concepts 
The concept of the public sphere has become a cornerstone in media research related to 
democracy and politics. The use of the concept most often has its roots in the ideas 
envisioned by Jürgen Habermas (1962/1989). Habermas’ concept of the public sphere 
has been subject to much critique and many adaptations but continues to be used as a 
foundation for theorizing how the public communicates with democratic rule (Lunt & 
Endpoint Pro Con 
Voice Allows for complex negotiations where 
participants can potentially develop their 
viewpoints through a continued 
suggestion/response process. 
Can be resource intensive, especially when 
trying to accommodate many participants, 
which might lead to exclusion of people and 
produce results that are difficult to 
summarize.  
Aggregation Can accommodate more participants with 
fewer resources and results are easy to 
summarize. 
Opinions are pre-emptively funnelled into 
static categories with the risk of 
oversimplifying opinions and shut down the 
possibility of participants learning from 
each other. 
Consensus Agreeing on a single, combined viewpoint 
makes it easier to reach a concrete 
decision or response. 
Being overly concerned with reaching 
consensus might create the need to shut 
down minority or ‘irrelevant’ voices thus 
excluding opinions. 
Agonism Can accommodate larger and broader 
ranges of opinions and does not exclude 
voices that do not agree with the majority. 
Risks being less constructive sustaining 
shaky foundations for progressing and 
formulating collective decisions. 
Engagement Opinions are more likely to create a strong 
connection between expectation and 
reality when produced by informed and 
engaged participants. 
Can be an unreasonable requirement for 
participants that do not have sufficient 
resources. 
Ignorance Participants can have their voices count 
without spending too many resources 
providing added freedom and satisfaction 
in personal affairs. 
Can produce responses that lead to 
undesired results or the manipulation of 
participants by dominant figures. 
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Livingstone, 2013).  
Most media research adopts a version of the public sphere that is more loosely defined 
than what was originally conceived by Habermas. The original concept was built on the 
idea of a bourgeois public sphere, which refers both to an ideal as well as geographically 
and historically specific period. The ideal public sphere is traced through the political 
development in Great Britain from the turn of the 18th century to early 19th century. 
Within this period optimal conditions arose that allowed private people to come together 
in free deliberation over matters of common concern with the purpose of establishing a 
public opinion to serve as a guiding principle for the general rules and regulations 
enforced by the state (Habermas, 1962/1989, 27). One of the distinguishing features of 
the bourgeois public sphere is the division between opinion and public opinion. The 
division is derived from looking at the Rousseauian tradition, which emphasizes opinion 
characterized as simply the general spirit of the people with no element of critical 
deliberation and free of discursive power relations, in opposition to the British and 
German tradition, especially the Kantian, where the public use of reason (critical reason) 
is seen as the very element that constitutes public opinion and allows for the public to 
penetrate any manifestation of personal domination (Habermas, 1962/1989, 102; 121). 
Thus, public opinion should rely on the Kantian public use of reason, which constitutes the 
transfer of one’s private concerns into a form that makes them relevant to everyone (the 
public) (Kant, 2013/1784). The social mechanism that helps ensure the occurrence of 
said transfer is sometimes expressed as “private vices, public benefits” meaning anyone 
who would privately wish to be excluded from the restrictions imposed by a certain law 
will under the condition of publicness wish to do the opposite, since all members of the 
public will have the same knowledge and suspicions toward each other (Habermas, 
1962/1989, 179). 
According to Habermas the societal changes imposed by the advance of mass 
communication technology, mass democracy and the welfare state, which made the 
public susceptible to manipulation and caused private trade relations to be intermingled 
with state control, led to the downfall of the bourgeois public sphere and caused an 
effective re-feudalization of society (Habermas, 1962/1989, 253). It is especially this 
scepticism towards structures, which many would consider unavoidable in modern, 
liberal democracies, which has served as a point of departure for much subsequent 
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critique. The idea of the bourgeois public sphere has been criticized for being exclusive 
and anti-feminist, historically inaccurate and trapped in an unrealistic normative ideal 
(Fraser, 1990). However, it has been noted that Habermas has accepted much of the 
critique and expanded his overall view on the function of the public sphere (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2013; Dahlgren, 2002). 
Ideas pertaining to the deliberative function of the public were further developed in 
Habermas’ later works. They can be seen as a more general formulation of the theory of 
the bourgeois public sphere that describes the norms for how public opinion is ideally 
formed. Deliberation should be carried out under the condition of publicness, signifying 
general visibility, unrestricted access and publicity, and discourse should be oriented 
towards reaching a mutual agreement (Habermas, 1990, 88-89). A set of criteria 
pertaining to comprehensibility, truth, appropriateness and sincerity (Habermas, 1979, 
58-59) is necessary for instituting what Habermas denotes as communicative action, 
which guarantees that discourse is oriented towards consensus in opposition to strategic 
action, which is only oriented towards the interests of the acting party (Habermas, 1984, 
333). A more simplified version of Habermas’ ideal discourse is to say that it should be 
rational and reason-centred (Robert & Crossley, 2004), however it is important in this 
context that Habermas distinguishes between instrumental rationality and 
communicative rationality, with the former being entirely empirical and directed toward 
a predetermined goal and the latter being a product of unrestricted, argumentative 
speech and oriented towards consensus and mutual understanding (Habermas, 1984, 
10). Thus, in the context of this thesis, it seems appropriate to place the bourgeois public 
sphere and the extended concept of communicative action in the metaphorical origin 
(0,0,0) in the triaxial model, meaning that it is characterized by a high degree of voice, 
consensus and engagement. To ensure theoretical clarity, when addressing the conflation 
of both the early and later works of Habermas the term ‘Habermasian public sphere’ will 
be used as distinct from the bourgeois public sphere. 
The idea of the bourgeois public sphere serves very well as a point of departure to which 
all succeeding concepts of the public can be related. As will be shown in the following 
sections, many of the problems connected with the bourgeois public sphere lies with it 
being too close to the extremes on all three axes in the triaxial model.  
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Evolving Conceptions of the Public 
In response to the aforementioned critique of Habermas’ original concept of the public 
sphere as well as the expansion of mass democracy and development of new media 
technologies, scholars have sought new conceptions to better accommodate the 
dynamics of contemporary society. Discussions revolving around the concept of the 
public sphere since Habermas’ early work was translated to English in 1989 can be 
divided into two main stages. The first stage concerns defending the virtues and benefits 
of increasingly pluralistic societies and the progression of its institutions (Interests 
groups, activists, investigative journalism etc.), while also pointing out the falsity of some 
of the historic accounts that have shaped the normative functions of the bourgeois public 
sphere (Dahlberg, 2011). The second stage is linked to changes in the media landscape 
loosely centred on the question of whether the internet has potential to revitalize the 
public sphere or be the cause of its ever-expanding fragmentation.  
The initial critique of Habermas came as a natural response to the fact that he chose to 
exemplify his ideal public sphere using a historical period where ‘the public’ consisted 
only of a small elite of well-educated, property owning men. The function of the bourgeois 
public sphere is inadvertently conditioned on exclusion and repression of many parts of 
society (Eley, 1992, 321), especially women (Fraser, 1990). Aspects of mass democracy 
such as women’s right to vote and proliferation of workers unions might compromise the 
basis for an ideal public sphere (bourgeois public sphere) as Habermas somewhat 
suggests in his early work, but most people today would still much prefer how things are 
organized today compared to 18th century Britain. Some critics have claimed that the 
institutionalization of the public sphere itself during the early days of European 
democracy was made to silence unwanted, marginalized voices and create a sense of 
consensus where none really existed (e.g. Hetherington, 1997). 
Extending the original feminist critique into a broader trend that has run counter to 
Habermasian notions of the public sphere is the idea that the personal is political 
(Papacharissi, 2010, 37). Critics have sought to challenge the discourse restrictions 
imposed by Habermas such as ideals pertaining to rationality and other deliberation 
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norms (i.e. communicative action) (Plummer, 2003), which direct people toward 
disregarding issues that might be considered too personal and peculiar. Rather than 
leaving personal issues at the door in the pursuit of appropriate public deliberation, 
concerns pertaining to family life, gender, sexual preference, medical issues, cultural 
identity and the like are considered to have strong political relevance, which is sometimes 
referred to as ‘identity politics’ and linked to larger societal trends (Fraser & Honneth, 
2003). In the same line, Habermasian theories have also had a tendency to promote only 
deliberation that is reason-centred and detached (Dahlgren, 2009, 83), almost echoing 
the Kantian norm of ‘disinterested judgement’5. Deliberation that is fuelled mainly by 
passion about a cause, without striving to put one’s thoughts into the most logically 
bounded and reasonable arguments possible, have often been considered a subverting 
mechanism potentially detrimental to democracy (Hall, 2013, 13). While not advocating 
the idea of passionate engagement completely devoid of reasonable argumentation, many 
later theories have considered at least the interconnection between passion and reason 
and how both are important ingredients in the development of citizens’ democratic 
identity (Papacharissi, 2013; Dahlgren, 2009; Mouffe, 1999, 756). Emotionally based 
public opinion formation can, at the very least, be a powerful precursor to more formal 
deliberation processes (Wessler & Brüggemann, 2008, 5).  
In addition to the reemphasis on the political relevance of opinions that are personal in 
nature and induced by passion rather than reason is a defence of the critical function of 
the press, which, in Habermas’ original critique was considered to primarily administer 
manipulation and pacification of the public. Habermas’ very negative view of the mass 
media has been accused of being too exaggerated (Hartley, 1996, 87), elitist (Dahlgren, 
1995) and trapped in a hypodermic needle paradigm of media effects (Billig, 1991). In 
reality the press serves many functions that are just as potentially beneficial to the public 
as they can be detrimental. Just as those in power may attempt to use the media for 
manipulative and distractive purposes, the media also helps the citizenry by keeping 
them informed about general concerns and might act as a watchdog to keep governments 
and other powerful actors in check (Nerone, 2015, 143), which constitutes a classic view 
of the democratic function of the press. It is obvious that the concept of the public sphere 
presented by Habermas has been considered useful, especially regarding its main 
 
5 (Kant 1790, 5: 204–210 [2000: 90–96: 42–50]) 
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function of facilitating deliberation between members of the public over matters of 
common concern. In order to reach a more inclusive concept, scholars have sought to 
simply transpose the public sphere onto the media; meaning contemporary media 
practices are considered able to support this main deliberative function, although in a 
very different manner than the bourgeois public sphere. This is sometimes referred to as 
the mediated public sphere (Brants & Voltmer, 2011; Couldry et al., 2007). Actions taken 
by decision makers are communicated to the public and societal issues that are important 
to the public are transferred back to the decision makers via the mass media thus 
instituting a deliberative function. As will be discussed in the following chapter, social 
media technologies offer the potential for the public to participate more directly in the 
process of discussing and sharing political information, rather than mass media simply 
being representative of the public. 
In tracing evolving conceptions of the public further it is the changes in media technology 
that comes to the forefront. Habermas is criticized for delivering an account of mass 
media that is overly negative. However, other scholars have voiced concern about the 
dominant mass media technologies, TV, radio, newspapers as serving the construction of 
passive audiences (Herman, 2000), that might, in the long run, steer people away from 
public engagement, confining them in their homes and discouraging larger democratic 
community(ies) (Putnam, 2000). Furthermore, media organizations and journalistic 
practices are vulnerable to many implicit biases pertaining to elite interests, economic 
concerns and ideologies (Herman & Chomsky, 2010/1988). 
The popularization of the internet has thrown a new, very significant piece into the 
discussion about media technologies, the public and democratic engagement. While not 
settling the discussion, there is no doubt that the internet and related technologies have 
disrupted the stable relations between sender and receiver typical of a mass media 
dominated world. In this thesis it is worth highlighting two6 of the most often discussed 
consequences for conceptions of the public: 1) the possibility for the public to play a more 
active role in media production and consumption, and 2) the potential fragmentation of 
the public sphere. 
 
6 There are more important consequences, such as globalization and the expansion of global publics (e.g. 
Volkmer, 2014). However, they are less relevant or lie outside the scope of this thesis. 
 41 
Givskov & Trenz (2014) describes the first consequence as a transition from attention 
publics to voice publics. It is important to note that people still watch television and read 
newspapers in the internet age, but the concepts are illustrative in highlighting a key 
difference, namely that many of the online digital platforms available with the internet 
have, at least nominally, increased the potential for each individual member of the public 
to have their voice heard. This potential for having a more active public, endowed with 
agency through technology, has been cause for some early proclamations that the 
internet can somehow revitalize the public sphere (Barber, 1998). However, it is almost 
common sense that just because you are able to voice your concerns does guarantee that 
anyone is listening. The possibility to engage with content and other people through 
online digital media platforms can come to constitute a kind of ‘faux interactivity’ 
bringing very little potential for actually influencing the political process (Koc-Michalska 
& Lilleker, 2017, 2). 
The second main consequence of the internet has to do with an increased fragmentation 
of the public sphere (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008), a trend that had already begun with the 
proliferation of technologies such as cable TV and DAB radio. It is a consequence of the 
individual having more control over the selection and consumption of information. 
Publics can easily become more specialized focusing on common concerns that are only 
common among a very specific congregation of certain individuals, which creates new 
spheres of sub-politics (Papacharissi, 2010, 101). This trend can be seen as empowering 
(Dahlgren, 2005), as when previously scattered members of a group of minorities (e.g. 
diaspora) are brought together. But it can also be seen to make the individual’s 
information environment more difficult to navigate (Papacharissi, 2002) and 
unintentionally instigating group polarization (Sunstein, 2002). 
This fragmentation can also be attributed to the increase in media categories and modes 
of communication itself (Wells & Thorson, 2017, 35) making the age-old question in 
media research of ‘Who says what to whom, through which channels with what effect?’ 
decidedly more difficult to answer, which in turn makes publics and functions relating to 
the public sphere harder to identify. Additionally, another argument has been presented, 
which, at first glance, would appear to run counter to the fragmentation theory, namely 
that the internet has contributed to an increased centralization of the public sphere 
(Hindman, 2008). Indeed, the internet has been framed both as an amplifier (Keen, 2011) 
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and silencer (Karppinen, 2009) of minority voices. It is not unlikely that fragmentation 
and centralization are occurring simultaneously. Some of the evidence for this has been 
offered by Helles (2013), which shows that internet activity is split between spaces that 
are extremely popular and central (i.e. Facebook, Wikipedia, international media sites) 
and those that are highly specialized and narrow (i.e. fan blogs, closed discussion forums, 
hyperlocal media sites). Thus, the online public space is becoming increasingly 
fragmented and centralized at the same time; it is the middle ground which is 
disappearing. 
The implications that online digital media hold for the public as an opinion forming body 
will be unfolded in much greater detail in the next chapter. This section mainly served as 
an introduction to how and why different conceptions of the public have evolved since 
the popularization of the public sphere as a distinct concept. What follows is an account 
of some of the more specific concepts of the public that are relevant for the topic of this 
thesis. 
 
Formal and Informal Publics 
This part of the thesis will address the function of the public with respect to how public 
opinion formation happens on multiple levels, not least because this potential continues 
to grow with the expansion of media technologies. 
The public is never a singular fixed point in society. Publics, collectives of people, 
continuously form in different ways and hold varying capabilities. One of the most 
persistent distinctions in both past and current representative democracies is that 
between formal and informal publics. It was conceived by Fraser (1990) in the early 
critique of Habermas’ public sphere as strong and weak publics, but later adopted by 
Habermas (1996) under the labels formal and informal. According to Fraser the primary 
difference between the two is that formal publics have the power to make binding 
decisions on the issue being considered whereas informal publics can only form opinions. 
For the democratic society as a whole one would say that the parliamentary body is a 
formal public whereas the general citizenry is an informal public. This distinction is very 
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sensible, almost common sense to anyone who have grown up in a democratic system 
where each Member of Parliament represents a fraction of the general public and is 
granted the time and power to take part in deliberation and decision-making on behalf of 
that part of the public. As mentioned previously, continually maintaining a connection 
between the formal and informal publics is often seen as being the primary political 
function of the Press. The broad workings of parliament, the Press and the general public 
mentioned are central to the tenets of representative democracy and an almost trivial 
thing to reiterate. However, it is vitally important to always have in mind the distinction 
between formal and informal publics as they carry with them different features and 
potential issues. 
In relation to the triaxial model outlined in this thesis, a formal public will be located 
towards the engagement endpoint while informal publics will lean more towards 
ignorance, which is probably the most obvious difference. MPs simply have more time 
and resources. This is not to suggest that the general citizenry is completely unengaged. 
Some citizens are highly interested and highly engaged in the goings on of society, but in 
the mediated public sphere view of the mass media era people mainly engage as an 
audience with fewer possibilities to express themselves and come together as a public.  
With a few exceptions such as protest actions members of the general public only vote 
once every three or four years and do not engage in regular debate, while MPs have long 
sessions of discussions on a weekly basis. Albeit, it should be noted that MPs have some 
implicit restrictions, which can be traced back to Habermas’ earliest theory of the public 
sphere that posits political parties in mass democracy as actors representing and 
advocating certain political positions (Habermas, 1962/1989, 165) meaning they are 
restricted to the use of instrumental rationality mentioned earlier. Another way of saying 
this is that political parties in mass democracies can only negotiate, not deliberate in the 
strict sense. It is not suggested that the general public engages in more deliberative 
practices than Members of Parliament, but it is an important quality that the general 
public are all in all more unrestricted in their communication. They are allowed to learn, 
change opinion and supposedly make up their minds as free, rational agents.  
The distinction between formal and informal public is not analytically sensitive to the 
specificities of opinion formation, but it is important to highlight. Any conceptualization 
of public opinion that is not purely theoretical needs to address how information can flow 
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from informal to formal publics. This thesis does not seek to provide an exact answer to 
that question, but it is especially important when evaluating the role of media to be 
constantly mindful of this distinction because the consequences for how opinion is 
formed in an informal public might differ depending on how the flow between the formal 
and informal publics is conditioned.  
 
Polled Publics 
The term ‘polled public’ is not commonly seen in the literature. It is invoked here to 
highlight how opinion polls and related techniques are ways of calling the public into 
being. As mentioned earlier, opinion polls are usually not considered to even constitute a 
public since there is very little publicity, however the inclusive framework proposed in 
this thesis makes it necessary to consider opinion polls as special instances of the public 
rather than not publics at all. 
Polled publics come from opinion polling, which is most often tied to the developments 
of survey techniques by George Gallup in the 1930’s United States (Gallup & Rae, 1940). 
A thoroughly technical approach, opinion polling had a big impact on the theoretical 
debate about public opinion since the techniques made it possible to accurately measure 
how an entire population thought or felt about a political decision, issue or actor. Political 
scientists or other experts devise a series of questions or statements that typically have 
fixed answers or responses relating to how enthusiastic the respondent feels about a 
political proposition. This technique has been considered especially appropriate since it 
directly mirrors the voting process and keep individuals free of the discursive influences 
of others since responding to surveys are done in private (Gallup, 1971, 227). 
Driven by Gallup himself, the introduction of opinion polling saw the rise of advocates 
against earlier theoretical conceptions of public opinion in the face of new and effective 
measurement techniques. Why are long and chaotic debates needed when we can just ask 
people in a way that is representative and easy to summarize? Opinion polling has since 
received critique for being too static and constrained, meaning it does not inspire 
individuals to develop their opinions through an open intellectual process, in part 
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because opinions have to fit within the response schematics of a particular, externally 
subsidized survey design (Ginsberg, 1989). The lack of individual voice and publicity 
makes opinion polling an aggregate of sentiments rather than a representation of 
people’s actual opinions (Splichal, 2012). By not requiring opinion formation to be a 
public procedure the potential reliability and quality of its final expression is significantly 
decreased (Bohman, 2000).  
The purpose of opinion polling is to elicit opinions that can be aggregated; thus, emphasis 
is put on aggregation over voice. It is not oriented towards consensus nor towards 
agonism; depending on the survey design and respondents, both things can come about 
(Stéphane, 2008). While requiring slightly more engagement than casting a single vote in 
an election, taking part in an opinion poll favours ignorance over engagement. 
 
Mini-Publics 
The concept of mini-publics can be seen as an attempt to create a hybrid between formal 
and informal publics. Some of the initial ideas are often credited to Robert Dahl (1989), 
but as mentioned by Goodin & Dryzek (2006), the popularization of the concept followed 
the “deliberative turn” of democracy studies in the 1990s (e.g. Fishkin, 1991; Benhabib, 
1996; Bohman, 2000). The deliberative democracy movement puts great emphasis on the 
practice of real deliberation, especially between lay people, or those of the general public. 
One of the most typical concrete manifestations of a mini-public is the so-called 
“deliberative poll” (Fishkin, 1991), where lay people are selected and put together with 
the directive to deliberate on a specific topic. The hope is that by formalizing a setting for 
regular people to participate in deliberation and address important political issues, a 
mini-public can serve as an improved vehicle of opinion in opposition to the mass 
attention publics of the voters/media consumers (Dryzek, 2006, 3). It is important to note 
that even the formal creation of a mini-public such as a deliberative poll still retains more 
similarity with an informal public as it is not meant to have legislative power, except in 
rare cases (Ferejohn, 2005), but rather complement parliamentary decision-making 
(Budge, 1997, 7). 
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Although the deliberative democracy movement is unique, it can still be seen as having 
strong ties to the Habermasian tradition of rational debate and consensus-oriented 
discourse as was mentioned previously in this chapter. Mini-publics can take many 
concrete forms, even some that explicitly seek to not pressure participants towards 
consensus (Fishkin, 2005). The ideal is still to transcend differences of opinion rather 
than just clashing them together. Not surprisingly the concept of the mini-public can be 
placed fairly close to the ideal Habermasian public sphere at the metaphorical (0,0,0) 
coordinate in Fig 2.0. It has deliberation at the very heart and thus might not be easily 
summarized (aggregated) unless measures are taken to restrict what parts will be 
counted as part of the final output of the public deliberation, a deed, which in deliberative 
polls is often carried out by an impartial moderator or through voting at the end 
(Landwehr, 2014). Depending on the setup a formal mini-public might require a fair 
amount of engagement, which can discourage people with low resources from 
participating; a problem that has been duly noted (Jacquet, 2017). 
 
This chapter has outlined some of the major distinctions between publics and non-publics 
and presented the triaxial model as a framework to describe different perspectives on 
public opinion and the interrelations between them. The public sphere tradition has been 
introduced, starting with Habermas and onto some of the main ideas regarding the 
function of public opinion through critiques of Habermas and changing media landscapes. 
The following chapter will take a more contemporary look at public opinion, specifically 
in relation to online digital media and social media. First by describing some of the main 
characteristics of online digital media and then examining them in relation to more recent 
theories of the function of the public with respect to the triaxial model.  
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Chapter 2. New Media, New Publics 
 
Online Digital Media and Social Media 
At the time of writing social media and online platforms in general are considered an 
integral part of life, even for the minority of people who do not use them. Popular online 
venues such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia etc. have been around for almost 20 
years. Calling such platforms ‘new’ can seem a bit strange, however online digital media, 
along with the devices on which they are accessed (smartphones, laptops, tablets), can 
still be considered the latest, game-changing macro-level category of media. The fact that 
online digital media have changed so much for how the public engages with politics has 
necessitated the development of entirely new conceptions of the public. Some of the 
general trends in public sphere theory that were already identified in the early days of 
the internet were briefly introduced in the previous chapter. This chapter goes into detail 
about the intricacies of online digital media that are necessary to understand newer 
conceptions of the public. The present section will consider three main trends pertaining 
to online digital media: 1) media convergence and hybridization, 2) user-generated 
content and user interaction, 3) mediatization and personalization. 
The digitized environment known as the computer, whether it is a phone or laptop, is 
considered to be the physical, outer frame of not just social media, but all online digital 
media. Computers have their own materiality, typically a screen, speakers and a tactile 
interface, however they are effectively meta-media. It means they pull together all sorts 
of content that was previously considered to be intimately linked to its own physical 
medium, thus negating McLuhan’s original one-liner7 into ‘the medium was the message’ 
(Jensen, 2010, 84). The features and manifestations of meta-media have been a popular 
topic in media theory such as Bolter & Grusin’s (2000) concept of remediation, Jenkins’ 
(2006) convergence cultures and, the most popular notion in recent literature, online 
digital media as hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2013). However, they all share the same 
 
7 Marshall McLuhan’s famous quote: ’the medium is the message’ (1962).  
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basic notion, namely that the digital computer creates a space for media convergence 
where traditional media are available side by side with new digital media forms. Not only 
do they appear simultaneously, but content that has a certain form when distributed 
through one channel might be creatively appropriated by members of the audience and 
re-communicated in another place (Jenkins, Ford & Green, 2018). An example could be 
when a digital television broadcast is edited so that the same 20 seconds loop 
continuously to create a satiric effect, and then shared on social media. Since content can 
be endlessly remixed and shared with effect, the message that one receives depends very 
much on one’s place in the communication network. A clear consequence of hybrid media 
systems is the increased difficulty of locating media effects as categories are becoming so 
intermingled that it is no longer realistic to ask people about exposure to specific types 
of media (Wells & Thorson, 2017, 35). From the perspective of media production this can 
be referred to as narrowcasting in opposition to broadcasting (Scheufele & Nisbet, 2013) 
or as a transition from a ‘push’ to a ‘pull’ model of communication (Webster, 2011). In a 
hybrid media system content can no longer simply be pushed through established 
channels, it has to be ‘on-demand’ and available to the user on their terms. A typical 
strategy for accommodating such changes is to give media content a cross-platform 
presence, making it available for consumption and/or engagement in multiple settings 
(Ksiazek, Peer & Lessard, 2016). Hasebrink (2016) argues that the view of ‘shared news 
consumption within a nation state hooked to the mass media’ has been surpassed by the 
individualized practices of social media. For the same reason there is a call for a re-
emphasis on the uses and gratifications lens, focusing on how people use media 
technologies and not what technologies do to people (Shah, McLeod, Rojas, Cho, Wagner, 
Friedland, 2017, 492). 
It can be difficult to separate traditional media from those that can be considered truly 
novel. And even more since analogue, offline media are still widely used as well (Helles, 
Ørmen, Radil & Jensen, 2015). A useful distinction is that between digitized and natively 
digital (Rogers, 2013). Streaming TV and radio on a website would be a good example of 
digitized media forms in the sense that they are very similar to their analogue 
counterpart, though they are of course still subject to potential remixing; whereas the use 
of hashtags on Twitter does not have an obvious analogue predecessor. Phenomena that 
can be considered natively digital are also some of the main reasons for the necessity of 
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theorizing new conceptions of the public, which will be introduced later in this chapter. 
Details pertaining to materials and historical definitions of what can be considered new 
and traditional media are outside the scope of this thesis, instead focus will be on the 
distinct consequence that hybrid media systems have for political communication.  
The potential for creating, publishing and sharing user-generated content is considered 
one of the main advantages of online digital media. It is non-passive, brings a world of 
possibilities at a very low-cost of entry for regular people and fosters empowerment 
(Shirky, 2011). The arrangement supported by online digital media where people can be 
both receivers and creators of content has spurred the invention of terms such as 
produser or prosumer (Bruns, 2007). Combined with hybrid media systems, user-
generated content has caused additional decentralization of media production and 
consumption mostly because of its capacity to be extremely specialized and appeal to 
never-before-conceived niche audiences (Gruszczynski & Wagner, 2016, Lee & Tandoc, 
2017). Individuals establishing their own platforms have triggered a surge in alternative 
media content, which has even caused the lines between mainstream and alternative to 
become blurred (Stroud, 2011). Examples of this are when established journalists act as 
independent bloggers or private people become powerful ‘influencers’8. A noted 
consequence is the rise of citizen journalism (Anderson, 2013), which is when private 
citizens, especially in situations where they are directly embedded in the context of the 
story, act as reporters using personal webpages and blogs. Another is the existence of a 
viewertariat (Loader & Mercea, 2011, 768), which constitutes a small percent of users 
typically on social media who are significantly more active than other users and act as the 
main opinion leaders both in terms of distributing and framing the content. There is much 
empiric evidence to support the active presence of such a viewertariat on the big social 
media platforms (Bruns, 2013; Bruns & Stieglitz, 2014) 
In the same vein as user-generated content, online digital media also allow for user 
interaction. A popular strand of research has analysed the architectures and affordances 
found on online digital media platforms (e.g. boyd, 2010; Bruns & Moe, 2014 – see 
Hafezieh & Eshragian, 2017 for a review). However, the focus of this thesis is public 
 
8 The term influencer denotes an individual who has gained a significant level of fame exclusively through 
social activities. Influencers are then often approached and contracted by commercial enterprises for 
advertising purposes. 
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opinion and not media platforms and thus will only consider the general and most 
relevant characteristics. Notably online digital media have increased the reconfigurations 
of different degrees of communication such as one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-
many (Jensen, 2009). People can act as broadcasters on blogs and social media (one-to-
many), have intimate conversations through instant messaging apps (one-to-one) and 
engage in comment threads and discussion forums (many-to-many). The different 
degrees can even be conflated, as when a comment intended for a single individual in a 
semi-public setting (e.g. Facebook’s wall) becomes a trigger for multiple other individuals 
to join in. Just like how messages can be constantly remixed they are also subject to 
interpersonal and group-specific dynamics in terms of sharing and discussion. In essence 
this is not something new. Before the internet people would also share news via word-of-
mouth, by saving a newspaper clipping or recording a tv-program, however this level of 
communication has been considerably intensified. With online digital media information 
consumption, sharing and discussion happen concurrently (Rojas, Shah & Friedland, 
2011). One of the most extreme cases of this intensification can be found with the 
phenomenon of dual-screening9 (Vaccari, Chadwick, & O’Loughlin, 2015), where 
individuals are watching a tv-program while simultaneously blogging about it on their 
laptop or smartphone.  In the Lazarsfeldian tradition it can be considered a change from 
two-step flows to multi-step flows of communication (Jensen, 2016). Though it is worth 
noting that even with the heightened communication intensity, most online digital media 
formats are inherently asynchronous forms of communication, which some consider a 
positive feature as it allows time for individuals to reflect before responding to an issue 
(Androutsopolous & Staehr, 2018). In sum, increased interconnection and reciprocity 
should be considered some of the main characteristics of online digital media 
technologies. 
Two often mentioned features of contemporary media environment, at the time of 
writing, are mediatization and personalization. It is interesting to note how both terms 
describe two sides of the same process. Mediatization denotes the way that media 
technologies are increasingly present in our lives and thus impose new media logics that 
influence our behaviour; everything from grocery shopping to charity work has a 
potential mediated dimension. Personalization then describes how media technologies 
 
9 Sometimes called second-screening. 
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make consumption and communication highly customizable; providing increased 
amount of choices about how to transmit, receive and engage with information. This two-
sided process also highlights an often-reiterated notion, namely that affordances and 
communication practices pertaining to online digital media are created in the interplay 
between people and technology (e.g. boyd & Crawford, 2012; Lomborg 2011; Tierney, 
2013). This stance is taken in order to avoid technological determinism, which has always 
been a tempting avenue for media research (Lum, 2014). Also, personalization is most 
often used as a general concept while mediatization has a much more distinctive 
theoretical foundation (Hjarvard, 2008). This section will not treat them separately as 
they both emphasize many of the same consequences of online digital media. 
The trend of personalization is typically derived from domestication theory, where media 
technologies increasingly become an extension of the self, depending on how much they 
are integrated into everyday life (Haddon, 2011), which has become the case with 
smartphones, tablets and laptops this last decade (Helles, 2013b). The consequence of 
this is a more individual centred conduct and more flexible social relations (Rasmussen, 
2014, 63-64). The individual user has more control over what, when and where they 
communicate with certain actors, however, as will be discussed later, the networked 
nature of online spaces also imposes some limits to how much absolute control the user 
has. From the perspective of mediatization, these new features of customization not only 
condition the communicative potential of the individual (Hjarvard, 2019), but also allow 
for the creation of entirely new kinds of sociality (Van Dijk, 2013). Last but not least, 
personalized digital media and increased mediatization produces new relationships 
between the individual and the self. The same way that a personal diary or notebook can 
be a way to interpret and interact with oneself, so does the increased mediatization, 
especially asynchronous, written forms, insert a reflective distance into much of one’s 
everyday communication thus putting more emphasis on daily life as a performance 
(Rasmussen, 2014). 
Central to all aspects of online digital media is the many ways they allow users to 
influence the creation and sharing of content, especially when compared to traditional 
mass media. The increased role that individual users, and networks of users, play in 
combination with the affordances offered by specific social media platforms, has a 
significant impact on how public opinion is formed. The next section will go into detail 
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about how communication practices on social media affect flows of information.  
 
Locating Media Effects: Curation and Expression 
This section goes into further detail about how online digital media, especially social 
media, have affected the flow of information in society. As mentioned old and new media 
forms converge on digital platforms and communicative practices are constantly 
negotiated in the interplay between technology and people in interconnected networks, 
thus understanding who, how and to where information is disseminated key in order to 
approach the political consequences of citizen’s complex media environment and 
participatory behaviour (Brundidge, Garrett, Rojas, & Gil de Zuniga, 2014; Valenzuela, 
2013).  
In an attempt to frame the complexity of information flows online, Thorson & Wells 
(2016) presents the concept of curated flows, which argues that media effects follow how 
any given individual is embedded within networks of content flows curated by different 
sets of actors. A weakness of the framework is that emphasis is put entirely on the 
distribution of information and pays little attention to the creation of content and the role 
played by creative professionals (i.e. media organizations). Using media resources as the 
main point of departure for subsequent conversation has long been, and still is, very 
common (Edgerly, Kjerstin, Bighash & Hannah, 2016; Della Carpini & Williams, 1994), 
thus details pertaining to how original content is shaped is important. Still it is useful to 
consider curated flows as the primary factor for contemporary media effects. For 
example, earlier media effects concepts such as agenda setting and framing are just as 
relevant today; the difference is that agendas are not being determined mainly by news 
producers, but by the whole network of information flows (Neumann et al., 2014). 
For social media five typical kinds of curation can be identified: personal, social, strategic, 
journalistic and algorithmic (Thorson & Wells, 2016). Personal curation involves choices 
made by the individual about which information channels are selected and what content 
time is spent with. As mentioned earlier, many theories stress the increased ability to self-
select content using online digital media, however in a social media context it is worth 
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noting that this ability is greater in terms of choosing which actors to connect (Bode, 
2012), whereafter the control over what content one is exposed to becomes limited. 
Choosing to follow certain actors on social media platforms determines which pieces of 
information show up in an individual’s news feed (Gonzales-Bailon, Borge-Holthoefer & 
Moreno, 2013). 
Social curation then is the filtering mechanism causing information selection to be greatly 
biased towards what is shared within an individual’s social network. It should be 
considered a curation logic in its own right as it can have pronounced consequences since 
most people’s primary reason for being on social media is pursuit of social goals 
(Lomborg, 2011, 56), which then unintentionally ends up determining the kinds of 
political input the individual receives (Graham, Jackson, Wright, 2016). Still, the effects of 
using social media can be particularly difficult to determine because personal and social 
curation logics can vary greatly between individuals. As an example, it has been shown 
that the link between using social media and greater engagement with politics is highly 
dependent on users’ goals and expectations when connecting to the platform (Ekstrom & 
Ostman, 2015). 
Strategic and journalistic curation respectively describe the roles of elite actors such as 
politicians on one side and interest groups and journalists and media organizations on 
the other in contributing to the information flow. Both are governed by more clearly 
defined objectives than personal and social curation in that they seek to amplify their 
message, get supporters, retain audiences and promote their position. They benefit from 
an institutional legitimacy and other elite endorsements that give them a more privileged 
position than ordinary people (Poell, Abdulla, Rieder, Woltering, & Zack, 2015), however 
at the same time the communication hierarchy is significantly flattened compared to 
traditional mass media (Khan, Gilani & Nawaz, 2012). In the news industry this is referred 
to as a change from gatekeeping, where journalists and editors have power over what 
gets published, to gatewatching, which signifies the important role of private people as 
intermediary distributors in their personal network (Bruns, 2005). For politicians there 
is a disruption in how they communicate with the public since social media lets them 
reach out to the masses directly thus circumventing the traditional channels they used to 
rely on (Broersma & Graham, 2015). Since social media are fundamentally interactive, 
the public has the ability to respond and voice their concerns to politicians and 
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government agents, which has mostly been seen as a positive thing (Bertot et al., 2012), 
though there is also scepticism about how much influence such interaction actually 
provides (Tarta, 2014). Additionally, this has initiated a transfer from a mass media logic 
to a network logic in terms of how politicians seek to reach the public, meaning they are 
seeking to create messages that can spread well in social networks (Klinger & Svensson, 
2015). This is an example of how strategic and social curation become interlocked, 
notably since the social level of networked communication has been identified as the 
most significant for messages to go viral (Ibid., 1249). This view also ties in with the 
argument of media convergence where the media is not as an intermediary between 
political actors and the public. Individuals, political elites and media organizations are all 
seen as actors in hybrid discursive flows (Chadwick, 2017). Eldridge & Bødker (2018) 
describes journalists as interlocutors rather than intermediaries. Journalists are both 
reacting to socially and personally curated information as well as redistributing, 
appropriating and soliciting content directly from social media (Harder & Paulussen, 
2016). Such tendencies have been shown to be especially pronounced during breaking 
news events where the whole news media industry gets on the bandwagon, reporting 
information sourced uncritically from social media, which can later turn out to be 
completely unsupported (Bandopadhyaya & Kristensen, 2019). 
Lastly there is algorithmic curation, which is determined by the technological 
infrastructure behind social media platforms. Social media act neither as creators, 
senders or receivers of information, or even as distributors in the traditional sense, but 
as digital intermediaries (Thorson & Wells, 2016, 317). Most of the popular social media 
platforms at the moment, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, have some kind of 
content feed that helps people find and select content within what can only be described 
as information saturated networks. The feed automatically makes suggestions and is thus 
governed by an algorithm that determines what content is shown to an individual. Such 
algorithms typically rely on metrics pertaining to the overall popularity of the content 
and individual users’ previous engagement with types of content and specific actors 
(Nikolov, Lalmas, Flammini & Menczer, 2019). One key thing to keep in mind is that 
where social media very notably make sharing and interaction more visible and more 
public than before the internet, the processes behind the algorithmic curation remains 
largely invisible to most users (Jones, 2015). Some of the political consequences that can 
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be attributed to algorithmic curation will be unfolded in greater detail in the next chapter. 
As mentioned earlier, the introduction of social media can be thought of as a transition 
from attention publics to voice publics to which can be attributed the potential for people 
to express themselves. Thus, expression effects are often accentuated as a major factor for 
understanding contemporary media effects (Valkenburg, 2017; Cho et al., 2018; Shah, 
2016). Some even claim that social media have made expression just as important as 
reception (Yoo & Gil de Zuniga, 2019, 1). Expression is significant for obvious reasons 
such as being the fundamental building block of conversation thereby supporting the 
organic distillation of ideas throughout society (Shah, 2007). However, since one of the 
distinguishing traits of social media is many-to-many forms of communication such as 
comment threads and posting forums, which encourages quick exchanges rather than 
lengthy conversation, scholars have turned their attention to how expressions affect not 
just the receivers, but also the sender of information (Pingree, 2007). In some sense, this 
idea is not new; Dewey (1938) pointed out how learning through expressive acts was 
many times more effective than the passive reception of dogma. It is mentally a more 
effortful and elaborate action and encourages one to relate to the self in anticipation of 
how others will respond to one’s expression (Eveland, 2002). Accordingly, expression 
effects have been linked to increased political efficacy (Cho et al., 2009) as well as 
increased initiative for political action (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2014). It is important to keep 
in mind that expression is not limited to creating original content and writing comments 
but can also be done through the creative appropriation of other people’s content such as 
pasting videos together or generating image-based memes (Jenkins, Ford & Green, 2018, 
2). 
According to Shah, McLeod, Rojas, Cho, Wagner & Friedland (2017) an emphasis on the 
level of interpersonal communication in the flow of information between all parts of the 
public should be considered the most significant aspect for locating contemporary media 
effects. The political consequences should therefore be analysed from the perspective of 
how people organize, manage and perceive their online information networks. In a 
similar vein, Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar (2016) claim we have entered a fifth 
paradigm10 of media effects centred on preference-based effects models. In line with the 
 
10 Kuhnsian oscilation between strong and weak effects models. McQuail. 
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general trend of personalization of media technologies, engagement with information 
revolves increasingly around our political preferences. According to the authors these 
preferences are most pronounced with social and personal curation, but also part of 
strategic and journalistic curation, and, although they do not mention it, algorithmic 
curation can likely be considered part of it too. Preference-based models alternate 
between weak and strong media effects, which are contained, respectively, in the 
concepts of preference-based reinforcement and tailored persuasion (Ibid., 19). The first is 
considered a weak effect because messages that are more or less in tune with preferences 
already held by the individual might only cause a slight reinforcement of attitudes 
without changing much. The second effect, however, considers those messages that are 
so adequately timed and personalized that they can persuade uncertain individuals to 
swing down a new path such as what the marketing firm Cambridge Analytica claimed to 
have done during the 2016 US presidential election (Grassegger & Krogerus, 2017), or 
cause people to advance their political preference towards a new grade of extremism 
(Hendricks & Hansen, 2016). 
This section has presented a framework that highlights the primary forces affecting the 
flow of information through networks on social media platforms. To effectively explain 
this framework, the section has taken the perspective of the individual and their place in 
the interconnected network of strategic, journalistic, personal, social and algorithmic 
curation practices. The next section will discuss how such networks of information flow 
relate to public opinion as collective opinion and not just individuals in arbitrary 
networks.  
 
Connectedness and Togetherness 
There are many modes of being together with other people, which involve varying 
degrees of connection. It is common to conceive oneself to be closely connected to one’s 
immediate family and long-time friends. The strength of connection then begins to 
weaken as we expand to extended family, co-workers and casual friends, local 
communities, nations and lastly humanity as a whole. Once we reach a certain level, our 
sense of togetherness can only be expressed as an imagined community since only a 
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handful of people in the community will personally know one another, such as in a nation 
(Anderson, 1983). Being together also relates to space. Assembling in a physical space is 
the most natural expression, however any act of communication allows us to connect with 
other people. This is where media technologies offer an extended communicative space 
wherein connections can be established and maintained without any physical interaction 
(Newscomb & Hirsch, 1983). Connections are not necessarily products of a practical, 
economic need to exchange information. Habermas (1962/1989) noted how the reading 
and subsequent discussion of works of fiction lay the foundations for understanding 
oneself as part of a larger populace vis-à-vis the shared human experience.  A useful lens 
for understanding togetherness and connectedness in isolation is the popular, but 
sometimes overlooked, notion of communication as both transmission and ritual (Carey, 
1975/2002). Most studies of political communication and media technologies have 
focused on communication as transmission such as agenda setting, framing, priming, 
public relations, propaganda, where media are considered instruments of effects that can 
instil ideas and persuade people. However, communication, as the word itself would have 
it, is also the condition of community and a “…process whereby reality is produced, 
maintained and repaired” (Ibid., 23). Thus, independently of the content of 
communication, it is possible to conceive a parallel process of socialization, gluing people 
together and producing an overall sense of connectedness and togetherness, though it 
will of course always be related to the content.  
Media technologies might technically connect people, but different kinds of media afford 
different kinds of connections. Around the turn of the millennium Putnam (2000) 
expressed concern that our ability to come together in local communities was in decline 
due to the dominance of mass media. The underlying argument is that mass mediated 
communication, which, when compared to face-to-face communication, is based only on 
passive reception of information, produces a sense of togetherness that is too abstract to 
sustain the public communities that have a collective agency of their own. The same 
concerns have been reiterated with the internet where an even broader range of 
communicative experiences is accessible from the physically isolated space of one’s own 
home (Turkle, 2011). However, since online digital media provide many modes of 
communication that are in fact not passive, some have attributed such concerns to a bias 
against virtual (non-physical) togetherness (e.g. Rasmussen, 2014). Papacharissi (2010, 
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142) notes that the digital public consists of individuals that are physically alone in their 
private spheres, but not isolated.  
What is central to the discussion about connectedness and togetherness comes back to 
the earlier introduced distinction between digitized and natively digital. Private instant 
messaging apps might simply produce a sense of togetherness that is similar to that of a 
phone conversation, mail correspondence or a face-to-face talk thereby being a case of 
digitized communication. Digitized communication in this sense is of course also being 
studied, however the greater challenge lies in conceptualizing the kind of connectedness 
and togetherness produced by natively digital media uses such as comment threads, 
retweeting networks and hashtag uses. Some would argue that the reason for a general 
decline in traditional modes of political participation lies with the transposition of 
political engagement onto these natively digital forms of communication (Hay, 2007; 
Ekmann & Amna, 2012). A term like ‘community’, which is normally used to describe 
collectives that form a strong bond through continued interaction compared to the 
random crowds of people that participate around trending hashtags on Twitter 
(Albrechtlund, 2010), is still relevant, and even useful in the light of digital tools. 
Facebook groups for example can be effectively used to maintain communities of cultural 
minorities who would normally have a difficult time finding each other (Marino, 2015). 
However, using only terms that are tied to offline phenomena is problematic and not 
sufficient for understanding the novelty of connectivity on social media (Mejias, 2010; 
Yuan, 2013). One of the simplest concepts of a meaningful political collective builds on 
the formulation of a symbolic ‘we’ in opposition to ‘them’, identifying an in-group and an 
out-group. There is a rich theoretical tradition that has explored this dichotomy (e.g. 
Schmitt, 1932/2004; Gamson, 1992; Mouffe, 2000), which lies outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, the transformation from a mass of opinions into a distilled, collectivized 
form of public opinion that has uniform power is akin to that of a group of people 
becoming a ‘we’. The voice versus aggregation part in the triaxial model explains this 
collectivization of opinion as a fluid process, and as such people do not necessarily need 
to form a sense of belonging to a certain political group or collective but can form public 
opinion through more external means such as opinion polling. The last part of this section 
discusses the significance of coming together on social media through means that, on the 
surface, appear arbitrary and ephemeral. 
 59 
The conceptualization of connectedness and togetherness on social media has come to 
naturally revolve around how socially significant these so-called natively digital forms of 
connectedness really are when compared to traditional forms. This is also tied to 
questions about the actual political power offered by digitally networked technologies. 
They may enhance our ability to solve everyday problems like finding a lost phone or 
selling second-hand goods, but are they really capable of enhancing our ability to 
challenge political, governmental and cultural hegemonies? (Bakardjieva, 2015, 986). 
One of the focal points of the debate locates collective identity (Melucci, 1989; 1995; 1996) 
in opposition to connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; 2013), which are both 
considering the degree to which formal organizations, individual agency and technology 
are necessary for people to collectively support a political cause. Both emphasize the 
important role that formal organizations can play, but do not see them as the sole driver 
of collective action. Instead, on a very basic level, Melucci’s collective identity emphasizes 
the importance of individual agency that is employed in interactive processes of 
negotiation, interpretation and reflection in order to produce and formulate collective 
goals (Melucci, 1995, 43). The logic of connective action on the other hand postulates that 
many of the laborious cognitive tasks that are required for maintaining collective agency 
and organizing collective action have been replaced by digital tools that functions as 
organizing agents in their own right (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, 755), thus emphasizing 
the role of technology. Tied to the concept of connective action is also the idea that the 
symbolic ‘we’ in opposition to ‘them’ can attain more fluid formulations. Bennett & 
Segerberg (2013) calls this personal action frames, where a political cause can be 
supported through meaning making that is mostly personal and somewhat disjoint. One 
of the most famous examples is from the political movement ‘we are the 99%’, which was 
organized around people posting their personal stories and sharing them on social media, 
but still under the collective banner of ‘the 99%’. Seeking a conclusion to the debate is 
outside the scope of this thesis, however it will be assumed that digital online media are 
themselves powerful agents of organizations and that connective action can occur, but it 
must also be considered a delicate potential that might require the support of purposeful 
individuals or formal organizations in order to avoid having only a fleeting effect on 
people, which is what is often expressed as clicktivism or slacktivism (Morozov, 2012). 
The greatest focus of this thesis is on social media communication in public settings (e.g. 
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commenting on public news posts on Facebook), which can easily be deemed the most 
short-lived and randomly directed acts of communication. Attempting to theorize 
connectedness and togetherness in these instances has largely been ignored in the 
research literature. One of the most relevant concepts is that of momentary 
connectedness, which describes “…computer--mediated publicness that allows 
polymorphism across layers of communication” (Rathyanke & Suthers, 2018, 10). 
Essentially feelings of connectedness are in most cases very temporary and are unlikely 
to have lasting effects, but at the same time they are also very malleable and inclusive and 
can be a cheap source of obtaining quasi-continuous forms of togetherness at a distance 
(Licoppe & Smoreda, 2005). The reason for people to be willing to engage and find such 
momentary connectedness meaningful is tied to the previously mentioned expression 
effects. Interactions are sometimes non-transactive and motivated by expression and 
experiences of connectedness rather than the exchange of opinions (Rathyanke & 
Suthers, 2018, 6). This is also an attestation to the polymorphic nature of momentary 
connectedness, that can develop in the direction of being either a community of debate, 
meaning it prompts further inquiry and engagement with an issue as well as potential 
deliberation, or a dialogue of the deaf, where people simply voice their opinion without 
seeking continuation or further learning (Ruiz et al., 2011). 
Expanding the frame for what counts as collective opinion via concepts such a connective 
action and momentary connectedness risks puling public opinion so far away from any 
substantive political process that it hardly retains political relevance. On the other hand, 
they tap directly into the publics unrestrained opinion formation activities. Building on 
more recent concepts of the public, such as data publics, which will be presented later in 
this chapter, it will be considered How Big Data and the methods for measuring public 
opinion developed in this project can help to bridge this gap ever so slightly. 
 
Counter Publics and Issue Publics 
Counter publics and issue publics are not related in any obvious sense, but they are 
included in the same section here because they share a single key trait; both being 
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concepts that address a concrete manifestation of public opinion in direct response to 
something else. 
The use of counter publics as a concept, again, has roots back to the early critique of 
Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere. Historically it points to the existence of groups of 
people who shared common ground on a range of issues but were most often not officially 
recognized (e.g. elitist women, laborers etc. in the early days of European democracy) 
(Fraser, 1990, 67). On a macro-level, the idea of a counter public can best be described as 
an organization of people that “…differ markedly in one way or another from the 
premises that allow the dominant culture to understand itself as a public…” (Warner, 
2002, 81). In more recent media research the term is also applied at the micro-level, such 
as in cases where either a small or large group of people immediately rise up to challenge 
to premise of the information that they are presented with, which is something that social 
media and blogs have made much more prolific in the last decade by allowing publication 
of user-generated material and interaction with content in general. Thus, talking back, 
commenting on a piece of news online, can sometimes constitute a kind of counter public 
(Brooker et al., 2015, Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). By presenting more niche perspectives 
commenting can significantly diversify the points of views that are attached to a story 
(Saez-Trumper, Castillo, Lalmas, 2013), and in some cases the general persuasiveness of 
a news article can be damaged by user comments (Winter, 2013). The key characteristic 
for counter publics is that they come into existence by resisting the very premise that the 
construction of another public is based on. On the macro-level this premise can be 
fundamental ethico-political concerns, and on the micro-level some basic, context-
specific assumptions (e.g. poor people are lazy). In regard to the triaxial model counter 
publics are notably characterized by a very high degree of agonism. Also, they are more 
often considered in a form where public opinion does not rely on the distillation of many 
complex idea into a singular form. Instead simply being in opposition to a dominant 
viewpoint irrespective of concrete reasons can be regarded as relevant participation in a 
counter public, thus less engagement is demanded. And with social media technologies 
counter publics become even more easily aggregable. Massive disliking of a politician’s 
post on Facebook is more easily quantifiable than the result of a multisided discussion 
yielding several perspectives. 
The term issue public has, especially in media research, been used in many contexts, not 
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always building on previous literature, which makes it one of the fuzzier terms to come 
across. Broadly, it points to the coming together of people in response to a specific current 
issue. Originally envisaged as a group of people who were particularly well informed and 
often personally invested in an issue (Converse, 1964/2006; Iyengar, 1990; Krosnick, 
1990). Later works have highlighted that members of an issue public are not necessarily 
technical specialists, but ‘specialists of passion’ based on shared values, interests and 
identities directed toward a certain issue (Kim, 2009, 255), which seems to be in line with 
the progression of public sphere theory towards more discursively inclusive conceptions. 
It is important to mention that any kind of constellation of the public will consist of a 
group of people with something in common, and thus what is distinctive for an issue 
public is its very narrow expression (Poor, 2005). It is a very narrowly focused public. As 
mentioned in the beginning publics are plural, and any one person can be a member of 
multiple publics, but at the time of its construction an issue public is determined by its 
narrow motivation. This also makes an issue public pertaining to a certain case easier to 
identify, as it exists at a specific point in time (Brenes Peralta, Wojcieszak, Lelkes, & de 
Vreese, 2017), even though its members still possess fluid positions within the larger 
network of publics. It has been noted that on social media issue publics might sometimes 
be more appropriately termed ad-hoc publics (Bruns & Moe, 2014). This highlights the 
more arbitrary and loosely organized way that people can come together as a public on 
social media, especially compared to the traditional conception of issue public that would 
consider people to be heavily invested in the issue. Ad-hoc publics can be formed by 
people who do not necessarily invest a lot of attention in the issue, which also makes them 
potentially more sporadic and short-lived, though they can potentially evolve into new, 
related ad-hoc publics (Bruns & Burgess, 2011). The significance of ad-hoc publics relies 
heavily on experiences of momentary connectedness as it manifests in interconnected 
networks of curated information flows.  
The concept of issue publics, at least in the age of online digital media, enjoys a fairly 
flexible centre position in the triaxial model, not overly determined by any of the six end-
points. Firstly, social media as an example have been noted to possess the capacity to 
easily generate issue publics with the risk of being too superficial and end up hindering 
potential political motivation (Rathyanke & Suthers, 2018, 8), but also capable of creating 
positive feedback loops that provoke members of the public to become increasingly 
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engaged with the issue (Obar, Zube & Lampe, 2012). Thus, issue publics can reside in 
multiple spots on the engagement versus ignorance axis in the triaxial model. Secondly, 
it is also open to both aggregation, as when digital tools are used for sharing and signing 
petitions (Bimber, 2017), but also deliberation in cases where the online environment 
provides the space for initiating debate and helps the public to develop (Bruns & Burgess, 
2011). Lastly, one might attribute a slight tendency for an issue public to drift toward 
agonism over consensus exactly because of its parochial and often personal nature, 
seeking to posit the greater importance of its own issue over that of others. 
 
Networked Publics and Data Publics 
The concept of networked publics has been created as way to update the theoretical 
understanding of the public in a world dominated more and more by online digital media. 
The main characteristic of the concept lies in the name itself, that publics, in terms of a 
body of people, are networked. Publics should be seen less as a purposeful congregation 
of a designated group of actors, and more as random, spontaneously amassed crowd of 
people in crosscutting networks (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). It is important to 
emphasize that these networks are best described as digitally enhanced rather than 
implying that their existence are conditioned on digital technology. Opinion formation in 
the general public has been referred to as happening in complex networks before the web 
2.0 revolution (e.g. Habermas, 1996, 307). Still, this digital enhancement of networking 
practices, most prominently facilitated by social media, makes the concept of networked 
publics necessary as earlier conceptions of the public become increasingly insufficient for 
analysing the online media environment (Rathnayake & Suthers, 2018, 2). Networked 
publics are ‘called into being’ in ways that are much more varied than before social media. 
They are relevant both in response to either a specific issue (see issue public) or a broader 
political trend (Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2012, 268). Some of the primary 
characteristics worth highlighting are 1) the blurred boundaries between public and 
private and 2) the collapsing of social contexts (Baym & boyd, 2012; Marwick & boyd, 
2014). Both aspects relate to how individuals negotiate their own social role in different 
situations. Additionally, this also relates to how increased mediatization beckons more 
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reflective performances in people’s daily conduct, as was mentioned previously in this 
chapter. One might present oneself differently to one’s co-workers, putting on more of a 
calibrated performance, which is sometimes referred to as the frontstage, compared to 
being alone or with immediate family, where one’s behaviour resembles the more 
authentic backstage (Goffmann, 1959, 97). While online digital media afford the 
individual increased control over the information selection, they also create a confluence 
of spaces. As online networks gradually become more complex so does the difficulty with 
which the individual negotiates her own role at a given time (Papacharissi, 2010, 68). In 
a hypothetical situation a person might think: ‘If I post this online am I a parent or an 
employee?’ A consequence of these collapsed contexts is the much more fluid position 
that an individual inhabits in being able to move in and out of multiple publics on different 
levels. The fluidity of roles and positions that individuals obtain in each other’s networks 
leads to more potential communication with imagined audiences (Litt, 2012). These 
imagined audiences are best realized in public and semi-public settings. Using a social 
media platform to write a private message to a friend does, of course, not cause any real 
ambiguity in terms of who is in communication with whom. It is when posting a post on 
one’s Facebook wall, making a comment to a piece of news on a public page or using a 
hashtag on Twitter that one’s audience becomes largely imagined. When joining a 
discussion using a popular hashtag on Twitter one can imagine that one’s tweets are 
being viewed by tens of thousands of people or all of one’s followers while it may actually 
be that not a single other person is paying attention. Each individual’s communication 
choices will be guided by implicit or explicit expectations about the audience she will 
reach. Audiences are then, of course, both real and imagined, but navigating the boundary 
between the two has become increasingly complicated (Gruzd, Wellman & Takhteyev, 
2011). This is also why a private person with a small immediate network can 
unintentionally cause a trend that sends ripples through the greater mass of 
interconnected networks (Rose, 2017). One of the consequences of these imagined 
audiences, which ties in well with previously mentioned expression effects and the non-
transactive acts of communication in momentary connectedness, is the actual audience 
becomes less relevant. For example, 50% of Twitter users report not thinking about a 
specific audience when tweeting (Litt & Hargittai, 2016). 
Networked publics are born from the interconnection of ego-centred publics, which 
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describes how digital networking technologies are very much centred on the individual 
(personalization), but still potentially connected to a diverse world of opinions and 
knowledge (Latour et al., 2012). Based on the idea of ego-centred publics information 
sharing in social media networks can be described as intradiverse (Seargeant & Tagg, 
2019). Social media, in general, offers a high level of information diversity, but is 
restricted by the immediate (ego) network around the individual, which determines a 
great deal about how flows of information are curated. The way that networks are 
centred on an individual, but still part of a larger mass of interconnected networks 
beckons the distinction between strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). On a basic 
level most people have both a small number of strong ties, typically as immediate family 
and close friends, as well as a larger portion of weak ties consisting of colleagues, casual 
acquaintances and the likes. A large-scale study of Facebook showed that people 
communicate most with their strong ties, but that weak ties are responsible for bringing 
novel information into a person’s ego-network (Bakshy, Marlow, Rosenn, & Adamic, 
2012). The political significance of weak ties will be discussed later in the next chapter. 
In relation to the triaxial model, it is worth noting that while networked publics as a 
concept is open to varying degrees of consensus, agonism, deliberation, aggregation; 
networked publics provide unique opportunities for political opinion formation that 
requires lower levels of engagement. In her analysis of affordances for networked publics 
boyd (2010, 46) notes that activity on online digital media platforms is recorded and does 
likely persist for longer durations while also being more scalable and easily replicable 
compared to analogue media. Embedded in the DNA of networked publics is the potential 
for opinions to go viral, spreading very quickly across vast, interconnected networks 
having great effect compared to the low amount of effort demanded of the individual 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, 761). Some have even considered this exponential sharing 
of content as a new political discourse in itself (Graeff, 2016). 
The concept of data publics is built on the idea that online digital media facilitate new 
kinds of networked publics. Data publics assume the same affordances noted by boyd, but 
the term narrows down the general concept by focusing explicitly on how the public can 
leverage datafication, which is a natural part of online digital media (Milan, 2018). The 
huge quantities of digital traces that are being produced by interaction in complex 
networks are not just stale records, and a potential method of surveillance (Lyon, 2016), 
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but provide feedback to the individuals in their interaction with the system (Jensen, 
2013). Seeing one’s own actions such as likes, shares or retweets visually represented 
and tallied alongside those of others is what Milan (2018, 515) refers to as machines of 
visibility and agency. This is where data publics can be seen as an extension of networked 
publics, as it is only in the multiple folds of networks that digital traces can produce a sort 
of ‘distributed agency’ (Rammert, 2008). Digital traces involve both individual, 
performative expression and identity building, but what constitutes a data public is when 
the sum of all actions becomes visible and fosters collective self-reflection that can serve 
as a basis for future acts (Reigeluth, 2014, 250; 244). For this reason, the extension of 
networked public into data public follows an aggregative logic (Juris, 2012), though this 
does not imply that its enactment is necessarily shallow and not meaningful. Thus, while 
being enabled by similar affordances as in networked publics, data publics favour 
aggregation over deliberation.  
 
Affective Publics and Acclamation Publics 
 
This section presents two final conceptualizations of the public, the recently popularized 
affective public and the much less known, but useful acclamation public. The two concepts 
are closely related through their emphasis on publics that are formed on the basis of 
emotion and mood rather than concrete ideas and rationales.  
Affective publics are mobilized and identified through the expression of sentiment among 
their members (Papacharissi, 2015). The concept builds on the premise that, on multiple 
levels, emotion and affect plays a significant role in cognition and guides people by 
making certain pieces of information more salient than others, which helps form opinions 
and make decisions (Damasio, 1994). It is worth adding that affect becomes even more 
significant in situations where an individual’s cognitive surplus is low, meaning low levels 
of knowledge pertaining to the situation with not enough resources to gain said 
knowledge, or when decisions need to be made quickly. Through the expression of 
sentiment that resonates with each member of the public people are brought together in 
unison that can potentially translate into collective power. The idea of affective publics is 
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closely tied to the evolution in public sphere theory away from reason-centred, 
Habermasian conceptions of the public towards more inclusive notions where passion is 
seen as important for democratic consciousness, as was mentioned in the previous 
chapter.  
One notable consequence of affect being the foundation of a public is that it becomes 
perfectly liminal (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, 9). This means that affective publics can be 
both a powerful force or vanish as quickly as they came if affect is not strong enough to 
foster continued mobilization. It is easy to imagine; an expression of sentiment can have 
deep roots to some fundamental political grievance, but it can also just be a case of people 
letting off some steam, getting some small frustrations off of their backs. This liminality 
resonates well with the earlier mentioned notion of momentary connectedness and its 
inherent polymorphic character, and in the same way affect can sustain a quasi-
continuous form of togetherness, meaning that even though no concrete political 
movement has begun to move forward, the flame is being kept alive through the active 
manifestation of affective publics. 
It should be noted that Papacharissi, who is the main proponent of the concept of affective 
public, has explicitly linked it to countering dominant narratives of social media 
technologies. Affective publics are born from networked publics and are intricately linked 
to the visibility they attain through the digital footprints they leave behind. From this they 
produce disruptions of the political order and provide visibility to underrepresented 
viewpoints (Papacharissi, 2016, 311-312; 318). 
The term acclamation public is coined by Dean (2017) and is adapted from Agamben’s 
concept of acclamation, which is broadly defined as a public rite with performative 
elements such as applauding, waving flags, raising hands etc. A central part of 
acclamation is an emphasis on the institutionalization of the performative dimension. 
Acclamation acts can be carried out without much reflection on the part of the individual 
about the meaning and political significance of it (Dean, 2017, 420).  It expresses 
collective affect rather than private feelings; the act of people using a trending hashtag on 
Twitter together draws a clear parallel to traditional acts of acclamation in its enunciation 
of the publicness and co-presence of people. Acclamation publics on social media do differ 
from traditional forms of acclamation by way of voice. There are more degrees of freedom 
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in terms of individual expression in acclamation on social media (Papacharissi, 2015), 
and thus the public is more pluralized and atomized, but still together through the 
participation of the ritual (Dean, 2017, 426). This resonates well with the earlier 
mentioned concept of personal action frames, where an open signifier like a slogan or a 
symbol can create the context for people to be connected while maintaining their 
personal narrative (Papacharissi, 2016, 314). In acclamation publics this open signifier 
can also be construed as a socially institutionalized ritual such as the posting of selfies 
(Dean, 2017, 427). Affective and acclamation publics can both be tied to the idea of public 
will; what the public really wants free from discursive restrictions and formalized 
procedures. This idea is not novel though. In fact, Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere is 
grounded in opposition to the uncritical formation of public opinion, much cherished by 
Rosseau, where direct expression of the public will is considered the most important 
(Habermas, 1962/1989, 96). It is easy to accuse affective and acclamation publics of 
simply being a naïve repositioning the public will as such, however it can likewise be 
considered appropriate that current media environments warrant this kind of 
repositioning. Social media has greatly increased the influence the public has on the 
information flow as well as the complexity of modes of participation.  
In the triaxial model affective and acclamation publics favour ignorance over engagement 
since they can be based on affect, emotion and ritualized social practices, which can be 
considered less demanding than thinking deeply about issues and formulating long 
arguments, though there is still room for people to grow in their engagement within and 
with the public itself. Affective publics in particular are heavy on agonism with little room 
for consensus as expressions of affect are geared towards showing discontent with the 
political opposition rather than trying to transcend differences. Affective and acclamation 
publics afford aggregation as they gain visibility through the digital traces. Though there 
is less emphasis on exact quantification of opinion compared to data publics.  
 
This chapter has positioned social media as highly participatory communication 
technologies where the information flow can be viewed as the result of networked 
curation practices including strategic, journalistic, personal, social and algorithmic forms 
of curation. Concepts such as ad-hoc issue publics, data publics and affective publics 
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describe public opinion in a manner that lends itself to novel combinations of aggregation 
and voice as well as ignorance and engagement, although they seem to favour agonism 
over consensus. 
The following chapter examines the political effects of seeking, consuming, sharing and 
discussing opinions online. The purpose is to better grasp how curated information flows 
and social media specific enactments of the public relates to the development of 
individual political knowledge and identity. The focus is specifically on the potential for 
people to exchange opinions and find common with those whom they do not politically 
side with as well as the possibility for increased political polarization. 
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Chapter 3. Political Engagement and 
Consequences 
 
Everyday Political Engagement and News Consumption 
The purpose of the chapter is to locate the political consequences of opinion forming 
activities as they take place on social media platforms. Social media in relation to political 
communication has received much attention from the research community, and it is 
important to specify the kinds of engagement that are most relevant for this thesis. The 
most popular strands of research include those that focus on how social media can 
support behaviours associated with activism (e.g. Crivellaro et al., 2014; DiSalvo et al., 
2008) or how the platforms are being used to purposefully support formal politics (e.g. 
Tarta, 2014; Foth, Agudelo & Palleis, 2013). It is important to re-state that the focus of 
this project is the general public. Making strong assumptions about the types of spaces 
and discourses that are for gauging political engagement would become too limiting. 
While the focus on public Facebook pages for the empirical study already poses some 
serious limitations, it is important to at least consider a broad range of spaces, people, 
discourses and contexts within these limitations. Thus, theoretically this thesis aligns 
with previous research into everyday political talk, where the connection to real political 
effects can be more difficult to locate (Wright, Graham, Sun & Wang, 2016). The focus is 
on how people casually and sometimes randomly engage with political content and 
initiate discussion in their everyday lives. One of the primary motivations for this focus 
is the assumption that political talk, in any shape or form, serves as a cornerstone in 
democracy (Graham & Wright, 2014) and bestows vibrancy upon the public as such (Delli 
Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004, 321). Even casual conversation that is not politically framed 
can have political value (Kim & Kim, 2008). Social media have been viewed as being 
particularly good for increasing everyday engagement with politics compared to earlier 
where engagement may have been clearly defined, but also more sporadic (Highfield, 
2017). It implies a subtle Deweyian perspective, focusing on the cultivation of the 
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electorate rather than communication that leads to overt manifestations of power, such 
as protest actions. Political talk can provide a cognitive surplus that is only realized at a 
later point, such as in elections (Shirky, 2010).  
It is nearly impossible to suggest any direct link between very small, everyday acts of 
communication and actual political outcomes. Furthermore, scholars are usually hesitant 
about proposing normative criteria such as the triumph of one policy or party over 
another as a sign of a politically efficacious electorate. For this reason, the object of study 
is usually the development of individuals and their political engagement. Most studies are 
based on surveys and hypothesize correlations between the use of social media and 
political engagement measured as political interest (Bertot et al., 2012), political 
knowledge (Bode, 2015), political efficacy (Chan, 2016) or offline forms of political 
participation such as contacting local politicians and organizing protests (Kim et al., 
2016). Findings are mixed with a favourable edge towards positive links between using 
social media and being more politically engaged (See Boulianne, 2015 for review). 
Additionally, there is evidence sourced directly from social media and discussion forums 
where expression of interest and promotion of concrete political action develop out of 
spontaneous talk, the limitation here being that it is difficult to follow up and verify 
whether political effects linger with people after they leave the discussion (Graham, 
Jackson & Wright, 2016). Studying political participation accordingly suffers from the 
same problem mentioned several times already, namely a lack of concepts that denote 
online participation per se without relying on an offline mirroring effect (Vissers & Stole, 
2014).  
Central to the emphasis on everyday political engagement is the assumption that 
discussion spaces as well as people’s motivations are not necessarily geared towards 
politics. Visiting an online group dedicated to sharing parenting advice or browsing one’s 
social media news feed is not motivated by political goals, but the communication can 
quickly take a political turn (Wright, 2012, Linaa Jensen, 2014), and even cause 
‘accidental political mobilization’ (Hamilton & Tolbert, 2012). Graham, Jackson & Wright 
(2016) have even demonstrated how political talk in non-political online spaces has a 
tendency to be less polarized and uncivil, when compared to debates that are politically 
framed from the start. Political talk can easily occur, but the spaces themselves are not 
overtly political or encourage political discussion. They are often referred to as “third 
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spaces” (Ibid.). The occurrence of political engagement in non-political context ties in well 
with the notion mentioned earlier that primary pursuits on social media are personal and 
social. Thus, political engagement does not necessarily spring forth from identification 
with a specific ideology, party or political line, but from issues relating to the self and 
everyday experiences (Ibid.). 
For this thesis it is appropriate to conceive of everyday political engagement as 
happening around a piece a news that a person becomes exposed to which then 
potentially facilitates further engagement from inside that person’s network. Such a piece 
of news can be from a media organization, alternative media sites and bloggers or simply 
a personally relayed rumour. Social media has come to account for a large proportion of 
people’s exposure to news, both hard and soft (Boczkowski, 2018). A useful view of 
everyday political engagement in the context of news consumption is the OSROR model 
as presented by Chan (2016), which fits well with the curated flows framework explained 
in the last chapter. Political engagement potentially follows five steps: First is the initial 
orientation, which denotes the general boundary conditions for what kinds of 
information can be received such as general demographics (e.g. education, income, race 
and related socio-economic ,measures are all factors that influence what news people 
consume (Jung et al., 2011)). A more social media-specific description of initial 
orientation is by how people are embedded in interconnected networks (Thorson & 
Wells, 2016). Second is stimuli where a person encounters or is exposed to a certain piece 
of news, which can be either intentional or unintentional (Kim, Chen, & Gil de Zuniga, 
2013). Third comes reasoning which entails engaging with the news content, interpreting 
the message and maybe even commenting on it, which can be considered a more powerful 
act of reasoning vis-à-vis expression effects, as mentioned in previous chapter. The fourth 
step has to do with political efficacy, which signifies a change or reinforcement of an 
individual’s own opinion and perception of ability to participate in political discussion 
and activities (Delli Carpini, 2004), which often leads to the outcome that the person 
becomes more willing to engage with political content at a later time again (Beaumont, 
2010). Last is response where people choose to take more concrete action (e.g. starting 
petitions, protesting, contacting politicians, join political parties etc.). In many cases 
people might not get further than step one or two, but the five steps illustrates the 
potential trajectory that can be realized when news exposure is made possible. 
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News consumption in general has been positively linked to political participation (e.g. Gil 
de Zuniga et al., 2012), but sometimes only when mediated by conversation (Kim & Chen, 
2016) or expression effects (Chan, 2016). At this point it is worth re-highlighting the 
importance of expression effects as distinct from conversation effects. Conversation over 
political news in the traditional sense is of course still widespread (e.g. face-to-face, 
phone calls, instant messaging), but typically as one-to-one or one-to-few forms of 
communication. Most forms of many-to-many communication that occur in public social 
media settings do not support conversation in the traditional sense. Many studies claim 
that social media is better at information dissemination than facilitating conversation 
(Moe & Larsson, 2011; Brooker et al., 2015). And the users themselves do not even find 
social media to be suitable for engaging in real conversation (Seargeant & Tagg, 2019, 
47). 
Communication via comment threads and click interactions (i.e. likes on Facebook) has 
to viewed as something distinct from traditional forms of conversation and deliberation. 
Instead people’s sense of being part of a public relies on expression effects and the 
visibility afforded by the digital platforms as described in the earlier mentioned concepts 
of data publics and affective publics.  
 
Selective and Incidental Exposure 
Current and following sections will explore in detail the political consequences of the 
curation practices that affect the enactment of networked publics. In the arena of 
everyday politics facilitated by social media it is, as was noted in the previous chapter, 
flows of information through personal, social, strategic, journalistic and algorithmic 
curation practices centred on preference-based mechanisms that give form to the range 
of potential effects. The assumption is that individuals will consume information that 
reinforces current beliefs or nudge them in a direction that builds on existing feelings of 
a highly personal nature (Stroud, 2011; Stroud, 2017). The underlying danger is that 
public opinion will become guided by the consumption, sharing and discussion of 
information within networks that are increasingly homogenous making it difficult to find 
common grounds between political oppositions and leading to polarization in society. 
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This section takes the first step into the discussion about the concern that public opinion 
formation on social media generates political homophily and polarization by first 
considering how users become exposed to political information. The study of selective 
and incidental exposure has existed as a subfield within media studies for some time but 
is not always related to curation practices that are centred on political preferences. At the 
same time a separate area of research that focuses specifically on political homophily and 
polarization as a result of social and algorithmic biases has emerged within the last 
decade, which only occasionally considers the literature on selective and incidental 
exposure. This section provides a review of the most relevant findings related to selective 
and incidental exposure, and the following section will continue the discussion about 
curation practices centred on political preferences by reviewing the research related to 
the consequences of political homophily and polarization on social media. 
Initially, the rise of complex networks of information flow has prompted the narrative 
that online digital media lead to increased democratization and thus greater diversity of 
content (Benkler, 2006). The aggregate effect of curated flows and their different 
intersections do not produce a black and white picture, which is why a central topic in 
media research focuses on the dynamic between incidental and selective exposure. The 
former happens when people incidentally stumble upon information that they had not 
looked for or consciously expected to find (Frensch, 1998; Tewsbury et al., 2001), 
whereas the latter describes situations where people have sought to be confronted with 
certain kinds of information (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001; Gentzkow & 
Shapiro, 2011). The underlying assumption is that selective exposure provides 
information that aligns with an individual’s current opinions while incidental exposure 
typically has a higher probability of containing counter-attitudinal content. The potential 
for social media to foster both incidental and selective exposure is appropriately framed 
by Eady, Nager, Guess, Zilinsky & Tucker (2019) as respectively related to information 
supply and demand. The supply side is characterized by an abundance of diversity where 
dissonant viewpoints are encountered incidentally on a regular basis (Brundidge, 2010; 
Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), but is held in check by the demand side where preferred 
perspectives are easily selected and unwanted ones filtered out (Himelboim et al., 2013). 
Overall there is not one predominant trend in the literature. Greater opportunity to select 
and pre-select streams of information does not automatically entail less exposure to 
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other things (Webster, 2014; Beam, 2014; Flaxman, Goel & Rao, 2016). Some results have 
shown a propensity for selective exposure among most people (Garret & Stroud, 2014), 
while other studies have only demonstrated strong effects within small groups of 
partisans (Prior, 2013). At the same time, incidental exposure to diverse information does 
happen a lot on social media (Morgan, Shafiq & Lampe, 2013), and results have shown 
incidentally occurring information to have a larger presence in the daily lives of people 
who use social media compared to those who do not (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018). One 
potential explanation is that the media trend towards increased choice of content was 
already going strong before the popularization of the internet (Prior, 2007), and it is 
possible that while online digital media provides ever more self-selection the supply side 
is equally boosted resulting in higher net incidental exposure for people who use social 
media compared to those relying mostly on traditional mass media. One can easily 
imagine how choosing to be exposed to only a small selection of TV and radio channels 
might deliver much less incidental exposure than the networked information flows on 
social media, which might be attributed to evidence that people who use social media 
frequently have larger as well as more active and diverse networks (Barnidge, 2015). As 
mentioned earlier, within the full range of curated flows on social media, users only have 
partial control over their information environment. If someone watches an 
entertainment program, and turns off the television when it is finished, it is almost certain 
that no exposure to unsought political information will have occurred. However, on social 
media someone might log on just to write a quick personal message but end up seeing a 
lot of extra information in the news feed. This is backed up by reports that only 16% of 
users use social media primarily for finding political news, while 70% end up engaging 
with it (Thorson & Wells, 2016). Additionally, 60% of Facebook users say they encounter 
political news mostly by chance (Matsa & Lu, 2016). It is a bit more difficult to investigate 
the degree of attention that users pay to incidentally occurring information in their 
everyday lives, however it should be safe to assume that at least a minimal impression is 
elicited, sort of like commercials (Lu et al., 2018). Empirical experiments have also shown 
that people are able to recall incidentally occurring information (Lee & Kim, 2017), 
though the evidential strength is limited because it is obtained from a controlled 
environment.  
Selective and incidental exposure in the research literature is, respectively, often 
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associated with conscious choices about consumption of media content aligned with pre-
existing (political) attitudes and randomly stumbling upon counter-attitudinal 
information. However, it is important to remember that those two descriptions only 
account for half of the story. People can both consciously seek out messages that are 
aligned with pre-existing views and coincidentally stumble upon diverse perspectives as 
well as wilfully wanting counter-attitudinal content and accidentally consuming biased 
information. 
 
The Causes and Consequences of Political Similarity and Dissimilarity in 
Opinion Formation Processes 
Opinion diversity versus opinion homogeneity is front and centre on the research agenda 
for political communication on social media (Shah, McLeod, Rojas, Cho, Wagner, 
Friedland, 2017). With curated information flows being centred on political preferences, 
the main concern is that people become surrounded with politically homogenous 
information triggering greater polarization between groups in society (Colleoni, Rozza & 
Arvidsson, 2014). In this sense, polarization is often used to characterize two groups that 
are opposite each other and growing more extreme in their diverging opinions over an 
issue, and since societies have multiple issues, political polarization does not necessarily 
entail that all of society is being divided into just two camps, though this can still happen 
to some degree (Goel, Mason & Watts, 2010). Links between group homogeneity and 
polarization are often ascribed to people becoming angrier and more poorly informed 
over time (Lee, 2016) in part due to the fact that it prevents misinformation from being 
stopped or challenged (Read, 2016). Information networks that become very 
homogenous are often described as echo-chambers (Sunstein, 2018), meaning that the 
sharing of information and exchange of opinions happen only between actors in networks 
that are so tightly closed around themselves that they are simply echoing the same 
opinions, with which the whole group already agrees with, over and over without much 
new information being added. Such political polarization can cause different groups of 
people to have entirely different realities, which in turn limit the capacities for 
 77 
democratic problem-solving (Yeginsu, 2017). Indeed, polarization caused by social media 
has been blamed for preventing informed public opinion formation (Benton, 2016), 
which some scholars have linked it directly to populist victories in the last decade (Solon, 
2016; Viner, 2016). The concern at the extreme end of the scale is that continued 
polarization can undermine belief in democracy altogether (El-Bermawy, 2016).  
Indeed, evidence does suggest that politics are becoming increasingly contentious and 
polarized in democratic societies all over the world (Iyengar et al., 2012; Wendler, 2014; 
Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). The question then is how much of this trend can be attributed to 
social media and online digital media more broadly? Though, before getting into how 
previous research has attempted to answer that question, it is important to note that 
there are many aspects of polarization. First of all, the outcome of political 
communication can be any of three: polarization, de-polarization or homeostasis, 
meaning people move further apart, closer together or nothing much happens (Slater, 
2015). Furthermore, polarization and related outcomes have psychological, 
technological, social, empirical aspects, which are necessary to disentangle to be able to 
grasp the full spectrum of it. Most recent literature on the subject tends to ignore this or 
focus on just one aspect of polarization. This thesis will attempt to trace the different 
aspects of polarization (and de-polarization) through the different modes of coming 
across information that was briefly outlined at the end of the last section. Exposure and 
potential engagement with information can be both intentional and incidental, while the 
content itself can be aligned with pre-existing beliefs or be counter-attitudinal.  
Intentional selection of politically similar information occurs most obviously at the 
personal and social level when people consciously choose to connect to fewer actors or 
channels because they feel that only those few provide them with a resonant and singular 
message, or because others, including friends and family, are identified as the cause of 
cognitive dissonance in the form of stress, uneasiness or social ambiguity and are avoided 
as a result (Stroud, 2010). This avoidance of other people is of course linked to the idea 
of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) with the key difference that, on social 
media, instead of reacting with silence, people can make a greater effort to select and 
engage content outside of certain perceived hostile environments (Quercia & Crowcroft, 
2013). Some minority of people who are strongly partisan even view balanced content as 
harmful and will seek to avoid it altogether (Mcleod, Wise, Perryman, 2017). While 
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intentional selection, of course, is centred on personal and social curation, it is worth 
noting that journalistic and strategic curation also play a potential role. Politicians and 
journalist can seek to double down on people’s search for less ambiguous messages by 
appealing to more narrow and extreme audiences (Conboy & Eldridge, 2018). 
It is important to keep in mind that people are motivated to seek out and generally wish 
for more politically dissimilar information (Conover, Searing & Crewq, 2002)11. In fact 
most people by far claim that a balanced news diet is preferred to one that is only in line 
with pre-existing beliefs (Garret & Resnick, 2011), though news where the content is 
balanced is also preferred over messages that are directly counter-attitudinal (Feldman 
et al., 2013). Motivated reasoning theory argues that the intentional search for 
information is grounded in two types of motivation: validation and accuracy (Kunda, 
1990). The former describes the longing for information that can bring some certainty to 
one’s pre-existing views, while the latter is a search for information that can challenge 
one’s views and give a sense of being closer to some empirical truth. In this regard, 
balanced news might be the best to deliver way to deliver on both motivation fronts. Here 
it might be good to highlight previously mentioned weakness of the curated flows 
framework, which focuses mostly on exposure and distribution. A balanced news diet can 
be provided both by being exposed to equal amounts of news pieces with opposing 
viewpoints, but a single news piece can also have greater content diversity in itself 
(Bozdag et al., 2014). 
The unintentional selection of politically similar information might be the one that has 
received most attention in recent research on social media and polarization. Though this 
is rarely done in the literature, it is convenient to distinguish between the social 
psychological side of the issue related to personal and social curation and the 
technological one. The social psychological side of it is often attributed to an effect called 
confirmation bias, which is often used in a broad sense to describe people’s preference 
towards information that confirms their views (Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman 
(2012). However, it is worth emphasizing that the effect does not describe people’s 
intentional selection of content, but rather an unconscious predisposition to pay 
attention to and internalize information that is consistent with already existing 
 
11 A caveat with this sort of research is that respondents might be more likely to want to appear motivated 
to seek out politically diverse news even though their actual motivation to do so is significantly lower. 
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narratives about the world. It is an effect that unintentionally directs attention towards 
and retention of information. Coronel & Poulsen (2018) did several experiments in which 
the test subjects had to read, remember and then pass on information to other test 
subjects resulting in information being incrementally changed over several iterations 
until it better fitted the views that were considered more mainstream among the group. 
Thus, confirmation bias is best considered a social psychological effect at the unconscious 
level (Hendricks & Hansen, 2014). 
The technological side of the unintentional selection of politically similar information is 
primarily located at the level of algorithmic curation and has been most famously 
expressed as the tendency towards filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011; Pariser, 2015). As 
mentioned earlier, online digital media function as digital intermediaries and are 
sustained by algorithms that help users find and select information. Filter bubbles can 
happen when the main digital intermediaries (e.g. Google, Youtube, Facebook etc.) 
recursively curate information that people are more likely to find interesting, which, 
together with confirmation bias effects, can cause people to be trapped in bubbles of 
software filters (algorithms) that allow for less and less diverse information. The opaque 
algorithmic bias inherent in online digital media has become one of the main points of 
critique of social media as a less than ideal platform for democratic opinion exchanges 
(Gillespie, 2014) with filter bubbles potentially transforming into echo-chambers 
(Sunstein, 2018). However, a seminal study by Bakshy, Messing & Adamic (2015) showed 
personal curation and confirmation bias to be a stronger effect than algorithmic in 
determining exposure to political news on Facebook, though there are still limitations to 
their methods12. It is also worth keeping in mind that it is easier to blame a piece of 
technology than people and social structures (Seargant & Tagg, 2018, 42). A theoretical 
argument against filter bubbles as the predominant cause of echo-chambers is the 
previously mentioned notion that social media practices arise from the interplay between 
people and technological affordances. Thus, people start to form expectations about the 
algorithms that control their news feed and adjust their actions accordingly (Jones, 2015). 
This argument also has some empirical backing from evidence that shows a significant 
increase in how aware people are about algorithmic biases and their potential effects 
 
12 The researchers behind the study were at the time part of Facebook’s internal research unit, which is a 
cause for concern about potentially biased results. It is at least imaginable that Facebook would not want 
to publish research that would put their platform in a negative light. 
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(Dylko, 2016). 
Before moving on it seems appropriate to quickly reiterate the premise of algorithmic 
biases. At the basis level digital intermediaries, which are commercial companies, thrive 
on user activity, typically to generate more advertising revenue. For this reason, the 
sorting algorithm’s main responsibility is to show users types of content that they are 
most likely to respond positively to or engage with, thus encouraging them to stay longer 
on the site or return more frequently. Most research in political communication tends to 
focus on the part of the algorithm that makes selections based on previous user activity, 
meaning similar content or sources. However, Nikolov, Lalmas, Flammini & Menczer 
(2019) note that most search, filtering and news feed algorithms are also tuned to show 
content that is generally popular or ‘trending’. They consider algorithms to have both a 
homogeneity bias and a popularity bias. While all the major digital intermediaries 
(Google, Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Wikipedia etc.) deploy algorithms that have both 
biases, the results of their particular study then show that search engines such as Google 
have a stronger popularity bias with social media having a stronger homogeneity bias. 
The important point here is that attaining influence in networked communication on 
social media also depend on whether a message or its sender can create shock and awe 
with some mainstream appeal, akin to what has been referred to as sensationalism in 
mass media (Örnebring & Jönson, 2004). 
Last but not least, it is worth considering the unintentional selection of politically 
dissimilar information, which is often the implicit focus of studies of incidental exposure 
as laid out in the previous section. Studies of information dissimilarity and incidental 
exposure on social media tend to put emphasis on the level of social curation (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012). The opportunity to encounter diverse and politically dissimilar 
information is often attributed to the special role that weak social ties have on social 
media (Eady, Nagler, Guess, Zilinsky, Tucker, 2019, 19). People are generally made more 
aware of their weak ties on a day-to-day basis in a way that was much less prominent 
before social media (Kwon, Stefanone & Barnett, 2014). Of course, this means that the 
actual diversity of one’s social network can be a big factor in how politically dissimilar 
one’s exposure to information is, which is why network size and frequency of social media 
are strongly correlated with amount of incidental exposure (Bechmann & Nielbo, 2018). 
The importance of weak ties can be explained with the notion that social networks on 
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social media are often determined by people’s life trajectory rather than by their concrete 
political preferences (Seargant & Tagg, 2019). This resonates well with earlier mentions 
that people use social media primarily with personal and social goals in mind. This, 
however, still has an upper limit of exposure diversity because social networks tend to be 
more homogenous than perfectly random networks, so-called ‘superdiverse’ networks 
(Androutsopolous & Juffermans, 2014). Instead there is actually an observed trend for 
online and offline social networks to become increasingly isomorphic (Rojas, 2015). 
Some studies focus entirely on the social psychological effects of social media, namely as 
an enhancer of known dysfunctional social dynamics (e.g. Hendricks & Hansen, 2014), 
while some consider mostly the technological aspects related to algorithmic biases and 
filter bubbles (e.g. Bozdah, 2013). Although, on the whole, most research, implicitly or 
explicitly, combines both psychological and technological aspects in their study of 
preference-based curation and political polarization, which has so far produced mixed 
findings. There have been large-scale Big Data studies showing clear tendencies for 
polarization (e.g. Barberá, 2015; Mocanu, Rossi, Zhang, Karsai, & Quattrociocchi, 2015; 
Schmidt et al., 2017) as well as those that show only limited polarization effects and 
overall much more diverse large-scale behavioural outcomes (e.g. Barberá, 2014; Bakshy, 
Messing & Adamic, 2015). The story is the same with qualitative studies where some 
show that users are much more likely to share, read and remember news messages with 
which they already agree (e.g. An, Quercia, Cha, Gummadi & Crowcroft, 2013; Grevet, 
Terveen & Gilbert, 2014), while other studies reveal relatively high willingness among 
users to consume and engage with news that are diverse and even counter-attitudinal 
(e.g Semaan, Robertson, Douglas, & Maruyama, 2014), especially when conditioned by 
how the content is presented (Graells-Garrido, Lalmas & Baeza-Yates, 2015).  
The great quantity of studies into political polarization on social media, which have 
produced mostly mixed findings, have led some scholars to conclude that a total schism 
between, on one side, rife polarization, filter bubbles and dangerous echo-chambers, and 
diverse, politically productive networks on the other, might not be the best; instead more 
precise conceptualizations of polarization and de-polarization are needed (Haewoon 
Kwak, Posegga, Jungherr, 2019). This thesis will thus follow the same line of thinking, 
namely that social media can initiate and promote increased exposure to both similar and 
dissimilar news, also with the possibility of being both intentional and unintentional. This 
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is not to dismiss effects such as filter bubbles and echo-chambers. They should both be 
considered real, highly relevant consequences of social media use. However, it is not hard 
to imagine, that they can happen under some set of specific circumstances, while not 
being able to manifest in other situations. Some studies, for example, report budding 
echo-chambers as a kind of local effect within an ecosystem that is largely diverse (Eady, 
Nagler, Guess, Zilinsky, Tucker, 2019). Research from the United States has also 
suggested that polarization does not happen uniformly across the political left-right 
spectrum, although the results are disjoint with one study blaming right-wing 
conservatives for being the main drivers of political polarization (Parker & Baretto, 2014) 
and another study pointing to left-wing liberals as less open-minded in relation to 
exposure and discussion online (Beam, Hutchens & Hmielowski, 2018). 
This project seeks to focus the automatic measuring of public opinion on effects related 
to political homogeneity/heterogeneity and polarization/de-polarization. This is both to 
map potential polarization processes in the public on social media, but also to 
demonstrate the usefulness of tools that can make effects of political homophily and 
polarization more transparent as the opinion formation process is occurring, thus 
combating some of the obscurity that indeterminate combinations of curation biases have 
brought to public opinion as it takes form on social media. This is radically different from 
most previous attempts to automatically measure public opinion on social media that 
often focus on predicting poll results (Jungherr, 2016) or estimating what the public 
thinks about a topic using simple measures such as aggregated positive versus negative 
sentiment (Cody, Reagan, Dodds & Danforth, 2016). The next section will extend the 
discussion of political polarization to cases that focus on critical reception and 
discussions about politically disagreeing content rather than just the finding, sharing of 
information, which has been the main focus in the last two sections. 
 
Political Disagreement Beyond Exposure 
The previous section gave an account on a central topic in political communication on 
social media, namely political polarization, which is viewed as potentially detrimental to 
democracy. Most of the research mentioned focused on effects pertaining to exposure to 
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politically similar or dissimilar information with the aggregate of results not showing a 
clear tendency toward polarization or de-polarization as a result of such exposure. Even 
though information exposure in curated network flows is already a complicated matter, 
there is at least another level of complexity that should be acknowledged, which is that 
individuals have different predispositions and motivations that result in different types 
of engagement, interaction and discussions. This goes back to a classic notion in reception 
studies, namely that the way content is presented (its encoding) in conjunction with the 
cultural and political predilections of the receivers which influence the way a message is 
comprehended (its decoding) determines the actual effect of the media content (Hall, 
2001). Three outcomes are possible: 1) the dominant-hegemonic code where the receiver 
sees the message as congruent with previous narratives; 2) the oppositional code where 
the message is largely rejected; and 3) the negotiated code where the receiver accepts 
parts of the message even if it runs counter to his/her current attitudes. Theoretically, 
only the negotiated code can result in de-polarization. 
A lot of studies, many of them mentioned in the previous section, simply consider 
exposure to politically similar or dissimilar information to be both the cause and 
indicator of either polarization or de-polarization. And the overall correlation between 
very homogenous networks of curated information flows and the development of more 
extreme views should be considered real and problematic. Though, how people actually 
react and reflect on exposure individually is not so straightforward. Mutz (2002; 2006), 
which are two of the most cited works on the topic of people’s engagement with politically 
similar/dissimilar information and disagreement, lay out both positive and negative 
consequences. Firstly, increased exposure to and engagement with politically similar 
content might embolden people to participate more in political discourse and identify 
their democratic duty (Ibid.), which is often, among many scholars of political 
communication (e.g. Dahlgren, 2009), considered an important achievement in the fight 
against cynicism and apathy. Increased communication with like-minded others 
promotes trust (Lewandowski et al., 2012) and can cause mobilization and unity among 
people (Obar, Zube & Lampe, 2012). Tight networks of reinforcing opinions have been 
referred to as sorts of ‘safe spaces’ for fostering political action (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 
2002). This suggests that maybe some common ground needs to be found among a 
collection of people for momentary connectedness, which is emblematic of social media, 
 84 
as was mentioned in the previous chapter, to morph into something that has a lasting 
effect.  
Secondly, and likewise, engagement with dissimilar information and disagreement can 
lead to both positive and negative outcomes. Exposure to and awareness of opposing 
views has the power to increase political tolerance (Mutz, 2006; Garret & Resnick, 2011) 
and can in some cases help people to think more deeply about previously held ideas 
(Price, Capella, & Nir 2002). However, exposure to opposing views can just as likely make 
people more confused and ambivalent about their opinions with the result of further 
detachment from politics (Mutz, 2006). Depending on the framing of the content, 
exposure to politically dissimilar views can be a great source of frustration for people 
(Smith, 2017). People might also choose to engage with counter-attitudinal content with 
the explicit intention of mocking it (Jae Min & Wohn, 2018). Findings have shown both 
negative (Nir, 2005; Mutz, 2006; Lu, Heatherly & Lee, 2016) and positive (Taber & Lodge, 
2006; Hogan, 2010; Iyengar, 2012) relationships between engagement with politically 
dissimilar information and political participation, which is a further attestation to the 
complicated nature of political consequences of social media use.  
Engagement with politically dissimilar information is of course not a uniform experience; 
specifically nuances in content and people’s identity may play a role. It is possible to 
distinguish between two dimensions of political difference: opinion and partisan. The 
former, opinion-based difference, has already been touched upon in relation to 
confirmation bias. It has roots in cognitive dissonance theory, which suggest that a piece 
of information can cause more or less dissonance with the receiver depending on how 
much the message differ from prior beliefs and attitudes (Festinger, 1957). A message 
might be rejected if it falls completely outside a person’s ‘latitude of acceptance’ (Sherif 
& Hovland, 1961). Partisan based difference on the other hand might have less to do with 
the content itself and instead depend on the source of information and social cues 
pertaining to the sender. Social identity theory suggests that only a few social cues are 
necessary in order for someone to place another person into a political out-group, which 
can have a large impact on the perception of further communication (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Tajfel, 1982). There are few non-verbal cues (e.g. body language) in online 
communication, but language, timing, cultural markers as well as cues about 
relationships and political affiliation are all important aspects of meta-communication 
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(Walther, 2011). It is worth recognizing that social media have increased the availability 
of social cues compared to anonymous message boards of the kind that were more 
common in the early days of the internet (Antheunis, Valkenburg & Peter, 2010). Since 
social cues heighten and direct attention when individuals are deciphering information 
(Westerman et al. 2008), it can be assumed that social media provoke extra strong effects 
compared to other public spaces on the internet. This however does not solve the 
conundrum that engagement with similar and dissimilar information can have both 
positive and negative consequences. 
Some solutions have been offered by looking into the details of the content and context 
of opinion exchanges. The way a message is constructed, both in terms of social cues and 
other discursive features, can lead to affective polarization. Language choices that make 
a message overly negative or offensive are more likely to be met with an equally negative 
response (Kaplan & Anderson, 1973). Similarly, with social cues; negative and polarizing 
responses are sometimes motivated by purely partisan reasons meaning people dislike 
opinions for no reason than that they belong to the ‘other side’ (Abramowitz, 2010; 
Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012). All things considered we cannot expect exposure to 
politically dissimilar information or even heterogeneous interaction to cause de-
polarization. Sometimes viewing counter-attitudinal opinions might even cause an 
increase in polarization (Bail et al., 2018; Theocharis et al., 2016).  
One of the most popular suggestions for communication that mitigates affective 
polarization is to have content that is balanced, consensus-oriented and civil; all three 
often go hand in hand (Gastil, 2000). Arguments that are civil are considered to be more 
convincing (Ng & Detenber, 2005) and experimental evidence suggests that civility is a 
powerful factor in having people be more open to political dissimilarity (Gil de Zuniga, 
Barnidge, Diehl, 2018), while incivility very often leads to continuous increase of 
polarization (Anderson et al., 2014). It is still worth noting though, that, akin to how 
communication with like-minded others can foster unity, trust and increased political 
participation; incivility and anger can stimulate participation and bring people together 
(Valentino et al., 2011; Borah, 2014). Similar to civility in messages, effects pertaining to 
openness to political dissimilarity have been observed in regard to messages that strive 
to be balanced and consensus-oriented (Babaei et al., 2018). In relation to social cues 
there is evidence that while people most often prefer strangers who are politically 
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similar, such preference can be highly context dependent. Morey & Boukes (2018) show 
how people’s actual preferences for discussion partners change based on the context (e.g. 
the topic of discussion). When people do not know the political stance of the people they 
are engaging with, they are likely to prefer discussion groups that consist of people from 
different parts of the political spectrum over those that are completely homogenous 
when considering a range of different contexts.  
The literature presented in this chapter should urge us to re-ask the question: “What kind 
of political engagement is actually good for democracy?” There is a good case against 
political polarization, especially if continuous communication leads to the formation of 
echo-chambers. However, at the same time many of the causes of polarization, such as 
communication in homogenous networks, affects and even incivility, also help to foster 
the political engagement necessary for people to actually realize their democratic 
identity. Research continues to claim that more knowledge is needed before answering 
such a question becomes possible (e.g. Neo, 2019, 152).  
 
Patterns of Polarization and De-polarization in Networked Data Publics 
The theoretical framework presented in the first three chapters has served to show how 
public opinion on social media holds certain novel possibilities based on their potential 
for combining characteristics relating to aggregation versus voice, agonism versus 
consensus and ignorance versus engagement. The actual formation of public opinion 
depends on how the information flow is affected by strategic, journalistic, personal, social 
and algorithmic biases centred on the political preferences of individual users. The 
consequences that such preference-centred curated flows have on political engagement 
and knowledge in the public are fairly complex and context dependent, however the main 
concern in most of the current literature tends to be the negative effects that increased 
political homophily and polarization have on public opinion. The purpose of the 
remaining chapters is to explain the Big Data-oriented methods that have been developed 
for this project to measure manifestations of public opinion in these curated information 
flows with respect political homophily and polarization. The purpose is two-fold: 1) 
measuring the prevalence of homophily and polarization across the Danish public on 
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Facebook and 2) using the results to discuss how Big Data and automatic computational 
methods can be used to take advantage of the potential configurations of the public 
offered by social media (i.e. configurations of aggregation versus voice, agonism versus 
consensus and ignorance versus engagement) in order to make the opinion process more 
transparent and visible for the users, as exemplified in concepts such as the data public. 
This section will briefly summarize some of the key points in the theoretical framework 
and present the empirical point of departure. 
Returning to the evolution of different concepts of the public in response to changes in 
media and society traced in the two first chapters, the triaxial model can be used to 
highlight some of the prime characteristics of social media engendered manifestations of 
the public. Social media allows for new ways of communicating and being together in 
public, which by extension brings about new modes of being part of a public. The most 
outstanding change is the mixing and recombination of voice, aggregation, consensus, 
agonism, engagement and ignorance that have become possible with online digital media 
in general. With mass democracy and mass media the dominant view became that of a 
representative parliament, a formal public, connected to the wider informal public, via 
the free press. Each, respectively, on opposite ends of the engagement – ignorance 
continuum. Searching for ways that would let the public gain expression, the pre-online 
era was dominated by ideas of polled publics and mini-publics, each respectively on 
opposite ends of the aggregation – voice continuum. As has already been touched upon, 
more recent concepts of the public, such as data publics, allows for more middle positions 
in the triaxial model. 
While the triaxial model oversimplifies many concepts related to the public, it is useful to 
focus the discussion around its the three axes. Social media most notably offers a bridging 
of the gap between aggregation and voice. This was illustrated through the concepts of 
affective publics and data publics that highlight how the expression of sentiments and 
opinions gain a special status vis-à-vis the digital traces that are left behind by users. The 
public interaction process itself becomes datafied and thereby potentially aggregated and 
visualized (e.g. showing number of likes and comments to a Facebook post on the post). 
Ways of engaging with political matters and expressing opinions on social media are 
much less restricted than in opinion surveys, but can still be counted, measured and 
summed up (of course with some loss of complexity). Viral tweets, trending hashtags, 
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Facebook groups and posts that receive thousands of likes, these are all examples of how 
the micro-actions of individuals become a visible public through the aggregation and 
visualization of digital traces (Milan, 2017, 5). This thesis will argue that the potential of 
mixing voice and aggregation in digital manifestations of the public has not been fully 
realized.  
Looking at the primary characteristics of social media publics, they seem to be slightly in 
favour of ignorance and agonism. While social media can most certainly be used as an 
instrument by highly engaged individuals and organizations to garner attention and raise 
awareness, the wider, networked public often use it in ways that are emblematic of 
momentary connectedness (Rathnayake & Suthers, 2018) and imagined audiences (Litt, 
2012) rather than continuous debate and sustained communities. Again, it is important 
to stress that ignorance is not a negative term here. There is great power in allowing many 
people to participate in political activities without demanding much engagement from 
any single person, which has been demonstrated by Bennett & Segerberg (2013) in 
developing the concept of personal action frames. The loosely organized and potentially 
spontaneous coming together of people seems best directed by narratives of affect and 
political grievances.  As such, the collective power attributed to the quick and effortless 
forming of ad-hoc issue publics on social media, however liminal, is most in line with that 
of an agonistic public to which lending room to unheard voices and showing discontent 
with dominant ideas or governments is the prime resolve (Papacharissi, 2016). And to 
reiterate, agonism is not preferred over consensus or vice versa, instead each have their 
own advantages and disadvantages as was shown in Table 1.0 in chapter 1. 
The practical consequences for social media publics with a potential for both voice and 
aggregation as well as a tendency towards agonism and ignorance can be further 
illuminated by including insights from media effects research.  The concept of a 
networked public does well in suggesting that publics are called into being through cross-
cutting networks, which implies that information flow is networked. The networked 
information flow on a macro level can be explained with curation logics that include 
strategic, journalistic, personal, social and algorithmic curation (Thorson & Wells, 2015). 
Curation logics, in the context of political communication, are centred on the political 
preferences of social media users, which should then also be considered relevant for the 
formation of publics. Curated flows of information in social media networks connect the 
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individual to the collective. They are a significant influence on how publics form and who 
ends up participating, especially when dealing with short-lived ad-hoc publics such as 
those that form around a single hashtag or Facebook post. If we assume that the 
formation of publics on social media favours agonism over consensus and ignorance over 
engagement, how this relates to information flows and users’ political preferences then 
becomes the main issue for how opinions form on social media. From this it does seem to 
make sense that political polarization, increased social and political homogeneity and the 
potential spread of misinformation are high on the social media research agenda, at least 
at the time of writing. It matches the disadvantages of agonism and ignorance in terms of 
the public being pulled apart into more extreme political positions each contesting the 
other with some potentially being misled or only aware of one side of an issue. The 
argument here is not that agonistic politics or concerns over political engagement among 
citizens in an evolving media landscape is anything new, but rather that these tendencies 
are being shaped by the networked logics of social media of which users possess means 
of consuming content and expressing their opinion in ways that didn’t exist before online 
digital media. 
The concepts in the triaxial model do not have normative predispositions and whatever 
disadvantages a certain manifestation of the public might have; they can potentially be 
countered by its advantages. However, they are still only theoretical framings of the 
general conditions for different manifestations of the public, whereas opinion formation 
in practice can be influenced by such advantages and disadvantages to varying degrees. 
If people feel disillusioned or indifferent after expressing their opinion or interacting with 
other users on social media, then the advantage that it was easy for them to participate 
and add their voice to the public is not really felt. It must be possible to trace a positive 
outcome of people participating in public opinion formation. 
Recent research has shown very mixed results when it comes to social media use and 
political engagement, though there is a slight tendency towards a positive correlation 
between the two. Studies related to whether people are becoming politically polarized 
strikes a similar note in that quantitative and qualitative studies have presented evidence 
for both polarization and de-polarization. However, with respect to exposure to and 
interactions between politically dissimilar groups of people, polarization is a complex 
matter. From the material presented in this chapter we can narrow it down to two overall 
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aspects of polarization: 1) polarization as a consequence of networks and communities 
becoming increasingly homogenous and closed off such as in the example of the echo 
chamber, and 2) polarization as the reinforcement of previously held views or 
development of more extreme opinions as a result of exposure to or interaction with 
people with opposing views. To further complicate the issue polarization cannot be 
considered a de facto negative phenomenon. Increased homogeneity and reinforcement 
of previously held views can be considered important elements in political mobilization 
and development of people’s political identity, where even incivility and anger can play 
positive roles, whereas de-polarization can lead to ambivalence and detachment from 
politics.  
Following these perspectives on polarization it is the argument of this thesis that the 
triaxial model can be useful for managing the complexities involved in framing 
manifestations of the public on social media. From the agonism standpoint on democracy 
it is entirely possible that we actually do want a certain level of polarization to exist in 
societies. Strong political identities are necessary for the masses to be able to support a 
coherent hegemonic bloc (Mouffe, 2005). In a similar vein with ignorance and 
engagement, the liminal properties of short-lived and ever-changing networked publics 
that are rife on social media can appear to have little political value, however the ease 
with which they can form can outweigh this dubiety. As Zuckerman writes qua low-
engagement aspects of democracies: “it is not supposed to be hard to vote.” (2014, 158). 
The fact that a lot of research shows positive correlations between social media use and 
political engagement adds further support to the significant advantages that low-entry 
participation holds. 
While the triaxial model might seem to help manage the complexities involved with social 
media publics it also obscures a suitable point of entry for critiquing the function of the 
public. It remains difficult to assess the democratic value of the public on social media 
since there are so many potential advantages and disadvantages to different 
manifestations of the public. This thesis argues that it is important to retain this 
complexity and not make a final judgement call on which characteristics are most 
important for the function of the public. The results presented in the later chapters are 
relevant independently from what one would consider the most appealing outcomes of 
opinion formation on social media. However, since the motivation for this project was not 
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born in a vacuum; this thesis will consider a provisional point of entry for critiquing the 
function of the public on social media, which is explained in the following paragraph. 
This thesis takes its cue from the public deliberation tradition and Bohman (2000), who 
has, among other things, studied the potential for solving seemingly unsolvable dilemmas 
through democratic means. At the core of his creed is the idea of dialogue. The public can 
contain disagreement, polarization, radical ideas, peculiar voices and powerful emotions, 
but without any dialogue democratic cooperation is unlikely to go on (Ibid., 42). Dialogue 
supposes that people are not just throwing words at each other but listening and 
responding as well. This basic notion can also be found with Mouffe (2000) for whom the 
clash between different political positions lies at the heart of democracy. She stresses the 
importance of not viewing the political other as an enemy, but an adversary with whom 
ongoing communication is necessary to sustain an informed democratic society (Ibid., 
101-102). From this we can make the provisional assumption that too much polarization 
can be detrimental to democracy since if people are completely isolated in echo-
chambers, or not willing to take the opinions of the other side seriously in any capacity, 
dialogue cannot occur. A more generalized version of this assumption would simply be 
that any extreme case of either polarization or de-polarization should be considered 
problematic. Furthermore, while overall polarization contains both advantages and 
disadvantages, the digital traces of the data public can theoretically be used to make 
public participation, whether it be causing polarization or de-polarization, more 
transparent for the public itself. This is the idea of the previously mentioned concept, data 
agency. It is the argument of this thesis that by taking full advantage of the combination 
between voice and aggregation made possible by online digital media and using it to make 
the communication between different political positions more transparent, it becomes 
possible to promote engagement and knowledge for those parts of the social media public 
that do not feel confident in personally seeking out information inductively and alleviate 
some polarization by promoting consensus in publics that are dominated by agonism.  
 
Empirical point of departure 
The purpose of this thesis is to create and test methods to evaluate trends of public 
opinion formation on social media in democratic societies. The methods are best 
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described as Big Data-oriented computational methods and while a little bit of manual 
data preparation is necessary, the overall framework that they are built around can be 
coupled directly to the data stream. As such the methods can be automized and the results 
can potentially be fed back to the public as opinion formation is taking place. 
The methods are supposed to capture a significant part of public discussion on social 
media; specifically, the focus will be on public pages on Facebook. In the grand scheme of 
things, public Facebook pages represents only a fraction of opinion formation across all 
avenues of online digital media, however for some countries, especially Denmark, they 
do cut across many sectors and can at least be representative of some general trends 
within the public. The methods and ideas behind them, which will be explained in detail 
in the next chapter, can theoretically be expanded to other platforms such as Twitter, but 
for obvious reasons such as lack of time and resources, not to mention computing power, 
public Facebook pages will be the only empirical focus of this thesis. 
The methods are designed to pinpoint individual discussions and measure the amount of 
political agreement and disagreement with respect to political homophily and 
polarization. Thus, the methods can be used as a tool to find patterns and uncover certain 
qualities pertaining to a specific debate and the direction it is taking with respect to how 
politically homogenous the group of participants is and how much cross-cutting 
agreement it produces. However, since the focus of this thesis is on public opinion 
formation in general and not a specific political group, debate or topic, the testing of the 
methods will focus on the very broad trends vis-à-vis political agreement/disagreement 
and polarization/depolarization across various publics. 
This study will depart from previous research by framing cross-cutting agreement and 
potential polarization in a way that is centred on people’s political alignment with 
concrete party politics of a given nation state, but still allowing some flexibility and 
accounting for more complexity than most previous studies. This is accomplished in 
numerous ways. Previous approaches that use computational frameworks for studying 
polarization and cross-cutting agreement can most often be divided into two categories. 
The first include studies that try to retain a lot of complexity in the formation of publics, 
which can result in mappings of all social media interactions within a country (e.g. Bruns 
et al., 2016) or network analyses that compares clusters of users based on all the pages 
 93 
they have visited (Schmidt et al., 2017) or all the links they have shared (Bechmann & 
Nielbo, 2018). One of the weaknesses of this approach is that the results can quickly 
become too abstract to deliver insights on concrete political opinions. This is the case 
with Schmidt et al. (2017), which concludes that political polarization in the form of 
increased homophily is likely amplified by social media because most users tend to visit 
only a small subset of pages. Not all pages have the same political significance though. 
User activity in neutral spaces that have a high degree of political diversity is very 
different from user activity on highly politicized pages. The second types of studies are 
those that consider the political standpoint of users but limited to a binary split. This most 
prominently include studies of the bipartisan US public (e.g. Lock & Gelman, 2010), but 
also those that simply reduce political alignment to either right-wing or left-wing (e.g. 
Conover et al., 2011). Reducing political positions to binaries can be useful to highlight 
specific trends, however the framework created in this thesis has multi-party dynamics 
as the basis of the method. Thus, the political position of a given user can always be 
understood in relation to one or more political parties and not just a right-wing/left-wing 
construct. 
Most previous research, even those studies that apply Big Data approaches, are often 
confined to a single case, topic or point in time (e.g. Bossetta, Segesten & Trenz, 2018) or 
they consider only single, fixed instances of political discussions, such as comparing 
retweets and replies on Twitter (e.g. Bruns, 2019). This thesis departs from previous 
research by including a longitudinal perspective that takes into account how polarization 
evolves over time. It also seeks to account for the fact that cross-cutting agreement can 
have different configurations depending on how a given discussion is progressing. If 
users are initially split by a political issue but can reach some agreement through the 
exchange of opinions, then that is different from cases where no agreement is reached at 
all. Thus, this thesis seeks to account for multiple steps in the flow of a single discussion 
around a public Facebook post. 
Concretely, political polarization/de-polarization will be considered in two forms: either 
as an increase in political homogeneity, vis-à-vis less communication between people 
with opposing political positions, or as a heavy disagreement between politically 
dissimilar groups. Disagreement/agreement incorporates both how polarized users are 
in their initial response to a Facebook posts as well as how much agreement reach across 
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political oppositions, which can be abbreviated as cross-cutting agreement. 
Based on the literature presented in the previous sections of this chapter, this thesis 
proposes the following hypotheses to guide the analysis: 
 
- H1-A. Public Facebook pages will become increasingly homogenous over time, 
year by year, thus political homophily will see an increase. 
 
- H1-B. Cross-cutting agreement will decrease over time. 
 
- H2-A. Political homophily will increase from the beginning to the end of a single 
discussion. 
 
- H2-B. Cross-cutting agreement will decrease from the beginning to the end of a 
single discussion. 
 
- H3-A. Political homophily will be unequally distributed across different spaces 
and topics of discussion as well as combinations hereof. 
 
- H3-B. Cross-cutting agreement will be unequally distributed across different 
spaces and topics of discussion as well as combinations hereof. 
 
- H4-A. Political homophily will be positively correlated with incivility and angry 
emotional responses. 
 
- H4-B. Cross-cutting agreement will be negatively correlated with incivility. 
 
 
Multiple steps are necessary in order to accomplish the analysis sought by this thesis. 
Firstly, a method needs to be developed that can, with reasonable accuracy, predict the 
political position of individual users who participate in discussions on public Facebook 
posts. Secondly, an efficient calculation that can evaluate the level of political 
homogeneity and cross-cutting agreement based on the political position of all users 
during multiple steps of a public post discussion needs to be developed and tested. 
Thirdly, additional information has to be added that allows for dividing posts into 
different categories corresponding to the type of page it is posted on, the topic of the 
content (e.g. Economy or Gender Equality) and the quality of the text (i.e. the amount of 
incivility in comments by users). The following chapter will explain the general 
methodology behind the techniques developed for this study, whereas chapter 5, 6 and 7 
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will cover the three steps just mentioned. 
An important contribution this thesis seeks to make is to propose a computational 
framework that is more deeply rooted in media theory and public sphere theory, which 
is something rarely done in the field of computational social science (Freelon, 2014). By 
relating the results of the study to the theoretical framework presented in the previous 
chapters, it is the hope of this thesis that knowledge can be added to new directions for 
research of public opinion on social media.   
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Chapter 4. Methodology and Data 
 
Big Data and Computational Methods 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop and test methods for examining behavioural 
trends pertaining to public opinion formation on social media with respect to political 
homophily and polarization. The methodology does not revolve around any particular 
established methods but employs a range of different techniques to find and analyse 
patterns in large-scale data. Drawing on and recombining different techniques, as is done 
for this project, should not be confused with a mixed methods approach. The 
methodological focus of this study is on quantitative data analysis aside from a few 
illustrative examples. At the time of writing there no single methodological framework 
exists that could describe the set of methods as they are used together in this study, 
however the overall approach is oriented towards Big Data and computational methods. 
Big Data has become a methodological point of discussion because of the availability of 
large amounts of data across many fields of research. Scientific domains such as 
astrophysics have long relied on huge, multi-facetted data sets (Kithin, 2013). Terms such 
as Big Data and computational methods in the context of research methodologies, are 
born out of the ‘computational turn’ in the social sciences (Berry, 2011), which is in large 
part due to the proliferation of the internet and ubiquity of digital devices. However, it is 
important to mention that computational methods are attributable to a certain way of 
approaching empirical data and are not a bound by data types or technical equipment. 
For example, the development of software such as NVivo, STATA and SPSS have increased 
the precision and ease with which researchers engage with interview and survey data, 
however such techniques do not fall under the category of computational methods. The 
same can be said about Big Data. Some engineers might simply consider Big Data to be 
stored collections of information that correspond to x-number of rows in a database or 
bytes on a hard drive (Tsvetovat & Kouznetsov, 2012, 151). However, in the context of 
research methodologies Big Data can be characterized by other traits such as granularity 
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and exhaustivity while not taking up more than 10MB of storage space (Kitchin, 2013). 
And vice versa, data collections that consist of millions of observations with hundreds of 
features such as national censuses, which have been carried out in many Western 
countries for more than 150 years, would normally not be considered Big Data (Dalton, 
2016). The next section will go into detail about the methodological implications of Big 
Data-based research and computational methods. Since Big Data is almost always used in 
conjunction with computational methods they will be referred to as Big Data methods 
from this point on. 
 
Paradigm, Implications and Techniques 
This section will briefly present some of the popular definitions for Big Data and discuss 
the main impacts that Big Data has had on research design as well as potential pitfalls. 
Big Data methods do not have a clearly defined set of procedures or rules and there are 
not yet any common frameworks that can be directly applied to a certain kind of dataset 
(Mayer-Schoenberger & Cuckier, 2013), though some techniques are seen more often 
than others. Statistical techniques that were developed many years ago are still 
applicable to Big Data, and Big Data does not break with basic scientific principles. 
However, within the last decade Big Data has often been discussed as a new paradigm in 
empirical science in terms of data types, sources and epistemological implications. An 
often-cited instigator of the larger discussion about Big Data is Chris Anderson’s short 
blog post for Wired Magazine in 2008, in which he announced, ‘the end of theory’. The 
claim is that as data collections become very large and multifaceted the explanatory and 
predictive power of patterns extracted from the data will make all theoretically motivated 
models obsolete. While such a naïve claim is easily refuted in a number of ways, it does 
highlight what lies at the heart of the Big Data discussion, which is whether Big Data 
methods allow for entirely new ways of extracting knowledge (Schroeder, 2014). 
Whether Big Data constitutes an entirely new scientific paradigm or not lies outside the 
scope of this thesis, but the fact that the question is even asked suggests that at least some 
novel methodological phenomena have come about. 
One of the most famous definitions of Big Data is that data has to have a high degree of 
volume, velocity and variety. This definition did not originate in the academic world but 
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was adapted from an old report from 2001 by the consultancy company META Group and 
later promoted at a conference held by the company Gartner in 2012. It has become a 
commonly used definition and has later been adapted into a more rigorous framework 
by Kitchin (2014b), to which he also added five additional criteria: Exhaustivity, 
Resolution, Indexicality, Relationality and Flexibility. To start from the top, Big Data should 
be large in volume although this criterion can be difficult to use in practice since ‘large’ is 
highly context dependent (Lagoze, 2014). It implements high velocity being continuously 
accessible in near real-time, which is typical of data streams arising from mobile device 
sensors and social media APIs where data is constantly produced and pushed through 
digital channels. There is much variety such that every single data point, each 
observation, has many recorded features (e.g. measurements, timestamps, geo-location, 
categories, colour codes etc.). Data is also exhaustive, which in many ways can be 
considered a more precise definition of volume. Instead of insisting that data should have 
a large absolute volume, it should rather be exhaustive relative to the object of study. 
Thus, if your object of study is itself small, then your data volume can be small but still 
exhaustive meaning it contains every single relevant data point. This is what Mayer-
Schoenberger & Cuckier (2013) calls ‘N=all’, which, in simple terms, signals a move away 
from the sampling procedures that have been emblematic of scientific studies in the 20th 
century. Instead of taking a data sample you simply look at the data in its entirety. 
Exhaustivity is then often linked with Kitchin’s fifth and sixth criteria of resolution and 
indexicality where Big Data strives to have as many data points as possible, even if the 
object of study is small, and have every point be uniquely indexical. This automatically 
provides high resolution which allows researchers to study broad trends while at the 
same time having the opportunity to ‘zoom in’ on very specific subsections of the data 
(Bornakke & Due, 2018). In extension Big Data must have a high degree of relationality 
and flexibility, which implies that all data points should be easily connected to each other, 
or potentially to external data collections, and be flexible in the sense that a data 
collection is not dependent on having a fixed number of rows, but can be cleanly 
expanded or shrunk. As a final point it is worth mentioning that Kitchin does not claim 
that all criteria must be met in order for data to be Big Data. Instead Big Data is being used 
in situations where the data at hand naturally fit at least a number of the criteria, but not 
necessarily all of them (Kitchin, 2014, 6). 
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With those being the overall characteristics of Big Data, what then are the implications 
for the development of research methods? Before approaching this question, it is critical 
to mention the typical sources and enablers of Big Data. Without going into too much 
detail, the proliferation of Big Data in social science is largely due to a huge expansion and 
availability of online records of behaviour and sensor technologies13 with the former 
being most relevant for this thesis (see Kitchin, 2014 for a detailed list). Data about what 
people search for, what they say, when they do it, to whom and with whom they do it and 
where they are when they do it can be sourced directly from online platforms without 
asking each single person to be part of a study. This of course poses some ethical 
questions that will be addressed at the end of this chapter. For now, the use of online 
records of behaviour introduces a significant shift in social science from created data, 
which consists of designing surveys and interviews, finding participants and getting 
responses, to found data (Jensen, 2013) or exhaust data, as it is sometimes referred to 
(Amen & Clark, 2018), where the data of interest are technically mere by-products or 
digital traces of people’s behaviour. 
This has important methodological implications for how data is used. First, since data is 
not created with a specific research purpose it is messier to deal with, which is also a 
consequence of the large volume and variety of the data. The notion of messy data is 
related to the unpredictable nature of data availability. The same kind of data might not 
contain the same variables if they come from different sources, but they still need to be 
combined. Working with such unpredictability is called veracity of data (Kitchin & 
McArdle, 2016). There is simply going to be more data than you need and thus you need 
to sift through it to some extent; and if it does happen that most or all of the data is 
needed, it might not be structured in a way that is appropriate for the research you are 
conducting. At the same time the opposite effect is also present, meaning that one aspect 
of the data might contain a lot more information than what you need while another 
contains less. This is often the case with social media and privacy settings where some 
data collections will have incomplete fields across a number of variables depending on 
the user’s settings (Madsen, 2015). There is however a kind of trade-off between 
messiness and volume, especially if you are studying broader trends where a degree of 
messiness becomes acceptable once you have enough data points (Mayer-Schoenberg & 
 
13 Alex Pentland and Sensing DTU examples 
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Cuckier, 2013, 47). This means that researchers in most cases still have to wrangle, clean 
and manipulate data, as they did before Big Data, but the challenges have become very 
different. This leads to the second and maybe most significant implication for the actual 
methods being used with Big Data, namely data driven methods.   
Data driven methods are best described in opposition to theory driven methods. An 
important point here is that this shift does not entail the so-called end-of-theory, which 
was mentioned earlier (Kitchin, 2014). Data driven methods for research purposes are 
almost always used in conjunction with some theoretical framework. The difference is 
that instead of proposing a theory and then collecting data explicitly to verify or falsify 
that theory using established methods, the researcher starts out with all available data 
and then proceeds to design methods specifically around the data in order to produce 
support or resistance towards a theoretical line (Ruppert, 2015). Data driven methods do 
not exempt one from having a rigorous research design. One should be careful not to 
propose a theory that is born only of data as it often leaves open the possibilities for 
spurious connections to occur (Calude & Longo, 2017). Another way of putting it is to say 
that data driven methods for research purposes, especially in social science, are not a 
purely technical endeavour, but a combination of social and technological features 
(Bowker et al., 2009, 18). 
Data driven methods are different from the carefully constructed research designs of 
theory driven methods, but they are not simply a return to descriptive statistics either. 
Because Big Data is larger, more varied, faster and messier than traditionally collected 
data, it will often require one or more steps of pre-processing before it can be used to 
adequately study a social phenomenon. It is within these pre-processing steps that the 
actual ‘method’ of data driven methods can be found. 
Data driven methods are still a somewhat novel concept and there are no definitions 
which are widely accepted at the time of writing, however Madsen (2015) has proposed 
a useful framework for understanding and categorizing the overall strategies used in 
designing data driven methods specifically for social science studies of online digital 
media. As shown in figure 4.0 these strategies can be divided into four categories along 
two axes such that the design of data driven methods conform to either training or 
following approaches and either structured channelling or adaptive tracking. Training and 
following strategies are born of a necessity for automation when dealing with data that 
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are exhaustive and have high volume or velocity. The strategy of ‘following’ entails 
designing an algorithmic method that can extract interesting patterns from the data 
independently of whether the patterns at the outset have any social significance. In 
machine learning terminology, this is often referred to as unsupervised machine learning 
or clustering (Géron, 2017, 19). For research purposes this inevitably requires a human 
to interpret the patterns detected by the algorithm, which is where theoretical 
motivations and expert domain knowledge become important guiding principles for any 
meaningful results to be extracted from such ‘naturally occurring’ patterns. Training then 
corresponds to what is often called supervised machine learning (Géron, 2017, 17) where 
algorithms are designed specifically to recognize previously occurring patterns 
automatically such as whether messages have negative or positive sentiments. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.0 – DATA DRIVEN METHODS. 




Structured channelling and adaptive tracking can be seen as a response to Big Data being 
very multifaceted, flexible and granular. The degree to which data driven methods apply 
either of the two depends on how much pre-processing, or rather how much adaptation 
of the data occurs. Structured channelling is when the data categories, as they have been 
determined by the source, are used more or less directly in the research design. As an 
example, Facebook has certain categories for different types of actions and interactions, 
such as posts, comments, replies, shares or emoji responses that have sub-categories of 
like, love, angry, sad, wow, haha. A structured channelling approach is using an 
interaction such as ‘angry’ as representative of a certain kind of social behaviour, whereas 
adaptive tracking seeks to build new categories out of the original data such as looking at 
angry/love ratios rather than just ‘love’ and ‘angry’ emoji responses in isolation.  
Because the work with Big Data is relatively new in social science research most of the 
methodological literature is descriptive rather than prescriptive. At the same time there is 
an explosion of interdisciplinary research, not only because social scientists are seeking 
out ways to harness the benefits of Big Data, but also because scholars from fields such 
as biology, physics, computer science, statistics and engineering have sought to apply Big 
Data methods developed in their own field to social science research questions. As has 
been noted on multiple occasions by Freelon (e.g. 2014) a great deal of interdisciplinary 
research that study social phenomena falls short when it comes to interdisciplinarity. 
Social scientists are lacking in their knowledge of advanced statistics and technical skills 
needed to handle large amounts of data, while scholars from other fields have a tendency 
to oversimplify social behaviour to fit models used to study things such as bacteria, 
viruses, fluid dynamics. Part of the work in this thesis is to be mindful of this divide and 
seek to bridge it.  
In order to address the novelty and lack of clear methodological tradition for Big Data, 
and computational methods more broadly, this section has sought to give an introduction 
to the evolution of the field as it has been described by some scholars over the last decade. 
The following sections will first present the research design and data collected for the 





This section briefly outlines the main choices and considerations in discovering, 
collecting and preparing data for analysis. The chapters that follow will go into greater 
detail about each step of the way. The purpose of this thesis is to study public opinion 
formation in the context of political homophily and agreement/disagreement between 
citizens on social media in general and not in relation to a specific political event or 
community, though some narrowing down of the scope is necessary. 
The main data for this project is behavioural data sourced from public Facebook pages in 
Denmark. A major limitation, which is due to both technical barriers and ethical concerns, 
is that only data from public pages is collected. The bulk of Facebook activity takes place 
in private groups and chats and many people rarely seek out public forums (Rossi, 
Schwartz & Mahnke, 2016). For this reason, it is important to reiterate the purpose of the 
study which is not to infer what people use Facebook for, but rather examine the potential 
for social media as a public space where political knowledge can be obtained, and new 
opinions formed. As such, not all people have to participate the same amount. One of the 
benefits of rational ignorance in the triaxial model is that people are at liberty to 
participate to the extent they please. 
As a response to the necessity of dealing with Big Data produced by social media, the 
methodological framework social analytics has been proposed (Zeng et al., 2010). It is not 
a well-defined method, but an overall framework that has been developed for multiple 
use cases. The core idea is based on a data-driven methodology as it was described in the 
previous section. This is illustrated well in the basic model laid out by Fan & Gordon 
(2014) that specifies the direction of the process as capture -> understand -> present, 
which clearly indicates that one starts with the data rather than the theory. The research 
design in this thesis is based on the model for social media analytics in political contexts 
proposed by Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan (2013) and further refined by Stieglitz, Dang-Xuan, 
Bruns, Neuberger (2014) and Stieglitz, Mirbabaie, Ross & Neuberger (2018), which is 
illustrated in figure 4.1 The framework illustrates the linear process of collecting, 




FIGURE 4.1 – SOCIAL ANALYTICS FRAMEWORK. 
 
In this thesis the tracking source is Facebook, specifically public pages, and the tracking 
method is the HTTP version of the Facebook Graph API 2.x, which is the most common 
way of collecting data from Facebook (Sebei, Taieb & Aouicha, 2018). The method allows 
researchers to extract all behavioural data from public pages including who is posting, 
reacting and commenting, when it happens, on which pages and in response to what 
information. Data of interest for this study includes all instances of public opinion 
formation in the general public potentially related to politics. Since there is no API end-
point called “the general public” and because the Facebook API does not allow for 
keyword or hashtag searches, an actor related tracking approach is necessary. This 
entails identifying all public actors be it a single person (i.e. politician) or an organisation 
that have the potential to become spaces for political discussion. It is impossible to even 
come close to identifying all public pages that are potentially related to political opinion 
formation, but an effort is made to make data as exhaustive as possible by collecting from 
all pages that represent politicians, political parties, media organisations, publishers, 
unions, local communities, NGOs, charities, public institutions and interest groups. This 
will provide a fairly exhaustive cross-section of all public discussion and interaction that 
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is most likely to have political relevance in a Danish context. Many pages have a clear 
political frame such as those belonging to political parties, publishers focusing on political 
news, labour unions or pages dedicated to political movements. However, following the 
idea presented in the previous chapter that politically relevant discussions can arise in 
spaces that are not overtly political, other pages are also included such as gossip 
magazine, local sports clubs, charities and hobby groups. The pages are supposed to 
represent a fairly broad cross-section of society, but for practical reasons the selection is 
still tilted in favour of pages where political talk is more likely to occur. Initially many 
pages representing the music, film and entertainment industries were included, but then 
discarded as the occurrences of politically relevant discussions seemed extremely rare 
compared to how much data needed to be collected. Details on the selection of these 
pages will be covered in the following section. 
In order to consider public opinion in relation to multiple contexts, all three analytic 
approaches illustrated in figure 4.1 are applied: 1) Network attributes, 2) sentiment 
related and 3) topic related. The purpose of the first is to determine the political stance 
of users based on which actors they interact with. The second approach has the goal of 
leveraging information about how users engage in discussion by determining the 
sentiment and harshness of language in their comments. The third approach provides 
further insight into the content of the discussion by analysing the different topics that 
both posts and comments touch upon. In the ‘method mixture’ step of the research design 
all three approaches are combined into a final analysis that considers the overlap 
between network, sentiment and content. The three approaches entail a great deal of data 
preparation, an element that is often underdeveloped in the social media analytics 
literature. Data preparation is closely tied to the analysis and can be described as 
“…shaping the data into a format that allows it to be analysed for the intended purpose.” 
(Stieglitz, Mirbabaie, Ross & Neuberger, 2018, 160). However, the importance of this 
process is often downplayed by simply equating it with procedures such as data cleaning, 
data refining or data reduction (e.g. Sebei, Taieb & Aouicha, 2018). It gives the impression 
that data preparation is mostly a technical step. On a practical level the data preparation 
process involves many choices by the researcher that become closely tied to the types of 
results and potential interpretations that can be made in the end (boyd & Crawford, 
2012). The specifics regarding each of the three approaches are respectively covered in 
chapter 5, 6 and 7. The final analysis presented in chapter 8. 
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A secondary aspect involves the use of two surveys14 with the purpose of asking 
participants about their political opinions and voting intention and further linking each 
respondent to her or his Facebook profile. The survey responses are used to create and 
test a classification algorithm that can then predict the political affiliation of all Facebook 
users in the Danish dataset. This can greatly increase the strength and reliability of 
analysis done at the individual level and create a stronger connection between offline and 
online behaviour such that both can be assumed to mutually reflect each other (Wells & 
Thorson, 2017).  
 
Data Selection and Collection 
 
Facebook 
As mentioned in the previous section, data from Facebook is the primary data source for 
the project. The goal is to obtain behavioural data that is representative of how political 
interactions plays out in the general public on Facebook pages, which entails seeking a 
selection of pages that is as exhaustive as possible. The approach is to identify all public 
Facebook pages where politically relevant interaction is likely to take place. This is done 
in five parts. The first consists of all Danish politicians with a Facebook page who was in 
parliament between 2010 and 2018 as well as all who ran for parliament in the election 
of 2015. The second is a selection of the most influential media producers and publishers 
and the third consists of public organizations such as the National Taxation and Tariffs 
office as well as interests groups such as charities and NGOs. The fourth part contains the 
public Facebook pages of all workers’ unions, which is a major source of influence in 
Danish political life. The fifth and last part is a selection of all pages that can be directly 
attributed to local activities within specific sub-regions of the country known as 
communes, which can be referred to as local community pages. The pages for part one 
and four includes all known actors as they are listed on publicly available lists while part 
two and three were identified by looking up their respective categories on 
 
14 The surveys were carried out for the purpose of publishing a journal paper. They have been repurposed 
in this thesis. 
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socialbakers.com15 and getting all pages listed. The pages for part five are all those that 
either have the name of the commune or a major town within the commune in their page 
title or are registered as part of that commune, which is a feature provided by Facebook. 
The data collected for all five parts captures the period between January 2014 and 
February 2018. The total breakdown of data for each part is illustrated in Appendix 4.0-
SI. The part of the data that consist of all political pages is an exception and captures all 
activity between January 2010 and February 2018, however the main focus in this thesis 
is on the period starting in 2014.  
The data is queried using the Facebook Graph API through an HTTP protocol. The 
program to handle the collection process was written specifically for this project in pure 
Python16. The collection program uses a MySQL database to store the data, although, 
according to the Big Data literature, SQL-based DBMSs are not preferred for Big Data 
(Huang et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2015). MySQL was chosen as the database 
management system due to the author having much more experience with said system. 
It was estimated to be sufficient for the storing and handling of the data for the project 
despite not being a preferred Big Data technology. While data from a single Facebook 
page is theoretically infinitely expandable with no upper limit, the population of a country 
is a fixed size and thus it is possible to make a broad, but reliable estimate for how much 
data one can be expected to store.  
The data available for collection at the time (2016 - 2018) is as follows: For each identified 
page it is possible to collect all posts made on that page. For each post on the page 0 – n 
reactions can be made where each reaction can be any of six emoji style types: Like, 
Angry, Sad, Wow, Haha and Love. Furthermore, every post can have 0 – n comments to 
which each comment can have 0 – n reactions as well as 0 – N replies, which is a comment 
to a comment. Finally, each reply can have 0 – n reactions. At the comment and reply level 
only positive reactions i.e. Like, Love emojis were collected. The different types of data 
available for each of these types of interactions is shown in Appendix 4.1-SI.  
The data to be collected does indeed qualify as Big Data on multiple counts. The full data 
collection takes up more than a billion rows with a variety of hierarchies, data types and 
data formats to consider. It is high resolution and uniquely indexical such that a single 
 
15 Consulted in December 2017. 
16 A popular and flexible programming language that is used both for general tasks as well as data analysis. 
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reaction made to a single Facebook post can be identified by unique user id, type and date, 
and there are no upper or lower limits for how much data can be attributed to a single 
Facebook page, post or comment. 
Instead of describing all the raw data collected for each interaction it is more useful to 
explain the information that can be extracted. The analysis in this thesis will take 
advantage of the following pieces of information that can be extracted from the collected 
data: The date and time of a single interaction, who is responsible for the interaction, with 
whom the interaction occurred, on which page it happened, the type of interaction, the 
text of posts and comments and the first name of the person who initiated the interaction 
(unless it was a page). With just these fairly few pieces of information it is possible, by 
properly preparing the data, to complete the entire analysis for the thesis and approach 
an answer to the main research questions. Making real use of the data is of course not an 
easy task as the amount for just the Danish dataset comes to almost one billion rows. As 
mentioned earlier, preparing the data and extracting the necessary information require 
a series of separate analyses, which are covered in chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Surveys 
Two surveys have been requisitioned for this thesis. Both serve the purpose of securing 
an offline “ground truth” that link people’s social media behaviour to their political 
preferences. The first, which is the main one, is a stratified random sample of the Danish 
population. The stratified random sampling technique is used in order to most accurately 
reflect the actual population across a series of key demographic variables such as sex, 
education, place of residence and income (Deacon, 2007, 20). A special feature of the 
survey is that respondents are asked to log on to their Facebook and thereby connect 
their answers to their Facebook profile. Denmark has a very high penetration of Facebook 
use (Statistics Denmark, 2016) so you can reliably assume that many respondents will 
have their own Facebook profile. However, there are two additional factors that might 
increase the dropout rate: 1) not all respondents are willing to hand over their Facebook 
data; 2) not all respondents are active on public Facebook pages. As part of taking the 
survey it is explicitly explained that no private data will be collected from the 
respondents’ profiles but having to officially create a link between their answers and 
their online profiles is enough to make people sceptical and opt out. After dropout the 
 109 
final sample consists of a slightly more skewed, but still sufficient representation of the 
national population, though the sample size is severely reduced. This is explained more 
in detail in the next chapter. 
The purpose of the first survey is to link participants to their public behaviour and thus 
no access to their private accounts was obtained. Only a uniquely identifiable ID was 
provided, which would allow their actions on public pages to be linked to their responses. 
Importantly, the ID cannot be used to do a reverse lookup on Facebook, which means that 
the whole process can be carried out without the researcher ever knowing who any of 
the respondents are. The survey was carried out by the Scandinavian based company 
Userneeds and only the anonymized data was passed on17.  The main purpose of the 
survey is to develop a method that can reliably predict the political affiliation of a single 
Facebook user, which is covered in Chapter 5.  
A second survey was done at a later stage by the Danish company Analyse & Tal with the 
purpose of making the predictions about political affiliations better as well as expanding 
the predictive algorithm to a few other areas such as place of residence. The procedure 
was similar to that of the first survey. The sampling technique used however was 
convenience sampling (Deacon, 2007, 56), which produces heavily skewed results with 
respect to the national population. For this reason, it was only used together with the first 
survey in chapter 8 where the purpose is more exploratory.  
 
Limitations Imposed by Data and Methods 
This section will cover the overall limitations that are inherently imposed by the data 
selection and methodological framework. Limitations that are very specific to certain 
parts of the data preparation are contained in their respective chapters. 
The study is based on a Big Data and data-driven methodology, which raises some 
immediate concerns. One that is worth mentioning right off the bat is that N is never equal 
to all and social media activity does not represent people as such (boyd & Crawford, 2011, 
532). This observation criticizes claims related to volume and exhaustiveness in Big Data, 
 
17 The survey was done purely for research purposes with no commercial incentive. 
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particularly the end-of-theory argument claiming that having more data is better than 
having sound theories. While the setup for this project has allowed the collection of all 
Facebook posts by all politicians over the last 10 years in Denmark rather than just a 
sample, assuming that this collection represents all political discourse or something 
similar would be very wrong. Some politicians do not have Facebook pages and, as 
mentioned in the last section, not all people are active on public pages. In fact, a great deal 
of people who use social media are ‘lurkers’ meaning they do not actively participate, but 
only observe what other users are doing (Kohring & Zimmerman, 2018). Since only 
interactions that consist of reactions, posts, comments and tags can be collected with the 
Facebook API, all lurking activities are excluded. The data used in this study has been 
collected largely because it is collectable, while that which is not collectable is ignored by 
default. This is what Axel Bruns (2013) calls simply a ‘data bias’, but it can also be referred 
to as ‘omitted voices’ (Hargittai, 2020). Not everyone gets to be part of the so-called 
exhaustive dataset. This bias does not invalidate the research design, but it is important 
for considering which conclusions can potentially be drawn from it. This thesis will 
assume to represent only people who are interested in engaging in public spaces on social 
media rather than the entire national population or even all people who use social media. 
Similarly to problems with data biases, the urge to collect a lot of data can result in a loss 
of the context surrounding the activity that the data represents. Big Data without context 
loses its meaning (boyd & Crawford, 2012). This project has sacrificed qualitative 
knowledge about how people interact differently in various forums on social media in the 
pursuit of volume and exhaustiveness. Data has been collected from thousands of public 
Facebook pages, many of them without insight into why they were created, what the 
motivations for users to engage with them are or if the space has diverged from its 
original purpose of creation. The focus of this thesis is on broad trends, which makes it 
possible to ignore some of details pertaining to behaviour on individual pages, however 
it will still be important to remain mindful of details that have potentially been 
overlooked, especially when observations are only weak trends. 
An important aspect of Big Data methods, especially with social media data, is the lack of 
control in respect to access, data conventions and transparency. Engaging with Big Data 
methods entails working within zones of limited control (Lagoze, 2014). This lack of 
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control can be divided into two significant areas, which Madsen (2015) refer to as blue 
and red data dynamics. 
Blue data dynamics have to do with the control over data structures, formats and 
organisation. Social media platforms work with different concepts of how people 
communicate, e.g. a retweet on Twitter is embedded in a completely different data 
structure than a share on Facebook, which has implications for how the data is queried. 
Platforms might also change, expand or reduce the data available without the 
researcher’s knowledge. A good example is when Facebook added a range of emoji 
reactions for users to choose among over the classic like button when interacting with a 
post or comment. This has consequences for the technical setup that has to be changed in 
order to capture the added feature, but it also has conceptual consequences for 
researchers who are trying to understand behaviour from longitudinal perspectives. 
Does a like on Facebook mean something different after the user can choose between 
other reactions than it did back when users could only choose between liking and not 
liking? 
Red data dynamics has to do with access and transparency. The administrators of a 
certain social media platform have complete autonomy (within legal boundaries) when 
it comes to deciding what data to make available at which times and what to keep hidden. 
These decisions might not be well-thought out and they are not intended to help people 
doing research. A good example is the Facebook Graph API 2.x, which is used for this 
project, where it is possible to query the user ID for people who react to or comment on 
a public post, but not users who share that post. Furthermore, the lack of transparency 
might be an even greater cause for concern than access. When whole sections of the data, 
such as user IDs for people who share public posts, are not available, it is at least obvious 
that some parts of the data are missing. But when there is no transparency in regard to 
what comments have been removed or which pages are not allowed on the platform in 
the first place, researchers do not know the full history behind the data sample that they 
end up with. This adds another layer of uncertainty that should be ackknowlegded when 




At the time of writing social media and data obtained from digital platforms is a 
controversial topic, not just for researchers, law makers and private corporations, but for 
the general public (e.g. Naughton, 2019). This most often revolves around lack of privacy 
rights and lack of tools to control and mange one’s own digital trace data as well as a 
general lack of trust in those actors with privileged access to all the data such as the big 
tech companies that currently host the platforms (Isaac, Kang & Popper, 2019), but also 
clandestine organizations (Lyon, 2014) and the political elite (Fuchs, 2016.).  
For social science researchers the main issue is the lack of procedures for obtaining 
consent from people whose data is potentially going to become part of a study. Prior to 
the era of social media the process of obtaining consent was inscribed into the process of 
seeking out participants for either surveys, interviews or observational studies. Social 
media and the APIs that allow researchers to access the data stream directly inevitably 
circumvent both the necessity and incentive to obtain consent from individuals. The 
problematic circumstance can be tied to some of the defining characteristics of Big Data 
such as the earlier mentioned concept of exhaust data that is the repurposing of data that 
was not created for the purpose of research. 
Users do agree to the terms of services that solve the legal issues around letting third 
party actors have access to parts of the data, though that does not necessarily make it 
ethical (Ixchel & Zimmerman, 2011). Some studies such as the famous “emotional 
contagion study” in which researchers with privileged access manipulated the content 
feeds of Facebook users to study whether it had an impact on the emotional states of the 
users, have received a lot of criticism for disregarding the ethics of using social media 
data (Panger, 2016). 
One prevalent problem comes from the fact that there is a lack of specific guidelines for 
how to handle social media data in the academic world. The Human Ethics Boards 
approached by the author for this study, which include the University of Canterbury 
Ethics Board and the Danish Datastyrelsen did not have a specific procedure for obtaining 
approval to use data that was available through public APIs. The methods used in this 
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thesis have, to the best ability of the author, abided by the ethics guidelines developed by 
the Association of Internet Research18. 
The biggest concern has been to ensure that no private content was ever accessed and 
that no data could be directly traced to a unique individual. All data come only from pages 
that are labelled as public and user activity was not cross referenced with other data 
sources except for the two surveys. Again, it is important to recognize that just because a 
space is labelled public on Facebook, consent to be part of a study cannot be assumed on 
the part of an individual who is active in such a space. All IDs in the data collection used 
to identify participants are completely anonymized and cannot be traced back to an 
individual. As mentioned earlier the process of connecting the survey to the Facebook 
data was set up in a way which ensured that the author was never in contact with any de-
anonymized personal information. The only remaining problem is that the full text of 
individual comments made on these pages were collected. Many such comments are 
unique enough such that if one was to go to the public Facebook page and manually look 
for the comment it would be possible to at least find out which user made the comment. 
How much information that would be available on the user then depends on the privacy 
settings chosen by that user. This problem can only be mitigated by keeping the raw data 
secure and private. However, as a way to limit the capabilities of the analyst, the code 
developed for parsing the data hides all comments in the final data set and show only 
aggregated results for posts made by public pages. 
The reason for undertaking this research is that by using and studying the data it is 
possible to expand the public knowledge about how online behavioural data can be used. 
From a consequentialist standpoint the assessment is that the risk of harm to individuals 
is minimal compared to the potential gain for the public. 
The ethical considerations become especially relevant in this project, specifically because 
the main data source is very similar to the one used by the infamous Cambrigde Analytica, 
which caused a major scandal in 2017 when the world learned that they had been using 
users’ digital traces from Facebook without their knowledge or consent in order to make 
targeted political ad campaigns. Contrary to the research conducted at Cambridge 





form of public communication rather for analyses to be carried out behind closed doors. 
This is to narrow the gap between what corporations and professional organizations can 
do with data and the capabilities of ordinary people, increasing the data agency of the 
public (Kennedy, Poell & Van Dijck, 2015). There is a long way from leveraging digital 
trace data from the privileged position of a university student to the same being possible 
by the general public, however presenting the methods openly can be regarded as a step 
in the right direction. The hope is for powerful analytical tools to become increasingly 




Chapter 5. Predicting Voter Intention in 
Multiparty Systems 
 
The purpose of the present chapter is to describe the first part of the data preparation 
which is to ascertain the political stance of all Facebook users in the data collection. This 
part of the data preparation seeks to leverage the network attributes of digital footprints 
left behind by users on social media. Essentially social network analysis is about relations 
(edges) between people (nodes) (Tsetovat & Kouznetsov, 2011, 2). Edges shared by 
nodes and nodes that intersect with edges can tell stories about the latent relations 
between people. The focus in this chapter is on user activity on various pages in the 
Danish public with the purpose of predicting their political stance. Providing empirical 
evidence for the feasibility of predicting political preference from behaviour on public 
pages is necessary in order to further explore the distribution of political homophily and 
polarization.  
Applying network analysis becomes very complex and computationally expensive at 
scale. Since the focus is not on exploring complex networks, but making straight 
predictions about users’ political stance, only relations in the first degree will be 
considered for analysis. More complex relationships will be explored later in the final 
analysis, but for the purpose of prediction only the pages that users visit themselves will 
be considered. If a user goes to a public page and likes a post it does not matter which 
pages other users who like that post also go to. This is not to say that such activity is not 
relevant, but in order to make calculations that are realistic with the computing power 
available, only relationships between users and pages are included, not the myriad of 
implicit relationships between users on public pages. More specifically, this entails 
calculating only the in-degree between users and pages (i.e. how many times a user has 
interacted with posts on a given page) and then treating this metric as a multivariate 
regression problem rather than a graph problem. Network attributes will be compared 
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with responses from a nationally representative survey in order to test how well they can 
be used to predict the voting intention of a single user.19 
 
From Sociodemographic Attributes to social Media Traces 
The representative opinion survey has long been the pinnacle of empirical research in 
political science (Campbell, 1960; Verba, 1987). The recent immense growth in digital 
platforms has provided researchers with the possibility of studying human behaviour on 
a whole new scale from traces left behind by our digital interactions (Dalton, 2016). No 
longer being limited to surveys with a couple of thousand respondents, political studies 
covering millions of people have emerged within the field of computational social science, 
generating important new knowledge about our digital and analogue lives.  
Within the subfield of election forecasting, scholars have shown the potential for 
predicting election outcomes based on digital data from a diverse range of platforms 
including YouTube (Franch, 2010) Google (Mavragani, 2016) , Twitter (Ceron, Curini & 
Iacus, 2016; Jungherr, 2015), Facebook (Giglietto, 2012; Barclay et al., 2015), and even 
Wikipedia (Yasseri & Bright, 2016). Studies based on the big social media platforms that 
is, Facebook and Twitter have largely been the most successful with prediction rates that, 
in terms of accuracy and scale, have often outperformed traditional polling (e.g. Franch, 
2010, see Ceron, Curini & Iacus, 2015 for a review). While this emerging field has mainly 
focused on predicting aggregated electoral results (Makazhanov, 2014), a smaller group 
of studies has focused on the challenge of predicting individual political orientation (e.g. 
Kosinski, Stillwell & Graepel, 2013; Adali & Golbeck, 2014; Youyou, Kosinski, Stillwell, 
2015; Volkova et al., 2015; Zhitomirsky-Geffet, Koppel & Uzan, 2016). Notably, Ceron et 
al. (2015) were able to reach very high accuracies in their political profiling using only 
Twitter data. Zhitomirsky-Geffet, Koppel & Uzan (2016) displayed how political 
orientation can be determined by comparing individuals’ writing style with the writings 
 
19 Most of the work done in this chapter was has been previously published as a journal paper for which 
the Thesis author was also lead author. Co-authors include Magnus Skovrind Pedersen, Michael Jensen, 
Emil Dahl-Nielsen, Thomas Albrechtsen and Tobias Bornakke. 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0184562 
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on politicians’ public Facebook profiles. While many of these studies attain high 
prediction accuracies, this accuracy is often reached by limiting the study to the most 
active users (Volkova et al., 2015). Furthermore, few studies validate their results against 
offline data such as surveys (Thomson & Wells, 2017). These limitations have, however, 
been tackled in the works of Kosinski and colleagues (2013; 2015) who have shown how 
personality and political attitudes can be predicted with great accuracy based solely on 
Facebook likes. Applying machine learning algorithms to search for patterns in hundreds 
of diverse Facebook likes, these already famous experiments have thus disclosed how 
people’s preferences for Hallo Kitty and Harley Davidson can reveal details about their 
personality and political attitudes — often with better precision than their friends or 
family.  
Thus far, the majority of studies predicting individual voting behaviour based on digital 
traces have focused on two-party systems or applied a left/right-wing scale, thereby 
avoiding the more challenging task of making all-inclusive predictions in multiparty 
settings. In the present study, this gap is filled by considering how individual party choice 
in a multiparty system is linked to liking posts made by political actors on Facebook. The 
predictions are based on likes on posts on public pages of Danish parties and politicians 
collected between January 2015 and 2017 through the Facebook Graph API. Through 
machine learning–based prediction models, ‘political likes’, consisting of likes on posts 
created by politicians and parties, are evaluated for their ability to predict present-day 
voter intention in a multiparty system for a subsample of surveyed respondents.  
 
Data Recap 
Predictions for the models developed in this chapter are based on positive reactions 
entered in posts by Danish parties and politicians on their public pages between 2014 
and 2018. Emoji reactions are generic mechanisms used by Facebook users to express 
their sentiment about content, which has already shown to be a good proxy for predicting 
both electoral results and personal traits (as mentioned in the previous section), making 
it an immediate choice for exploring the possibility for predicting political orientation. 
Only respondents who were able, and willing to share their public Facebook ID (N = 1216) 
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are included in this analysis. Additionally, it is limited to respondents who had liked 
political actors during the period and would vote for any of the nine parties in parliament 
during that time (N = 659). Dropout is not unexpected, especially considering that it is 
very unlikely that all Danish people are active on public Facebook people. The country 
has a population of around 5.5 million, but the number of distinct users in the Facebook 
data collection is 1.3 million. The final sample is slightly smaller (~23%) than one would 
expect given that the data collection contains 1.3 million users. Most of the dropout is 
likely due to privacy concerns (Appendix 5.0-SI). As a result of this dropout, 
representativeness of the data sample becomes slightly distorted (see non-response 
analysis in Appendix 5.1-SI). However, for the most part, the distortion simply 
reproduces Facebook’s already skewed user groups with the only large bias being an 
underrepresentation of older users; a skew that was recently shown to have limited effect 
on how often a person would like political actors (Kalsnes and Larsson, 2017). The data 
process is illustrated in Figure 5.0. 
 
FIGURE 5.0 – THE DATA PROCESS IN THREE PARTS  
(1) A representative survey was completed by 3050 randomly selected people living in Denmark, providing 
information on standard sociodemographic qualities, political values, and present-day voter intention toward parties 
eligible in the general election. As shown in Appendix 5.1-SI, the sample is somewhat demographically representative 
of the country’s entire population. Respondents were subsequently asked to log in with their Facebook account, and if 
willing to accept the same, respondents’ public Facebook ID was stored. (2) Post-likes were independently collected 
from all public profiles of Danish parties and politicians on Facebook. (3) After completion of steps 1 and 2, each 
respondent linked to the collected Facebook data and applied a LASSO-based multinomial logistic regression model to 
predict voter intention based on Facebook data. 
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The purpose is to predict the voting intention that was stated a given respondent in the 
survey. The primary method employed is multinomial logistic regression models that use 
machine learning techniques to optimize a function that models the relationship between 
network attributes and voting intention. Several models are constructed, including a 
baseline model that contains only responses from the survey (i.e. sociodemographic 
attributes, political attitudes, and opinions on political issues (see survey features in 
Table in Appendix 5.1-SI)). 
Moving on from the baseline model, a selection of multinomial logistic regression models 
is gradually compared, all predicting which party a person would vote for but modelled 
on different selections of Facebook data as well as combinations of Facebook and survey 
data. Using L1 regularization (LASSO) (Tibshirani, 1996), only features that contribute 
significantly to the overall prediction are included in the models. In each model an L1 
penalty was selected using 10-fold cross validation with a train/test split of 85/15 to 
avoid overfitting and account for variance in the prediction accuracy. 
 
Feature Engineering and Feature Weighting  
The process of feature engineering addresses the selection of the most appropriate 
features or set of features for any given model (Géron, 2017, 25-26). This can be 
accomplished by testing many different models or by testing the potential contribution 
value of individual features prior to modelling. In machine learning based on gradient 
descend, as in this case, weights for all features are constantly adjusted, raised or 
lowered, until the optimum for the log likelihood function is achieved. One special trait of 
L1 regularization is that noisy features, meaning features that only contribute to the 
predictive power of the model if they are unreasonably high or low, are given a weight of 
0.0, thus effectively removing them from the model. This does obscure the relevance of 
features since all models are evaluated based on the features used in the inputs and not 
the ones selected by the algorithm in the final model. This though is fairly typical for 
models that aim to reach the highest predictive power rather than exploring individual 
features. As an example, chapter 8 will employ different kinds of statistical models, some 




The results depict how different uses of “political likes” are able to predict which of the 
nine parties in the Danish parliament a given person would vote for. The significance of 
the results is held against a null hypothesis that denotes no relationship between present-
day voter intention and explanatory variables (H0: P = 1/9). The results are found in 
Figure 5.1. Detailed description of relevant evaluation metrics can be found in Appendix 
5.2-SI. 
 
FIGURE 5.1 - MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING PRESENT-DAY VOTING INTENTION 
 
Establishing a Baseline From Sociodemographics, Political Values, and Opinions 
The analysis is initiated by establishing a baseline model based on sociodemographic 
variables, political values, and opinions toward current issues collected through survey 
questions. The questions were selected to mirror the most typical variables for explaining 
voter alignment within the discipline of political science (Stubager, Hansen & Andersen, 
2011). The baseline model (model 0) includes 19 different features.  Note however, that 
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several coefficients are neutralized by L1 regularization, which is implemented in LASSO 
regression to prevent model overfitting. The optimal model makes predictions with 
35.8% accuracy (confidence interval [CI] of 2.9%) including 101 out of 668 coefficients. 
This echoes the accuracies of similar survey studies within political science, on average 
reaching an accuracy of approximately 35% [e.g., 20–22]. For comparison reasons, model 
accuracy is tested on predictions for present-day voting intention on a right versus left 
scale. Not surprisingly the accuracy is much higher when using this binary classification 
(80.3% accuracy).  
 
The Power of a Single Political Like 
With an established baseline model, attention turns toward the collected Facebook data. 
As an initial experiment, a model that uses just a single feature, the latest like that the 
respondent has entered to a post by a party or politician, is created. This very simple 
setup (model 1) is more accurate and, on average, marginally better than our baseline 
model. With an accuracy of 43.9% (CI ±3.8%) and a right/left accuracy of 81.3%, model 
1 indicates that a person’s single latest political post-like tends to say more about party 
choice than a prediction model trained on a sample with 19 different features on each 
person, including questions on core political values. 
 
Raising Accuracy by Including Individuals’ Entire Political-like History 
In this part all political likes for each person collected during the two-year period (model 
2) are included. The features in this model consist of the number of posts that a person 
has liked for each of the nine parties in parliament. For example, if a respondent has liked 
a post made by a party or a politician from that party on their public Facebook page, then 
that counts as one like to that party for that respondent. To compare respondents who 
are extremely active on public pages with those who are less active, all values are 
normalized across each respondent’s likes toward each of the nine parties. Thus, all 
values are on a scale 0-1 representing the proportion of likes that a single respondent has 
toward a single party. Applying these features, it is possible to predict which party a 
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person would vote for with an accuracy of 60.9% (CI ± 3.7%). This result is notably better 
than both the baseline model and model 1. Interestingly, the best L1 penalty in model 2 
was 0.0, meaning that excluding coefficients would not increase the cross-validated 
accuracy. With a right/left average accuracy climbing to 90.1%, the model suggests 
political likes as an efficient predictor for voter intention. 
 
Combining Survey and Political Likes only Minutely Increases Prediction Rate 
The next model considers the possibility of a positive complementary effect by combining 
the best of two worlds. Features from the baseline model are added to model 2 in order 
to explore whether the survey questions encapsulate other dimensions than the political 
likes: Do the two approaches overlap or complement each other? The new model, model 
3, hereby includes all the sociodemographic background information, core political 
values from the baseline model, and the entire political-like history from model 2. The 
prediction accuracy is now 62.0% with (CI ± 3.7%). This is higher than model 2, but still 
within the margin of error. The increase in area under the (receiver operating 
characteristic, or ROC) curve (AUC) and in right/left accuracy suggests that model 3 is 
still only slightly better than model 2. 
The sample size in model 3 is lower than the number of coefficients, which is one probable 
explanation for why the added data does not deliver a significant increase in accuracy. 
Even though L1 regularization filters out most of the unnecessary noise, it is conceivable 
that the regression algorithm would perform much better with this selection of features 
if the sample size could be increased. 
 
Optimizing Political-likes Prediction Rates with Minimum-like Criteria 
The previous models propose political post-likes as the single strongest variable for 
predicting individual party choice. It is therefore reasonable to consider whether it is 
possible to further optimize the use of this variable. Since values for number of posts liked 
across each of the nine parties for each respondent are normalized, the models might 
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make overconfident predictions based on respondents who have only liked a single post. 
Similarly, a person for whom 90% of likes go to the same party should yield better 
predictions than a person whose likes have been evenly distributed across several 
parties. This part will explore the relationship between these two criteria, namely (1) 
minimum likes which entails excluding respondents with less total likes than the 
threshold, and (2) party like cap which entails excluding respondents with a lower 
percentage of likes directed toward a single party than the threshold. The results can be 
seen in Figure 5.2, and Table 5.0 provides the values corresponding to the figure. Figure 
5.2 shows how the accuracy increases with both min likes and party like cap indicating 
that respondents with many likes distributed to one or few parties yield the most 
accurate predictions. With, for example, min likes = 7 and party like cap = 0.8, prediction 
accuracy goes above 90%; however, sample size is down to 153, which also considerably 
increases the error rate (see Table 5.0). 
 
Party-like cap 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Sample size 468 328 197 153 97 
95% Confidence interval (CI) 0.046 0.05 0.058 0.059 0.062 
Accuracy 0.64 0.777 0.861 0.912 0.93 
 
Table 5.0 – Party Like Caps and Minimum Like Criteria. 




Figure 5.2 – Accuracy at Minimum Like Levels. 
The x-axis shows party-like cap (PLC), which denotes how many likes at  least go toward only a single 
party. At PLC = 0.8, only users who have at least 80% likes toward a single party are included. The y-axis 
shows the percentage of users who are accurately labelled. Each coloured line shows accuracy for samples 
where all respondents have a minimum of total likes. Because the two criteria, party-like cap and 
minimum likes, involve filtering out respondents and thus effectively cutting down the sample size, it is 
unfeasible to rely on the training of machine learning algorithms for classification. Consequently, a simple 
algorithm that derives predictions based on the party a respondent has liked the most at different 
intersections of the two criteria is available. 
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Thresholding Total Likes Greatly Increases Accuracy 
Most importantly, Figure 5.2 shows that overall prediction rates, when thresholding 
individuals on their total likes, begin to converge significantly with a total minimum of 7 
political likes. Setting the minimum likes criterion higher than 7 results in only a little 
gain in total accuracy, but considerably reduces sample size. A threshold of minimum 7 
political likes is taken as the best choice for a near optimal prediction rate.  
Based on the optimization exploration, we deploy a fourth and final model that has the 
same features as model 2, but only includes respondents with a total of 7 or more likes 
for posts from parties or politicians. The effective sample size is now 468 while prediction 
accuracy has increased to 70.8% (CI = ±4.2%). It is indicative of better prediction rates 
by imposing a criterion for how many total political likes a user should have. Accuracy for 
right/left with this model is now 96%. 
 
Implications of Predictions 
The main implication of the results is showing the potential for studying political 
behaviour in multiparty systems on social media on a large scale. The profiling of 
individual users through their political “like history” thus lends itself as a tool to study 
political participation on social media. Through collecting political likes, it becomes 
possible to profile a significant portion of a national population — in this case 23% of the 
entire population — with a least one political like, and nearly 1 million with at least seven. 
In this thesis the ability to predict the voting intention of users will be used to develop 
other methods for measuring cross-cutting agreement and political homogeneity which 
are generalizable to other democratic countries with high social media usage.  
Due to the non-random drop-out rate in this study, which only ends up including 
respondents who are active Facebook users, the national population is not perfectly 
represented. Women, younger people and people with higher education are 
overrepresented in the samples used for the regression models (see Appendix 5.1-SI). 
However, it does not seem that any one group is totally left out or overrepresented to a 
degree that would call the overall results into question. Estimates for predicting the 
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aggregate electoral outcome based solely on political likes are comparable to most 
opinion polls suggesting that the results can potentially be generalized to the entire 
Danish population (details in Appendix 5.3-SI). Generalizing findings outside the group 
of politically active users, one should, however, be attentive of the bias inherent to 
Facebook as mentioned earlier. There are clear similarities between the sample 
demographics and those found by Facebook’s own Audience Insights20 
Further, one should also expect users who seek out politicians on Facebook to be slightly 
more politically active than the rest of the population. With these limitations in mind, and 
in accordance with studies of other social media platforms (Ceron, Curini & Iacus, 2015), 
it is possible that the general mechanism of political likes would be reproducible in most 
open Western multiparty democracies where Facebook has become a central political 
arena. 
 
Perspectives on Parsimonious Data and Generalization of Digital Traces 
The use of traditional survey data combined with a parsimonious strategy that 
emphasizes theoretically motivated selections and filtering of features can seem at odds 
with the Big Data oriented methodology laid out in this project. However, such deviations 
will be necessary. First of all, even if a prediction model is developed for use on very large 
amounts of data a smaller sample of reliable real world responses or manually labelled 
data points are required in order to establish a “ground truth” that a machine learning 
model can be trained on (Řehůřek, 2011, 56). The Big Data aspect of the methods tested 
in this chapter hinges on the fact that less parsimonious models that used more data 
points were tested, but shown to be less effective than more parsimonious models that 
applied filtering based on domain knowledge and common sense (e.g. removing users 
based on some political likes minimum criteria). Employing a parsimonious approach as 
demonstrated relates to the previously mentioned notion by boyd & Crawford (2012) 
that Big Data completely devoid of theory is likely less effective in the social sciences. 
 
20 (https://www.facebook.com/ads/audience-insights/people?act=41292822&age=18-&country=DK). – 
Checked December 2017. 
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Searching for patterns that can predict personal traits within very large datasets is an 
approach that goes beyond Kosinski and related work. Rather, the trend toward bigger 
and broader datasets seems to have become the standard for data experiments in the 
field of computational social science (e.g., Watts, 2014). Increasingly, this ideal has also 
appeared in commercial data analysis as illustrated by Cambridge Analytica, a data 
analytics firm drawing on Kosinski et al.’s  (2013) work, when it proclaimed to have 
secured Donald Trump’s victory through the collection of “4–5,000 data points on every 
American” (Tett, 2017).  
The field of computational social science has reached a level of maturity that makes it 
timely to replace the ideal of broad data with a parsimonious ideal of selective data. While 
the studies by Kosinski and colleagues should not be compared 1:1 (due to differences in 
goals and context), it seems fair to note how using only the respondents’ single latest 
political like delivers performance comparable to their best prediction of political 
attitude built on hundreds of likes (Kosinski, Stillwell & Graepel, 2013; Youyou, Kosinski, 
Stillwell, 2015) (this project = AUC 0.8 vs. Kosinski et al. = 0.85). Additionally, 
Theodoridis, Papadopoulos & Kompatsiaris (2015) reach a result of AUC = 0.8 using the 
same dataset as Kosinski and collegues. Again, this is reporting the left-right AUC value 
obtained in this project in order to make our results comparable.  
Accuracy with generalizability is the main advantage of the parsimonious data strategy 
used for the prediction models in this chapter. Based solely on a limited data scope, 
consisting of the single latest like per respondent, it was possible to predict multiparty 
choice with an accuracy of 0.439. The accuracy was lifted above 0.6 by including all likes, 
and then above 0.7 by imposing a minimum like criteria of 7 likes. The results thus 
indicate that even a single political like is comparable in accuracy to most multiparty 
studies in political science, commonly reaching accuracy of around 35%, by combining 
survey questions on sociodemographics, political values, and opinions toward current 
issues (e.g. Merrill & Grofman, 1999, Schmidt et al., 2017). While this line of research is 
not entirely comparable, since political scientists are typically searching for explanation 
rather than prediction, the predictive power of political likes becomes striking when 
contemplating the approximately 30 survey questions involved in reaching 35% 
accuracy. 
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It seems reasonable to consider why likes predict voting behaviour so dramatically, and 
so much better than survey results. Referencing major theories in studies of voting 
behaviour, one could suggest that a like is predictive because it reveals alignment with 
the ideology of the liked party (Campbell, 1960), the issue taken up (Petrocik, 1996; Nie, 
Verba & Petrocik, 1999) or the personal traits of the party candidate (Kinder et al., 1980; 
Ohr & Oscarsson, 2013). Another response to this question is to re-articulate an often-
used designation: that likes comprise a generic mechanism for users to show their 
support. Political likes should be seen as a measure that captures a multitude of the 
abovementioned — and probably also other — theories for why we vote (i.e., ideology, 
shared issue, or personal identification). This response is in line with both the overall 
high accuracies reached, which make it difficult to imagine a single theoretical driver, and 
with the lack of complementary effects seen in model 3, which suggest that we should 
view likes as encapsulating a number of different motives and preferences. 
The high accuracies and lack of complementary effects also indicate that most people are 
highly selective with their political likes. We should thus not think of political likes as a 
cost-free interaction that we carelessly direct toward any post that catches our attention, 
but rather as an interaction form that we apply when we are clearly aligned across one 
or even multiple axes of preferences. As such, political likes should be seen as a 
parsimonious measure that condenses a heterogeneous mixture of different motives and 
individuals’ inscription into politics.  
 
This chapter has explained the process of creating prediction models that can reliable 
show the voting intention of a given Danish Facebook user, assuming of course that the 
user has interacted with content from political pages. However, since nearly a million 
users have made at least 7 likes on posts from political pages over a 4-year period, at least 
in the data collected for this project, the approach can be reliably used on the general 
public. The purpose has been to show that these political likes are a solid indicator of a 
user’s political stance. Using this information, the next chapter will present techniques 
for calculating political homophily and agreement/disagreement from interaction with 
content and discussions in comment threads. 
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Chapter 6. Calculating Homophily, 
Agreement and Disagreement in 
Discussions 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to build on the results from chapter 5 in order to construct 
methods that can be used to determine levels of political homophily and of 
agreement/disagreement for a given discussion. 
As determined in previous chapters, social media bring specific issues to the forefront of 
political communication research, namely how networked information flows curated by 
a mix of actors relates to the political preferences of the individuals who make up the 
general public on the digital platforms. Chapter 5 has laid out a method for estimating the 
political preferences of users. This chapter seeks to translate aggregated interaction 
patterns related to these political preferences into single measures that can help reveal 
the contentious nature of a public news piece posted on Facebook and its ensuing 
discussion. One of the most central concerns with respect to how political preferences 
influence information flows is political polarization and de-polarization. As mentioned in 
the previous chapters, polarization is usually viewed as potentially detrimental to 
democracy. The relation between political polarization and de-polarization will be 
discussed in later chapters in light of the final results of the analysis. In this chapter the 
focus is on establishing measures that can reliably be used to analyse political patterns 
related to polarization and de-polarization of any given discussion. A discussion in this 
study is defined as a post created by a public Facebook page to which users contribute 
with reactions and comments. A discussion includes all potential interactions such as 
users’ interactions with content through reactions and comments, but also among users 
through reactions and replies made to comments.  
As stated in chapter 3 political polarization can be represented in two forms: 1) as 
increased isolation of political groupings (increased political homophily), and 2) as lack 
of recognition among groups with differing views (heavy political disagreement). This 
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chapter seeks to shine light on these two kinds of polarization by establishing measures 
that pertain to individual discussions. The first, political homophily, is the simplest 
because it does not have to take multiple flows of interaction into account. It should 
simply measure the degree to which all users who participate in a discussion (post) are 
likely to be politically likeminded. The other measure, political disagreement, is more 
complicated because it has to take into account how two or more politically likeminded 
groupings that participate in a discussion behave together. For this reason, political 
disagreement will be split into two measures: 1) initial political disagreement and 2) 
subsequent agreement. The first is to be calculated based on users’ interactions with the 
content and the second will be determined by users’ interactions among one another. The 
logic behind all three measures will be explained in the rest of this chapter. 
It is important to note that the measures created in this chapter are, by themselves, only 
indicators of patterns pertaining to polarization and de-polarization and must be utilized 
together with patterns revealed by other pieces of information for a thorough analysis of 
political polarization to be realized. These will be added in the following two chapters. 
 
Political Likes Vector 
In order to demonstrate the potential universal application of methods developed in this 
thesis, this chapter will utilize data from New Zealand. The final analysis will focus on the 
Danish public as it has more data available, however distributions of the three measures 
will be compared between the two countries in order to substantiate their transferability. 
As explained earlier, not every politician has a public Facebook page. For New Zealand it 
comes to a total of 121 pages that represent either a politician or a political party.  
Chapter 5 showed that political preference of a user is best determined by simply 
counting the number of positive reactions to posts made by a party, and all politicians 
from that party, that the user has made. Average best prediction accuracy is obtained for 
users for whom the sum of total reactions is at least 7. The number of positive reactions 
for any given users in the direction of a political party should then be normalized by the 
total sum of positive reactions pertaining to that user. This procedure is illustrated in 
Equation 6.0 wherein a user is given by u with v being a vector of positive reactions to 
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political parties. Thus, a user is represented by a vector where each element corresponds 
to the proportion of likes that has gone towards a particular party. Throughout this study 
the user is represented as a vector to better accommodate the less absolutistic workings 
of MMP systems. If a user has liked two or three parties equally then that user will be 
represented as such, instead of being reduced to a supporter of a single party or block. A 
visual representation of the user vector can be found in Appendix 6.0-SI. This also helps 
accommodate some of the error in the prediction model developed in the previous 
chapter (Figure 5.1). As was shown, users who have more than 90% positive reactions 
towards are single party are much more likely to actually vote for that one party 
compared to one with only 50% towards a single party. It is possible to infer from this 
that users who divide their likes more equally among parties are more split between 
political positions. By always treating a user’s voting intention as a vector of support 
towards multiple parties, the inaccuracy pertaining to actual voting intention is 





Applying this to all users in the New Zealand dataset ends up with a total of 271,992 
politically significant users in New Zealand. It is then observed how many and how often 
these users appear on the New Zealand public pages. By counting how many actions 
(reactions, comments, comment-reactions etc.) were taken by our politically significant 
users compared to the full number of actions, an average political user penetration (later 
denoted as userPolPen) of approximately 56% on public pages is reached. Values of 
userPolPen are of course not evenly distributed, and some pages, typically ones with low 
amounts of political content, have much lower penetration rates.  
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Estimating political homogeneity 
With a single user represented by the vector denoted in Equation 6.0, the intention is to 
estimate the political homogeneity of a discussion using the aggregate of all users who 
participate. Nikolov, Lalmas, Flammini & Menczer (2019) deal with a similar problem in 
their research, where instead of a user being represented by the proportions towards 
political parties they support, a user is represented by how many times they have shared 
links from specific web domains. In their study they estimate the homogeneity bias 
simply from the entropy of a single user vector. This approach misses two aspects, both 
of which are important when the user vector represents affiliation with political parties: 
1) it does not account for the fact that parties vary in size (i.e. in New Zealand one would 
expect Labour and National to represent a very large fraction of the total vote), 2) some 
parties are more likely to support each other, which should resonate with the voters (i.e. 
it is more likely that a Labour voter will show some support to the Green Party compared 
to ACT). To address these two aspects, this study will apply a slightly more complex 
approach, but also seek to make it more empirically intuitive. 
In order to calculate political homogeneity for a single discussion the political 
distribution of users for that discussion will be compared to the grand average of all users. 
The intuition is that the average political distribution of all users will represent the 
maximum empirical entropy. By comparing the grand average distribution to that of a 
given discussion the distance between them will give an indication of how politically 
homogeneous a discussion is. For this reason, a base function for this method will be one 
that calculates the distance between two aggregated user vectors. 
The calculation for the grand average and the aggregate of users for a single discussion 
essentially has the same form as that of a single user. The values for the user vectors are 






For a single discussion, the users represented by g include only those who participate on 
the post, either through reactions or comments. For the national average g includes all 
users and will be denoted as natAvg.  
Next a formula for calculating the distance between two vectors is needed. There are 
many standard approaches to this with one of the most popular being the cosine distance 





However, the standard formula needs to be updated to accommodate the specific needs 
of this study. Simply taking the distance between the two groups (i.e. participants from 
discussion g vs. natAvg) would not take into account that some political parties are more 
similar than others. In New Zealand for example if the biggest contributor to the distance 
is the difference in the proportion of Green and Labour voters this would be less 
significant than if the difference was between Green and National voters. Thus, one would 
like to calculate an estimate for the covariance between positive reactions towards each 
pair of parties. This is done by going back to the political pages to calculate the covariance 







Furthermore, it is desirable to account for the variable size of political parties. Low 
entropy cases that are heavily biased towards very small parties should considered 
slightly more homogenous compared to the largest parties. To put more emphasis on 













The original cosine distance function (COS)  it then updated by adding the weighted 
covariance matrix to create a non-Euclidean inner product. The final formula for 
calculating the political homogeneity for a discussion has the following form polHom, 
where A represents all the all participants given by the previous Equation 6.1. polHom is 







Equation 6.6 allows us to collapse the multiparty vector space into a single number that 
indicates the political homogeneity of users. A discussion of course needs to have enough 
participants. Using the method in the following chapters will be limited to posts that have 
at least 10 participants and at least 40% political penetration (40% users with a history 
of at least 7 positive reactions to politicians).  
The measure of political homogeneity builds on the previously mentioned general idea 
that a homogeneity bias can be obtained from the entropy of this kind of user vector. 
Furthermore, the face validity of the calculation is apparent by looking at the top and 
bottom of Facebook pages that have the highest and lowest levels of homogeneity. 
Politicians who generally seek less broad appeal tend to have the most homogenous 
Facebook pages, which will be explored more in detail in chapter eight. The measure 
aligns well with the general expectation that specialized political pages have the highest 
levels of political homogeneity while media pages that are least related to politics have 
the lowest levels. For these reasons it is assumed to be a fairly reliable measure that does 
not need to be evaluated further. This however is not the case with political 
disagreement/agreement, which will require more assumptions to be made. 
 
Estimating initial political disagreement and subsequent agreement 
There are many ways for users to convey whether they agree with one another by 
commenting specifically on each other’s arguments. However, this study is interested in 
finding a generic mechanism that can be used as an indicator of overall political 
disagreement/agreement. Instead of finding patterns pertaining to agreement and 
disagreement within the comments themselves, which can be an extremely complicated 
problem, this study strives for a more parsimonious approach. This part wants to take 
advantage of the fact that Facebook employs affordances that contain both positive and 
negative reactions as well as comments on multiple levels of interaction. It builds on the 
intuition that if users who choose certain types of responses can noticeably be divided 
into groups that corresponds to distinct political factions (within the multiparty vector 
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space), that can be an indicator that users are positioning themselves differently based 
on political affiliation and thus represent a kind of disagreement. Again, this can happen 
in multiple flows of communication. Three measures are devised: disCom, disAs and 
subAgree21.  
The value of disCom functions as a measure of political disagreement based on users’ 
initial reaction to a post. The calculation entails separating users into two groups: 1) those 
who “like/love” the post and 2) those who comment on the post without clicking “like/love”. 
The formula is more or less identical to the function for obtaining the political distance between 
two aggregated user vectors used to calculate polHom. The formula for calculating the disCom 
has the following form with A and B being the two groups described above, where N is the 





Thus, a high value for disCom should be equal to a high level of initial, political 
disagreement over a post. 
The disAs value is similar to disCom. It describes political disagreement over the content 
of a post. But here the distance between two other groups is measured: 1) those who 
“like/love” the post and 2) those who click “angry/sad” to the post. Calculating the disAs 
relies on the exact same formula as disCom. A high value for disAs is equal to a high level 
of initial political disagreement over a post.  
With subAgree the attempt is made to measure what happens in the interaction between 
users in the comment section. This can be called subsequent agreement and consists of 
positive reactions to comments with the purpose of measuring agreement between users 
who have different political preferences. This means that by measuring the distance 
 
21 The variable names are mapped as follows: disCom = disagreement through comment only vs. comment 
+ like. disAs = disagreement through angry + sad. subAgree = subsequent agreement. 
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between the user who wrote the comment and the users who reacted positively 
(“like/love”) to the comment, one gets an estimate of the level of subsequent agreement 
between people with different political preferences. For subAgree roughly the same 
formula as for disCom and disAs can be used, with a small adjustment. A is now the single 
user who wrote the comment and B is the aggregated group of users who reacted 
positively to it. The operation is then performed for all comments C to determine the 





A high value for subAgree should then be equal to a high level of subsequent agreement 
across political lines. Additionally, subsequent agreement can also be obtained for a 





Testing measures of political agreement and disagreement 
Compared to the method for calculating political homogeneity disagreement is less 
straightforward. It cannot be assumed that people necessarily use Facebook in the way it 
is imagined for the disCom, disAs and subAgree measures. It is possible that the use of 
emoji responses and comments are too subjective to reveal any true patterns at all. For 
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this reason, it is necessary to evaluate whether interaction patterns comprised in disCom, 
disAs and subAgree correspond to the political affiliation of the users. 
 
 
For illustrative purposes the variables are shown as part of the communications flow as 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.0: COMMUNICATIONS FLOW WITH DISCOM, DISAS AND SUBAGREE 
 
To be able to check whether users are actually reacting in a politically significant way, 
1.200 posts using the categories political, non-political or proto-political are manually 
labelled by two researchers (thesis author + fellow researcher). A label is assigned 
depending on the content of the post independently of any other data related to that post. 
It is hypothesized that if people are reacting to posts in a politically significant way, then 
posts that contain political content should have very different reaction patterns than non-
political posts. 
As mentioned previously, not all posts have an equally high penetration of active users 
with politically significant profiles. Furthermore, common sense dictates that for example 
a post with only one reaction and one comment might provide very unreliable results. 
Therefore, in calculating disCom, disAs and subAgree a post must pass a certain condition 
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or the value will be Null. The conditions are shown in Table 6.0. The final dataset to be 
used for the rest of this study is the one called final selection. The second column in the 
table designates the number of posts that match the condition. 
 
Selection Number of non-
Null posts 
Condition 
all posts N = 56.782 No condition 
disCom N = 12.170 Minimum userPolPen = 40% AND minimum 10 politically 
significant users in each group (“like/love” vs. comment with no 
“like/love”) 
disAs N = 6.599 Minimum userPolPen = 40% AND minimum 10 politically 
significant users in each group (“like/love” vs. “angry/sad”) 
subAgree N = 9.488 Minimum userPolPen = 40% AND minimum 10 politically 
significant users in each group (commenter vs. positive comment 
reactions) 
final selection N = 14.455 At least one of the variables disCom, disAs or subAgree must be not 
Null.  
TABLE 6.0: CONDITIONAL FILTERING OF DATA SAMPLES 
 
Political posts are those connected to political parties, government, election, politicians, 
policies, known political issues or any other concept explicitly related to politics. Stories 
revolving around statements and proposals made by politicians and parties are the most 
typical political posts. Non-political posts are those that by no means have any political 
implication. For instance, the posts that are about sports and celebrities were labelled as 
non-political posts in our study. Proto-political posts are those that do not refer explicitly 
to political concepts but are related to issues that could easily take a political turn. 
Table 6.1 contains examples of some labelled posts. 
 
Example Post content Post link Explanation 
Political Bill English talks about national's 
child poverty target, urban planning 
and last night's debate 
https://www.facebook.com/Stuff.co.nz/
videos/10155730056819268/ 
The story is directly about the 
leader of the National party in 
a political context.  
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Proto-political #LIVE: Police hold a brief middle-of-
night (UK time) press conference in 
the wake of the suspected terror attack 
at an Ariana Grande concert that has 




This is a significant and sad 
story, that can have important 
political implications, but no 
explicit reference to politics is 
made in the news piece. 
Non-political Thieves took irreplaceable photos of 
Anna Geddes' deceased four-year-old 
daughter, Brydie, during a burglary at 




This story is not related to any 
prevalent political issues. 
TABLE 6.1: CODING EXAMPLES 
 
Posts that are explicitly related to politics, users are expected to more clearly position 
themselves politically in agreement or disagreement over the main message in the news 
piece. 
Values of disAs and disCom are not distributed equally. In order to ensure an equal 
distribution of high, middle and low values of disCom and disAs, posts are sampled as 
illustrated in Figure 6.1. It includes taking 250 random posts with disCom values above 
0.5 and the same with disAs. Lastly, 350 random posts with non-Null values of disCom 
and the same with disAs are taken, which comes to a total of 1200 posts. 
As a last step, two coders using the same guidelines as above independently recoded 100 
random posts. Calculating the pairwise intercoder agreement using Krippendorfs alpha 
yields α = 0.946.  
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FIGURE 6.1: HISTOGRAMS FOR DISCOM AND DISAS – SAMPLING STRATEGY SHOWN 
 
Results 
High levels of disagreement over political content 
In order to show the significance of agreement/disagreement patterns, we start by 
comparing the means of the three groups for the disCom and disAs variables. Table 6.2 
contains the means and standard deviations for all three variables across for political, 
proto-political and non-political posts. Political posts have significantly higher averages 
for both disCom and disAs values. For disCom proto-political posts also seem to have 
higher values than non-political posts, but since there are much fewer proto-political 
posts this is not completely reliable. The significant difference between non-political and 















non-pol -  pol -21.382 2.2E-16 -17.119 2.2E-16 8.8519 2.2E-11 
pol - proto-pol 6.9899 1.96E-09 6.8657 3.10E-08 -3.5699 0.0007901 
non-pol - proto-pol -2.4733 0.0164 
-
0.74313 0.4614 0.68565 0.4959 


















non-pol 0.240 0.167 0.335 0.228 0.543 0.162 578 
pol 0.499 0.219 0.659 0.216 0.445 0.136 515 
proto-pol 0.306 0.182 0.367 0.242 0.527 0.141 102 





It is worth noting that all groups have fairly high standard deviations on disCom and 
disAs. This demonstrates that while the average difference between political and non-
political is extremely significant there are some non-political posts that cause political 
disagreement. It suggests that topics, which appear non-political on the surface, might 
have latent political qualities.  
Users’ initial reaction to a post is shaped by the political standpoint of the user if the 
content is political, and it shows that disCom and disAs work as reliable measures for 
initial political disagreement. Through the inclusion of both disCom and disAs it is 
possible to show that emoji responses, which are sometimes considered ambiguous, do 
in fact correspond to the political alignment of users on average. 
 
Reaching agreement 
This part covers the relationship between disCom/disAs and subAgree. We can see 
already from Table 3 that average subAgree is significantly lower for political posts than 
non-political ones. However, in order to test the actual relationship three ordinary least 
squares regression models are run: subAgreeDisComMod, subAgreeDisAsMod and 
subAgreeFullMod. The two first ones model subAgree as a function of disCom and disAs 
respectively, and the last one contains both disCom and disAs. All models are 
accompanied by a selection of control variables such as total number of reactions, 
comments etc. They are shown in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 0.537477463 0.007450521 72.13958233 0 *** 
disCom -0.089419072 0.011591057 -7.714487941 1.35E-14 *** 
totalLike 3.57E-06 3.83E-06 0.93243216 0.351138653  
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totalLove -2.25E-05 7.95E-06 -2.824969243 0.004739091 ** 
totalSad 5.21E-05 1.10E-05 4.744934231 2.12E-06 *** 
totalAngry 2.41E-05 1.15E-05 2.087946182 0.036831194 * 
totalShares -5.03E-06 7.25E-06 -0.69382967 0.487807233  
totalReactions -1.55E-06 3.05E-06 -0.506603203 0.612445874  
totalComments 3.24E-05 6.86E-06 4.718966245 2.41E-06 *** 
 
TABLE 6.4: SUBAGREEDISCOMMOD (OLS) 
Formula: subAgree ~ disCom + totalLike + totalLove + totalSad + totalAngry + totalShares + totalReactions + 
totalComments. 
P <  *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 0.557910036 0.011427981 48.81965104 2e-16 *** 
disAs -0.108747428 0.012441909 -8.740413094 3.31E-18 *** 
totalLike 2.79E-06 4.97E-06 0.562663806 0.573694053  
totalLove 1.43E-05 1.07E-05 1.333180648 0.182545285  
totalSad 3.24E-05 1.44E-05 2.24948758 0.024533398 * 
totalAngry -1.19E-05 1.50E-05 -0.789653155 0.429775211  
totalShares -1.25E-05 9.92E-06 -1.262412368 0.206870968  
totalReactions 9.72E-07 3.86E-06 0.252107035 0.800970745  
totalComments 2.04E-05 8.78E-06 2.326134949 0.020059005 * 
 
TABLE 6.5: SUBAGREEDISASMOD (OLS) 
Formula: subAgree ~ disAs + totalLike + totalLove + totalSad + totalAngry + totalShares  + totalReactions + 
totalComments. 




Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 0.559527336 0.011850939 47.21375452 0 *** 
disCom -0.065797825 0.019505081 -3.373368378 0.000750494 *** 
disAs -0.091489049 0.016123734 -5.674184859 1.50E-08 *** 
totalLike 1.99E-06 4.99E-06 0.399383064 0.689634969  
totalLove 1.12E-05 1.08E-05 1.043535507 0.296771319  
totalSad 2.42E-05 1.45E-05 1.669049142 0.095195718  
totalAngry 1.35E-06 1.55E-05 0.087270244 0.930461622  
totalShares -5.92E-06 1.01E-05 -0.586937991 0.557282634  
totalReactions -1.09E-06 3.84E-06 -0.284798444 0.775815158  
totalComments 4.04E-05 9.04E-06 4.468083707 8.14E-06 *** 
 
TABLE 6.6: SUBAGREEFULLMOD (OLS) 
Formula: subAgree ~ disCom + disAs + totalLike + totalLove + totalSad + totalAngry + totalShares + 
totalReactions + totalComments. 
P <  *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 
 
In all three models disCom and disAs are negatively correlated with subAgree to a 
statistically significant degree (e.g. disCom estimate in subAgreeDisComMod = -
0.089419072). This means that high levels of political disagreement over the content of 
a post affects the second step in the communication flow yielding lower levels of 
subsequent agreement. However, it is worth noting that, while statistically significant, the 
correlation is not extremely strong. It can also be seen in Table 6.2 that the difference 
between the means of political and non-political is much lower for subAgree than for 
disCom and disAs. This suggest that there are many additional parameters that will 
influence whether a discussion might produce agreement across political lines. 
 
 145 
Disagreement during the election campaign 
As election campaigns in liberal democracies are often quite short and intense, the media 
typically delivers increased amounts of political content during that time. With a surge in 
political content published by mainstream media outlets one would expect higher levels 
of political disagreement over content on Facebook. In Figure 6.2 it shows that the 
average levels of disCom and disAs are increasing towards the election date, after which 
they drop again. Similarly, subAgree reaches a low point at the same time disCom and 
disAs are at their highest. It shows that initial political disagreement is highest around 
election time with subsequent agreement being at its lowest. However, it is important to 
notice that initial disagreement and subsequent agreement aren’t always moving in 
tandem. In the middle of 2016 it shows that disCom and disAs are at relatively high levels 
while subAgree is at its highest point. It suggests that even though subAgree is negatively 
correlated with disCom and disAs on the general level, there are cases where users are 
reaching subsequent agreement despite much initial disagreement. The disCom, disAs 
and subAgree measures might help point us towards the issues that either unite or 





FIGURE 6.2: TIMELINE FOR DISCOM, DISAS AND SUBAGREE 
 
Further Exploration: Distribution and Min/Max Examples 
The main purpose of this paper has been to show that there are clear patterns pertaining 
to how users position themselves politically in a two-step flow of responses to news 
pieces on Facebook conceptualized as initial political disagreement and subsequent 
agreement. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore the potential reasons for 
why particular content attain different combinations of values of disCom, disAs and 
subAgree. However, there is potential in further using these values to group, categorize 
and analyse public Facebook discussions, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This 
section includes a few examples of how the computational framework can be used for 
further exploration. This is done by manually looking at some of the posts that receive 
very high disCom or disAs, but very low subAgree (upper left corner of Figure 6.3) as well 
as those that score relatively high on both disCom/disAs and subAgree (upper right 




FIGURE 6.3: SCATTERPLOT FOR DISCOM AND SUBAGREE 
 
 
Top 5 posts with high initial disagreement and low subsequent agreement 
Table 6.7 contains some examples of posts that have very high disCom or disAs values 
while retaining a relatively low subAgree (Those closest to the upper left corner of Figure 
6.3). 
One can see that all posts are strongly framing a specific political party in terms of what 
they do and say, such as: “Pm announces…”, “Labour tidies up…”, “Ardern takes 
initiative…”. Interestingly two out of these five posts are about the financial plans drawn 
up by National and Labour, which suggests that their main economic policies sustain 
political division. A proposal about home improvements made by Green Party leader 
James Shaw also ends up with very low subsequent agreement. This could be of interest 
since home improvements might intuitively be topic where one would expect more 
political unity across the spectrum. 
 
Message Post Link disAs disCom subAgree 
pm tours hawke's bay and announces economic plan  
national says its five-point plan announced today will 
bring sustained economic success.  




1503462&objectid=11923536 0.809 0.861 0.151 
labour tidies up tax policy  
labour tidies up its tax policy.  




1503462&objectid=11922151 Null 0.669 0.055 
labour lays out financial plan with billions more for 
health, education  
  
labour has put its money where its mouth is - what's 





education Null 0.615 0.039 
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comment: ardern takes the initiative  
jacinda ardern was the winner of the leaders’ debate 
in christchurch last night in her most spirited and 
interesting clash yet with bill English....  
"Jacinda ardern was the winner of the leaders’ debate 
in Christchurch last night in her most spirited and 
interesting clash yet with bill English." do you agree? 
have your say in our poll, which is included in Eileen 
Goodwin’s opinion piece. 
https://www.odt.co.nz/news/
election-2017/comment-
ardern-takes-initiative Null 0.740 0.084 
'housing kills more people than our road toll' – greens 
pledge $500 million to insulate homes  
James Shaw says there would also be warrant of 
fitness rules for rentals under a plan for warm, dry 
homes.  
Mr Shaw said poor quality housing "kills more people 






homes-if-in-government Null 0.673 0.144 
 
TABLE 6.7: EXAMPLES OF POSTS WITH HIGH DISCOM/DISAS AND LOW SUBAGREE 
 
Top 5 posts with high initial disagreement and high subsequent agreement 
The posts, shown in Table 6.8, that start out with high initial disagreement and then ends 
up with relatively high levels of subsequent agreement are topically quite diverse. 
Two of them are related to U.S. politics, which might suggest that NZ citizens can easily 
unite over their relation to the U.S. One also sees people uniting over the stepping down 
of Green Party leader Metiria Turei, who admitted having defrauded the NZ social 
benefits system when she was younger. In a more positive way for Greens, users also 
seem to come together over Green MP Chloe Swarbrick’s decision to join a weapons expo 
protest. 
These are just a few examples and no broad trends can be extracted from them. However, 
by expanding the analytical frame either qualitatively or quantitatively it might be 
possible to learn more about how or why users reach agreement over political (or non-
political) issues in a public online forum such as Facebook. 
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Message Post Link disAs disCom subAgree 
former green party co-leader metiria turei's political career 
likely to be over    #breaking  metiria turei could be looking 




d=11925699 0.665 0.527 0.815 
southland's perspective on the us elections  
americans in southland keeping a close eye on the us election 
tim newman last updated 16:31, november 9 2016 staff will 
it be donald trump or hillary clinton for us president? an 
american woman living on a dairy farm near otautau says the 
us election is "crazy".elisa ternstrom, born and raised in or...  
"it's crazy - it's like a reality tv show with the kardashians." 
americans living in southland give us their thoughts on the us 







election Null 0.676 0.831 
pm bill english on waitangi and his talk with donald trump  
mike puru and trudi nelson talk with prime minister bill 
english on waitangi weekend and his chat with united states 
president donald trump in the weekend.  
if you were in bill english's shoes and received a call on your 
cellphone from us president donald trump, what topics 
would you raise? mikeandtrudi talked with the nz prime 







.aspx Null 0.723 0.734 
new green mp chloe swarbrick turns out to support 'weapons 
expo' protests in wellington  
protesters from around the country have gathered in the 
hopes of disrupting the delegates.  
"i think it’s really crucial that we do things like 










wellington-v1 0.795 0.737 0.695 
kiwis in oz: stop whinging  
 migrants should add to a country. the simple reality is, if you 




0589/ Null 0.666 0.729 
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TABLE 6.8: EXAMPLES OF POSTS WITH HIGH DISCOM/DISAS AND HIGH SUBAGREE 
 
Utility of Political Disagreement Measures 
The purpose of this chapter has been to present the main techniques used to calculate 
political homophily and agreement/disagreement for any given public Facebook post. 
Additionally, the chapter has explored some patterns related to the proposed measures, 
especially those pertaining to agreement/disagreement, in order to verify that they can 
be used to analyse actual political behaviour.  
In chapter 8 the aim is to examine patterns of cross-cutting agreement meaning 
agreement that happens across political oppositions. As was demonstrated in this 
chapter, getting a solid indicator for cross-cutting agreement is difficult using either of 
the disCom or subAgree measures independently; they have to be used in combination. 
To make analysis more manageable it would be useful to combine disCom/disAs and 
subAgree into a single measure, however this will not be done until chapter 8 because it 
is easier to grasp when employed in the context of the final analysis. 
The final analysis will explore how political homophily and agreement/disagreement 
relate to public opinion in the Danish public on Facebook with respect to various spaces, 
topics, sentiments and periods. Before this can be accomplished, it is necessary to 
establish a method for sorting and categorizing posts based on which type of space it 
appears in, the topic that it discusses, and the language used by the users in response. The 
next chapter will present the page categories, topics and sentiment analysis strategies 
used to accomplish this. 
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Chapter 7. Page Categories, Topics and 
Sentiments 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and test methods for determining the category 
of pages on which a discussion might take place, the topic of discussion and the sentiment 
of a discussion. The results obtained through the methods in this chapter will later be 
combined with information from chapter 6 in order to analyse the distribution of political 
homogeneity and disagreement across spaces, topics and sentiments in chapter 8. One 
thing that sets this chapter apart from the two previous chapters is that each method is 
more restricted to a particular language/culture. They can technically be applied in any 
country, but not without additional, manual preparation of data (e.g. determining the 
sentiment of a text requires some data to be prepared by human coders22). For this 
reason, and to make the full analysis more focused, the methods described here will be 
applied only to the Danish dataset. 
Page Categories 
Designating categories for pages within each data collection is the simplest out of the 
three (page categories, topics and sentiments, data preparation) steps in this chapter.  
It was mentioned in chapter 4 that the Danish dataset contains thousands of public 
Facebook pages. Each page can be considered its own space, its own little corner of 
Facebook, which greatly influences who the participants are as well as their expectations 
and subsequent behaviour. However, for the purpose of analysing broad trends and 
general patterns of potential polarization and de-polarization in the Danish Facebook 
public it can become a bit problematic to consider each page as its own unique space. As 
was mentioned in chapter 4 all pages already correspond to a specific collection of either 
political pages, media pages, local pages, union pages or public organization pages. These 
 
22 A few languages such as English can be considered an exception to this restriction because similar 
classifiers of sentiment already exist. In practice though, the application and preparing of additional models 
is still required.  
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collections can be useful as categories; however, they can also obscure some significant 
differences within the categories, especially for a very broad and diverse collection such 
as media pages. It is desirable to categorize pages at a meso level between the macro level 
of each data collection and the micro-level of each individual page.  
The approach for dividing Facebook pages into categories pertaining to the type of page 
it represents can best be described as heuristic. Two of the data collections, political 
pages and local pages, already have inherent meso level categories from the way the 
pages were collected. Political pages, be it individual politicians or party pages, all 
correspond to the political party they represent, and thus the page categories for political 
pages will consist of each of the parties in parliament during the period captured in the 
data collection. Local pages were collected by searching for pages that represented local 
municipalities (communes) around the country. Thus, page categories for local pages 
correspond to any of the 98 Danish communes that a page might represent.  
In Denmark labour unions are organized such that each union traditionally represents a 
specific group of workers (e.g. transportation personnel, nurses, psychologists). Some are 
naturally bigger than others, but most unions also belong to an umbrella organization 
that is responsible for negotiating the overall conditions and rules of employment with 
public and private institutions. Page categories for unions are those that correspond to 
these umbrella organizations. The umbrella organization LO for example, contains most 
unions that are involved with manual labour and trades. FTF is made up of unions that 
represent nurses, social workers and teachers and AC contains unions for academic 
professions across all fields. The union system is largely influenced by tradition and 
anyone can join any union even if it does not typically represent their profession. A 
handful of unions make it their mission to be independent of professional traditions and 
are not associated with the umbrella organizations. These will be given the label: 
Independent. 
Media pages is the largest of the five data collections even though it contains the second 
lowest number of individual pages (137). Dividing these into a dozen categories can make 
it significantly easier to navigate the data load. The choice of categories will build on the 
author’s experience as a native Dane and media scholar. The focus of the analysis is on 
very broad and clearly observable trends and it is assumed that any bias in choosing the 
categories of the pages should not impact the general trends too much. Furthermore, the 
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categories are fairly broad and designed to fit the general expectation of the average 
Danish person. Some pages could potentially be put in more than one category, but in that 
case it will only carry the one category that is the best fit. The main approach can best be 
described as phenomenological and heuristic meaning that a page will be put into the 
category that best describes what sets the news content of the organization apart from 
other media outlets.  
The following 13 media categories are conceived: Business, Culture, Debate, General News, 
Infotainment, Left Leaning News, Right Leaning News, Lifestyle, Local News, Political News, 
Sports and Tabloid. A small selection of pages that do not fit into any category will be given 
the label Other and will be omitted from some analyses.  
Some categories are self-explanatory such as Business, Tabloid and Sports. Right and left 
leaning news are those media outlets, which are known to either promote certain political 
views or simply be overwhelmingly popular with either right- or left-wing voters. 
Political News are those that specialize in political content, but are considered to be 
mostly neutral, which can actually be backed with some of the results presented in the 
next chapter, which show close to 50/50 participation from both right- and left-wing 
voters on these pages. General News more or less consists of all the most popular media 
outlets that are not considered tabloids such as DR the national public service news 
provider or Berlingske, a commercially driven news outlet that a few might consider 
politically biased, but generally embraced by a diverse cross-section of the Danish public. 
The last data collection subset is the one that consists of public organizations such as 
NGOs, charities, government agencies and lobby organizations. No apparent 
categorizations schema could be found that was better than the generic one provided by 
Facebook, so it has been adopted here. 
 
Topics 
Being able to recognize patterns across various topics allows for a more precise mapping 
of the kinds of behaviour that is correlated with cross-cutting agreement. It is likely that 
topic of discussion is an important factor contributing to whether people agree or 
disagree about certain things. Whether a topic is politically pressing has a significant 
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impact on people’s engagement in relation to cross-cutting agreement (Gerber, Huber, 
Doherty & Dowling, 2012). Additionally, as was mentioned in chapter 3, the context to a 
particular discussion, including the topic, is a strong factor in determining participants’ 
preferences for homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of groups and thus should be relevant for 
people’s initial disposition towards either agreement or disagreement (Morey & Boukes, 
2018). This study therefore takes the approach that cross-cutting agreement and 
disagreement are not evenly distributed across topics. Using a Big Data approach with 
high granularity can provide fairly accurate estimates of how much topics differ in terms 
of eliciting cross-cutting agreement or not. 
The primary methodological challenge is how to categorize individual discussions, which 
entails developing a procedure for dividing discussions into groups based on their topic. 
Grimmer & Stewart (2013) provides a solid overview of the most typical approaches 
when dealing with text classification tasks. The validity and effectiveness of certain 
approaches are highly dependent on the main research objectives. Since this thesis relies 
on a Big Data approach, one requirement is that the classification procedure is 
automatable. Furthermore, the focus of this study is on how polarization patterns and 
cross-cutting agreement are distributed across different topics, rather than exploring 
which topics can be found or which are the most salient. For this reason, the approach of 
choice is dictionary methods, which are based on sets of words or n-grams that 
correspond to pre-selected categories (ibid., 8). Simply put, a word such as “dogfood” can 
be attributed to the topic “animals and pets”, then depending on how many times the 
word “dogfood” appears in a text, the probability that the text revolves around the topic 
“animals and pets” can be calculated. 
One of the advantages of dictionary methods is that they are very intuitive; there is a 
simple connection between a piece of text and its designated category. A disadvantage 
compared to methods such as machine learning based supervised classification or 
manual coding is that validating the effectiveness of the chosen categories becomes 
difficult. There is no straightforward way to estimate whether the words and phrases 
chosen to mirror a certain topic are the best ones. Furthermore, one of the most 
significant biases to be aware of when applying dictionary methods is when drawing 
upon lists of words and phrases used in previous studies as these are often highly context 
dependent with respect to the specific study for which they were developed (Loughran & 
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McDonald, 2011). For this reason, a list of words and their corresponding topics was 
developed specifically for this thesis. 
The formula used to calculate which category a certain text falls under can vary 
depending on the purpose of the study (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013, 9). The first aspect to 
deal with is whether a discussion can only be labelled with one primary topic or is 
allowed to stretch across several topics. Intuitively the latter approach will appear to 
most adequately model the real world since actual communication practices rarely fit into 
neat categories such that all individual texts always pertain to only a single topic. It seems 
natural that some discussions may touch upon several topics, although there is still an 
advantage in being able to calculate the topic that is most strongly accentuated in a text. 
It might be relevant for discussions that loosely touch upon several topics, but still have 
one clear main topic to only count the main topic. In this thesis both approaches will be 
included. For summary statistics such as comparing distributions of polarization and 
cross-cutting agreement across different topics it is useful to only count each distinct 
discussion once, meaning a discussion can only fall into one topic. Restricting a discussion 
to only its primary topic will help sharpen the contrast between topics, rather than 
allowing discussion to span multiple topics, which would account for more complexity, 
but also make interpretations of the results more difficult. This requires a formula to 
determine which topic is most salient in any given discussion. In another case, where 
topics can be used as control variables when modelling the impact of features such as use 
of emojis, sex or language use, it can be a better approach to include all occurrences of 
topically charged words and then let the regression function sort out the relative import 
of each topic. The next section will go into further detail about topic choices and 
calculations. 
 
Topic calculations and representations 
For dictionary methods to work properly topics must be chosen from the outset and a list 
of words corresponding to each topic must be manually compiled using inputs from 
previous research, domain knowledge and exploration of the data. This project takes its 
main inspiration from the agenda setting literature where media coverage based on 
topicality has long been a focus area. Groshek & Groshek (2013) presents a list of 17 
topics used to categorize news stories based on content, which will be used as the point 
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of departure for choosing topics. However it will be updated to focus slightly more on 
political topics and be more applicable in a Danish context. Topics such as sports and 
culture are merged and so are the topics media and technology. The topics accidents and 
oddities are removed and instead the broad category politics is divided into foreign 
policy, social policy, domestic policy and refugees and integration. The complete list of 
topics and descriptions can be found in Appendix 7.0-SI. Finding all words and phrases 
that would best represent each of the topics requires a bit of manual work. Initial 
inspiration was sourced from the Danish media monitoring company Infomedia23. A 
combination of said list and the researcher’s own knowledge of Danish news media and 
culture was used to compile a list of 2750 words corresponding to the chosen topics. As 
mentioned in the previous section, one of the disadvantages of dictionary methods is that 
it is difficult to validate the effectiveness of a specific dictionary, especially when it is 
applied to a huge dataset. However, because the dataset is large and since the main focus 
is on fairly broad trends, total precision with respect to matching words with topics is not 
an absolute requirement for the method to be useful. Still, one step of iterative correction 
was applied, which entailed picking 10 random Facebook posts labelled with a specific 
topic and then changing or removing words in the list if not all 10 posts were related to 
the topic. This process concluded in a final list of 2834 words corresponding to 16 topics 
including an additional topic named “other” for all posts that did not contain any of the 
keywords. 
Following the usage logics presented above, a given discussion (a Facebook post) can be 
represented by the vector x where each element corresponds to the number of word 
occurrences that match one of the 17 chosen topics. Many posts might have multiple 
topics, but for the final analysis, it is useful to be able to reduce one Facebook post to a 
single topic. The list of words used to designate each topic is far from perfect. Some topics 
are by definition broader than others and some specific words used to designate them 
are likely to be more common. Thus, a method is needed to provide the best possible 
estimate for what is most likely the main topic of a given post. For this reason, the final 
score for each topic is given by the very popular TF-IDF formula (term frequency * inverse 
document frequency) (Řehůřek, 2011). This means that topics and words that are rarer 
 
23 https://infomedia.dk/blog/lyt-og-laer-kom-godt-i-gang-med-social-listening/. The list of words and 
corresponding topics used for consultation in the research design is no longer available at the provided 
link. 
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will be given a relatively higher value. For example, if a post contains one instance of a 
frequently occurring word and one instance of a fairly uncommon word, then the topic 
corresponding to the uncommon word will be given precedence, thus being labelled as 
the main topic for the post. Equation 7.0 shows the frequency value for a given word t 





Equation 7.0 TF-IDF formula. 
 
The topic with the highest word count after the formula is applied to the word is labelled 
as the primary topic for a given post. 
 
Harsh Language 
As showed in the social analytics framework in chapter 4 sentiment or opinion mining is 
a central analytic piece when extracting knowledge from communicative behaviour on 
social media. Registering the overall tone in the great masses of texts available from such 
online spaces as social media platforms has caught the interests of especially marketers 
and political scientists in the last decade. Indeed, if writing on social media in relation to 
a specific product or public figure is notably positive or negative, it can be a powerful 
predictor of the public’s actual, although simplified, opinion on any topic (Jungherr, 
2015). The techniques associated with opinion mining have been heralded as a much 
cheaper and more effective tool for mapping public opinion compared to traditional 
survey approaches (Dalton, 2016). Though it should be mentioned that mining opinion 
from social media is often reduced to gauging whether feelings towards certain themes, 
ideas, products or people are positive or negative and can rarely be used to determine 
the complexities inherent in the opinions of individuals, especially in cases where the 
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overall sentiment is both positive and negative. In the perspective of Big Data methods 
versus traditional quantitative approaches, an increase in volume, velocity and variety 
does come at the expense of specificity, peculiarity and depth. Social media-based opinion 
mining can cover more opinions, more topics and can be updated in near-real time 
without any additional costs, however it can be difficult to extract the opinions to very 
specifically formulated questions or explore the complexities of how people feel about 
certain issues. 
The most popular term in the methodological literature is sentiment analysis (SA). It 
encapsulates the general approach of extracting sentiment from texts. As was mentioned 
in the previous section, there is a range of different approaches such as dictionary 
methods and supervised or unsupervised machine learning techniques, however at the 
time of writing supervised machine learning is by far the most researched approach for 
automatic sentiment analysis of texts from digital online media (Kumar & Jaiswal, 2019). 
One of the reasons for the popularity of this approach is its simplicity and flexibility with 
respect to how the automatic classification algorithm is trained. In a nutshell an algorithm 
is designed to simply recognize certain inputs such as examples of positively and 
negatively laden texts. One selection of texts is labelled as negative and another is labelled 
positive and then an algorithm is trained to best distinguish between the two selections 
until its accuracy can increase no further (Grus, 2015, 95). In contrast to the dictionary-
based methods mentioned in the previous section, where a human agent is responsible 
for selecting words associated with a certain topic, this approach lets the machine figure 
out which words or combinations of words are most likely to cause a text to have a 
positive or negative tone, though the individual texts are still labelled by a human.  The 
algorithm can easily be tweaked to specifically recognize texts that use violent or 
derogatory language instead of generic representations of negatively laden language, 
which is the background for one of the largest subfields of sentiment analysis, hate speech 
detection. Attempting to recognize texts that specifically contain hate speech, rather than 
just whether the tone is negative or positive, brings a lot of additional challenges with it 
because the context is much more sensitive to social and cultural issues (MacAveney et 
al., 2019). Furthermore, on the whole, supervised machine learning for general sentiment 
analysis and hate speech detection has become a huge research area, and what has, in this 
section, been presented as a very intuitive, simple and flexible method is by no means an 
easy thing to deploy. There are many technical intricacies pertaining to which statistical 
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techniques are best used to optimize each individual algorithm, which is again dependent 
on the data used as input. Machine learning and artificial intelligence is only as good as 
the data used to train its underlying algorithms (Géron, 2017, 6). For this reason, the 
meticulousness of the human agents responsible for labelling the texts used to train the 
algorithm has a huge impact its effectiveness. This aspect is in many ways similar to 
issues in traditional content analysis techniques where the role of human coders is 
equally important. One key difference introduced by Big Data methods, which is 
especially relevant for supervised machine learning, is that "more trumps better” (Mayer-
Schoenberger & Cuckier, 2013). There is a trade-off where a small increase in how 
accurately texts are labelled is less important than simply increasing the number of 
labelled texts.  
In this thesis supervised machine learning is used to model harsh language use in Danish 
posts and comments on social media. The motivation behind tracing opinion sentiment 
is to be able to account for how people generally feel about certain topics or specific 
events. Because this project is aimed specifically at polarization and cross-cutting 
agreement it is of greater interest whether language is intentionally aggressive or not 
rather than the more generic dichotomy of negativity versus positivity. The original idea 
was to train a model that could recognize hateful speech, however such speech turned 
out to be fairly rare, only occurring in very specific situations. Instead the definition was 
changed to “harsh language” in order to be a bit less specific than the violent or 
threatening language aimed at minority groups, which are some of the characteristics 
often associated with hate speech. Harsh language is rather defined as instances of speech 
that is unnecessarily harsh to a degree where it is not productive for the debate. Using 
terms such as “idiot” or “clumsy clown” can be appropriate if used in the right context or 
to make a satirical point. In the same way, calling the prime minister an idiot compared 
to calling a fellow commenter an idiot can generally be regarded as less harsh. These 




Being able to map harsh language in relation to political polarization and cross-cutting 
agreement requires the training of an algorithm that will be able to automatically 
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evaluate the millions of Facebook posts and comments used as empirical data. As 
described in the previous section, supervised machine learning for sentiment analysis 
entails a selection of texts (posts and comments) to be first manually labelled by human 
coders as either containing or not containing harsh language and then used as inputs to 
train a statistical model. This section will describe the concrete steps necessary for 
obtaining a useful model. The main steps involve 1) coding posts and comments based on 
whether or not they contain harsh language, 2) transform the texts into a data format that 
is appropriate for formal statistical analysis, 3) train a model that is able to automatically 
recognize if a text contains harsh language or not. As briefly mentioned in the previous 
section, automatic sentiment analysis is a huge research area in its own right.  
In the first step, three coders, all of whom were undergraduate students at the time, were 
recruited in addition to the author, for a total of four coders. After discussing the 
definition of harsh language (language that is unnecessarily harsh), 20,000 posts and 
comments were randomly selected and distributed among the coders. Texts were 
required to have a minimum length of 100 characters in order to make performance more 
reliable as very short texts will often contain too little information. This requirement 
pertains to both the coding process as well as the analysis meaning the final model is not 
applied to any text shorter than 100 characters, these will instead be labelled as null. Out 
of the 20.000 texts 538 were determined by the coder to be either non-sensical or too 
ambiguous for coding, 2.102 were labelled as harsh language and 17,360 were labelled 
as not harsh language. This comes to a fairly uneven distribution of labelled data samples 
since only a little less than 11% of texts contains harsh language, which provides some 
additional challenges when training the final model. In order to ensure the quality of the 
coded data, 150 texts were labelled by all four coders, which produced a Krippendorff’s 
alpha of .81. 
Since all statistical models are based on numerical inputs, a step must be taken to convert 
all texts into a format that is compatible with known mathematical structures. Simply put, 
strings of words need to become numbers. One of the most well-known approaches is 
known as the bag-of-words (sometimes called bag-of-ngrams) approach, where a text can 
be represented as an n-dimensional vector with each element corresponding to a certain 
word or combination of words to which the value represents the number of occurrences 
of that word in a specific text. If 1000 texts all together contains 10,000 distinct words, 
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which is known as the vocabulary, then each of these texts can be represented by a vector 
with length 10.000 where element no. 3694 might correspond to the word “angry” and 
the value will designate the number of times that “angry” can be found in the text. All texts 
can then be represented by a m × n matrix (1000 × 10.000), though it goes without saying 
that it will be a sparse matrix containing many zeroes since a short text containing only 
30 words still needs to be represented by a vector with length 10.000, even though most 
of the words in the full vocabulary have zero occurrences in the specific text.  
The bag-of-words is used as the point of departure for converting texts to numerical 
representations. One of its main limitations is that the order of the words in a text is not 
accounted for. There are models such as those based on convolutional neural networks 
which are better able to account for the context around each word based on its preceding 
and succeeding words (Johnson & Zhang, 2015). However, since the techniques required 
for such approaches drastically increase the complexity of the model, the amount of 
labelled training data needs to increase in proportion for the model to actually perform 
better (Johnson & Zhang, 2016). Obtaining a huge amount of labelled texts is not feasible 
in this project, which is why text pre-processing is based on the bag-of-words approach, 
although a few techniques are used to optimize the usefulness of the numerical text 
representations beyond simply counting words. Three aspects are often addressed in 
bag-of-words approaches: 1) definitions of word-tokens, 2) calculating word importance, 
3) word similarities. 
When converting texts to structured data some cleaning steps are often necessary. 
Normally texts become tokenized and each word, separated by a whitespace, is regarded 
as a single token. If no cleaning is carried out these two tokens would not be identical: 
“awesome” and “awesome.” because one of them ends with a period. A way to mitigate 
this is to simply remove all periods from the text before tokenizing it. Other choices have 
to do with whether to include words with spelling mistakes or non-sensical strings of 
letters. It can seem tempting to only include words found in an official dictionary, 
however sometimes, especially on social media, some words are repeatedly misspelled, 
and such behaviour can carry a lot of information with it (Řehůřek, 2011, 17). Some more 
advanced approaches include stemming and lemmatization. The former is the process of 
merging words that basically describe the same thing into identical tokens such that the 
words: “truck” and “trucks” become the same token. The latter describes the opposite 
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process, that of separating words that appear similar but have different meanings 
depending on whether they are a noun or a verb such as “ferry” and “ferry”. Stemming 
and lemmatization require specialized, pre-programmed algorithms that are able to 
determine parts of speech (e.g. verb, noun etc.), which could not be found for Danish 
language in a reliable version. However, using a technique called word2vec, which will be 
described later, most of the benefits of stemming and lemmatization can be retained. 
As mentioned, the basic version of the bag-of-words approach entails simply counting the 
occurrences of specific tokens in a text. However, some words have a tendency to occur 
much more often than others. Words such as “you” or “think” will often occur several 
times in the same text and thus many texts will demonstrate high values for such tokens 
even though common sense dictates that they are fairly neutral and unlikely to be 
important when identifying harsh language use. One of the most popular weighting 
schemes TF-IDF (term frequency * inverse document frequency), which was mentioned 
in the previous section, is an attempt to account for the relative importance of words 
across the entire corpus of texts (Řehůřek, 2011). Basically, words are assigned higher 
values if they are only found in a small handful of texts. Using this weighting scheme also 
increases one’s ability to determine the most important words for the classification task. 
In total the relatively small training data sample of roughly 20.000 texts contain a 
vocabulary of nearly 60.000 unique word-tokens. By including only words that appear at 
least 3 times the vocabulary size can be decreased to around 18.000. This is however still 
a large vocabulary and the computational power required to test many different models 
that all need to make millions of multiplications of these m × n matrices is still a little bit 
outside the resources available for this project. But, as mentioned earlier, it is common 
sense that some words are likely to be somewhat unimportant for classifying harsh 
language. By only selecting the word-tokens that have the highest values for each class 
(harsh language and not harsh language) compared to the rest of the classes. This means 
that if a maximum vocabulary of 5.000 words was enforced we would select the 2.500 
words that have the highest proportion of the TF-IDF weighted values for texts labelled 
as harsh language, and vice versa for not harsh language. Selecting the final classification 
model will include testing different vocabulary sizes. 
One last concern is addressed, which has to do with one of the inherent weaknesses in 
the bag-of-words approach. Words like “angry” and “furious” are semantically similar, 
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but when used as tokens in numerical representations of texts they are treated as fully 
dissimilar words. It is common sense that some language patterns will become clearer if 
it is possible to account for the semantic similarities between words. A seminal paper 
from 2013 presented an effective solution to this issue, which is most often referred to as 
Word2Vec (Mikolov, Chen, Corrado & Dean, 2013). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
cover all the details of how Word2Vec models are calculated.  
In brief, the intuition behind Word2Vec modelling is to take a huge corpus of texts, which 
in this case comes to approximately 2 million Facebook posts and more than 30 million 
comments written in Danish language. Based on how certain words are used together, i.e. 
appear near to each other in sentences or in specific sequences, word similarities can be 
extracted. The final Word2Vec model then contains n-length vectors representing every 
single word in the corpus where vector length depends on how much complexity should 
be retained in the representation of the word. Recommended length is 100-300 (Mikolov, 
Chen, Corrado & Dean, 2013, 7), to which a vector length of 250 was chosen for this 
project. The similarity between two words can then always be calculated using the 
distance between the vectors representing the two words24. 
A last synchronizing step is necessary before the Word2Vec model can be included in the 
final classifier to be trained to detect harsh language. The model is already based on a 
bag-of-words representation where each word-token corresponds to one element (a 
scalar) in an n-length vector. However, the Word2Vec model converts each word to a 
vector in its own right, thus, to get a meaningful representation of a single text, all word 
vectors should be transposed and averaged such that the full text can be represented by 
a 250-length vector. This process is called Doc2Vec (Kim, Seo, Cho & Kang, 2019). Using 
Doc2Vec provides increased flexibility meaning that a text can be represented purely by 
a 250-length vector of Word2Vec representations of words found in that text or this can 
be concatenated with the original n-length vector of TF-IDF weighted word counts. Tools 
used to create Word2Vec models have been adopted into the Python based library 
Gensim (Řehůřek, 2011), which is used in this project. 
To summarize, the following choices were made as part of text pre-processing: 
 
24 There are many ways to calculate the distance between two n-length vectors. The distance between the 
cosine angle in vector space was used earlier in this thesis. 
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- All punctuation symbols were removed except when used together in cases where 
they form often used emojis (e.g. “: - )”). 
- All words were converted to lowercase. 
- Misspellings and non-sensical strings of characters were not removed. 
- Stemming and lemmatization were not applied. 
- TF-IDF weighting schema was applied. 
- A Word2Vec model was calculated and the per text averaged Doc2Vec was 
attached as a potential m × 250 feature to the text corpus. 
 
Training the Algorithm 
The training of supervised machine learning classifiers is a highly technical procedure 
where many different models and statistical techniques can be applied and tweaked in 
order to find the optimal algorithm. It is good to keep in mind that the purpose of this 
thesis is not to train the best harsh language detection algorithm, but rather to find the 
best possible one within the standard guidelines for model selection in supervised 
classification. One of the more typical approaches is to apply a degree of model 
agnosticism, which means that a few fixed versions of the input data are fed to a selection 
of the most popular classification models in order to see which one performs best when 
tasked with recognizing texts containing harsh language (Montiel et al., 2018). Most 
machine learning models have what is known as tuning parameters that determine 
aspects such as when the optimizer function should stop trying to converge. However, 
instead of trying to tune all these for a single model, it can be more effective to simply go 
with the default settings recommended by the developers of the models and then just test 
a variety of models while only tuning a one or two parameters. 
The only model parameter (known as a hyperparameter in machine learning) to be 
considered is the regularization parameter. Regularization prevents weights from getting 
too high or low, which would cause some words to have disproportional impact on the 
evaluation. It is important in order to alleviate the risk of overfitting the model to the 
input data, which is a common problem with advanced machine learning techniques and 
complex, high-dimensional data. The model will simply become too good at recognizing 
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patterns found in the input data, but when applied to new cases that might have a few 
additional, not previously seen patterns, the model performs badly. Simply put, based on 
the input value to the regularization parameter, the model prevents the values for the 
final parametrized model from becoming too high thereby making the model more robust 
(Géron, 2017, 27). In summary, the models to be tested will be different combinations of 
the following three aspects: 
 
1. Input data: This involves the size of the vocabulary as well as whether or not to 
include the Word2Vec representations of the texts. 
2. Model type: This involves which base algorithm to use (e.g. Logistic Regression, 
Random Forest Classifier, Multi Perceptron Neural Network etc.). The model type 
chosen is not of great concern since its performance and robustness is the only 
actual interest. The selection is made among a list of the most often used models 
in the machine learning literature, which is compiled by the developers of the SK-
Learn library (Géron, 2017). 
3. Regularization Value: A high, low and middle value is chosen as a potential 
regularization value for each model instance. This only applies to models that use 
regularization. 
 
The final results of the performance testing can be found in Table 7.025. All values 
reported are the macro means for the 10-fold cross-validation, which means that 10 
permutations of the data trained and tested. The split between test and training data is 
15%/85%. 
As mentioned earlier, data samples are not evenly distributed between the two classes 
(harsh language and not harsh language), which is why the F1-metric should be used as 
the most important model selection criterion. Accuracy is important; however, the F1-
score measures the balance between the number of true negatives and true positives, 
which is critical with uneven distributions. A model with an 80% accuracy but only true 
negatives and zero true positives is not a useful classifier. Fortunately, accuracy and F1-
seems to go somewhat hand in hand. The best performing model appears to be a Multi-
 
25 Only the top results are shown in the table. The full table can be found in Appendix 7.1-SI. 
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Layer Perceptron Neural Network using input data with a vocabulary of 7500 words, 
including the 250 features given by the Word2Vec model, and a L2 regularization penalty 
of 2.5. 
 
Model Name Accuracy F1-Macro Accuracy Std. F1-Macro Std. Run time 
MLPClassifier_alpha=2.5_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.8212 0.6987 0.0038 0.0099 0:20:53 
MLPClassifier_alpha=5.8_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.8256 0.6944 0.0054 0.0111 0:26:08 
MLPClassifier_alpha=1.09_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.8156 0.6935 0.0058 0.0118 0:11:48 
LogisticRegression_C=1.09_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.7986 0.684 0.0074 0.0074 15:02:29 
LinearSVC_C=0.055_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.8061 0.6812 0.006 0.01 0:39:36 
LinearSVC_C=1.09_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.7973 0.6797 0.006 0.0096 1:34:09 
LogisticRegression_C=2.5_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.7909 0.6789 0.0128 0.0172 1 day, 0:27:06 
LinearSVC_C=2.5_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.7967 0.6786 0.0056 0.0091 1:37:58 
MLPClassifier_alpha=0.055_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.8095 0.6784 0.0065 0.0102 0:11:57 
LogisticRegression_C=0.055_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.8162 0.6779 0.006 0.0098 0:01:44 
LinearSVC_C=5.8_nwords=7500_word2vec_ 0.795 0.677 0.006 0.0096 1:43:12 
MLPClassifier_alpha=2.5_nwords=7500_ 0.8122 0.6768 0.0089 0.0154 0:22:11 
LogisticRegression_C=1.09_nwords=7500_ 0.8045 0.6759 0.0084 0.0149 0:07:01 
LogisticRegression_C=2.5_nwords=7500_ 0.8037 0.6757 0.0083 0.0145 0:11:13 
Table 7.0 Harsh language prediction models performance 
 
The best model will be applied directly to all posts and comments in the final analysis in 
the next chapter. Since all models employ a so-called SoftMax function (Géron, 2017, 139) 
to determine if a piece of text contains harsh language, it is possible to extract a 
probabilistic measure instead of just the binary harsh language / not harsh language. This 
helps to account for some of the uncertainty in the model. Using the harsh language 
models in the final analysis entails summing over the likelihoods that a text contains 
harsh language. If a post has 20 comments where 19 are 0 % likely to contain harsh 
language and 1 comment is 50%, then that discussion has a total 5% probability of 
containing harsh language.  
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Chapter 8. Patterns of Political Homophily 
and Cross-cutting Agreement in the 
Danish Public on Facebook 
 
Preparing analysis 
The data preparation process described in the three previous chapters requires multiple 
analytic steps in order to organize all actors, posts, comments and interactions as well as 
the textual content of each message. It requires the parsing of hundreds of millions of 
data points. It is unfeasible to run the full data preparation process every time a single 
aspect is analysed. The data preparation requires one last technical step where all the 
data is batched and aggregated at a level that is suitable for performing flexible analysis. 
The analysis is focused on how indicators of political polarization/de-polarization change 
over time, how they are distributed across spaces and topics and which characteristics of 
a discussion are most likely to push it towards either polarization or de-polarization. For 
this reason, all values can be aggregated at the level of a single post without losing critical 
information. However, because it can potentially be useful to look at which individual 
comments are most influential on the outcome of a discussion, some of these need to be 
retained. The data for the final analysis is split into three parts: 1) posts, 2) comments 
and 3) replies. The data structure is designed so that all three can be combined along both 
the first and second axis26. As an example, comments can be joined with the respective 
posts on which they originated, but they can also be analysed independently of the posts 
they belong to. This also means that all three parts will technically share the exact same 
variables, even though some variables will only be relevant for posts. Thus, for the final 
dataset every row can be considered either a post, comment or reply and each contains 
all the variables described in Appendix 8.0-SI. Each post, comment or reply contains a lot 
 
26 In SQL-language this corresponds to both union and join operations.  
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of variables, but these variables can roughly be divided into a number of categories. First, 
base variables contain the most rudimentary pieces of information such as the text of a 
message, the date and time, proportion of female and male participants, number of 
reactions and comments etc. Second, page category, which is just a single variable, 
provides information about the category that the page belongs to as they were conceived 
in chapter 7. Third, topic variables include the primary and secondary topics for a given 
discussion as well as the score for all topics pertaining to a given discussion as they were 
conceived in chapter 7. Fourth, political variables provide information about the voting 
intention of whoever writes the post/comment/reply, the proportion of left-wing or 
right-wing voters who participate, the proportion of voters for each party that participate 
and the political homogeneity, initial disagreement and subsequent agreement for a 
discussion. Fifth, sentiment variables contain information about the likelihood that a 
single post/comment/reply uses harsh language as well as the likelihood that the 
aggregated mass of comments made in a discussion contains harsh language. Sixth, meta 
variables are those that simply describe which database the original data was pulled from 
and the ID’s of posts/comments/replies. The full list of variables with descriptions can be 
found in Appendix 8.0-SI. 
The dataset prepared for the analysis represents the culmination of all methods 
pertaining to network attributes, topics and sentiment that were introduced in the three 
previous chapters. This dataset and the procedures for preparing it, which can be applied 
to any democratic multiparty system with a sufficient social media penetration 
represents one of the main accomplishments of this thesis project. It provides a very 
flexible way to analyse discussions on public Facebook pages from many perspectives, 
both in terms of broad trends and specific cases. The rest of this chapter will test and 
argue the usefulness of this dataset by analysing broad trends of political communication 
related to polarization and de-polarization in the Danish public.  
 
Statistical modelling and inference 
The purpose of this section is to give a general introduction to the statistical techniques 
that will be used with specific variables and cases to obtain the results that follow. Strictly 
speaking, the results reflect both an exploratory and confirmatory approach. A big part 
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of this thesis is to develop computational Big Data methods for evaluating public opinion 
on social media. These methods, derived from a Big Data methodology, facilitate data that 
have many dimensions and high granularity. This gives the researcher many 
opportunities to dive deep into some aspects of the data and explore specific subsets. The 
purpose of the analysis is also to test a selection of relevant hypotheses as was laid out at 
the end of chapter 3 as these relate to some of the most pressing questions in social media 
research. However, the final dataset itself contains many prospects which will not be 
covered here.  
Testing the hypotheses from chapter 3 roughly requires three types of analytic 
perspectives: 1) development over time, 2) distribution of activities across different 
topics and categories and 3) correlations between base variables and selected key 
variables related to polarization and cross-cutting agreement. In order to reject or verify 
the hypotheses it is necessary to confirm that any observed pattern is not a statistical 
artefact, but an indication of a real-world effect. For this reason, a rigorous statistical 
analysis procedure is employed, which is described in the following sections. 
 
Bivariate relationships and contingency tables 
Analysing development over time will be treated as a simple linear regression problem 
meaning that the average of any given key value will be modelled as a function of time. 
The recurring unit of time used in the results will be weekly increments. Preliminary 
exploration of the data seemed to suggest that looking at weekly development would be 
granular enough to reveal anomalies caused by significant real world events, but also 
containing a sufficient number of observations per unit that the timeline could be split 
across other dimensions (i.e. topics, pages) without the results becoming too unreliable. 
A common way to test the statistical significance of a simple linear regression is by 
looking at the t-ratio with respect to the principal coefficient, which is determined by the 
relation between the value of the coefficient and its standard error (Warner, 2008, 347). 
However, since a simple linear regression (containing only 1 independent variable) is not 
very computationally expensive, it is possible to do permutation testing instead, which is 
a slightly more exact method of evaluating the statistical significance of the relation 
between two variables (Anderson & Robinson, 2001). It provides more reliable results 
than t-ratio statistics because it is not built on the assumption that the underlying data 
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has a perfect Gaussian distribution. Permutation tests involve testing all permutations of 
values in the actual distribution of the data rather than relying on the t-distribution. Thus, 
all those results in the following sections that are obtained by modelling the relationship 
between just two variables (bivariate regression) are subject to permutation tests for 
acquiring the statistical significance level. 
The analysis requires the comparing of political polarization and de-polarization in terms 
of how they are distributed across different topics and spaces on Facebook. Comparing 
values between two or more groups is a common problem in statistics, most often tackled 
in medical science and referred to as contingency tables (Warner, 2008, 27). For this 
analysis it is necessary to compare the frequency of discussions (i.e. number of posts) in 
one category with that of another in order to infer whether independent categories are 
more likely to contain one type of discussion over another. In this thesis Fisher’s exact 
test will be used to obtain the statistical significance that pertain to the difference of 
frequencies between groups. Originally designed to handle statistical inference for 
contingency tables that had either low frequencies or skewed distributions, Fisher’s exact 
test can be used for almost all cases, though it becomes almost indistinguishable from 
Chi-Square Tests if samples are large enough (Warner, 2008, 325). Fisher’s exact test is 
more computationally expensive than Chi-Square, but was chosen for thesis study as it is 
the most flexible. It was originally designed to handle 2x2 contingency tables, but the 
solution can be generalized to include N x M tables as well (Well & King, 1980). 
 
Multivariate regression models 
To fully understand how polarization and de-polarization effects are distributed across 
public Facebook pages and what the potential causes are, it is important to consider the 
multivariate effects of all available variables. It is needed in order to analyse the 
relationship between key variables such as political homogeneity and cross-cutting 
agreement and potentially related features such as harsh language use, emoji responses 
and gender distribution. Furthermore, it will also provide insights into whether there are 
overlapping or mitigating effects among all available variables. For example one 
particular media organization might appear to be posting a lot of content that promotes 
cross-cutting agreement, but they are actually just posting content within topics that are 
likely to cause cross-cutting agreement and it is in fact the topics, independently of the 
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specific media outlet, which are the real predictors of cross-cutting agreement. The 
multivariate models greatly help avoid misinterpretations of results 
One of the challenges of multivariate analyses is the complexity with which variables 
might affect one another. A popular approach to achieve estimates for positive and 
negative correlations between independent and dependent variable in a way that takes 
the interaction between parameters into account is structural equation modelling (SEM) 
and path analysis (Randall, 1992). However since SEM is more geared towards solving 
problems related to latent constructs of factor analyses in survey based research and not 
Big Data, it will not be applied in this analysis. SEM essentially consists of a set of 
techniques that can help social scientists select the best regression models and interpret 
potentially complex relations between predictors (Lin et al., 2017). Most of the same 
results can be obtained by making sure that the interaction effects between two or more 
predictors are taken into account and that appropriate measures for selecting the best 
model out of all possible configurations are taken. Additionally, SEM techniques are fairly 
specialized, not designed for Big Data, but rather the interpretation of survey data. 
General solution multivariate regression models provides more flexibility when working 
with large data sets.  
The dependent and independent variables will vary based on the actual model being 
tested, but the model selection process will be the same for all models. Because models 
can be almost infinitely complex all regression models in this study will have both a 
simple and a complex version. The simple version will be fully linear and not consider the 
interaction between parameters on any level. The purpose of the simple model is to 
highlight which are the main predictors for any given dependent variable. For the simple 
model to be valid it is assumed that the complex model will show the same overall trend 
but add additional perspectives. The complex version will consider two types of non-
linear effects: 1) interactions between parameters (i.e. infotainment * sad) with up to four 
levels of potential combinations (i.e. infotainment * sad * female * harsh language), and 
2) higher order polynomial effects with a maximum power of four (i.e. sad^4). 
Interactions between polynomial effects will not be included. For the complex version 
any given model can easily end up containing tens of thousands of parameters, which is 
unlikely to be the best possible and most robust model. For this reason, model selection 




In this project the model selection process contains a number of steps, which apply to 
both simple and complex versions of all models. Because of the potential complexity of 
the models two different statistical techniques are employed to guide selection: 1) the 
variance inflation factor (VIF), which estimates collinearity between two or more values 
(Miles, 2014) and 2) Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Pan, 2001), which can be used 
to evaluate the parsimony of a given model. Collinearities of features in a model can make 
it difficult to interpret the contribution that one or two specific parameters provide. By 
estimating the VIF value for all potential independent variables it becomes possible to 
retain only variables that do not produce heavy collinearity. VIF is a ratio value meaning 
that a value of 20 can reliably be used as the maximum value that an independent variable 
can have without inflating the variance of the full set of parameters (Craney & Surles, 
2002). AIC is a common indicator based on the log likelihood to help statisticians decide 
between two or more models. It penalizes models that have a bad ratio between number 
of parameters and log likelihood. For AIC the fixed values 4, 6 and 10 are the most 
commonly used to indicate whether one model is better than another (Dam, Heinesen & 
Wiltshire, 2017). Since this study is dealing with models that have large numbers of 
observations, 10 is used as the selection value. The process for the selection of 
multivariate regression models is as follows: 
 
1. A data matrix is initialized so that values for all independent variables are pre-
calculated, both linear and non-linear terms. 
2. All independent variables are sorted by its Pearson correlation value with respect 
to the dependent variable from highest to lowest. 
3. A full ordinary least squares model (OLS) containing all independent variables is 
produced in order to obtain the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each 
independent variable. 
4. All independent variables are now filtered based on the original sort in step 2 such 
that an independent variable is only added to the final list if it has a VIF score lower 
than 20, which would otherwise indicate fairly high collinearity with terms that 
have a stronger Pearson correlation.  
 173 
5. The list of potential parameters from the independent variables obtained in step 
4 is added one by one to an ordinary least squares model (OLS). If the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) value is lower than 10, the parameter will be removed 
from the model again. Because not all permutations of parameters are  evaluated 
against the AIC value of the model it is important that steps 2 – 4 ensure that the 
list of independent variables are sorted based on high Pearson correlation with 
low variance inflation. Independent variables are added to the model in the 
sequence that is most likely to incrementally increase the AIC of the model, though 
it can never be guaranteed that the absolute best model is found.  
6. The final regression model is obtained when step 5 reaches the end of the list of 
parameters. For complex versions of a given model it is assumed that the majority 
of parameters will have been skipped.  
 
For evaluating the final model after model selection, the following indicators are used: 
First is the R-squared value, which gives an indication of the amount of variance the 
model can explain with a value between 1 and 0 (Warner, 2008, 355). For example, if 
political homogeneity is the dependent variable and our model achieves an R-squared 
value of 0.99 it indicates that the independent variables in our parameterized model can 
almost perfectly explain the occurrence of politically homogenous discussions on 
Facebook. Second is the F-statistic which gives an indication of the statistical significance 
of the full model with respect to critical values of the F-distribution (Warner, 2008, 216). 
Third is the p-value that corresponds to a single parameter, which is calculated based on 
its t-value with respect to the critical values of the t-distribution when compared to the 
full model minus the respective parameter (Warner, 2008, 567). The p-value that 
corresponds to a single parameter is important because it indicates whether the 
underlying independent variable is a statistically significant contribution to the model. 
Of course, exploring the results of the parametrized model entails using the estimated 
strength of the individual coefficients. If the use of Angry emojis are positively correlated 
with political homogeneity, then the coefficient corresponding to the number of Angry 
emojis used in a discussion should be a relatively strong positive number. The P-value 
can then be used to see whether the correlation is statistically significant. Because the 
models take unstandardized input variables, the initial values of the individual 
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coefficients can be deceiving. In order to interpret the relative strength of individual 
coefficients, each must be normalized with respect to the mean value of the input 
variable. In the following analysis all figures that contain the results of regression models 
will have a corresponding table of normalized coefficients, which can be found in the 
appendices. 
So far, this chapter has explained the general procedures, which help guarantee that the 
final analysis has a rigorous format. The rest of the chapter presents the results when the 
general procedures are applied to specific cases. 
 
Political Homogeneity 
This section seeks to address contemporary concerns about social media effects 
pertaining to whether curation logics are causing people to communicate increasingly 
with those who are politically similar, which can be considered a precursor to political 
polarization. As mentioned in chapter 3 previous findings on the subject are mixed 
showing both tendencies towards homogeneity and heterogeneity depending on the 
context and locus of the research. 
This thesis is not claiming to present more precise or wholesome evidence about whether 
or not social media as such produce increased political homogeneity. The focus is on 
public pages on Facebook, which is only a small part of the role social media play. 
However, some gaps in the research are being addressed, namely the lack of connection 
between offline and online behaviour (e.g. Thomson & Wells, 2017) as well as the 
tendency for much research to be based on weak and overly specific concepts of 
polarization e.g. Republicans versus Democrats (e.g. Bail et al., 2018). These gaps are 
addressed by creating a politically meaningful measure of political affiliation that works 
both in bi- and multi-party systems and reflects offline voting behaviour as shown in 
chapters 6 and 5 respectively. Furthermore, this section will look into the development 
of political homogeneity over time rather than just a single case (e.g. Schmidt et al., 2017) 
or snapshots of selected periods (e.g. Bossetta et al., 2018). Such exploration is possible 
because political homogeneity is calculated on the message level (either a post, comment 
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or reply) and is based on all users who participate by reacting to or commenting on the 
given message as was described in the “Reaching Agreement” section of chapter 6. 
 
FIGURE 8.0 – MEAN POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY FOR EACH DATA COLLECTION 
 
 
The main focus of this section is how levels of political homogeneity change over time and 
how homogeneity is distributed across spaces, topics and sentiment. Before going to the 
main results, it is helpful to have an idea about what to expect based on how political 
homogeneity is conceptualized and measured in this study. If we look at figure 8.0, we 
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see that average political homogeneity is much higher for political pages than all other 
categories of page types. This is to be expected since all pages in this category will be 
directly affiliated with a specific political party for which many of them are primarily used 
for people to show their support. Further to be expected is pages that represent big 
organizations or top politicians have more activity and also a more diverse crowd of 
people. It is common sense that a current or former prime minister has a more politically 
diverse user base on their Facebook page compared to a much lesser known local 
politician, even though they both represent a specific political party. Table 8.0 shows the 
25 pages with the highest average political homogeneity27. They are all local politicians 
and/or politicians who are generally known for having more extreme opinions. 
 
TABLE 8.0 – MEAN POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY, TOP PAGES 
PAGE_ORIGIN HOMOGENITY_ALL 
NYE BORGERLIGE I ASSENS 0,730607 
NYE BORGERLIGE GREVE/SOLRØD 0,637899 
NYE BORGERLIGE FAABORG-MIDTFYN OG ÆRØ KREDSEN 0,610913 
NYE BORGERLIGE I HOLSTEBRO 0,584482 
NYE BORGERLIGE FAVRSKOV 0,584392 
PARTIET NYE BORGERLIGES VENNER I AABENRAA OMRÅDET 0,580085 
BO ERIK HANSEN KANDIDAT FOR NYE BORGERLIGE NÆSTVED 0,56801 
NYE BORGERLIGE SKANDERBORG-ODDER-SAMSØ 0,563877 
NYE BORGERLIGE I LEJRE OG KØGE 0,560336 
NYE BORGERLIGE SLAGELSE 0,548521 
NYE BORGERLIGE VORDINGBORG 0,546922 
NYE BORGERLIGE GULDBORGSUND 0,540424 
NYE BORGERLIGE LOLLAND 0,539325 
JAN KØPKE CHRISTENSEN, FT-KANDIDAT, NYE BORGERLIGE, LISTE D I 
SYDJYLLAND. 
0,539115 
NYE BORGERLIGE I AABENRAA KREDSEN 0,535288 
NYE BORGERLIGE I HJØRRING 0,535169 
NYE BORGERLIGE I RUDERSDAL 0,533303 
NYE BORGERLIGE I ODSHERRED 0,523169 
KRESTEN OLSEN NYE BORGERLIGE - GULDBORGSUND KOMMUNE 0,521055 




27 Since the data collection contains nearly 10,000 unique pages. Only the top results are shown. 
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Pages with more activity would tend to have less political homogeneity in general, which 
is supported by a negative correlation between average activity and political 
homogeneity. While this is the general rule, it is by no means absolute. Figure 8.1 shows 
the relationship between average activity and political homogeneity for all pages except 
political pages28. The figure can direct us towards some of the outliers that defy the 
general trend. Most impressively we see two news media pages, Den Korte Avis and 
NewsPeek Network, which are well known outlets, especially popular with the Danish far 
right movement. Both have average levels of political homogeneity that are many times 
higher than the grand average while also having high levels of daily activity. A few less 
extreme but still significant outliers consist of a number of charity organizations such as 
Oxfam IBIS, Dansk Flygtningehjælp, Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke and Amnesty International 
Danmark. In contrast to the two previous examples, the charity pages all have user bases 
that are disproportionally slanted towards the political left. 
 
 
28 Political pages are omitted since they are generally expected to have very high levels of political 
homogeneity no matter what.  
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Political Homogeneity Over Time 
Looking at figure 8.2, which shows the average political homogeneity for all posts per 
week across all pages, topics and domains, we can detect a very slight increase in overall 
political homogeneity over the four years between 2014 and 2018. More noticeable is 
how much political homogeneity can fluctuate from week to week. The two spikes in 
average political homogeneity coincide with the national (2015) and regional (2017) 
elections of Denmark, which suggest that people are especially likely to seek out more 




FIGURE 8.2 – MEAN POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY OVER TIME 
 
 
Interestingly, if we split political homogeneity between reactions and comments, as 
shown in figure 8.3 we see that the overall increase seems to be caused by an increase in 
likeminded users who participate in discussion (comments) in contrast to those that 
simply react (reactions). While the effect is statistically significant to an acceptable 
degree (p < .003), the slope of the curve is so small that one should be cautious about 
concluding that a general rise in political homogeneity is occurring. The fact that political 
homogeneity fluctuates around a fairly stable average over several years attests to a small 




FIGURE 8.3 – MEAN POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY OVER TIME, REACTIONS AND COMMENTS. 
 
What is more striking are the spikes that occur around the election campaigns. If the 
timelines are split between the different types of pages (politician, media, union, local, 
organization), as shown in figure 8.4, media and local pages are the main drivers of 
increases in homogeneity while the more overtly political spaces, pages belonging to 
politicians and unions, remain around average during the time of elections. This suggests 
that media and local communities are particularly good at curating content that is in line 
with people’s political preferences during campaigns. It is also worth noting that media 
pages (4.8% increase, R2 = .201) and especially political pages (24.2% increase, R2 = 




FIGURE 8.4 – MEAN POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY OVER TIME FOR EACH DATA COLLECTION 
 
Topics and pages 
It is expected that people are more attracted to some topics even if we don’t agree with 
the message and vice versa. By looking at the increase of political homogeneity over time 
for each topic it is clear that increases, decreases or homeostasis are all trends depending 
on the topic, as shown in Table 8.1. Specifically, topics such as religion, refugees and 
immigration as well as justice and security are dominated by groups of users that are 
becoming increasingly homogenous between 2014 and 2018. For religion and 
immigration topics there seems to be a sharper increase in political homogeneity on 
political pages compared to those belonging to media organisations. In contrast, topics 
relating to the economy and the labour market have become much less homogenous both 
on political pages and media pages in the four-year period. 
 
TABLE 8.1 – INCREASE IN MEAN POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY PER TOPIC 




HOMOGENEITY OVER TIME - 
POLITICAL 





2,45E-06 0,296015 1,55E-05 < 0,0001 
SOCIAL POLICY -1,88E-06 0,133203 1,40E-05 < 0,0001 
RELIGION 2,50E-06 0,226175 6,59E-05 < 0,0001 
REFUGEES AND INTEGRAT
ION 
6,79E-07 0,830634 5,60E-05 < 0,0001 





JUSTICE AND SECURITY PO
LICY 
6,49E-06 < 0,0001 4,19E-05 < 0,0001 
HEALTH 1,95E-06 0,003601 6,32E-06 0,061799 
GENDER EQUALITY, GEND
ER AND DISCRIMINATION 
-4,80E-06 0,069159
9 
2,06E-05 < 0,0001 
FOREIGN POLICY 1,52E-06 0,397795 3,20E-05 < 0,0001 
EVERYDAY LIFE AND CONS
UMPTION 
5,57E-06 < 0,0001 2,04E-05 < 0,0001 
EMPLOYMENT AND THE L
ABOR MARKET 
-1,53E-05 < 0,0001 -1,40E-06 0,633151 
EDUCATION AND RESEAR
CH 
-6,22E-06 < 0,0001 5,06E-06 0,09543 
ECONOMY -5,35E-06 < 0,0001 -1,58E-06 0,475989 














It is worth noting that a topic such as religion has changed from being a topic with a 
lower-middle level of homogeneity to being within the top four passing both economy 
and labour market related topics, which have in turn fallen to much lower levels. This is 
illustrated in figure 8.5. 
An examination of word usage strongly indicates that this increase in political 
homogeneity for the topic religion is entirely due to discussions about Islam and Islamic 
culture (see Appendix 8.1-SI). This is in line with the simultaneous increase in political 
homogeneity for content related to immigrants and refugees, who, in Denmark, are 
predominantly from Middle Eastern countries. 
 
 
FIGURE 8.5 – MEAN POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY OVER TIME, SELECTED 
TOPICS 
 
It is not surprising, albeit still an important finding, that topics related to immigration 
produce strong patterns of increasing political homogeneity. Immigration has become a 
hot-button issue in Europe over the last decade and the main cause of political division 
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(Holmes & Castañeda, 2016), which is likely making people averse to engaging with 
opposing views. Surprisingly, the results suggest that, as the locus of political division 
moves towards territorially external elements such as immigrants and foreign religions, 
people seem to simultaneously become more comfortable engaging across political lines 
when dealing with topics such as economy and the labour market, which have 
traditionally been more divisive areas.  
Using the methods developed in this project, it is possible to zoom in further on specific 
areas of discussion. Table 8.229 shows the increase of political homogeneity within each 
page category for each of the types of pages: politician, media, local, union. There are few 
discernible results to note for local pages and unions. Over the last decade the 
independent unions have seen a surge in subscriptions and general interest, and it is 
possible that such a surge is related to the fact that other groups like FTF and AC are 
showing sharp increases in political homogeneity while independent unions remain 
unchanged. However, it is a bit speculative to suggest that union memberships are 
necessarily connected to political homogeneity on their respective Facebook pages. For 
local pages there is a small tendency for pages with high increases in political 
homogeneity to be from small and rural communes, though it is not an exclusive trend 
and it is difficult to infer something more without going into greater detail, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
TABLE 8.2 – INCREASE IN HOMOGENEITY PER PAGE CATEGORY 
PAGE CATEGORY HOMOGENEITY INCREASE P-VALUE 
FAXE KOMMUNE 3,39E-05 0,000219 
PARTY C 2,28E-05 0,00057 
PARTY O 2,19E-05 < 0,0001 
BRØNDBY KOMMUNE 1,81E-05 0,000199 
TABLOID 1,31E-05 < 0,0001 
GENERAL NEWS 7,11E-06 < 0,0001 
PARTY AA 6,87E-06 0,044849 
 
29 Table 8.2 only shows the results for those categories that have a certain level of activity. At least 50.000 
interactions over the whole period. 
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INFOTAINMENT 5,71E-06 < 0,0001 
LIFESTYLE 4,89E-06 < 0,0001 
SPORT 4,49E-06 < 0,0001 
FTF 4,20E-06 0,213319 
LEFT LEANING NEWS 2,96E-06 0,351757 
PARTY F 1,74E-06 0,347609 
PARTY A 1,44E-06 0,354863 
PARTY I 3,43E-07 0,885231 
PARTY B -1,23E-06 0,66499 
PARTY OE -2,27E-06 0,0668 
PARTY V -5,67E-06 0,019844 
LOCAL NEWS -5,93E-06 < 0,0001 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS -1,20E-05 0,002562 
FREDERIKSBERG KOMMUNE -1,29E-05 0,496035 
KØBENHAVN KOMMUNE -1,35E-05 < 0,0001 
CHARITY -2,23E-05 0,35806 
LO -2,51E-05 0,000357 
RINGKØBINGSKJERN KOMMUNE -2,87E-05 0,03657 
DEBATE -3,49E-05 0,006617 
ÆRØ KOMMUNE -0,00026 0,474655 
 
 
Political pages and media pages have more striking results. Populist parties such as Dansk 
Folkeparti (O) and Nye Borgerlige (NB) both demonstrate the highest levels as well as the 
largest increase in political homogeneity, which suggests that the rise of populism in 
Denmark, and Europe in general, is linked to the formation of spaces where such political 
factions increasingly homogenous and rarely challenged by diverse opinions. This trend 
is also potentially related to the tendency for populist and far-right parties to become 
gradually more extreme in their opinions, especially those that are fuelled by anti-
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immigration views. As an example, the party Nye Borgerlige (NB) was founded in 2014 
and consists mostly of voters who thought that the older populist party Dansk Folkeparti 
(O) was too soft on immigration (Hvilsom, 2016)30 and during the 2019 national election 
the party Stram Kurs, which is the most extreme-right wing party ever seen in Denmark, 
almost made it to parliament. In contrast, a far-left party such as Enhedslisten (OE) shows 
a sharp decrease in political homogeneity, which might be linked to them changing their 
stance on big political issues such as going from anti-EU to pro-EU31. 
For media pages it is worth noting that it the categories of General News and Tabloid 
which have seen the largest increase in political homogeneity, while partisan news media, 
both left and right wing, have remained more or less stable. Taking a peek inside the 
categories of Tabloid and General News, which consist of many of the most popular media 
outlets, users are becoming polarized across topical lines such that stories relating to 
immigration and religion are attracting an increasingly homogenous group of right-
wingers whereas the same can be said about left-wingers for topics such as Gender 
Equality, Social Policy and Culture. This is illustrated in Table 8.3 where the variable left-
wing-increase can be used to infer whether the increase in homogeneity is slanted 
towards the political right or left. 
 
TABLE 8.3 – INCREASE IN HOMOGENEITY, MEDIA AND POLITICAL PAGES 







INCREASE - P-VALUE 
TABLOID 1,31E-05 < 0,0001 -3,35E-05 < 0,0001 
SPORT 2,09E-06 0,001557 6,44E-06 0,030353 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS 9,54E-07 0,774997 -1,01E-06 0,799477 
POLITICAL NEWS -2,74E-05 < 0,0001 -7,17E-05 < 0,0001 
PARTY V -3,66E-06 0,127804 1,60E-05 < 0,0001 







PARTY O 2,17E-05 < 0,0001 -1,11E-06 0,572741 
PARTY NB 0,000135 < 0,0001 -4,48E-05 < 0,0001 
PARTY I -1,18E-06 0,47932 3,71E-05 < 0,0001 
PARTY F -7,71E-07 0,620307 -1,42E-05 < 0,0001 
PARTY C 2,52E-05 < 0,0001 3,25E-06 0,363062 
PARTY B -5,53E-06 0,002281 -1,22E-05 0,062381 
PARTY AA -1,33E-06 0,549871 -2,66E-05 < 0,0001 
PARTY A 1,74E-06 0,248246 7,84E-06 0,003509 
LOCAL NEWS -5,94E-06 < 0,0001 -4,07E-06 0,00977 
LIFESTYLE 4,89E-06 < 0,0001 -2,05E-05 < 0,0001 
LEFT LEANING NEWS -4,78E-06 0,001606 -7,40E-06 0,001376 
INFOTAINMENT 5,91E-06 < 0,0001 4,83E-06 0,129743 
GENERAL NEWS 7,26E-06 < 0,0001 -2,18E-05 < 0,0001 
DEBATE 3,81E-07 0,788666 2,96E-05 0,000166 
CULTURE -2,05E-05 < 0,0001 -3,01E-05 < 0,0001 
CHARITY 6,61E-06 0,021265 4,66E-06 0,6821 
BUSINESS -6,74E-06 0,000745 2,30E-06 0,743746 
 
 
At the same time, news media in the category Political News, which consists of all media 
organizations that brand themselves as focused on politics and generally not considered 
partisan, have seen one of the sharpest decreases in political homogeneity. This 
observation deserves some attention because it suggests that 1) people are not blatantly 
averse to seeking out spaces where they might encounter opposing political views, and 
2) that some media outlets such as Tabloids, might be peddling stories that are politically 
appealing to specific political groups depending on the topics. An example would be 
stories about immigration that employ emotional language that appeal to the fears or 
grievances of narrow political segments thus increasing the political homogeneity on 
those posts. To really confirm this, a more in-depth discourse analysis would be needed. 
Another likely explanation for these results is that users who seek out political news 
sources are generally more politically engaged and feel confident defending their 
opinions to strangers with opposing views (Mutz, 2006), while users who engage with 
tabloid and general news outlets reflect less on their engagement with political news and 




Political homogeneity is both increasing and decreasing depending on different 
situations, pages and topics on a wide selection of public Facebook pages.  The purpose 
of this subsection is to address the issue of whether pages that are politically homogenous 
tend to attract more user activity over time. Examining the development of homophily 
over a fairly long stretch of time offers a robust indication of general patterns of political 
homophily on social media in general, especially compared to the previous studies 
mentioned in chapter 3 that mostly focus on a single point in time.  
The rise of activity for individual pages over time is modelled as a function of both average 
political homogeneity and the gradual increase of homogeneity over time. This takes into 
account the fact that some pages are more politically homogenous than others as well as 
the potential for pages to become more or less homogenous as time goes by. This includes 
the possibility that some effects might be aligned with topics or page categories such as 
in the example with tabloid news in the previous subsection. 
Two regression models are created, a simple one and a complex one that accounts for 
potential non-linear effects. Both are based on the independent variables: average 
homogeneity, increase in homogeneity over time and all topics as they were conceived in 
chapter 7.  However, the model selection process can cause variables that do not 
contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the model to be filtered out. The 
dependent variable in this case is increase in activity over time, which is calculated as the 
slope for the average weekly increase in reactions, comments and shares to posts made 
by the page. Previous studies have found social investments by users on Facebook to 
differ depending on the type of interaction such that reactions are the least significant 
with comments being more of an investment and shares having the highest value (Winter, 
Brückner & Krämer, 2015; Kaur, Balakrishnan, Rana, Sinniah, 2018). Thus, the activity is 
calculated as reactions+comments*1.5+shares*2.0 in order to account for the differences 
in perceived social investment. There are many small pages, especially among local 
community pages; and since each page will count as a single observation, pages that have 
very low weekly activity might produce unreliable averages, potentially skewing the 
results. Therefore, only the top 5% of pages in terms of weekly activity are selected. 
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Additionally, they must have at least 75% political penetration on average, which comes 
to a total of 691 pages. 
 
FIGURE 8.6 – OLS RESULTS POPULARITY ~ HOMOGENEITY, SIMPLE 
DEP. VARIABLE:    INCREASE IN ACTIVITY           R-SQUARED:             0.198 
 
MODEL:            OLS                Adj. R-squared:        0.193 
 
METHOD:           Least Squares      F-statistic:           39.29 
 
DATE:             Fri  11 Oct 2019   Prob (F-statistic): 1.06e-22 
TIME:             03:45:17           Log-Likelihood:       684.04 
 
NO. OBSERVATIONS:    480             AIC:                  -1360. 
 
DF RESIDUALS:        476             BIC:                  -1343. 
 
DF MODEL:              3                                          
 
COVARIANCE TYPE:  nonrobust                                       
 
                  coef     std err      t     P>|t|  
CONST              0.0142     0.004     3.312  0.001 
HOMO_INCREASE     -0.0092     0.001   -10.244  0.000 
HOMOGENITY_ALL     0.1255     0.034     3.700  0.000 
FOREIGN_POLICY    -0.3049     0.267    -1.141  0.254 
OMNIBUS:       41.975   Durbin-Watson:         2.068 
 
PROB(OMNIBUS):  0.000   Jarque-Bera (JB):    210.050 
 
SKEW:          -0.031   Prob(JB):           2.45e-46 
 




Looking at the results in figure 8.6 which is the simple regression model, we see that the 
only two statistically significant variables are average homogeneity and increase in 
homogeneity. Interestingly, increase in activity for pages is positively correlated with 
higher levels of average political homogeneity, but negatively correlated with an increase 
in homogeneity over time. The obvious implication here is that pages are more likely to 
keep people engaged when they have above average levels of political homogeneity, 
however a constant increase in homogeneity tends to discourage users on average. 
Having an appropriate amount of political homogeneity, but still be able to attract some 
diversity seems to be the most popular configuration over time. 
 
FIGURE 8.7 – OLS RESULTS POPULARITY ~ HOMOGENEITY, COMPLEX 
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DEP. VARIABLE:    INCREASE IN ACTIVITY           R-SQUARED:             0.309 
 
MODEL:            OLS                Adj. R-squared:        0.299 
 
METHOD:           Least Squares      F-statistic:           30.14 
 




TIME:             03:43:51           Log-Likelihood:       719.61 
 
NO. OBSERVATIONS:    480             AIC:                  -1423. 
 
DF RESIDUALS:        472             BIC:                  -1390. 
 
DF MODEL:              7                                          
 
COVARIANCE TYPE:  nonrobust                                       
 
                                                 coef     std err      t     P>|t|  
CONST                                             0.0141     0.004     3.540  0.000 
HOMO_INCREASE*ECONOMY                            -0.0691     0.070    -0.985  0.325 
HOMO_INCREASE*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS    -0.2581     0.084    -3.064  0.002 
HOMO_INCREASE                                    -0.0084     0.002    -5.563  0.000 
RELIGION*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET         49.5111    15.125     3.273  0.001 
HOMOGENITY_ALL                                    0.0443     0.033     1.350  0.178 
HOMO_INCREASE^3                                6.908e-06  1.92e-06     3.591  0.000 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION^6                  43.7132   464.451     0.094  0.925 
OMNIBUS:       59.658   Durbin-Watson:         1.958 
 
PROB(OMNIBUS):  0.000   Jarque-Bera (JB):    359.251 
 
SKEW:           0.299   Prob(JB):           9.76e-79 
 




The complex model shown in figure 8.7 suggests a few additional terms, the most 
interesting and only significant one being an increase in homogeneity to the power of 
three, which shows a positive correlation rather than a negative one. It generally becomes 
a bit speculative to attempt to interpret higher order polynomial effects, but it might help 
explain the fact that there is a minority of very popular pages that have both increasing 
homogeneity and activity. 
It suggests that pages with a particularly large increase in political homogeneity are in 
fact more popular than the average page, which is in contrast to the more general effect 
where increase in homogeneity causes a drop in popularity. Looking at the top 20 pages 
where popularity has increased over the four-year period, it shows that 4 out of 5 of the 
pages with highest increase in homogeneity as well as an increase in activity are 
representatives of the populist movement in Denmark, namely Folkets 
Avis, Lokalavisen.dk, Den Korte Avis and Karen Jespersen who is the editor of Den Korte 
Avis. This is significant as it implies that the far-right populist movement in Denmark 
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poses an exception to the rule that the most popular pages have a healthy mix of political 
homogeneity and some increase in diversity.  
The complex model explains roughly 30% of the variance for pages that see an increase 
in activity over time, which indicates that political homogeneity, and in some cases 
increase in heterogeneity, contributes significantly to the popularity of discussion spaces 
on Facebook. It is important to remember that these are regression models that compare 
the increase of activity among the selected pages, which means that even though activity 
has in general increased on most pages since 2014, the results of the models implicitly 
take that into account. In order to account for a potential selection bias, a series of similar 
models were run selecting only media pages, only political pages or only local pages as 
well as pages that had lower levels of general activity, however all models showed the 
same overall results, only varying in the strength of the coefficients. 
 
Homogeneity at the post level – anger and incivility  
The final subsection will cover potential causes of political homogeneity at the level of 
individual posts. The main purpose is to investigate whether harsh language and anger 
facilitate higher levels of political homogeneity. It is theorised that users will stay away 
from spaces with opposing views or be discouraged to engage if the language and overall 
sentiment is very negative.  
Anger and incivility are addressed by modelling political homogeneity at the post level as 
a function of emoji responses and harsh language. All base variables are included to act 
as controls. Since the dependent variable is average political homogeneity, it is sensible 
to exclude all variables that are naturally correlated with political homogeneity such as 
whether a post belongs to a political page or a left leaning media page. This allows for 
political homogeneity to be modelled more or less independently of which page it appears 
on. This is especially important when creating a model where the final values for the 
individual parameters are to be interpreted independently of the model in its entirety. 
Simply put, the predictive capacity of the model is not all that matters. It is important to 
be able to dissect the parametrized model and compare the effect of the key independent 
variables (harsh language and emojis) with the base variables.  
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The two normalized coefficients that are by far the strongest are harsh language and 
proportion of male participants, as shown in Figure 8.8. Emoji responses such as love and 
sadness are negatively correlated with political homogeneity, whereas angry emojis have 
a positive correlation. Having a high degree of angry men using harsh language is 
therefore likely to be the most homogenous discussions on public Facebook pages. It is in 
line with the theory that strong, negative feelings generally thrive better in a homogenous 
environment (Wollenbæk, Karlsen, Steen-Johnsen, Enjolras, 2019), although the fact that 
a greater percentage of men over women compounds the effect is more surprising. 
 
FIGURE 8.8 – OLS RESULTS HOMOGENEITY ~ *, SIMPLE 
DEP. VARIABLE:    HOMOGENITY 
ALL   
  R-SQUARED:             0.264   
 
MODEL:            OLS                Adj. R-squared:        0.264   
 
METHOD:           Least Squares      F-statistic:           3968.   
 
DATE:             Fri  22 Nov 2019   Prob (F-
statistic): 
  0.00     
TIME:             04:16:00           Log-Likelihood:     2.8687e+05 
 
NO. OBSERVATIONS: 253900             AIC:                -5.737e+05 
 
DF RESIDUALS:     253876             BIC:                -5.734e+05 
 
DF MODEL:             23                                            
 
COVARIANCE TYPE:  nonrobust                                         
 
                                             coef     std err      t     P>|t|  
CONST                                         0.0997     0.004    22.833  
0.000 
REACTIONS_TOTAL                               0.1354     0.001   126.407  
0.000 
WOMEN_ALL                                    -0.0723     0.001   -84.265  
0.000 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY                          0.1481     0.002    94.446  
0.000 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                      0.1705     0.002   101.302  
0.000 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS               0.1992     0.004    54.273  
0.000 
RELIGION                                      0.0761     0.002    43.048  
0.000 
COMMENTS_TOTAL                               -0.1229     0.004   -29.534  
0.000 
SAD_TOTAL                                    -0.1020     0.002   -51.862  
0.000 
ECONOMY                                       0.0753     0.002    30.789  
0.000 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                   0.0509     0.002    26.712  
0.000 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                 0.2508     0.003    71.744  
0.000 
ANGRY_TOTAL                                   0.0277     0.001    29.219  
0.000 
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FOREIGN_POLICY                                0.0527     0.004    14.743  
0.000 
HEALTH                                        0.0152     0.003     5.507  
0.000 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                       0.0464     0.004    12.649  
0.000 
DOMESTIC_POLICY                               0.0211     0.002     9.804  
0.000 
LOVE_TOTAL                                   -0.0805     0.004   -18.058  
0.000 




   -0.0316     0.005    -5.867  
0.000 
SHARES                                    -4.919e-06  4.55e-07   -10.817  
0.000 
EVERYDAY_LIFE_AND_CONSUMPTION                 0.0476     0.004    10.744  
0.000 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                        0.0221     0.004     6.170  
0.000 
SOCIAL_POLICY                                 0.0541     0.003    18.047  
0.000 
OMNIBUS:       44630.650   Durbin-
Watson:      
   1.862  
 
PROB(OMNIBUS):  0.000      Jarque-Bera 
(JB):   
96531.587 
 
SKEW:           1.035      Prob(JB):               0.00  
 
KURTOSIS:       5.200      Cond. No.           1.38e+04  
 
 
Less surprising is the presence of positive effects for topics related to immigration along 
with the Political Games and Referendums topic. The main reason for the latter topic is 
that it covers stories about poll results and are likely to have a headline such as “candidate 
X is leading in the polls…”, which does not encourage much cross-cutting discussion. The 
fact that sad emojis have a negative correlation in the model suggests that stories that 
invoke sad emotions are more likely to encourage engagement from a wider political 
spectrum. 
The complex version of the model (Appendix 8.8-SIADJ) is able to explain 35% percent 
more of the variance (R2 = .294) compared to the simple one (R2 = .193). It illustrates 
some of the same effects, though it becomes hard to interpret the cumulative effect of the 
higher order polynomials. We do see, unsurprisingly, that the two main coefficients from 
the simple model are dependent on other factors such as levels of activity and topics. For 
example, anger and harsh language is more likely to be associated with higher levels of 
political homogeneity when the discussion is centred on immigration compared to topics 
such as economy or domestic policy.  
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Political Disagreement and Cross-cutting Agreement 
In the previous section polarization and de-polarization were considered a derived effect 
of political homogeneity or diversity. This section looks into cross-cutting agreement in 
relation to its potential for causing de-polarization in discussions that already have a 
certain level of political diversity. Cross-cutting agreement is slightly more complex than 
political homogeneity as it considers user interaction that is a result of both users’ initial 
reactions to a post as well as their interaction in the comment section. The groundwork 
for this approach was laid in chapter 6 in the methods for calculating 1) initial 
disagreement represented by how politically charged users’ reaction/comment patterns 
are, and 2) subsequent agreement represented by how many positive comment reactions 
are aimed at users who do have the same political stance as the commenter. As an attempt 
to simplify the analysis of cross-cutting agreement, this section seeks to flesh out a 
measure that represents a relation between initial disagreement and subsequent 
agreement. Simply put, initial disagreement and subsequent agreement needs to become 
a single value. Due to the complexity of analysing multiple steps of interaction, this 
section will first cover the measure of initial disagreement in isolation, and then in 
combination with subsequent agreement. 
 
Initial disagreement in relation to political homogeneity 
Initial disagreement should not be seen as a negative occurrence per se since having a 
certain level of political disagreement means there is at least a certain level of political 
diversity among the people who are disagreeing with each other. From how initial 
disagreement is calculated we can logically infer that discussion with low homogeneity 
does not entail high levels of disagreement necessarily; however, discussions with very 
high levels of homogeneity cannot produce high levels of initial disagreement since initial 
disagreement can only happen with at least some diversity. Discussions can have a 
diversity of participants, but not result in any political disagreement, whereas the 
opposite can never be the case. This means political disagreement is naturally negatively 
correlated with political homogeneity and when comparing the two it should generally 
be expected that if one goes up the other goes down or stays the same. It is important to 
keep in mind that low levels of initial disagreement do not necessarily guarantee 
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agreeable content. Potentially divisive discourse might be found in spaces with high 
levels of homogeneity and never become exposed to people with opposing views and thus 
produce no political disagreement. It is furthermore important to reiterate that initial 
disagreement here is conceptualized as ‘political disagreement’, meaning that users can 
be disagreeing about other things that are not related to their observed political stances. 
Later sections in this chapter will look at cases where initial disagreement leads to 
subsequent agreement whereas this subsection will consider instances where initial 
disagreement is particularly high in order to highlight the main precursors of how users’ 
initial responses are related to the measure initial disagreement. 
 
Initial Disagreement Over Time  
In Figure 8.9 we see how average initial disagreement fluctuates over time. The overall 
pattern is similar to that of political homogeneity, which consists of continuous 
fluctuations around a fairly stable average with some sudden spikes in value. It is worth 
mentioning that initial political disagreement is clearly more volatile, which suggests that 





FIGURE 8.9 – MEAN INITIAL DISAGREEMENT OVER TIME PER DATA 
COLLECTION.  
 
As expected, political pages which have seen an increase in political homogeneity show a 
decrease (R2 = .16) in political disagreement over the four-year period 2014 – 2018. 
There is a huge spike in initial disagreement on political pages right around the national 
election where, as seen in the last section, political homogeneity was just below average. 
Similar patterns occur during the 2017 local elections. This suggests that users do engage 
much more in cross-cutting discussion in political spaces around election time. 
Interestingly, public media pages elicit a different pattern. First off, a fairly significant 
increase in average initial disagreement can be observed, which runs somewhat counter 
to the expectations since homogeneity is also slightly increasing on media pages (see 
Figure 8.4 in the previous section). There is even a spike in initial disagreement around 
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the 2015 election just as was observed with political homogeneity. Again, this goes 
against the logical expectation that average homogeneity should go down as initial 
disagreement increases since discussions with very homogenous collections of 
participants cannot achieve high levels of initial disagreement. The only way to explain 
why both values spike around the 2015 election is that both are caused by activity around 
more specific events such that initial disagreement increases on some pages, or even 
particular posts, while the same happens for homogeneity on different ones. This is 
supported by a significant increase in the standard deviation for initial disagreement as 
shown in figure 8.10. It is worth noting that the four-year increase in political 
disagreement on media pages is substantial enough that it actually overtakes that of 
political pages towards the end of 2017. This surely suggests media pages are taking up 
the role of an arena for cross-cutting discussion while political pages are in the process 
of becoming more of a space for political mobilization.  
 
 




On a week-by-week basis media pages elicit fewer volatile fluctuations in initial 
disagreement (Figure 8.9) compared to all other types of pages in general. This is most 
likely due to the fact that there is more activity to be found on media pages, which often 
causes a regression towards the mean. There are however four significant spikes to note, 
two of which happen around the national election in 2015 and local elections in 2017. 
The more significant of the two additional spikes happens around September 6th 2015 
when a large caravan of refugees and migrants, who had been walking up through 
Europe, arrived at the Danish border, seeking passage to Sweden. This situation ignited a 
range of activities such as the Police temporarily detaining the caravan and citizens being 
arrested for trying to help the caravan by driving their members across the country in 
cars and buses. The fact that such a significant spike in initial disagreement happens 
around this time indicates that coverage of the issue swept across a very large cross 
section of media organizations in a way that also inspired many citizens with opposing 
political predispositions to engage in discussion. The most remarkable feature of this case 
is its rarity in terms of causing very high levels of initial disagreement on Facebook. It 
testifies to the fact that something singular and perhaps politically important takes place. 
Such an observation of event-based spikes in political disagreement across the entire 
public space on Facebook provides good arguments for social media publics as ad hoc 
publics of momentary connectedness that are none the less significant for public opinion 
formation. The case will be revisited later in this chapter. 
The other spike in initial disagreement, which happens around January 29th, is a bit more 
difficult to grasp on the surface. Skimming over the top 100 posts that produce high levels 
of initial disagreement around the time, it seems the main focal point of discussion is the 
immigration policies of newly elected US president Donald Trump and French prime 
minister candidate Marine Le Pen. It is interesting that a politician like Donald Trump, 
who is overwhelmingly unpopular with the broader Danish population (Thobo-Carlsen, 
2017), still produce opinions that strike a nerve with many Danes in a way that is 
potentially causing some degree of political division.  
If we take a step back and look into the media page categories, it is clear that only some 
categories are the main drivers of increasing political disagreement. Media pages within 
the categories of Political News and Debate show the highest increase in disagreement, 
which aligns with the general expectation since both categories were also showing the 
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most significant decreases in political homogeneity, as shown in the previous section. In 
contrast, the categories Tabloid and especially General News demonstrate increasing 
levels of political disagreement even though they also saw an increase in homogeneity. 
Zooming in further to look at how the increase is distributed among topics for all media 
outlets in the categories of General News and Tabloid, it shows that initial disagreement 
is increasing for all topics, though there are some that have increased more than others, 
specifically Refugees and Integration, Religion and Foreign Policy. At this point it 
becomes difficult to extract more definite patterns without looking at the content of some 
of the posts that generate high levels of initial disagreement. Table 8.4 displays key 
metrics for the top 25 posts with respect to initial disagreement for media pages within 
the mentioned categories and topics, and for comparison reasons Table 8.5 displays key 
metrics for the top 25 posts with respect to political homogeneity. 
 
TABLE 8.4 –TOP 25 POSTS SORTED BY INITIAL DISAGREEMENT. 











Politiken 0,139 0,862 0,377 0,888 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/81
0040472452484_918504864939377 
POINT of VIEW 
International 
0,094 0,809 0,703 0,915 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/16
8787544201_10154210174479202 
Avisen.dk 0,02 0,774 0,012 0,985 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/11
5104055206794_1440181959365657 
DR Nyheder 0,04 0,765 0,585 0,784 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/12
860228293_10155848409428294 
Politiken 0,023 0,742 0,355 0,893 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/12
787473132_10153204022628133 
Berlingske 0,018 0,737 0,154 0,889 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/12
787473132_10153588665403133 
Berlingske 0,026 0,734 0,696 0,264 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/38
6305466118_10153577537426119 
Ugebrevet A4 0,068 0,73 0,577 0,945 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/81
0040472452484_1085572684899260 
POINT of VIEW 
International 
0,019 0,717 0,316 0,91 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/12
787473132_10154958140063133 
Berlingske 0,013 0,69 0,29 0,766 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/63
503662682_10154524310422683 
Jyllands-Posten 0,088 0,688 0,129 0,541 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/12
860228293_10156344982383294 
Politiken 0,024 0,682 0,395 0,847 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/63
503662682_10153929912052683 
Jyllands-Posten 0,056 0,68 0,194 0,64 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/11
5104055206794_1271277509589437 
DR Nyheder 0,022 0,679 0,227 0,81 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/11
5104055206794_1293921317325056 
DR Nyheder 0,031 0,678 0,418 0,899 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/27
3409062862504_423985734471502 
DR1 0,041 0,675 0,084 0,868 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/12
787473132_10155178531458133 




Berlingske 0,03 0,67 0,737 0,216 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/38
802765760_10153885493525761 
P3 Nyheder 0,024 0,669 0,188 0,812 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/81
0040472452484_1424685060988019 
POINT of VIEW 
International 
0,017 0,663 0,28 0,875 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/63
503662682_10153633667792683 
Jyllands-Posten 0,063 0,663 0,624 0,138 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/11
5104055206794_1191877674196088 
DR Nyheder 0,037 0,662 0,593 0,684 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/16
7016186701167_1038534406216003 
Metroxpress 0,039 0,662 0,349 0,565 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/12
860228293_10155289033313294 
Politiken 0,033 0,661 0,411 0,907 
 
 
TABLE 8.5 –TOP 25 POSTS SORTED BY POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY. 











TV 2 NEWS 0,383 0,091 0,057 0,019 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/610
55003519_10153540147413520 





0,331 0,031 0,074 0,087 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/106
526434713_10154100958794714 
TV 2 NEWS 0,301 0,064 0,096 0,13 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/635
03662682_10154117450497683 
Jyllands-Posten 0,293 0,081 0,082 0,159 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/106
526434713_10153811804194714 
TV 2 NEWS 0,289 0,168 0,05 0,202 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/635
03662682_10155225169417683 
Jyllands-Posten 0,287 0,091 0,093 0,174 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/127
87473132_10152929071248133 
Berlingske 0,286 0,097 0,137 0,077 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/635
03662682_10154981391867683 
Jyllands-Posten 0,283 0,278 0,095 0,18 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/127
87473132_10154852122818133 
Berlingske 0,281 0,104 0,129 0,143 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/251
133001593459_976380869068665 
newsbreak.dk 0,28 0,197 0,235 0,095 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/144
493345745611_465211063673836 
TV 2 0,28 0,088 0,004 0,209 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/635
03662682_10153803439907683 
Jyllands-Posten 0,279 0,058 0,106 0,116 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/251
133001593459_933966679976751 
newsbreak.dk 0,278 0,054 0,135 0,185 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/251
133001593459_1016379241735494 
newsbreak.dk 0,277 0,072 0,166 0,112 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/106
526434713_10154121729224714 
TV 2 NEWS 0,276 0,048 0,133 0,165 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/127
87473132_10152921147623133 
Berlingske 0,275 0,194 0,155 0,051 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/635
03662682_10155209251467683 
Jyllands-Posten 0,266 0,22 0,04 0,303 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/251
133001593459_988018514571567 
newsbreak.dk 0,266 0,046 0,16 0,183 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/115
634401797120_1853428004684409 
BT 0,262 0,331 0,16 0,169 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/127
87473132_10154991235428133 
Berlingske 0,261 0,254 0,124 0,175 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/106
526434713_10153808059049714 




Jyllands-Posten 0,259 0,323 0,093 0,207 
HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/106
526434713_10155862535504714 
TV 2 NEWS 0,259 0,101 0,089 0,217 
 
The most striking feature about the content, without going into any deeper analysis, is 
that all posts with the highest levels of initial disagreement mostly contain very positive 
stories, especially those related to refugees, while posts with the highest levels of political 
homogeneity are more negative both in tone and content. Figure 8.11 extends to contain 
the top 100 posts with high levels of political disagreement and homogeneity, 
respectively. Each post is placed in a scatter plot that has percentage of left-wing voters 
who have reacted to the post (like, angry etc.) on the Y-axis, and percentage of left-
wingers who commented on the X-axis. The figure displays an overwhelming tendency 
for high homogeneity posts to be caused by a high concentration of right-wingers while 
very few posts with high political homogeneity are caused by left-wing participants. 
Interestingly however, posts with high levels of initial disagreement are overwhelmingly 
determined by a fairly high degree of left-wingers who react, but an even higher degree 




FIGURE 8.11 –SCATTERPLOT OF 100 TOP POSTS WITH RESPECT TO 
INITIAL DISAGREEMENT AND POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY 
 
The findings in Table 8.4 and 8.5 as well as Figure 8.11 strongly indicate that public 
activity on General News and Tabloid media pages, when it comes to hot button topics 
such as immigration, refugees, religion and foreign policy, is determined by right-wing 
voters constantly challenging news pieces that are well liked by the political left while 
vice versa cases are rarely seen. Instead there is a much higher tendency for discussions 
to remain politically homogenous when they are dominated by right-wingers. With 
General News and Tabloid being the most popular of the media categories, this specific 
trend provides a solid explanation for why public media pages on Facebook are rising in 
both political disagreement and homogeneity. There may be other factors that contribute 
to the general trend and it is likely not possible to uncover them all without a much more 
in-depth qualitative approach, which the sheer number of posts and comments would 
make very difficult. 
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Like in the previous section it is considered whether an increase in initial disagreement 
is correlated with an increase in popularity for a given page. However, in this case there 
is no correlation, either negative or positive, to speak of. 
 
Initial Disagreement at the Post Level – Love and Incivility 
Following the analysis of political homogeneity this thesis wants to consider some of the 
general effects that contribute to initial disagreement on the post level. A simple 
regression model, which is able to explain around 23% of the variance, confirms that 
posts with high levels of initial disagreement share many of the same characteristics as 
those that have above average political homogeneity. As shown in figure 8.12, harsh 
language, overrepresentation of male participants and shorter discussions rather than 
longer ones are positively correlated with initial disagreement. 
 
FIGURE 8.12 – OLS RESULTS INITIAL DISAGREEMENT ~ *, SIMPLE 
DEP. VARIABLE:    INITIAL_DISAGREE_
ALL 
  R-SQUARED:             0.239   
  
MODEL:            OLS                    Adj. R-squared:        0.239   
  
METHOD:           Least Squares          F-statistic:           1157.   
  
DATE:             Wed  23 Oct 2019       Prob (F-
statistic): 
  0.00     
 
TIME:             05:54:49               Log-Likelihood:     1.4357e+
05 
  








DF MODEL:             46                                                
  
COVARIANCE TYPE:  nonrobust                                             
  
                                   coef     std err      t     P>|t|    
[0.02
5  
CONST                               0.6486     0.007    91.888  0.000     
0.635 
WOMEN_ALL                          -0.0966     0.002   -58.167  0.000    -
0.100 
POLITICAL NEWS                      0.0738     0.002    45.905  0.000     
0.071 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION            0.1599     0.003    54.957  0.000     
0.154 
TABLOID                            -0.0296     0.001   -23.100  0.000    -
0.032 
HOMOGENITY_ALL                     -0.7989     0.006  -138.727  0.000    -
0.810 
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SAD_TOTAL                          -0.1241     0.003   -35.514  0.000    -
0.131 
B                                   0.1041     0.002    59.485  0.000     
0.101 
LOVE_TOTAL                          0.3717     0.007    50.977  0.000     
0.357 
COMMENTS_TOTAL                     -0.3531     0.007   -49.213  0.000    -
0.367 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY                0.1202     0.003    44.442  0.000     
0.115 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY        -0.1151     0.004   -32.845  0.000    -
0.122 
V                                   0.1024     0.002    58.236  0.000     
0.099 
HEALTH                             -0.0845     0.005   -16.921  0.000    -
0.094 
ECONOMY                             0.0418     0.004    10.914  0.000     
0.034 




    0.0978     0.006    16.200  0.000     
0.086 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATIO
N   
   -0.1097     0.007   -15.870  0.000    -
0.123 
LOCAL NEWS                         -0.0074     0.001    -6.106  0.000    -
0.010 
LEFT LEANING NEWS                   0.0401     0.002    19.400  0.000     
0.036 
F                                   0.1018     0.002    54.571  0.000     
0.098 
CULTURE                            -0.0937     0.006   -15.513  0.000    -
0.106 
FTF                                 0.0135     0.003     4.402  0.000     
0.008 
SPORT                              -0.0954     0.004   -25.084  0.000    -
0.103 
RELIGION                            0.0277     0.003     8.769  0.000     
0.022 
LIFESTYLE                          -0.0227     0.004    -5.772  0.000    -
0.030 
A                                   0.0859     0.002    55.535  0.000     
0.083 
NB                                  0.1553     0.005    33.013  0.000     
0.146 
I                                   0.0485     0.002    25.211  0.000     
0.045 
LEFT_WING_ALL                      -0.0824     0.002   -38.699  0.000    -
0.087 
O                                   0.1312     0.002    56.145  0.000     
0.127 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT             0.0328     0.006     5.544  0.000     
0.021 
BRØNDBY KOMMUNE                    -0.1118     0.008   -13.533  0.000    -
0.128 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH             -0.0519     0.006    -8.579  0.000    -
0.064 
LO                                 -0.0006     0.003    -0.229  0.818    -
0.006 
C                                   0.0619     0.002    30.519  0.000     
0.058 
RANDERS KOMMUNE                    -0.0607     0.010    -6.150  0.000    -
0.080 
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AA                                  0.1047     0.002    47.819  0.000     
0.100 
OTHER                              -0.0021     0.003    -0.843  0.399    -
0.007 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS                  0.0338     0.002    18.334  0.000     
0.030 
SILKEBORG KOMMUNE                  -0.0319     0.009    -3.599  0.000    -
0.049 
DEBATE                              0.0019     0.002     1.029  0.304    -
0.002 
GENERAL NEWS                        0.0019     0.001     2.064  0.039  
9.54e
-05 
FREDERIKSBERG KOMMUNE               0.0909     0.004    23.129  0.000     
0.083 
HØRSHOLM KOMMUNE                   -0.0610     0.019    -3.163  0.002    -
0.099 
OE                                  0.0763     0.002    40.492  0.000     
0.073 
BUSINESS                           -0.0253     0.004    -6.417  0.000    -
0.033 
OMNIBUS:       25518.501   Durbin-Watson:         1.886  
  
PROB(OMNIBUS):  0.000      Jarque-Bera (JB):   42697.08
3 
  
SKEW:           1.013      Prob(JB):               0.00  
  




The topic Refugees and Integration is one of the top positive coefficients for initial 
disagreement. It is observed in the data that political disagreement favours an 
overrepresentation of right-wing voters over left-wingers. It can be a bit speculative to 
interpret exactly what this means, but it could be related to the previously observed trend 
of right-wingers often jumping into discussions to challenge messages that are supported 
by left-wingers. One of the main differences between modelling political homogeneity 
and initial disagreement is that love emojis are correlated with initial disagreement, 
whereas angry emojis were strongly correlated with political homogeneity. This feeds 
into the previously mentioned narrative that it is positive stories that are being 
challenged by the political opposition rather than negative ones.   
A more complex regression model containing all the same independent base variables is 
able to explain 32% of the variance by considering that some of the effects might be non-
linear (Appendix 8.12-SIC). Overall the simple and complex model show similar 
correlations, and it is not worth it to look too far into the details about how the two 
models might diverge since non-linear effects and the potential interaction between them 
are already difficult to interpret. The complex model here serves simply to establish how 
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much of the variance in political agreement can be explained using the base variables. 
The important point to reiterate here is that there are a number of features that are 
correlated with both political homogeneity and initial political disagreement such as 
harsh language, overrepresentation of men and topics related to immigration.  
 
Establishing cross-cutting agreement 
The previous section specifically covered what in this thesis is conceptualized as initial 
disagreement (i.e. how users position themselves politically through their initial 
reactions to a post). Initial disagreement is when people with opposing voting intentions 
position themselves on either side of an issue, and as such at least some political 
heterogeneity is needed in order for initial disagreement to occur at all. Several 
noteworthy effects were pointed out in the previous section. Initial disagreement and 
political homogeneity on average being positively correlated with the same features such 
as harsh language, shorter discussions and overrepresentation of men while at the same 
time being independently, negatively correlated with each other. The most likely 
explanation for this observation is that only politically heterogeneous discussions that do 
not cause too much initial disagreement will exert inverted correlations. The prospect of 
users reaching agreement across political lines lies at the heart of political de-
polarization. However, because of the wide range of social media pages included in this 
study, as well as the earlier mentioned notions that social media thrives on mixed content 
and blurred boundaries between public and private, it cannot be assumed that all posts 
have an equivalent political charge, even if they are published by media outlets that 
specialize in political news. Discussions that represent a politically heterogenous public 
with low levels of initial disagreement might simply entail that it is centred on a banal or 
uncontroversial issue. By using initial disagreement to estimate how politically charged 
a discussion is, the ensuing exchange of comments and replies provides a more reliable 
measure of cross-cutting agreement. In the following section it will be considered that 
even posts that start out with high levels of initial disagreement can move in different 
directions depending on the ensuing comments and interactions of the users. 
In chapter 6 it was demonstrated how an estimate of subsequent agreement could be 
calculated from the comments and interactions that occur on a single post. If many users 
who are in political opposition are reacting positively to each other’s comments, then 
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subsequent agreement can be established. An important thing to note about subsequent 
political agreement is that it does not automatically distinguish between political and 
non-political content, which is also why this thesis will consider subsequent agreement 
in relation to initial disagreement for estimating real cross-cutting agreement. A quick 
way to illustrate the intuition behind subsequent agreement in isolation is with Table 8.6 
that shows the top 10 media pages with the highest levels of subsequent agreement. They 
all belong to media organizations that focus heavily on sports and lifestyle related topics. 
Since the content is not politically charged users are not likely to be politically motivated 
in their engagement with content and other users and their individual actions are 
essentially random with respect to their political affiliation. 
 
TABLE 8.6 – TOP 10 PAGES SORTED BY MEAN SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT 
PAGE ORIGIN PAGE CATEGORY MEAN SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT 
LIV Lifestyle 0,3523 
DR SPORTEN Sport 0,3496 
MIDTJYLLANDS AVIS Local News 0,3486 
CANAL 9 - SUPERLIGAENS HJEMMEBANE Sport 0,3482 
6'EREN Sport 0,3461 
DISCOVERY CHANNEL DANMARK Infotainment 0,3454 
MONTE CARLO PÅ DR3 Infotainment 0,345 
BOLIGLIV Lifestyle 0,344 
TLC DANMARK Infotainment 0,337 
FIT LIVING Lifestyle 0,337 
 
 
 Discussions should always be expected to exhibit fairly high levels of subsequent political 
agreement if the point of departure is not political. And as with initial disagreement, 
observing low levels of subsequent disagreement is not an argument that users are 
strongly at odds with each other since low levels can also be caused by the participants 
being very politically homogenous. To reiterate the main point, subsequent agreement is 
best understood in relation to initial disagreement, and the primary attention should be 
on posts that exhibit high levels of initial disagreement. By focusing on posts with high 
levels of initial disagreement we can generally expect that 1) the focal point of the 
discussion is political, which was illustrated in chapter 6, and 2) participants will have 
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some political heterogeneity since initial disagreement cannot happen with a completely 
homogeneous crowd. Thus, on posts with high levels of initial political disagreement we 
can safely assume patterns of subsequent agreement to be non-random.  
One productive approach to look further into patterns of subsequent political agreement 
and disagreement would be to disregard all posts that are below a certain threshold of 
initial disagreement. This threshold can be obtained from the results in chapter 6 using 
the distribution of posts labelled as political and non-political. A good point of departure 
would be the value of initial disagreement where 90% of the content is political. However, 
this approach entails filtering out a large amount of data and any statistical model would 
be less robust and generalizable as it would suffer from this filtering constraint. Instead 
it is possible to opt for an approach where the relationship between initial disagreement 
and subsequent agreement is put on a single dimension. This might retain a bit more 
noise but will be more inclusive of data overall. The objective is to cleanly separate posts 
with high levels of initial disagreement and high levels of subsequent agreement from 
those that have only lots of initial disagreement, but no subsequent agreement. In order 
to assure a useful transformation function that has empirical reliability, the results from 
chapter 6 are used to create a threshold value for initial disagreement to be used as a 
pivot. Considering all posts that that have a higher than 0.14 value for initial 
disagreement, it is possible to obtain a threshold value for subsequent agreement by 
taking the average subsequent agreement value for all posts that are above the initial 
disagreement threshold. The conditional function is illustrated in the table below 
(explanations for variables can be found in Appendix 8.0-SI); it serves the purpose of 
assigning low values to posts that are above the political disagreement threshold, but 
below the subsequent agree threshold and high values for posts that are above both 
thresholds while those that are below both are assigned middle values. The function 
ensures that a measure for cross-cutting agreement can be established using continuous 
rather than discrete values, and that the two thresholds serves as pivoting constants 
around which the values that reflect the relationship between initial disagreement and 
subsequent agreement are free to vary based on their original scores.  
 




initial_disagree_all > 0.14 AND subsequent_agree => 0.26 
(-INITIAL_DISAGREE_ALL*SUBSEQUENT_AGREE)*(1+ 
INITIAL_DISAGREE_ALL^2) 
initial_disagree_all > 0.14 AND subsequent_agree < 0.26 
-INITIAL_DISAGREE_ALL*SUBSEQUENT_AGREE Matches none of the conditions above 
 
With this function, posts (or comments) can be placed on a continuum that explains the 
degree to which users are able to reach agreement or not reach agreement as a result of 
interactions around the post. Again, it is values at the extremes that are the most 
interesting. The function is designed so that values around the average are likely to be 
those that have random or uninteresting effects with respect to political 
agreement/disagreement (i.e. non-political content or too politically homogenous to 
produce any disagreement/agreement). Values far above the average represent those 
discussions where users are able to reach some sort of agreement through cross-liking 
comments made by users with opposing political views, and very low values are those 
where users only like comments made by those that are politically similar to them. These 
effects will be referred to as cross-cutting agreement or cross-cutting disagreement. 
 
Cross-cutting Agreement Over Time 
Figure 8.13-A and Figure 8.13-B shows that the average change over time of cross-cutting 
agreement is very small, even smaller than that of political homogeneity and initial 
political disagreement (although there are some large fluctuations). Initially it could seem 
that the simultaneous rise of both political homogeneity and disagreement on media 
pages indicates some sort of political polarization process, which is an argument that can 
still be made regardless of how cross-cutting agreement effects are distributed. However, 
the fact that cross-cutting agreement is increasing slightly on media pages provides a 









The previous section demonstrated that mainstream news and tabloids were primarily 
responsible for the increase in initial disagreement. This increase appeared across all 
topics, though some were increasing more than others. With cross-cutting agreement it 
is possible to observe some much sharper trends, which are shown in Figure 8.14. 
Refugees and Integration and Religion are the only topics that show significant decreases 
of cross-cutting agreement. This finding is central because it adds further support to the 
notion that social media itself is not unilaterally fostering polarization, but rather that 
any such effects is contextually determined. 
 
FIGURE 8.14 – CROSS CUTTING AGREEMENT OVER TIME PER TOPIC  
TOPIC SLOPE P-VALUE 






REFUGEES AND INTEGRATION 
-1,13E-05 0,0315973 
POLITICAL GAMES AND REFERENDUMS 
4,09E-05 < 0.0001 
JUSTICE AND SECURITY POLICY 
3,26E-07 0,889114 
HEALTH 
1,27E-05 < 0.0001 
FIGURE 8.13-B – CROSS CUTTING AGREEMENT OVER TIME PER DATA COLLECTION . 
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GENDER EQUALITY, GENDER AND DISCRIMINATION 
3,56E-05 < 0.0001 
FOREIGN POLICY 
3,21E-05 < 0.0001 
EVERYDAY LIFE AND CONSUMPTION 
1,69E-05 0,001891 
EMPLOYMENT AND THE LABOR MARKET 
3,63E-05 < 0.0001 
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 
2,21E-05 < 0.0001 
ECONOMY 
3,86E-05 < 0.0001 
DOMESTIC POLICY 
1,83E-05 < 0.0001 
CULTURE 
1,19E-05 0,0013372 
CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT 
2,37E-05 0,0073919 
 
Looking at the cases from the previous section, both the week of the national election and 
the time around September 6th 2015 (the case of the migrant caravan), which had very 
high levels of initial disagreement and low levels of cross-cutting agreement. They are 
likely cases where the public is becoming politically polarized with not much agreement 
being reached through subsequent interactions among the users. In contrast the local 
elections of 2017 and the week around 29th of January, which also showed fairly high 
levels of initial disagreement, show comparatively much higher levels of cross-cutting 
agreement in subsequent discussions compared to the two other cases. The week around 
January 2017 included a lot of news stories featuring Donald Trump who is, as mentioned, 
widely unpopular in Denmark in general, which might explain how users are able to reach 
more agreement through subsequent interaction compared to the high levels of initial 
disagreement. In Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 we do see that the 20 posts that reach the most 
agreement compared to the 20 posts that reach the least agreement, the former has twice 
the number of Trump related stories. This is not definitive proof but does suggest that a 
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topic such as Donald Trump makes it easy for Danish people to reach some agreement 
across political lines.   
 
TABLE 8.7 – TOP 20 POSTS SORTED BY CROSS-CUTTING AGREEMENT (MOST AGREEMENT) 

















































































































TABLE 8.8 – BOTTOM 20 POSTS SORTED BY CROSS-CUTTING AGREEMENT (LEAST AGREEMENT) 
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Looking back at Figure 8.13-A, the week around January 24th 2016 is a time with 
particularly low levels of cross-cutting agreement, especially given that levels of initial 
disagreement are only slightly above average during the same period. It demonstrates 
how a small selection of special news stories are able to set off discussions where users 
are unlikely to reach agreement across political lines. Taking a quick look at the posts that 
produced the most disagreement around this time, almost all of them are related to a 
specific vote in parliament, which resulted in an unprecedented tightening of the quota 
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for asylum seekers in Denmark. Part of this piece of legislation also allowed the 
government to seize the belongings of asylum seekers upon their entry into the system. 
(Crouch & Kingsley, 2016.). The story also reached the international press since the vote 
at the time made Denmark one of the countries with the most unfavourable conditions 
for asylum seekers in Europe. Compared to the case with the migrant caravan around 
September 6th 2015, the news about this legislation does not appear to be have swept 
across the whole media landscape to the same degree, but for those who participate the 
discussion is at least as polarizing as the one concerning the migrant caravan.  
Overall the patterns pertaining to initial disagreement with varying levels of cross-cutting 
agreement across political lines through subsequent interaction and commenting 
demonstrates that political polarization can appear both as a sweeping effect that seems 
to frame the whole political discussion on social media, as in the case with the migrant 
caravan, but also with less uniform effects where initial disagreement does result in 
higher than expected levels of cross-cutting agreement among the users.  
 
Modelling cross-cutting agreement 
The purpose of this subsection is to further explore patterns pertaining to cross-cutting 
agreement in public Facebook discussions. One can only assume that cross-cutting 
agreement is caused by a complex set of factors and highly dependent on context. An 
advantage of cross-cutting agreement is that the value is determined as a relation 
between what happens at the post and comment levels of interaction. This allows for 
cross-cutting agreement to be considered at both levels, while the comment-level 
provides a much more fine-grained analysis of cross-cutting agreement. 
In order to compare predictors of cross-cutting agreement with previous models a simple 
regression model is applied at the post level using cross-cutting agreement as the 
dependent variable. Figure 8.15 shows that cross-cutting agreement is positively 
correlated with overrepresentation of women and negatively correlated with harsh 
language. The primary significance of this finding is that use of harsh language is shown 
to be an exacerbating factor for political polarization in discussions on Facebook. 
Discussions that have high initial disagreement, based on users’ initial reactions to the 
published content, can attain high levels of cross-cutting agreement in the comment feed 
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if comments are kept civil. Even though initial political disagreement is positively 
correlated with harsh language use, there are indeed variations based on how much 
agreement is reached through subsequent interactions. Discussions that have lower 
levels of harsh language have higher levels of cross-cutting agreement, indicating that 
civility might indeed be a component in creating consensus, though no causal relation can 
be proved at this stage. 
It can be observed that certain topics such as Refugees and Integration as well as page 
categories like Political News and Right Leaning News are more likely to produce 
discussions that do not reach agreement. 
 
FIGURE 8.15 – OLS RESULTS CROSS-CUTTING AGREEMENT ~ *, POSTS, SIMPLE 
DEP. VARIABLE:    CROSS_AGREEMENT    R-SQUARED:             0.147   
 
MODEL:            OLS                Adj. R-squared:        0.147   
 
METHOD:           Least Squares      F-statistic:           724.8   
 
DATE:             Thu  31 Oct 2019   Prob (F-statistic):   0.00     
TIME:             07:56:18           Log-Likelihood:       94294.   
 
NO. OBSERVATIONS: 193540             AIC:                -1.885e+05 
 
DF RESIDUALS:     193493             BIC:                -1.880e+05 
 
DF MODEL:             46                                            
 
COVARIANCE TYPE:  nonrobust                                         
 
                                   coef     std err      t     P>|t|  
CONST                               0.2873     0.018    16.120  0.000 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION           -0.2043     0.004   -54.587  0.000 
WOMEN_COMMENTS                      0.0717     0.002    37.229  0.000 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY               -0.1506     0.004   -41.613  0.000 
REACTIONS_TOTAL                    -0.0489     0.002   -20.650  0.000 
O                                  -0.0697     0.002   -33.476  0.000 
TABLOID                             0.0189     0.002    11.687  0.000 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS    -0.1673     0.009   -19.175  0.000 
LOCAL NEWS                          0.0182     0.002     9.742  0.000 
V                                  -0.0803     0.002   -35.254  0.000 
B                                  -0.1140     0.003   -37.405  0.000 
GENERAL NEWS                        0.0011     0.001     0.799  0.425 
OE                                 -0.0954     0.003   -36.118  0.000 
A                                  -0.0851     0.002   -36.156  0.000 
SAD_TOTAL                           0.0189     0.004     4.370  0.000 
I                                  -0.0658     0.003   -25.119  0.000 
HEALTH                              0.0904     0.007    13.332  0.000 
ECONOMY                            -0.0386     0.006    -6.108  0.000 
F                                  -0.0895     0.003   -31.102  0.000 
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RELIGION                           -0.0244     0.004    -6.492  0.000 
POLITICAL NEWS                     -0.0636     0.003   -23.768  0.000 
ANGRY_TOTAL                         0.0403     0.002    20.614  0.000 
AA                                 -0.0788     0.003   -26.511  0.000 
INFOTAINMENT                        0.0129     0.002     5.483  0.000 
NB                                 -0.0943     0.007   -13.720  0.000 
LEFT LEANING NEWS                  -0.0580     0.003   -22.050  0.000 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT            -0.0563     0.009    -6.046  0.000 
CULTURE                             0.1182     0.008    14.665  0.000 
COMMENTS_TOTAL                     -0.1902     0.018   -10.718  0.000 
SPORT                               0.0866     0.006    14.009  0.000 
LO                                  0.0335     0.004     8.369  0.000 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS                 -0.0220     0.002   -11.033  0.000 
LOVE_TOTAL                         -0.1350     0.010   -13.343  0.000 
FREDERIKSBERG KOMMUNE              -0.0663     0.005   -12.147  0.000 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY         0.0857     0.004    19.830  0.000 
BRØNDBY KOMMUNE                     0.1097     0.010    10.450  0.000 
CHARITY                             0.0512     0.011     4.732  0.000 
RINGKØBINGSKJERN KOMMUNE            0.0762     0.017     4.485  0.000 
FTF                                -0.0235     0.004    -6.003  0.000 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH              0.0854     0.009     9.399  0.000 
RANDERS KOMMUNE                     0.1118     0.020     5.558  0.000 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION       0.1030     0.009    11.098  0.000 
C                                  -0.0148     0.003    -4.783  0.000 
DEBATE                             -0.0183     0.003    -6.325  0.000 
EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET     0.0821     0.007    11.449  0.000 
DOMESTIC_POLICY                     0.0347     0.005     6.442  0.000 
AABENRAA KOMMUNE                   -0.0548     0.086    -0.638  0.523 
OMNIBUS:       15360.899   Durbin-Watson:         1.915  
 
PROB(OMNIBUS):  0.000      Jarque-Bera (JB):   26954.521 
 
SKEW:          -0.582      Prob(JB):               0.00  
 




In order to get a better grasp of the complexity involved in cross-cutting agreement its 
determining factors are modelled at the comment level. This entails considering the 
characteristics of individual comments that contribute to the average cross-cutting 
agreement of a given post. Another regression model using cross-cutting agreement as 
the dependent variable is created but using input data calculated at the comment level. 
This is done with the same formula as in Equation 8.0 where it is based on the subsequent 
agreement score for a single comment instead of it being the mean of all subsequent 
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agreement scores of comments made to a post. The model considers the interaction 
between parameters such as the topics, the page categories, harsh language and whether 
the comment is made by a female participant or not as well as the rest of the base 
variables. Since the model is now considering single users who are writing comments it 
should also include the multiparty perspective with respect to the predicted voting 
intention of the users and not just the political left- and right-wing scale. This way it is 
possible to explore the relations between user interaction in spaces, across topics, moods 
and demographics at a very fine-grained level. It also means there is a very large number 
of potential parameters to evaluate in the model selection process, and since there are 
lots more comments than posts, computational resource limitations dictate that the 
model be limited to a sample of 500.000 randomly selected comments. After non-null 
filters and model selection the final model contains a total of 433.132 observations and 
388 parameters (a single parameter can potentially represent the interaction between up 
to four parameters). The results of the final model, which is illustrated in Appendix 8.3-
SI will now be covered starting with the linear parameters and then on to more complex 
ones32.  
There is a total of 49 linear, non-interaction parameters, and most of them are in the top 
100 of most influential parameters. Unsurprisingly, harsh language and topics related to 
refugees and immigrants are negatively correlated with cross-cutting agreement, which 
is in line with the overall pattern seen in the analysis so far. It can also be seen that the 
length of a comment, meaning how many words it contains, is one of the strongest 
positive correlations with cross-cutting agreement. It is likely that longer comments 
contain more details or more well-thought out arguments, which might be more 
appealing to a broader political spectrum. The single strongest parameter, which is a 
negative coefficient, relates to whether the comment is made by someone who votes for 
the Danish Folkparty (DF), which is the mainstream populist party. Harsh language 
appears to be a moderator between comments made by DF voters and likelihood of not 
creating cross-cutting agreement. This means that harsh language moderates the 
strength of the first parameter such that a person voting for the Danish Folkparty is even 
less likely to cause cross-cutting agreement if they use harsh language. 
 




We see a number of other moderation effects related to comments made by DF voters 
such as if the comment is made by a woman or in response to topics such as employment 
and labour market, social policy, education and domestic policy where the moderation 
creates a positive correlation with cross-cutting agreement. It means that a DF voter, who 
is a woman or someone who makes a comment to posts about the topics just mentioned 
mitigates a lot of the negative correlation between being a DF voter and not causing cross-
cutting agreement. On the other hand, topics such as immigration, religion and foreign 
policy increase the strength of the negative correlation between comments made by DF 
voters and cross-cutting agreement. 
It is also interesting to note how the parameters: 1) topics related to immigration, 2) 
comments made by DF voters and 3) harsh language are, independently, negatively 
correlated with cross-cutting agreement, meaning that any discussion containing those 
elements are less likely to produce the kinds of interaction that will create agreement 
across political lines. However, there are exceptions such as when harsh language is 
moderated by posts related to domestic policies or when DF voters comment on economy 
related stories using harsh language, which are both cases that involve harsh language, 
but results in a positive relationship with cross-cutting agreement. Most impressively, 
three of the parameters which are individually some of the strongest negative predictors 
of cross-cutting agreement (comments made by DF voters, immigration related topics 
and harsh language) when combined into a single parameter are alleviated of their 
negative correlation when moderated by Tabloid news sources. These disjoint non-linear 
effects provide insights into the complex distribution of discussions that can potentially 
produce agreement and disagreement across the different public spaces. It is a testament 
to the importance of context when it comes to content consumption and social 
interactions. There is likely a specific subset of people who are able to find each other and 
reach agreement when discussing refugees and immigration in the aftermath of tabloid 
stories. 
Media outlets in the category of political news are less likely to cause users to reach 
agreement compared to other spaces, but all topics that are not related to immigration, 
religion and foreign policy seem to moderate this relationship and invert the effect, 
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suggesting that many political discussions can actually produce above average levels of 
cross-cutting agreement as long as they are not related to a few controversial topics. This 
is further supported by results shown in the previous figure 8.14, which indicate that the 
two topics Refugees and Integration and Religion are the only ones that appear to reach 
lower levels of cross-cutting agreement over time.  
Another noteworthy aspect is when users who are predicted to vote for one specific party 
seek out posts made by politicians from other parties and engage in discussions on their 
public pages. The model reveals how interaction patterns are not equally distributed 
across political pages but depends on specific contexts (Appendix 8.3-SI). Unsurprisingly 
the negative correlations are the strongest ones. Political pages from all parties are 
negatively correlated with cross-cutting agreement. To clarify what this means, when any 
user is commenting on posts published by politicians or political parties, those comments 
are less likely to cause cross-cutting agreement compared to all other pages in the Danish 
public. The negative correlation is unsurprising because political pages are, within the 
model, implicitly compared to media and other pages which will often be more neutral 
and less politically homogenous. It illustrates what one would expect, namely that when 
users are actively seeking out the political opposition it is more likely with the intention 
to attack opponents’ views, than seek to understand them. 
The second tier of strong negative correlations consists of situations where voters seek 
out posts from their rival parties e.g. Danish Folkparty (DF) voters on Radikale Venstre’s 
(B) pages or Enhedslisten (OE) voters on Venstre’s (V) pages, as well as the opposite for 
positive correlations e.g. Liberal Alliance (I) voters on Venstre’s (V), which is natural since 
they are ideologically closer to each other. Thus, the overall pattern is for users to attack 
their rivals and agree with their closest political allies. 
There are however also some less expected results such as cases where voters of the 
populist party Danish Folkparty (DF) comment on posts from Enhedslisten (OE) and the 
Social Democrats (A), which is positively correlated with cross-cutting agreement. 
Though, further down on the table in Appendix 8.3-SI, this relationship is moderated by 
use of harsh language such that comments with civil language are much more likely to 
cause higher levels of cross-cutting agreement compared to the uncivil ones. 
Furthermore, there is a great variance in terms of which discussions cause users to reach 
agreement based on which party is posting and the topic that they are posting about. The 
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party Venstre (V) seems split on different topics. Posts related to Climate and 
Environmental issues only have positive correlations when dominated by commenting 
users from their own side of the political spectrum (right-wing parties), yet a topic such 
as Justice and Security shows the exact opposite effect and produces a lot of agreement 
when published by any of the left wing parties.   
Unexpectedly, there is almost no statistically significant parameters related to whether a 
comment was written by a woman or a man. It runs counter to the previous findings (see 
Figure 8.15) that an overrepresentation of female participants was more likely to lead to 
cross-cutting agreement. The best way to interpret the discrepancy between the two 
results is that a slight overrepresentation of female participants is more likely to cause 
users to reach agreement across political lines, but it is neither the male nor female 
comments that make the real difference on average. This is because some comments are 
somewhat neutral in terms of promoting cross-cutting agreement, thus the cause must 
be either an overrepresentation of neutral female commenters or the female participants 
are not writing their own comments, but simply liking or otherwise reaction to other 
users’ comments.  
 
Flows of agreement and disagreement 
This subsection will dive further into the various directions that public discussions can 
take. Specifically, this part of the analysis considers the fact that Facebook allows for two 
steps of commenting on posts. This means that each comment to a post can potentially 
receive a number of replies and those replies can also receive likes from users. Thus, for 
each post where the ensuing comments pull the discussion in a direction, towards cross-
cutting agreement or not, replies made to those comments can pull the discussion further 
towards either agreement or disagreement. Thus, comments and replies respectively 
constitute the first and second step of cross-cutting agreement/disagreement. The 
calculation for the second step is identical to that of the first, which was covered in the 
previous subsection, except that it moves one step down in the communications 
hierarchy such that a reply is to a comment what a comment is to a post. The result of all 
replies made to all comments on a given post is averaged at the post level. 
 222 
With this it becomes possible to divide discussions into four categories on a per post level 
based on whether they 1) move toward cross-cutting agreement, but then revert back to 
disagreement through replies, 2) move toward disagreement, but achieve cross-cutting 
agreement through replies, 3) reach no agreement in either comments or replies or 4) 
move toward cross-cutting agreement and then reach further agreement through replies. 
Any of these four configurations is termed a flow group. These flow groups will, 
respectively, be denoted as Agree Revert (1), Agree Rebirth (2), No Agree (3) and Full 
Agree (4). It is, however, necessary to include a fifth category. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the calculation behind cross-cutting agreement is built on the premise 
that it is really the results at the extreme ends of the scale that denote either agreement 
or disagreement, whereas results around the global average are most likely either 
random patterns (not politically charged) or consist of politically homogenous crowds. 
For this reason, the four categories just mentioned must be based on whether they are 
significantly above average in both step one (comments) and step two (replies). Anything 
that is too close to the average in either step will fall into a fifth category, Mixed Agree (5). 
The process is illustrated in below (descriptions of variables are found in Appendix 8.0-
SI):  
 
FLOW GROUP CONDITION 
FULL AGREE > 2 * mean(initial_disagree*subsequent_agree) AND 2 * > 
mean(initial_disagree_comagg*subsequent_agree_comagg) 
AGREE REVERT > 2 * mean(initial_disagree*subsequent_agree) AND < 0.5 *  
mean(initial_disagree_comagg*subsequent_agree_comagg) 
AGREE REBIRTH < 0.5 * mean(initial_disagree*subsequent_agree) AND > 2 * 
mean(initial_disagree_comagg*subsequent_agree_comagg) 
NO AGREE < 0.5 * mean(initial_disagree*subsequent_agree) AND < 0.5 * 
mean(initial_disagree_comagg*subsequent_agree_comagg) 





It should be mentioned that far from all posts have enough activity and political 
penetration in both steps to reliably calculate the flow group. Only posts that have at least 
10 comments and 10 replies with at least 85% political penetration are included in the 
final sample, which comes to a total of 86.713 posts with close to 4/5 being from media 
pages. The distribution of initial disagreement and cross-cutting agreement do not vary 
much between the full sample from the previous subsection and the reduced one used for 
the calculation of flow groups. It will be assumed that the slicing of the sample is close to 
random with respect to the variables of interest here. As an example, if one compares the 
means of the variables found in Table 8.10 (the subsample) with the same means of the 
entire sample, no significant difference is observed (p > 0.05) 
 
Agreement flows in relation to popularity, gender, emojis and incivility 
After dividing all posts into distinct groups based on the flows of 
agreement/disagreement we can check them against a few simple statistics. Table 8.10 
illustrates that there is very little variation between the groups when it comes to average 
reactions and comments received per post. The Mixed Agree group has a much lower 
average for number of comments received, but this is to be expected as posts with 
relatively few comments are unlikely to have agreement flows that veer far from the 
global averages. 
 
TABLE 8.10 – MEAN NUMBER OF INTERACTIONS PER FLOW GROUP 
FLOW_GROUP LOVE_TOTAL LIKE_TOTAL ANGRY_TOTAL SAD_TOTAL COMMENTS_TOTAL REACTIONS_TOTAL SHARES 
AGREE_REBIRTH 0,021187 0,805058 0,096082 0,032079 0,021187 0,782828 112,1604 
AGREE_REVERT 0,019288 0,77832 0,112265 0,038234 0,019288 0,781764 95,05953 
FULL_AGREE 0,019622 0,783071 0,110291 0,035617 0,019622 0,763479 126,6168 
MIXED_AGREE 0,012407 0,791224 0,12009 0,042846 0,012407 0,770923 155,9113 
NO_AGREE 0,0175 0,833879 0,087645 0,026011 0,0175 0,784597 133,749 
 
There is a bit more variation when it comes to average number of shares received per 
post. The flow group Mixed Agree has, by far, the highest average of shares. To reiterate, 
Mixed Agree will typically contain two types of posts: 1) posts that have very little to do 
with politics and 2) posts with participants that are too homogenous to cause any great 
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variation in political agreement and disagreement. Since it was shown in an earlier 
subsection that homogenous posts are not correlated with shares (see Figure 8.8), this 
most likely means that posts which are less likely to have political content or overtly 
promote a political position are shared the most. The group with the second most shares 
on average is No Agree, which indicates that divisive and polarizing discussions are likely 
to spread farther than de-polarized ones. The mean share value between the No Agree 
group and the rest differs enough to be statistically significant (P < 0.0001), but the 
difference is still much smaller than the difference between Mixed Agree and all other 
groups. Thus, No Agree discussions are, comparatively, not that much more likely to be 
spread further. 
In line with previous results it can be seen that, when accounting for the full flow of 
agreement and disagreement, harsh language and high numbers of male participants are 
both more prevalent for the No Agree group, whereas the opposite can be said about the 
Full Agree group. There are no clear differences between the Agree Rebirth and Agree 
Revert groups. 
Emoji responses do not appear to differ too much between the different groups, which is 
somewhat expected since they have not appeared to play big roles in the previous 
regression models. The biggest relative difference is the average number of sad emoji 
responses, which is smaller for the No Agree group. It makes some sense that stories, 
which initially make people sad, could more easily unite people across the political 
spectrum. The No Agree group also has the lowest average of angry emoji responses, 
which can seem a bit unexpected. However it was shown in Figure 8.8 that angry 
responses were strongly correlated with politically homogenous environments so it 
makes sense that the Mixed Agree group has the highest average of angry responses. 
 
Distribution of agreement flows across topics and spaces 
This part explores how flows of agreement and disagreement are distributed across 
different spaces and topics. Political pages and media pages have a much higher percent 
of activity per post than the other types of pages in the Danish collection, and thus these 
are the only ones that will be included here, since the rest simply do not have enough 
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posts that qualify for calculating the full flow of agreement and disagreement to 
reasonably compare all different spaces that exist within them.  
Figure 8.18 shows a heatmap illustration of how many posts can be found within each 
category for each flow group among all media pages. Each category is normalized by its 
sum such that large categories like General News are put on the same scale as smaller 
ones like Debate. Furthermore, each flow group is standardized across all categories, such 
that the value for a given cell is a number between 0 and 100, which represents how close 





FIGURE 8.18 – INDEX SCORES FOR EACH FLOW GROUP PER MEDIA CATEGORY  
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P < 0.0001 USING FISHERS EXACT 
 
 
Agree Rebirth and Agree Revert are most prevalent for Political News and Debate. This 
gives the impression that pages within these categories are functioning as spaces of free 
debate, where the direction towards either cross-cutting agreement or disagreement can 
take multiple forms and easily change direction. Left Leaning News and Right Leaning 
News represent the spaces that produce most posts in the No Agree group. This suggests 
that those who seek out these spaces might have less motivation to discuss and learn and 
are more interested in challenging the political opposition. They both have by far the 
lowest number of posts in the Full Agree category. Though we do also see a fair amount 
of posts in the No Agree group for both Debate and especially Political News, which 
suggest that spaces that are framed as political are less likely to inspire cross-cutting 
agreement. 
The posts from the Full Agree group are most often found on infotainment pages. This 
can seem both trivial and curious at the same time. At first it might not be surprising that 
spaces with less political talk produce more cross-cutting agreement however, the 
calculation behind the flow groups is configured so that cross-cutting agreement only 
reaches high levels when the initial story presented in the post is at least potentially 
polarizing. A post cannot be in the Full Agree group unless there is some evidence that 
the users who engage with it have positioned themselves with respect to their voting 
intention. Thus, it is warranted to consider the de-polarizing effect that political 
discussion in non-political spaces might have. 
The page categories with the second and third highest number of posts in the Full Agree 
group are Local News and General News. The pattern here seems to be that users are not 
actively looking for political content or expecting other users to be guided by their 
political beliefs in the way that they engage with content. Instead they are commenting 
on issues of common concern based on more basic everyday life motivations and do not 
necessarily view the space as a political battleground. 
Figure 8.19 shows the distribution of flow groups across page categories that correspond 
to which political party the page belongs to. Here we see that the Conservative party (C) 
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has by far the highest amount of posts in the Full Agree and Agree Rebirth category. To a 
political scientist this may seem a bit surprising since they are usually not considered a 
centre-right party like for example, Venstre (V). However, it makes sense considering that 
the Conservative party is both one of the smaller parties, but also, and most importantly, 
has one of the least concrete stances on controversial issues such as refugees and 
immigration. As we have seen earlier, content related to immigration, refugees, 
religionand foreign policy are strongly negatively correlated with users’ abilities to reach 
cross-cutting agreement. We see that another one of the smaller right-wing parties, 
Liberal Alliance (I), dominates the Agree Revert group. It means that discussions on their 
pages are more likely to end on a disagreeing note even if it initially was en-route to cross-
cutting agreement. An in-depth analysis would be needed at this point in order to make 




FIGURE 8.18 – INDEX SCORES FOR EACH FLOW GROUP PER POLITICAL PARTY. 
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P < 0.0001 USING FISHERS EXACT 
 
It was mentioned in the previous subsection how comments made by Danish Folkparty  
(O) voters was one of the strongest predictors of discussions with cross-cutting 
disagreement. It might initially seem strange that they have a small number of posts in 
the No Agree group, but this makes sense since these are political pages and Danish 
Folkparty has the highest levels of political homogeneity. Thus, they dominate the Mixed 
Agree group and have low scores in all other groups. Posts within the No Agree group are 
most often found on pages that represent Radikale Venstre (B), which is famous for being 
a very centrist party with a little bit of a ‘homelessness syndrome’. They are more similar 
to right-wing parties on economic and tax related issues, but more similar to the left on 
issues related to immigration, education and political correctness. 
Finally, Figure 8.21 shows the distribution of posts across topics and flow groups. What 
stands out the most is how much the No Agree group is dominated by just two topics 
Refugees and Integration and Political Games and Referendums. As explained earlier the 
latter topic is not very interesting since it mostly contains stories related to poll results. 
That immigration related issues dominates this group so heavily does bear witness to the 
notion that political polarization happens mostly along a single topical dimension. This is 
supported by the fact that posts from the Full Agree group are much more evenly 
distributed across many topics, especially those related to health, education, culture, 
employment and everyday life. Foreign policy issues, which are often related to 
immigration in some way, elicit very different patterns compared to those that are 
directly about immigration and refugees. The Foreign Policy topic is prevalent in both the 
Agree Rebirth and Agree Revert categories and is also relatively high scoring in the Full 
Agree group demonstrating the true difference between the two topics (immigration and 
foreign policy). Looking more qualitatively into posts for these two topics might help shed 
some light on exactly what makes some stories more polarizing than others. A similar 




FIGURE 8.21 – INDEX SCORES FOR EACH FLOW GROUP PER TOPIC. 
P < 0.0001 USING FISHERS EXACT 
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Progression of individual discussions 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the progression of a single discussion as it 
develops from the initial publishing of a post to the last comment/reply. This entails 
looking at how levels of political homogeneity, cross-cutting agreement and harsh 
language use change over the course of a single discussion. However, it is not a case study 
of a selected discussion, but an average of all discussions. This will provide an insight into 
whether political polarization is in general likely to increase over the course of any given 
public Facebook discussion in the Danish public space.  
Similar to the flows of agreement and disagreement analysed in the previous section, the 
change in values over the course of a single discussion is not relevant for posts that only 
contain a few comments. Thus, we will choose a filter similar to the one used in the 
previous section. Only posts that have at least 20 comments or replies with at least 85% 
political penetration will be used, which comes to a total of 89,114 posts and 3,596,047 
comments/replies to be analysed. 
Progression in this context can essentially be understood as the lifecycle of a discussion. 
However, because the so-called lifecycles of individual discussions do not have equal time 
spans, some will finish after just a few hours while others last several days. It must of 
course be assumed that the length of the time span impacts the progression of the 
discussion, but since the focus is on very broad trends it can also be assumed that if there 
are significant differences between long and short time span discussions, it would gain 
some expression in the observed trends. The underlying assumption is that, 
independently of how long the time span of a discussion is, from the moment the first 
comment is made the people who are exposed and choose to engage will be somewhat 
determined by personal, social and algorithmic curation logics. The purpose of this 
analysis is to consider whether these curation logics push discussions toward increased 
political homogeneity, cross-cutting agreement and harsh language use.  
In order to compare the progression of discussions with varying numbers of comments 
and varying time spans it is necessary to consider each comment/reply as a single step 
forward in time independently of how much time passes between two steps. It is also 
necessary to apply a smoothing effect so that all discussions have the same dimensions. 
The average number of comments/replies on posts, after applying the aforementioned 
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filters, is 55. Discussions with more comments will be compressed and discussions with 
fewer will be stretched so that all discussions take place over the course of 55 steps in 
time. The function for compressing the timelines of discussions is documented in 
Appendix 8.4-SI. 
 
The main result is displayed in Figure 8.22. We see that political homogeneity and use of 
harsh language show a clear tendency to increase on average as a discussion continues. 
Cross-cutting agreement shows a weaker, but still politically significant (P < 0.00016) 
tendency to decrease over the course of a single discussion. All in all, the general trends 
point towards an average increase in polarization, both as increased homogeneity as well 
as increased disagreement. 
 
 
FIGURE 8.22 – INDEX SCORES FOR EACH FLOW GROUP PER TOPIC 
 
While the overall trends shown in figure 8.22 are fairly clear there are exceptions based 
on topics of discussion and the spaces in which they occur. Additional examples can be 
found in Appendix 8.2-SI. A topic like Economy stands out by having cross-cutting 
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agreement that is increasing rather than decreasing as well as a much lower end value 
for political homogeneity when compared to the general trend. A related topic like 
Employment and Labour Market displays homeostasis of cross-cutting agreement. Topics 
such as Social Policy and Domestic Policy do not have increasing values of harsh language 
use. 
For different categories of pages there is a very obvious exception for spaces that are 
politically charged. All political pages along with right leaning news and left leaning news 
display a decrease in political homogeneity the longer a discussion continues. Pages 
within these categories can be assumed to have a high degree of average political 
homogeneity, which means that a small decrease in homogeneity is not equal to a highly 
diverse crowd at the end of the discussion. However, it is interesting because it seems to 
suggest that more ‘outside fuel’ is needed as discussions progress in these spaces. It is 
possible to conceive a kind of inflation point for political homogeneity on Facebook. The 
idea would be that discussions which originate from spaces that have a certain level of 
political diversity have a tendency to move towards greater homogeneity, but spaces that 
reach very high levels of homogeneity will begin to have opposite tendencies. Though it 
is unlikely that such an inflation greatly determines patterns of polarization. Political 
News and General News and Tabloids for example all have high political diversity, but 
still elicit different patterns.  While Tabloid media and General News follow the general 
trend on all three counts, the Political News and Debate categories displays homeostasis 
with respect to cross-cutting agreement.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated how digital trace data from public pages on Facebook can 
be effectively leveraged in order to extract patterns pertaining to political homophily and 
cross-cutting agreement. Furthermore, the results from this chapter provides additional 
empirical evidence for some of the forces that govern social media behaviour with respect 
to political communication. The specific findings only pertain to Danish public pages on 
Facebook, however the findings are still relevant for the discussion about the general 
expectations on social media. 
There is evidence to suggest that political homophily does increase over time, though 
significant increases are heavily dependent on the types of pages, activities and topics 
discussed, thus hypothesis H1-A is partially confirmed. Cross-cutting agreement shows 
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an overall increase over time, though still somewhat dependent on types of pages and 
topics discussed, which means hypothesis H1-B is partially rejected. For single 
discussions political homophily appears to be increasing the longer they remains active 
on average, which confirms hypothesis H2-A. However, hypothesis H2-B is rejected since 
cross-cutting agreement does not show a clear trend of either increasing or decreasing. 
High levels of political homophily is heavily skewed towards certain types of pages and 
topics. Media pages that are particularly popular with voters of populists parties such as 
Dansk Folkeparti (O) and discussions about refugees and immigration have significantly 
higher levels of political homophily compared to many other pages and topics. The same 
can be observed for low levels of cross-cutting agreement. As such hypotheses H3-A and 
H3-B are confirmed. Political homophily is strongly correlated with anger and incivility, 
and cross-cutting agreement is negatively correlated with incivility though not the same 
degree of statistical significance. As such hypothesis H4-A is confirmed and H4-B is 
partially confirmed. 
The next chapter will offer a more in-depth discussion of the results, both those that 
relate to the hypotheses and those that go beyond.   
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Chapter 9. Discussion 
 
The analysis in the previous chapter provided insights into macro trends pertaining to 
political homophily and polarization over time, across pages, topics and other factors 
such as incivility and sex. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrated the application of the 
specific set of methods developed in this project and how they can be leveraged when 
combined. This chapter will discuss the implications of both the concrete results and the 
methods as tools for enriching public opinion formation processes. 
The discussion is split into two main parts. The first part will discuss the results 
presented in chapter 8 relating it to previous research into political polarization and 
disagreement on social media. The second part will extend the discussion from the first 
part by addressing how the results and methods used to obtain them relate to the concept 
of the public as an opinion forming body. 
The Evolution of Political Polarization in the Danish Public on Facebook 
The results presented in the analysis provide a counter-narrative to the idea that social 
media is increasingly causing users to engage with content that is aligned with their 
political preferences. We do see some public pages that are heavily dominated by users 
who are politically similar, which is not completely unexpected, especially given that 
many pages are relatively small. The more activity there is on a single page, the less likely 
it is for users on that page to be politically homogenous. Overall there is no significant 
increase in political homogeneity over time, except for political pages where we do 
witness an approximately 8% increase between 2014 and 2018. Furthermore, pages that 
are increasing in homogeneity are more likely to be decreasing in weekly activity over 
time. Thus, an increase in political homogeneity can, on average, be considered a negative 
influence on the popularity of a Danish Facebook page, which can be interpreted as a 
disincentive to seek homogeneity over heterogeneity.  
If filter bubbles are an ever-present and ever-growing phenomenon, even if only slightly, 
we would expect political homogeneity to gradually increase over time. As Bechmann & 
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Nielbo (2018) mentions, perfect homogeneity is rarely the case and it is difficult to 
determine the threshold that decides whether a space constitutes an echo-chamber or 
not. Such observation resonates well with this project since no single page in this analysis 
has a homogeneity score of 133; only a few obscure political pages even come close. 
However, it is possible to use the results to point out potential ‘relative’ echo-chambers. 
It was shown how the right-wing populist media pages Newspeek Network and Den Korte 
Avis can be considered true outliers in that they have very high homogeneity scores 
compared to how much weekly activity they also generate. Coincidentally both of them 
along with a few other populist pages are among a rare subset of pages that have seen 
both a surge in popularity as well as a significant increase in political homogeneity. The 
point to be made here is that the possibility for some spaces to emerge as self-reinforcing 
echo-chambers seems very real, even if it is not the norm among public pages on 
Facebook. Curiously the set of pages that qualify as being echo-chambers for the far-left 
include mostly charity organizations. With this note it seems appropriate to mention that 
these are just Facebook pages and cannot be used as evidence that people who vote for 
left-wing parties give more to charity; it rather suggests that being involved with charity 
organizations is more important for the leftist identity in Denmark.  
As was noted in the previous chapter, pages that have generally increased most in 
popularity, aside from the populist pages just mentioned, are those with higher than 
average political homogeneity in total, but with a gradual decrease in homogeneity over 
time. This offers some support to the idea that a higher level of homogeneity is good for 
mobilization (Obar, Zube & Lampe, 2012), but it also suggests that gradually attracting 
more diverse user bases provides more long-term popularity than the echo-chamber 
model, with the exception of pages associated with the political far-right. Additionally, 
the fact that there is an increase of homogeneity on political pages, but a significant 
decrease on those media pages which specialize in political news suggests that political 
pages are increasingly being used as mobilization grounds, or ‘political safe spaces’ 
(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), while some politics focused media pages, perhaps 
representing a more neutral space, become battlegrounds where users go to exercise 
their political identity and engage in debate with users from the entire political spectrum. 
The argument that media pages are increasingly taking the role as places of political 
 
33 In chapter 6 it was explained how the level of homogeneity is measured using a scale between 0 and 1. 
Thus a 1 represents a perfectly homogenous crowd. 
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debate is underlined by the fact that media pages overtake political pages with respect to 
levels of initial political disagreement by the end of 2017. 
The increased confidence that users might have in their political identity resonates well 
with the fact that politics focused news pages are seeing the sharpest increase in initial 
political disagreement. From how initial disagreement is calculated, it is likely to increase 
because of personal and social curation which covers the scenario that users engage with 
news stories based on their political preferences rather than other aspects of their 
identity. However, part of it could also be journalistic curation since it is possible that 
stories are increasingly being presented with headlines that are designed to incite 
political disagreement (Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017). Many of the pages within the category 
of political news are those that have seen a significant increase in popularity and decrease 
in political homogeneity. Such evidence provides a counter-narrative to the idea that 
increased exposure to a diversity of opinions produces detachment from politics (Mutz, 
2006). Although it is possible that users who seek out political news hubs belong to a 
special group of people who are generally resistant to detachment.  
Media pages that appeal to broader audiences than politics focused media outlets also 
elicit different patterns. Tabloid and general news media are increasing in both political 
homogeneity and initial disagreement, especially for topics related to immigration, 
refugees and religion. This can be interpreted as a sign of political polarization since it 
likely means that discussions are increasingly being separated into those that are either 
politically homogenous or politically divisive.  One of the most noticeable patterns that 
seems to explain this trend is the fact that many posts are either dominated by only right-
wing voters, or they are published stories that resonate with a left-wing worldview, but 
are then challenged by right-wingers in the comment section. As mentioned in chapter 8, 
one would typically expect political disagreement to go down on average when political 
homogeneity increases, which is often not the case for media outlets in the Tabloid and 
General News categories. Considering how distinct and strange this pattern is, it could be 
a consequence of social and journalistic curation logics being combined with algorithmic 
curation resulting in left-wing voters only being exposed to stories they agree with while 
missing those that they would normally seek to challenge. A few exceptions exist for the 
Tabloid and General News categories; left-wing homogeneity is increasing for topics 
related to gender equality, social policy and culture. Since the curation logics of social 
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media potentially allows for stories to be shared solely within very specific networks of 
users, it is possible that the publisher is aiming some stories at increasingly narrower 
segments, at least for some topics (Scheufele & Nisbet, 2013).  
It is important to view initial political disagreement as both a positive and potentially 
negative trait. As mentioned earlier, on the positive side it is an indication that users are 
exercising their political identity (Dahlgren, 2009, 79), however it can also be an 
indication of political polarization. For this reason, the concept of cross-cutting 
agreement was operationalized to provide information about the degree of polarization 
that could be attributed to a post such that it depended on how much of said cross-cutting 
agreement could be found in the interaction between users in the comment section. 
Simply put, interactions between users in the comment section, after a post is published, 
can act as a qualifier. Even if headlines are polarizing and division is incited, users can 
either write comments that lead to more polarization or instead create agreement across 
political lines. 
The employment of the measure cross-cutting agreement demonstrates that far from all 
posts with initial disagreement are polarizing. Some events such as the case of the 
migrant caravan around September 6th 2015 could be considered manifestations of 
political polarization since initial political disagreement for this point in time was 
extremely high with cross-cutting agreement being fairly low. On the contrary the local 
elections in 2017 saw the opposite effect, showing relatively high levels of cross-cutting 
agreement.  
Overall however, cross-cutting agreement shows little change over time, though there is 
a slight increase for media pages. Taking media pages as an example, if political 
polarization was truly increasing one would expect cross-cutting agreement to be 
decreasing to the same degree, and if de-polarization was happening cross-cutting 
agreement should be increasing together with initial political disagreement. This 
provides support to the argument that homeostasis with a slight tendency towards de-
polarization is the dominant trend. However, even this slight tendency towards de-
polarization might be offset by the special case of polarization happening on General 
News and Tabloid media pages, as mentioned earlier, as well as the fact that homogeneity 
is increasing on some pages. 
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The Complex Distribution of Polarization Dynamics    
The previous section already touched on several examples where increase/decrease in 
polarization, either as political homogeneity or lack of cross-cutting agreement, were not 
uniformly distributed across public discussions, although the overall trend was in favour 
of homeostasis. In fact, media pages have only two topics for which cross-cutting 
agreement is not increasing slightly, but actually decreasing: 1) Religion and 2) 
Immigration and Integration, to which the latter is sharply decreasing.  
Discussions with high levels of political homogeneity or initial disagreement without 
cross-cutting agreement are all expressively correlated with harsh language, 
overrepresentation of male participants and topics related to refugees and immigration. 
Since all three appear as some of the strongest coefficients for both homogeneity and not 
cross-cutting agreement it is worth considering them important indicators of 
polarization34. Although these effects can be further moderated depending on the context, 
which was shown in the analysis of standalone comments and their ability to cause cross-
cutting agreement. The length of a comment and the level of civility (using non-harsh 
language) are two of the strongest predictors for whether a comment inspires cross-
cutting agreement. Users who vote for the right-wing populist party, Dansk Folkeparti, 
are much more likely than any other users to cause further disagreement, though this 
effect is moderated by sex such that women participants alleviate this effect. Sex in itself 
however is not a predictor at all, meaning that the comments which cause a discussion to 
regress toward either agreement or disagreement are not affected by the sex of the 
commenter, even if an overrepresentation of women in discussions make them more 
likely to reach agreement. The most plausible explanation for this somewhat strange 
pattern is that it is the women who like the comments rather than the women who write 
the comments that cause an overrepresentation of women to be correlated with higher 
levels of cross-cutting agreement. Thus, the overall civility, not using harsh language, is 
very likely to stimulate consensus in discussions on Facebook, especially when comments 
are long. Adding more female participants only has an implicit effect towards cross-
cutting agreement, meaning a high number of female participants is positively correlated 
 
34 Though if something is a predictor of polarization it is also a predictor of de-polarization, since the effect 
can just be inverted. 
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with increased cross-cutting agreement, even if this is not related to how many of the 
comments are written by women. 
Content about refugees and immigration is much more likely to cause users to not reach 
agreement, especially with harsh language, however this correlation is again moderated 
by specific sets of factors. The analysis pointed out how Dansk Folkeparti voters using 
harsh language in comments about immigrants and refugees specifically on Tabloid 
media pages significantly increases the chance that some cross-cutting agreement will 
occur. The suggestion here is that Tabloid media pages provide a space for populist voters 
to successfully influence some previously uninitiated people with hardline anti-
immigrant opinions. 
By filtering the data down to only those posts that have a certain length of discussion and 
level of activity the analysis was able to explore the full flow of cross-cutting agreement 
and disagreement in both comments and comments to comments, also known as replies. 
This is because replies provide yet another level of discussion meaning comments and 
users’ interaction with comments can cause some cross-cutting agreement to which 
subsequent replies can go further in the same direction, causing additional cross-cutting 
agreement, or in the opposite. The analysis in chapter 8 provided further evidence for 
how agreement and disagreement in multiple steps are distributed differently across 
spaces and topics. Some topics such as Foreign Policy, Gender Equality and even Religion 
are more or less equally distributed across different flows of agreement even if they all 
have a slight tendency toward not reaching agreement; whereas a topic such as Refugees 
and Integration shows itself to be very divisive, almost never reaching agreement in any 
direction. It highlights just how polarizing content related to immigration can be 
compared to all other topics. Furthermore, the analysis revealed political news and 
especially partisan news to be the least likely to promote cross-cutting agreement while 
Tabloid, General News and most significantly Local News showed much higher potential 
for cross-cutting agreement. It was mentioned in the previous section that General News 
and Tabloid elicit patterns of polarization based on users’ initial engagement with the 
content, however it can evidently be suggested that some of this is mitigated by how users 
interact with each other in the comment section. Such observation fits well with previous 
research that has suggested that online spaces, which do not have political discussion as 
their primary purpose can set the stage for more progressive exchange of opinions 
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(Graham, Jackson & Wright, 2016). On the other hand, as was mentioned in the previous 
section, the Facebook pages in the categories General News and Tabloids have seen the 
biggest increase in political homogeneity, which could be an indication that users who 
are not necessarily looking for political news might also be more likely to have a 
confirmation bias and avoid news that are not aligned with their beliefs (Walton, 2017). 
The question of whether social and algorithmic curation on Facebook have an influence 
on the progression of a discussion was tested by measuring how political homogeneity, 
cross-cutting agreement and use of harsh language change from the beginning to the end 
of a discussion. The overall pattern is quite clear: homogeneity and harsh language, on 
average, increase steadily from the first comment to the last comment/reply of a given 
post. Cross-cutting agreement decreases but does start to plateau and slightly increase 
around the last third of the commenting period. This does seem to indicate that the 
overall pattern is towards polarization since a discussion is more likely to be politically 
homogeneous, contain harsh language and not reach agreement the longer it goes on. For 
cross-cutting agreement and especially political homogeneity it is notable that most of 
the change happens within the first half of the discussion period, which indicates that it 
is the first part of the discussion that sets the tone and direction. Explanations for this 
pattern can likely be found in the way users become exposed to content on social media, 
which is through networks and governed by aforementioned curation logics, specifically 
because this finding exposes a discrepancy in the distribution of political homogeneity. It 
is best illustrated by focusing on Political News, which had seen one of the largest 
decreases in homogeneity over time, as mentioned in the last section. However Political 
News still follow the same overall pattern as most pages, namely that homogeneity 
increases the longer a discussion goes on. Different curation logics might affect exposure 
and engagement in different ways. One suggestion is that some people are motivated to 
engage with opposing views (personal curation), however there are other forces at work 
such that if fewer users in a person’s network are involved in a discussion they become 
less likely to be exposed to it if enough time has passed since its inception (social 
combined with algorithmic curation). It is outside the scope of this thesis to conclude how 
the different curation logics work together across Facebook in general, but the results at 
least suggest that they likely manifest in different ways. 
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Transparency in Information Flows and the Flexible Data Public 
Social media publics hold the potential for combining attributes related to voice and 
aggregation as demonstrated in the triaxial model. The methods developed in this thesis 
and demonstrated in chapter 8 serve as an example of how this combining of voice and 
aggregation can be utilized. The great advantage of social media publics in this 
perspective is that opinions are constructed and shared freely by individuals. There are 
no pre-determined answer categories like in polls and surveys and people who are part 
of the public come into contact with one another in a public exchange of opinions, which 
is one of the important criteria of opinion formation in the deliberation tradition 
(Splichal, 2012). Voicing opinions are certainly restricted by the architecture of the social 
media platform (i.e. which emoji responses available to choose from), however such 
affordances are often regarded as leaving a fair amount of creative expression for the user 
(Lomborg, 2011). Also, in this specific study most discussions will often have been framed 
by the original post made by a media organization or politician, but there are few limits 
to which directions the discussion can take. 
The methods demonstrated in this thesis then show how the digital traces produced from 
the interactions, both between user and content and user and user, can reveal patterns 
pertaining to political polarization and cross-cutting agreement by parsing and 
combining these traces in certain ways. In the context of Big Data theory in media and 
communications research, it takes advantage of the notion of meta-data (digital traces in 
the form of likes revealing the political preferences of users) as a form of meta-
communication (Jensen, 2013). The Big Data approach with its high granularity provides 
very specific insights into some broad trends across multiple levels such as time periods, 
spaces and topics, but it also gives the opportunity to zoom in on a single post, comment 
thread or even a single comment to find an indication about its potential for fostering 
polarization or cross-cutting agreement.  
It is the argument of this thesis that these methods hold prospects for making the 
information flows on social media more sensible and transparent. The tools currently 
available on social media platforms, including the algorithms that they are built on, such 
as the Facebook news feed, which help users navigate information flows on social media, 
often promote content that is either popular/trending or matches the previously 
established preferences of users (Nikolov, Lalmas, Flammini & Menczer, 2018). In this 
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perspective it is possible to imagine other tools that could instead promote content based 
on its level of cross-cutting agreement. Attempts at creating such tools have been made 
before. This includes one tool employed by the Wall Street Journal, which had feeds that 
showed content by different partisan news sources side-by-side so that a diversity of 
perspectives was always available (Keegan, 2017). Another tool designed for the Chinese 
social media platform Sina Weibo allows users to more clearly position themselves as for 
or against a certain viewpoint by placing their comment in a certain bloc pertaining to a 
specific issue (Sui & Pingree, 2016). Both these tools are based on a binary prescriptive 
logic, asking users to choose sides from the beginning so to speak instead of repurposing 
digital traces as done in this thesis. In this sense, such tools are more focused on framing 
the actual communication (the principal data), rather than making the meta-
communication (meta-data, Jensen, 2013) visible in an aggregated format. 
One of the most innovative tools to date with respect to directly taking advantage of the 
combination between deliberation and aggregation possible with online digital media is 
the tool Polis employed by the New Zealand online newspaper Scoop NZ. This tool allows 
users to comment on an issue and then vote on each other’s comments with the added 
functionality that patterns of cross-cutting agreement between groups of yea and nay 
could be extracted and shown to the engaging public itself. The method used by this tool 
has a similar logic to those developed in this thesis, however instead of political positions 
reflecting the party politics of a given country, the Polis tool essentially calculates them 
on a case by case basis. Another difference, which can be effectively highlighted using the 
triaxial model, is that the Polis tool presupposes more engagement over ignorance as 
both the space and issue is politically framed from the beginning. Users are asked to 
consider and vote on all previous comments before writing some themselves and the 
debates are also edited by the host (i.e. Scoop NZ staff members). Communication flows 
on social media, which consist of both highly engaged individuals as well as incidental 
exposure, can better take advantage of the features of ignorance over engagement that 
can allow for more and broader strata of participants.  
As pointed out several times, there are definite benefits to a public that is placed further 
out on the engagement axis in the triaxial model, however methods that are directly 
coupled to the information flow on social media can take advantage of the ignorance of 
the public, which allows political talk and by extension cross-cutting agreement to arise 
 245 
more organically across spaces and topics that are not necessarily politically framed from 
the get go.  
An example of current research that comes close to exploring avenues similar to those in 
this thesis is Babaei et al. (2018), who themselves claim to be the first known example of 
such research. They develop and test a classifier to recognize social media posts with high 
probabilities of causing cross-cutting agreement that performs fairly well. The biggest 
differences between their study and this thesis are that 1) theirs is based on the binary 
Republican vs. Democrat construct, whereas methods in this thesis are designed to 
handle multiparty configurations, and 2) their study bases cross-cutting agreement on 
whether or not people from different sides of the aisle agree with the message presented 
in a news story, whereas this thesis considers cross-cutting agreement as that which 
unfolds in the interaction between users in the comment section. With respect to the 
latter, the methods in this thesis takes more advantage of an active voice public, whereas 
Babaei et al. (2018) relegates the public to the aggregative logic of the audience tradition. 
Furthermore, their study is based on the assumption that polarization is always bad, and 
consensus is to be strived for. This assumption automatically leads to ideas that tools 
should simply promote consensus-oriented content. Given that there are arguments, as 
have been mentioned, for why social media publics will have a tendency to be oriented 
towards agonism, having tools to promote consensus might not be a terrible idea, 
especially since it was also noted that too much polarization is potentially problematic. 
However, the complexity of pros and cons among different manifestations of the public 
informed by the triaxial model seems to suggest that tools which promote a more 
transparent data public altogether might be preferable. The triaxial model is centred on 
the debates of aggregation versus voice, consensus versus agonism and engagement 
versus ignorance. There are advantages and downsides to almost any configuration 
where a collection of people acts as an opinion forming body. Critiquing the conditions 
for public opinion formation vis-à-vis media technologies can scarcely avoid making 
normative assumptions about the public on behalf of the public. As mentioned previously, 
social media publics are likely to be slightly in favour of agonism over consensus and 
ignorance over engagement. Longer comments are strongly correlated with the 
likelihood of causing cross-cutting agreement, thus promoting longer comments could be 
a way to promote engagement over ignorance in the pursuit of mitigating polarization. 
Additionally, topics such as immigration and refugees are much more unlikely to cause 
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cross-cutting agreement compared to other topics. Promoting those posts and comments 
that do manage to reach high levels of cross-cutting agreement would be a way to move 
public opinion further towards the consensus side. However, the real point is to increase 
transparency of behavioural patterns as they relate to the formation of public opinion.  
Instead of simply promoting posts that have certain consensus-oriented characteristics, 
all patterns regarding cross-cutting agreement, polarization and de-polarization in the 
public should be made public to the public. Taking advantage of the mixing between 
aggregation and voice that is offered by networked data publics on social media, it 
becomes possible to envision a public that can better come to understand its own 
function, at least in concrete manifestations of momentary connectedness produced by 
posts, tweets, comments, likes and shares. 
This turns towards ideas of the knowing public (Kennedy & Moss, 2015), which is related 
to the briefly mentioned concept of data agency in chapter 2. Publics gain visibility on 
social media through the aggregation of shares, likes and comments in networked spaces. 
Social media platforms have tools that allow the public to become aware of itself. The 
primary tools are typically centred either on implicit user preferences such as in the 
Facebook news feed (Thorson & Wells, 2017) or general popularity as in the Twitter 
trends overview (Gillespie, 2012; 2014). Mapping, exploring and knowing publics beyond 
the tools provided by the social media platforms themselves have generally been 
restricted to the corporations in charge of the platforms (Williams, 2014) and small 
groups of researchers with specific technical skill sets and/or privileged data access 
(Manovich, 2011). Two central aspects when it comes to turning the known publics into 
publics that are themselves knowing is 1) greater transparency in terms of how 
algorithms filter and curate information (Couldry & Powell, 2014) and 2) control over the 
data (including meta-data) that the publics produce (Bates, 2013). A third aspect has to 
do with empowering the public with the tools that researchers are using to make the 
public known. 
 
 “Data analytics (and the representations and visualizations of publics they 
generate) could provide an invaluable cognitive resource for members of the public 
to understand each other, reflect on matters of shared concern, and to decide how to 
act together as publics” (Kennedy & Moss, 2015, 7-8). 
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The public itself can gain insights from observing the patterns that arise when single 
interactions are put into a much larger context, but it can also build bridges to the more 
formal publics of local communities, governments and politicians (Kennedy, Moshonas & 
Birchall, 2015). Politicians and some governmental bodies are already spending large 
sums of money on data and consultants in order to extract the opinions of the public. An 
active, transparent data public could potentially build a bridge between the formal and 
informal publics that would benefit both. 
Ideas relating to transparent data publics also fit that of the collectively intelligent public, 
in the form of an ephemeral issue public or counter public, as a resource available to 
public servants when seeking guidance on specific policy issues (Madsen & Munk, 2019). 
Methods proposed in this thesis would indeed make it easier for people, be it the general 
public or policy makers, to quickly discover discussions that are examples of polarization 
as well as those that cause cross-cutting agreements in relation to a general topic or 
specific case. It is the argument of this thesis that drilling down into discussions related 
to politics and finding those arguments or sentiments that appear to create cross-cutting 
agreement could provide insights for both the informal and formal manifestations of the 
public. Studying the broader trends as was done as a demonstration of the methods in 
this thesis could shine additional light on expectations for the future. These potentials 
should be seen as a direct consequence of the combination of voice and aggregation, 





This thesis project has been an attempt to look for new avenues for studying and 
leveraging public opinion on social media. There is a general concern that social media is 
influencing information flows and opinion formation in ways that are potentially 
detrimental to democratic institutions and the political efficacy of the public, to which 
increased political homophily and polarization are often emphasized. In addressing these 
concerns, this project has sought to develop computational methods with a twofold 
purpose: to study broad trends of political polarization in the general public on social 
media; and lay the groundwork for tools that could potentially be employed by the public 
itself in order to make opinion formation processes more transparent. 
Through a review of previous theoretical and empirical literature related to public 
opinion, social media communication and political behaviour, this project has proposed 
a framework to expand the general understanding of the function of public opinion in 
light of specific potentials for political engagement offered by social media technologies, 
specifically in relation to political homophily and polarization. Based on the conceptions 
of public opinion in the proposed framework, this project has presented methods that 
take advantage of the Big Data potential of the accumulation of digital traces from online 
behaviour in order to examine polarizing/de-polarizing behaviour on micro (i.e. a single 
discussion) and macro levels (millions of discussions over several years). The methods 
have been tested using them to study polarization trends in the Danish public on 
Facebook between 2014 and 2018. The potentials offered by tapping into the data flow 
from social media and employing a computational framework to output behavioural 
insights directly have been discussed in relation to the possibilities for the public to reap 




Despite social media being a nearly two-decade old media concept, the role it plays in the 
formation of public opinion is heavily debated. This project proposes a descriptive 
framework for understanding the function of public opinion relating it to three of the 
main debates around the public and its place in democracy: 1) whether public opinion is 
most reliable as a continuous process of deliberation and exchange of ideas where people 
can learn from each other, or as a technical aggregation of people’s opinions, such as 
voting or opinion polling, that clearly demarcates exactly what the majority wants; 2) 
whether public opinion should strive towards consensus and compromises between 
interested parties, or be a constant battleground between opposing ethico-political 
positions; 3) whether public opinion depends on high engagement by well-informed 
citizens, or is able to function relatively without demanding a lot of effort from the general 
public. These three debates have respectively been called voice versus aggregation, 
consensus versus agonism and engagement versus ignorance. Instead of taking any of the 
positions in the three debates, this project has proposed a framework, tentatively named 
the triaxial model, which has the purpose of highlighting the benefits and weaknesses of 
each of the six positions. The triaxial model serves as a lens through which the actual 
public opinion formation activities on social media can be examined rather than as a 
normative ideal to evaluate public opinion against.  
Following the general framework of the triaxial model, communicative practices on social 
media and their effects with respect to political preferences and experiences of 
collectivity are reviewed. Social media communication is viewed as networked 
information flows containing strategic, journalistic, personal, social and algorithmic 
curation biases, which are centred on the political preferences of the individual user. 
Collectivity is thus best seen as personal action frames where collective action is an effect 
derived from the personally motivated pursuits of individuals rather than organized 
group efforts and as instances of momentary connectedness allowing people to come 
together in debate of protest, such as in a hashtag public, which is not necessarily 
experienced as a weak form of collectivity, but is potentially unsustainable if activities are 
not constantly reinitiated. The peculiarities of communication and collectivity on social 
media platforms are related back to the triaxial model through a review of recent 
theoretical concepts used in the context of social media publics, which includes the 
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concepts: counter public, issue publics, networked publics, data publics, acclamation 
publics and affective publics. The most significant trait emphasized in this project, which 
is best explained with the concept of the data public, is the potential for social media to 
bridge the gap between voice and aggregation in the triaxial model. The affordances of 
most social media platforms are unrestricted enough that they allow for a lot of voice e.g. 
writing comments, but by simultaneously communicating with a central system, which is 
the platform that collects the data for all interactions, avenues are opened up towards 
ways of aggregating and measuring opinions. Furthermore, concepts such as acclamation 
publics and affective publics seem to emphasize social media’s tendency towards 
agonism over consensus, while issue publics (or ad-hoc publics on social media) and 
counter publics on social media appear to somewhat favour ignorance over engagement. 
Most social media platforms offer a variety of ways to communicate; one-to-one, one-to-
many and many-to-many. As such it must be assumed that how the platforms are being 
utilized impacts the kind of role, they play in opinion formation. The main focus in this 
project is on the open public venues such as public pages on Facebook where most 
activity consists of varying degrees of interaction with and sharing of content and 
participation in comment threads. This builds on an assumption of everyday political 
engagement where users trade in and out of discussions, sometimes very quickly, without 
necessarily being on the lookout for political discussions in the first place. What people 
end up doing when they log onto their social media accounts, which is again influenced 
by strategic, journalistic, personal, social and algorithmic curation biases, has 
implications for whether opinion formation causes political polarization. In the 
networked information flows of social media, users can engage with political content that 
they find either agreeable or disagreeable. Coming across politically 
agreeable/disagreeable content can be both intentional and incidental. There are 
different benefits depending on either; engaging with content and other users who are 
aligned with one’s own political preferences can bolster one’s confidence and political 
identity, however no engagement with the opposite side, or disingenuous engagement 
where one seeks out the political opposition only to taunt or disturb, might lead to 
increased political polarization, especially if the effect is self-reinforcing, creating virtual 
echo-chambers. Again, while there are upsides and downsides to engagement with both 
politically agreeable and disagreeable information, it should be fair to assume that too 
much polarization and disconnection between politically opposite groups will be 
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detrimental to the democratic function of public opinion. The methods designed in this 
project thus focus on finding patterns of behaviour in public social media spaces that 
relate to political homophily, political disagreement and the potential for cross-cutting 
agreement. 
This project proposes a methodological framework that is informed by computational 
methods and Big Data practices. Big Data in the social sciences still being a fairly new 
area, there are few established methods. Most methodological literature has focused on 
general frameworks for working with large, or smaller, amounts of digitally source data. 
This thesis builds on the social analytics framework which describes the process of 
harvesting data using social media API’s and then extracting structural, opinion and 
topical attributes from the behavioural data with the purpose of making a comprehensive 
analysis. Again, social analytics is a general frame to which much more specific methods 
need to be selected.  
The empirical case chosen for testing specific methods of extracting insights about 
political homophily and potential polarization is the Danish public on Facebook, 
represented by a very large cross-section of public pages. The behavioural data, including 
all interactions by all users on the chosen pages, is downloaded via the Facebook API. 
Additionally, a survey is sent out to 3.000 Danes, which asks them about their political 
opinions and most importantly their current voting intention while also linking their 
answers with their Facebook profile. Based on the survey a prediction model is created 
with the purpose of inferring the voting intention of Danish Facebook users based on 
their behaviour on public pages. The model performs with an accuracy of 70% on a 
multiparty range and 99% on a left-right wing scale. The model reveals that positive 
reactions from users on posts made by politicians and political parties is a reasonably 
reliable indicator of voting intention.  
Using voting intention as a proxy for political preference and building on the finding that 
positive reactions on political pages is a reliable estimator for it, the project presents a 
series of methods for calculating political homophily and agreement/disagreement in 
multiple steps of a discussion. Because it is near impossible to obtain a ground truth 
against which to test the reliability of the methods, it is instead tested against a set of 
common-sense assumptions such as: discussions about political issues are likely to have 
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more political disagreement. The results yielded by the methods are shown to be non-
random with respect to political behaviour. 
In order to consider complex distributions of political homophily and polarization in the 
Danish public on Facebook, additional methods are proposed with the purpose of 
segmenting discussions based on the types of spaces in which they occur, the topics being 
discussed and the sentiments in the language. This entails manually labelling different 
public pages with an appropriate category based on domain knowledge and previous 
literature. Furthermore, a dictionary-based language model is created to automatically 
label Facebook posts with one of 17 topics based on the prevalence of certain words being 
used. Lastly, a prediction model based on machine learning is created with the purpose 
of being able to automatically sort Danish language text into two groups: those that 
employ harsh language and those that do not.  
The automation aspect inherent in computational methods allow for all the methods 
developed to be used on any post in the Danish public that has a minimum of participating 
users. This is used to study broad trends of political homophily, disagreement and cross-
cutting agreement in the Danish public on Facebook over time, with respect to sentiment, 
across different spaces and topics and in multiple steps. The main results reveal that 
political homophily and polarization is overall not increasing or decreasing over time, 
which is an important contribution to the debate about whether the curation biases on 
social media are inevitably causing increased polarization. It provides a counter narrative 
to research claiming that polarization is rife on social media. Instead homophily and 
heavy political disagreement appear to be strongly moderated by topics relating to 
immigration and refugees and spaces belonging to populist advocates. Although, there is 
some indication that the longer a discussion is active homophily and disagreement does 
appear to increase on average within that single discussion. Furthermore, political 
discussions that take place in spaces that are not created for political debate seem to 
increase the likelihood of fostering cross-cutting agreement, even if the issues being 
discussed are of a political nature, which is in line with previous research into “third 
spaces” on social media. 
The methods developed in this project are well-posed to take advantage of social media’s 
unique position to bridge the gap between voice and aggregation. People can “freely” 
voice their opinions and insights based on their previous behaviour on the platform can 
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be leveraged in order to create more transparency about the underlying biases that affect 
the resulting public opinion. Potentially this can produce agency in the data public and 
potentially greater control over configurations of the public with respect to consensus 
versus agonism and engagement versus ignorance. 
 
Limitations 
This project has proposed a useful theoretical framework for understanding the function 
of public opinion on social media and designed methods that can reliably leverage 
opinion with respect to political homophily and polarization, however there are still 
many theoretical and empirical limitations. Public opinion is a notoriously broad and 
fuzzy concept. The theoretical framework in this project builds on the public sphere 
tradition from media studies which omits many aspects of public opinion, especially 
those studied in the fields of political communication and political economy. Thus, the 
flow of opinion from informal publics to formal publics and its impact on democratic 
decision making in society is heavily under theorized. How participation in opinion 
formation on social media impacts the individual is covered, but focusing mainly political 
homophily, disagreement and polarization. The more general impact that political 
engagement on social media has on an individual with regard to identity, citizenship and 
continuous behaviour is only mentioned briefly. The real importance of the role of public 
opinion can be made clearer if a full synthesis between micro, meso and macro levels is 
theorized. This thesis has focused on the meso level consisting of small and large groups 
of people who come together, which connects strongly with the empirical case, at the cost 
of under theorizing the micro and macro levels. Still, achieving a greater understanding 
of opinion formation processes as they take place on posts on public Facebook pages is a 
useful contribution to further work on the function of the public across multiple levels, 
albeit insufficient on its own. 
An inherent problem with public opinion on social media is the complexity of information 
flows. This project has reviewed some of the main characteristics of social media such as 
media convergence user generated content/user interaction and 
mediatization/personalization as well as having presented an overall frame which is best 
described as networked information flows centred on the political preferences of 
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individual users and influenced by strategic, journalistic, personal, social and algorithmic 
curation biases. However, none of the concepts (i.e. the different curation biases) are 
examined in greater detail, which makes it difficult to relate them directly to the empirical 
case, which focuses only on public Facebook pages. Instead it has to simply be assumed 
that the biases present in the general information flow on social media also affect how 
users find, share and engage with content on public Facebook pages.  
The project represents an attempt to further our understanding of public opinion on 
social media with respect to political polarization. The methods developed can be used to 
study general trends of polarization, but also to zoom in on a single Facebook post and 
get an estimate for how much political homophily, disagreement and cross-cutting 
agreement it elicits.  However, the methods deliver only an estimate and not a  complete 
representation of reality, as such, using the methods to find and study single discussions 
should only be seen as a way to guide further in-depth analysis. Rather the methods can 
be used to view public discussions in a new light and potentially point towards new ways 
of imagining the public 
The empirical case in itself covers only a very small corner of all social media activity. It 
is limited to only public Facebook pages from Denmark. The results concerning levels of 
political homophily and polarization pertain only to Denmark, though they are still 
relevant inputs in the discussion of political communication on social media e.g. whether 
social media inevitably leads towards increased polarization or not. The results 
presented provide additional insights to the forces that can influence the increase and 
decrease of political polarization. However, the methods for measuring public opinion 
have been developed to be fairly generalizable, which means that it is technically possible 
to apply almost the same methods to multiple platforms given appropriate resources and 
access to data. A fruitful venue for future work would be to use some of the methods 
presented here to make a comparison between different countries. 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter the current position for researchers is 
precarious at best. The results in this thesis cannot be replicated unless Facebook 
changes their general data policies, or a researcher gains privileged access. Terms of 
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Appendix 4.0-SI – Facebook Data 





                                                         NUMBER OF ROWS 
UNION pages 84 
UNION posts 115650 
UNION comments 776821 
UNION replies 243403 




UNION reply likes 124549 
POLITICAL pages 1840 
POLITICAL posts 1201965 
POLITICAL comments 15548192 
POLITICAL replies 7284611 




POLITICAL reply likes 6354957 
LOCAL pages 4211 
LOCAL posts 1035922 
LOCAL comments 6786830 
LOCAL replies 872287 




LOCAL reply likes 545717 
ORGANISATION pages 4582 
ORGANISATION posts 301102 
ORGANISATION comments 7432863 
ORGANISATION replies 1531264 




ORGANISATION reply likes 770503 
MEDIA pages 194 
MEDIA posts 2165588 
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MEDIA comments 79190981 
MEDIA replies 40476169 




MEDIA reply likes 21671772    
TOTAL Rows 703140257 
 
 
Appendix 4.1-SI – Facebook Data Structures 




POST Time Created Timestamp for the publication of the content 
POST Headline Headline for the post 
POST Description The description below the headline 
POST Message The main text content for the post 
POST Link The attached link 
POST LIKE The number of like emoji responses 
POST ANGRY The number of angry emoji responses 
POST SAD The number of sad emoji responses 
POST WOW The number of wow emoji responses 
POST HAHA The number of haha emoji responses 
POST LOVE The number of love emoji responses 
POST Created on 
Page 
The public page where the post was originally posted 
POST Post ID The unique ID of the post 
COMMENT Time Created Timestamp for the publication of the content 
COMMENT Message The main text content for the comment 
COMMENT Created By The anonymous user ID for the user who posted the content 
COMMENT LIKE The number of like emoji responses 
COMMENT LOVE The number of love emoji responses 
COMMENT Comment ID The unique ID of the comment 
COMMENT Post ID The unique ID of the post to which the comment was made 
REPLY Time Created Timestamp for the publication of the content 
REPLY Message The main text content for the reply 
REPLY Created By The anonymous user ID for the user who posted the content 
REPLY LIKE The number of like emoji responses 
REPLY LOVE The number of love emoji responses 
REPLY Reply ID The unique ID of the reply 
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REPLY Comment ID The unique ID of the comment to which the reply was made 
POST LIKE Made By The anonymous user ID for the user who made the emoji response 
POST LIKE Post ID The unique ID of the post to which the emoji response was made 
COMMENT 
LIKE 




Comment ID The unique ID of the comment to which the emoji response was 
made 
REPLY LIKE Made By The anonymous user ID for the user who made the LIKE/LOVE 
response 
REPLY LIKE Reply ID The unique ID of the reply to which the emoji response was made 
 
 
Appendix 5.0-SI – Survey and Sample Sizes 
Table. Data filtering and sample sizes for survey 
Filter Sample size 
No filter, all respondents in survey 3050 
Only respondents who reported their public Facebook ID in survey 1216 
Only respondents who had liked at least one post on political pages corresponding 
to a party in parliament (used in baseline and models II – III) 
659 
Only respondents who had liked at least 7 posts on political pages (used in model IV) 468 
 
 
Appendix 5.1-SI: Non-response analysis 
In order to address the significant decrease in sample size from the full survey to the 
samples being used in our models, we have conducted a non-response analysis. The 
primary reduction in respondent numbers consists of individuals who did not have a 
Facebook profile or would not allow access to their public ID (N = 3050 – 1834 = 1216). 
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Accounting for most of the dropouts are the 40% of the Danish population who do not 
have a Facebook account. We also expected privacy concerns to reduce participant 
numbers. The second dropout category is comprised of respondents who would not vote 
for one of the nine parties or did not enter at least one political like during the period (N 
= 1216 – 557 = 659). Accounting for the majority of these dropouts are people who did 
not plan to vote or who were not among the 28% (1.3 million) of Danes who liked political 
actors.  
In order to determine the extent of skewedness for survey features, we did a 10,000-fold 
permutation test of chi-square (Χ2) scores for each of the samples (see Table S4). The first 
test compares the distribution of answers from two random samples both from the full 
survey (total survey N = 3050). The next compares random samples where one is from 
the full survey and the other from a sample of only respondents with attached Facebook 
profiles (on Facebook N = 1216). The last compares random samples where one is from 
the full survey and the other from a sample of only respondents with at least one political 
like on any of the parties in parliament (with political like N = 659). The distribution of 
answers corresponding to a single feature, such as age, is only considered to be skewed 
if the mean of the Χ2 value, resulting from the permutation test, lies outside of the 95% 
confidence interval of the first permutation test that compared two random samples from 
the full survey. For example, in the N = 1216 sample, gender has an Χ2 mean of 0.96, but 
the 95% confidence interval of N = 3050 has Χ2 values between 0 and 3.5, so the skew is 
not significant. However, the N = 659 has a gender Χ2 mean of 4.49, and is therefore 
considered to have a small skew. Whether a skew is small or large is determined by the 
relative skew from the largest to the smallest. It is important to remember that the degree 
of skew for a single feature is determined by its relation to statistical significance and not 
how skewed it is in the real world. For example, the most skewed feature, age, has a 10-
percentage point difference between young and old. 
 
Table. Population and sample distributions for base demographics35 
 
 
35 Source for population percentages: http://danmarksstatistik.dk/da/Statistik  
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CATEGORY POPULATION N = 1216 N = 659 
FEMALE 0.5025 0.5444 0.5842 
MALE 0.4975 0.4556 0.4158 
AGE 18-34 0.2975 0.3497 0.3338 
AGE 35-53 0.358 0.3765 0.3849 
AGE 54-74 0.3445 0.2738 0.2813 
REGION CAPITAL 0.3136 0.3519 0.3493 
REGION CENTRAL JUTLAND 0.2267 0.216 0.2287 
REGION NORTHERN JUTLAND 0.1024 0.0984 0.0943 
REGION ZEALAND 0.1451 0.1005 0.1005 
REGION SOUTHERN DENMARK 0.2122 0.2332 0.2272 
STANDARD HIGH SCHOOL 0.1012 0.1278 0.1364 
VOCATIONAL 0.3288 0.2393 0.2374 
PH.D 0.0066 0.0151 0.0101 
PRIMARY SCHOOL 0.2861 0.1708 0.1724 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2-4½ YEARS) 0.1447 0.2194 0.2232 
HIGHER EDUCATION (5 YEARS OR MORE) 0.0849 0.1661 0.1616 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2 YEARS OR LESS) 0.0477 0.0616 0.0589 
 
 
Table. Population and sample distributions compared 
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CATEGORY N = 1216 COMPARED TO 
POPULATION 
N = 659 COMPARED TO 
POPULATION 
FEMALE 0.0419 0.0818 
MALE -0.0419 -0.0818 
AGE 18-34 0.0523 0.0364 
AGE 35-53 0.0185 0.0269 
AGE 54-74 -0.0707 -0.0632 
REGION CAPITAL 0.0383 0.0357 
REGION CENTRAL JUTLAND -0.0107 0.002 
REGION NORTHERN JUTLAND -0.004 -0.0081 
REGION ZEALAND -0.0446 -0.0446 
REGION SOUTHERN DENMARK 0.0209 0.015 
STANDARD HIGH SCHOOL 0.0265 0.0351 
VOCATIONAL -0.0896 -0.0914 
PH.D 0.0085 0.0035 
PRIMARY SCHOOL -0.1153 -0.1137 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2-4½ YEARS) 0.0747 0.0786 
HIGHER EDUCATION (5 YEARS OR 
MORE) 
0.0812 0.0768 
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Appendix 5.2-SI: Regression Models and Evaluation Metrics 
All data analysis was carried out via Python. The code used for the regression models can 
be attributed mainly to Turi’s GraphLab Create36; all other data analysis is original code. 
All data models are based on GraphLab Create’s Logistic Regression module and 
implement only L1 regularization (L2 is set to 0). L1 regularization is used for selecting 
the coefficients corresponding to the features that deliver the best bias–variance tradeoff 
for generalizing the model. L1 regularization performs this selection by setting least 
important coefficients to exactly zero while decreasing other coefficients by a value 
relative to the chosen λ-value. The least important coefficients can roughly be defined as 
those least related to (least correlated with) the maximum log likelihood (MLE) of the 
model under a certain λ-value. The relation between the MLE and a given coefficient is 
determined by soft thresholding [34,35]. 
We report the following evaluative measures, all in the form of cross-validated averages: 
AUC (area under [receiver operating characteristic, or ROC] curve): 
Effectively states overall ability of the regression model for separating classes 
based on input variables with 0.5 denoting no relationship between explanatory 
variables and prediction rate. The thresholds for the ROC curve are incremented 
by 0.0001. 
Precision: Number of true positives out of all positives, or TP/(TP + FP). In 
multiclass cases, precision is calculated as the mean of all classes. 
Recall: Number of true positives out of all positives and false negatives, TP/(TP + 
FN). In multiclass cases, recall is calculated as the mean of all classes. 
Accuracy: Global amount of correctly predicted classes divided by total sample 





36 See https://turi.com/products/create/docs/.  
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Appendix 5.3-SI: FC-Scaling 
We have sought to further explore the relationship between what Facebook users like 
and what they vote by testing whether likes conform to the same universality scaling as 
that proposed by (Chatterjee et. al, 2013) and (Fortunato & Castellano, 2007), also known 
as FC-scaling. The main insight provided by studies into FC-scaling is that the distribution 
of votes among candidates in an election depends solely on the relationship between the 
votes received by a candidate and the average number of votes received by that 
candidates political party (V/V0). This means that the distribution is very similar across 
countries and years (for countries that have similar voting systems). Here we only have 
data from one country, Denmark, so we compare distributions for different years. We 
have sought to recreate the model proposed by (Chatterjee et. al, 2013) as accurately as 
possible with the only exception being that our model deals with Facebook likes entered 
on posts by candidates instead of votes received by candidates. 
 







S5.3-A: Gaussian probability distribution of likes 
received by a candidate divided by the average 
number of votes received by candidates from 
her/his particular party. 
S5.3-B: Gaussian probability distribution of the 
natural logarithm of likes received by a candidate 
divided by the average number of votes received 















Two things we can note from the quick exploration is 1) likes seem to behave differently 
from votes in that there is a greater distance between candidates who receive the most 
likes and those who receive few likes i.o.w an exponentially increasing relationship; 2) 
the distributions for earlier years differ somewhat from those of later years. The reason 
for the second point is most likely that Facebook was much less popular in 2011, 2012 
and 2013, meaning that the political landscape consisting of candidates and citizens was 
radically different. 
Still the distributions are relatively similar across the different years, which suggests the 
existence of a mechanism related to the universality scaling found with votes received by 
candidates in real elections. However, this is the only part of the present study that looks 
at the relation between Facebook likes and votes at the candidate level. More research is 
needed to explore this aspect further.  
 
 
S5.3-C: Gaussian probability distribution of likes 
received by a candidate divided by the average 
number of votes received by candidates from 
her/his particular party. Presented as a histogram 
with 45 bins.  
S5.3-D: Gaussian probability distribution of likes 
received by a candidate divided by the average 
number of votes received by candidates from 
her/his particular party. Presented as a histogram 
with 45 bins and both axes normalized (each 
point divided by the sum of all the points). 
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Appendix 6.0-SI 
User Vector, Normalized 
 
 
Appendix 7.0: Topics for Dictionary Model 
TOPIC NWORDS 
CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT 162 
CULTURE 376 
DOMESTIC POLICY 210 
ECONOMY 198 
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 154 
EMPLOYMENT AND THE LABOR MARKET 170 
EVERYDAY LIFE AND CONSUMPTION 162 
FOREIGN POLICY 133 




JUSTICE AND SECURITY POLICY 208 
POLITICAL GAMES AND REFERENDUMS 132 
REFUGEES AND INTEGRATION 120 
RELIGION 99 
SOCIAL POLICY 162 


























Appendix 8.0-SI: Variables Available for Analysis 
VARIABLE 
CATEGORY 




datetime The timestamp for when the content is published  
message_text All the textual content of the post/comment/reply  
message_type Whether the content belongs to a post, comment 
or reply  
content_type If content is a post, this designates the type of 
post (e.g. picture or link)  
page_origin The page where the content is posted  
link The attached link of the content  
link_domain The domain of the attached link  
by_id The unique ID of the page / person who posted 
the content  
by_woman 1 = content is published by femal. 0 = content is 
published by male.  
reactions_total Number of total reactions for the post / comment 
/ reply  
comments_total Number of comments for the content  
shares Number of shares if content is a post  
sad_total Number of sad reactions to the content  
angry_total Number of angry reactions to the content  
like_total Number of like reactions to the content  
love_total Number of love reactions to the content  
women_reactions Proportion of females who reacted to content. 
Range = 0 - 1.  
women_comments Proportion of females who commented on 
content. Range = 0 - 1.  
gender_penetration Proportion of reactions + comments for which the 




entity_category The category that a page belongs to. Changes 
depending on the debates from which the content 





topic The topic that the content is most likely to belong 
to  
secondary_topic The topic that the content is second most likely to 
belong to  






by_party The political party that the one who posted the 
content belongs to. If it's a person this variable 
designates that persons voting intention. If it's a 
politician this variable designates the party that 
she belongs to.  
pol_penetration The proportion of reaction + comments for which 
the individuals' voting intention can reliably be 
determined.  
left_wing_reactions The proportion of reactions that belong to people 
with the intention to vote for any left wing party.  
left_wing_comments The proportion of comments that belong to 
people with the intention to vote for any left wing 
party.  
initial_disagree The level of political disagreement for the content 
based on the way users react and comment on the 
content ((disCom + disAs) / 2).  
subsequent_agree (subAgree) The level of subsequent political agreement based 
on the way people interact with each other within 
the comment thread.  
subsequent_agree_sin The level of subsequent political agreement for a 
single comment or reply.  
initial_disagree_comagg The level of political disagreement for the content 
based on the way users react and comment on the 
content. Aggregated one level down from the 
content. If the content is a post this variable 
designates the amount of political disagreement 
of all comments.  
subsequent_agree_comagg The level of subsequent political agreement based 
on the way people interact with each other within 
the comment thread.  Aggregated one level down 
from the content. If the content is a post this 
variable designates the amount of subsequent 
political of all comments.  
homogenity_reactions The level of political homogeneity for the content 
based on all users who reacted  
homogenity_comments The level of political homogeneity for the content 
based on all users who commented  
homogenity_all The level of political homogeneity for the content 
based on all users who commented and/or 
reacted 
SENTIMENT VARIABLES  
hate_penetration The proportion of comments to a piece of content 
for which harsh language use probability can 
reliably be determined.  
hate_probability The probability that the content contains harsh 
language  
agg_hate_probability The probability that all comments to the content 




message_id The unique ID of the content 
 292 
 
mid_level_id The unique ID of the parent to the content. If the 
content is a comment the parent is the post ID. If 
the content is a post the parent is the page it was 
published on.  
top_level_id The top level parent of the content.  
link_to_message The link to the specific piece of content on 
Facebook.  
from_db The data collection that the content is part of (e.g. 
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Appendix 8.3-SI Cross-cutting Agreement ~ *, Comments, Complex 
DEP. VARIABLE:    CROSS_AGREEMEN   R-
SQUARED:          
   0.139   
 
MODEL:            OLS                Adj. R-
squared:     
   0.139   
 
METHOD:           Least Squares      F-statistic:           182.3   
 
DATE:             Sat  26 Oct 2019   Prob (F-
statistic): 
  
0.00     
TIME:             20:59:49           Log-
Likelihood:     
1.3520e+05 
 
NO. OBSERVATIONS: 436239             AIC:                -2.696e+05 
 
DF RESIDUALS:     435851             BIC:                -2.654e+05 
 
DF MODEL:            387                                            
 
COVARIANCE TYPE:  nonrobust                                         
 
                                                                   coef     std err      t     P>|t
|  
MESSAGE_LEN                                                      3.892e-09  1.61e-09     2.419  
0.01
6 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                           -0.1701     0.014   -12.398  
0.00
0 
TABLOID                                                             0.0596     0.002    24.205  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL                                                           0.0064     0.003     2.457  
0.01
4 
POLITICIAN_V                                                       -0.1137     0.003   -33.113  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B                                                       -0.1053     0.004   -24.122  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                    -0.0610     0.019    -3.222  
0.00
1 
HEALTH                                                              0.1612     0.019     8.418  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY                                                   -0.0086     0.003    -3.031  
0.00
2 
O                                                                  -0.0484     0.002   -19.386  
0.00
0 
A                                                                   0.0054     0.003     1.595  
0.11
1 
B                                                                  -0.0320     0.004    -8.038  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS                                                     -0.0882     0.005   -18.228  
0.00
0 
RELIGION                                                           -0.0200     0.009    -2.156  
0.03
1 
ECONOMY                                                            -0.1203     0.026    -4.604  
0.00
0 




JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                         0.2540     0.018    13.986  
0.00
0 
LOCAL NEWS                                                          0.0376     0.003    13.000  
0.00
0 
C                                                                   0.0257     0.005     5.576  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_OE                                                      -0.0730     0.003   -21.562  
0.00
0 
DEBATE                                                             -0.0616     0.004   -17.174  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_F                                                       -0.0537     0.003   -18.723  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_I                                                       -0.0659     0.003   -21.979  
0.00
0 
I                                                                  -0.0327     0.003   -10.194  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A                                                       -0.0598     0.003   -19.630  
0.00
0 
FOREIGN_POLICY                                                      0.0750     0.016     4.702  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_NB                                                      -0.1698     0.009   -18.140  
0.00
0 
CULTURE                                                             0.1551     0.016     9.628  
0.00
0 
SOCIAL_POLICY                                                      -0.0521     0.019    -2.723  
0.00
6 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                                            -0.0321     0.012    -2.681  
0.00
7 
SPORT                                                               0.1064     0.006    16.553  
0.00
0 
GENDER_EQUALITY_GENDER_AND_DISCRIMINATION                       0.0716     0.022     3.182  
0.00
1 
GENERAL NEWS                                                        0.0088     0.001     5.898  
0.00
0 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                       0.0950     0.009    10.877  
0.00
0 
WITH_LINK                                                          -0.0206     0.003    -8.206  
0.00
0 
AA                                                                  0.0311     0.004     7.470  
0.00
0 
LIFESTYLE                                                           0.0553     0.006     9.082  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_AA                                                      -0.0704     0.004   -17.902  
0.00
0 




POLITICIAN_C                                                       -0.0399     0.004    -9.852  
0.00
0 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                                              0.0441     0.012     3.621  
0.00
0 
NB                                                                  0.0163     0.008     2.123  
0.03
4 
OTHER                                                               0.0036     0.004     0.969  
0.33
2 
V                                                                  -0.0115     0.003    -3.811  
0.00
0 
OE                                                                 -0.0127     0.002    -7.533  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS                                                 -0.0038     0.003    -1.276  
0.20
2 
LEFT LEANING NEWS                                                  -0.0238     0.004    -6.652  
0.00
0 
EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                                    -0.0841     0.015    -5.625  
0.00
0 
DOMESTIC_POLICY                                                     0.0238     0.009     2.734  
0.00
6 
GENERAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                           -0.2240     0.009   -23.584  
0.00
0 
O*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                         -0.0202     0.015    -1.312  
0.19
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                       0.1421     0.015     9.388  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*HEALTH                                                   -0.0461     0.023    -2.042  
0.04
1 
GENERAL NEWS*HEALTH                                                 0.1236     0.015     8.263  
0.00
0 
B*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                         -0.0545     0.016    -3.328  
0.00
1 
WOMEN_ALL*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                       -0.0484     0.035    -1.374  
0.17
0 
TABLOID*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                -0.0076     0.015    -0.515  
0.60
6 
POLITICIAN_B*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                              -0.0361     0.014    -2.633  
0.00
8 
TABLOID*HEALTH                                                     -0.0205     0.024    -0.840  
0.40
1 
A*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                      -0.0797     0.019    -4.222  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                             -0.1375     0.015    -9.456  
0.00
0 




O*FOREIGN_POLICY                                                   -0.1462     0.017    -8.573  
0.00
0 
O*RELIGION                                                          0.0092     0.008     1.122  
0.26
2 
V*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                          0.0403     0.016     2.478  
0.01
3 
WOMEN_ALL*RELIGION                                                 -0.0653     0.012    -5.547  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                           0.0821     0.012     6.842  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                           -0.1758     0.038    -4.672  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*RELIGION                                           0.0682     0.010     7.127  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*RELIGION                                              -0.1271     0.008   -15.245  
0.00
0 
B*RELIGION                                                          0.0081     0.020     0.405  
0.68
6 
O*HEALTH                                                            0.0114     0.022     0.528  
0.59
7 




NEWS*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                    
   -0.3302     0.024   -13.629  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*ECONOMY                                                0.0249     0.027     0.909  
0.36
3 
GENERAL NEWS*SOCIAL_POLICY                                          0.0859     0.016     5.276  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*SOCIAL_POLICY                                             0.1263     0.024     5.281  
0.00
0 
I*ECONOMY                                                          -0.1549     0.029    -5.323  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*CULTURE                                                  -0.1276     0.025    -5.166  
0.00
0 
BY_WOMAN*RELIGION                                                  -0.0167     0.005    -3.186  
0.00
1 
WOMEN_ALL*ECONOMY                                                  -0.0490     0.030    -1.638  
0.10
1 
POLITICIAN_B*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                    0.2161     0.044     4.861  
0.00
0 
B*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                   0.0312     0.034     0.906  
0.36
5 
V*HEALTH                                                            0.1038     0.024     4.404  
0.00
0 




GENERAL NEWS*CULTURE                                                0.0780     0.014     5.528  
0.00
0 
V*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                  -0.2054     0.029    -7.195  
0.00
0 




T                    
   -0.0192     0.032    -0.591  
0.55
4 
POLITICIAN_A*ECONOMY                                               -0.0917     0.033    -2.783  
0.00
5 
POLITICIAN_V*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                        0.0272     0.021     1.317  
0.18
8 
OTHER*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                     -0.4723     0.035   -13.616  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_F*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                               0.0178     0.017     1.034  
0.30
1 
A*HEALTH                                                           -0.0905     0.018    -4.975  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                        0.0688     0.014     5.003  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                              -0.2920     0.076    -3.860  
0.00
0 
OE*ECONOMY                                                          0.0808     0.028     2.926  
0.00
3 




NEWS*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                    
    0.0249     0.017     1.439  
0.15
0 
A*ECONOMY                                                          -0.0161     0.027    -0.596  
0.55
1 
OE*RELIGION                                                         0.0034     0.011     0.316  
0.75
2 
A*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                  -0.1576     0.026    -5.994  
0.00
0 
O*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                                  0.1414     0.018     7.862  
0.00
0 
V*SOCIAL_POLICY                                                     0.0676     0.024     2.869  
0.00
4 
GENERAL NEWS*FOREIGN_POLICY                                        -0.1439     0.016    -8.807  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B*ECONOMY                                                0.3135     0.056     5.562  
0.00
0 
AA*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                         0.0462     0.019     2.492  
0.01
3 








MINATION             
   -0.1800     0.042    -4.298  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY                                        -0.0100     0.045    -0.223  
0.82
4 
TABLOID*ECONOMY                                                     0.1283     0.033     3.885  
0.00
0 
AA*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                     -0.1141     0.025    -4.557  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                   -0.1517     0.015   -10.174  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_OE*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                   0.1420     0.039     3.644  
0.00
0 
O*SOCIAL_POLICY                                                     0.0113     0.016     0.697  
0.48
6 
OTHER*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                           -0.7440     0.103    -7.226  
0.00
0 
C*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                                   0.1328     0.035     3.840  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_F*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                       -0.0743     0.030    -2.445  
0.01
5 
V*ECONOMY                                                           0.0053     0.032     0.163  
0.87
0 
POLITICIAN_OE*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                         -0.0891     0.032    -2.801  
0.00
5 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                            0.2241     0.029     7.697  
0.00
0 
C*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                      -0.2694     0.029    -9.399  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*RELIGION                                               0.0488     0.011     4.524  
0.00
0 
LOCAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                -0.2057     0.016   -12.544  
0.00
0 
V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                      -0.1580     0.019    -8.280  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                        0.0926     0.013     7.086  
0.00
0 
AA*HEALTH                                                          -0.0898     0.023    -3.889  
0.00
0 
AA*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                                         -0.0746     0.029    -2.570  
0.01
0 
POLITICIAN_NB*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                          0.3609     0.086     4.195  
0.00
0 




POLITICIAN_V*HEALTH                                                -0.0231     0.041    -0.559  
0.57
6 
NB*HEALTH                                                           0.3407     0.097     3.530  
0.00
0 
DEBATE*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                          0.3537     0.062     5.726  
0.00
0 
A*SOCIAL_POLICY                                                    -0.0294     0.018    -1.666  
0.09
6 
POLITICIAN_C*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                               -0.3110     0.044    -7.079  
0.00
0 
LOCAL NEWS*ECONOMY                                                  0.2169     0.056     3.879  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_C*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                      -0.7910     0.097    -8.169  
0.00
0 
OE*CULTURE                                                          0.0609     0.021     2.914  
0.00
4 
V*FOREIGN_POLICY                                                   -0.0672     0.026    -2.612  
0.00
9 
V*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                                            0.1570     0.030     5.280  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_NB*RELIGION                                              0.1046     0.027     3.922  
0.00
0 




ET                   
    0.0838     0.026     3.285  
0.00
1 
POLITICIAN_I*FOREIGN_POLICY                                        -0.2409     0.061    -3.919  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B*FOREIGN_POLICY                                         0.1485     0.045     3.273  
0.00
1 




T                    
    0.1379     0.029     4.799  
0.00
0 
I*RELIGION                                                          0.1039     0.017     6.201  
0.00
0 
OE*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                                 -0.0424     0.014    -3.010  
0.00
3 




T                    
   -0.1416     0.069    -2.062  
0.03
9 
C*RELIGION                                                          0.0925     0.019     4.852  
0.00
0 




NB*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                        -0.1229     0.033    -3.725  
0.00
0 
O*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                      -0.1896     0.018   -10.688  
0.00
0 
I*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                                          -0.0366     0.034    -1.071  
0.28
4 
POLITICIAN_V*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                      0.2885     0.038     7.527  
0.00
0 
C*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                                           0.1826     0.046     3.967  
0.00
0 
B*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                      -0.0756     0.021    -3.606  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                      -0.3873     0.079    -4.876  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_C*FOREIGN_POLICY                                        -0.2356     0.108    -2.172  
0.03
0 
NB*ECONOMY                                                          0.6126     0.106     5.786  
0.00
0 
AA*ECONOMY                                                          0.0726     0.031     2.349  
0.01
9 
NB*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                               0.3949     0.109     3.624  
0.00
0 
OTHER*CULTURE                                                      -0.2724     0.101    -2.687  
0.00
7 
B*HEALTH                                                            0.0790     0.024     3.236  
0.00
1 
NB*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                     -0.2525     0.040    -6.257  
0.00
0 
A*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                          0.2089     0.015    13.644  
0.00
0 




MINATION          
   -0.5127     0.130    -3.940  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*RELIGION                                                   -0.1595     0.009   -17.809  
0.00
0 
AA*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                              0.1084     0.028     3.919  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                    0.0751     0.021     3.634  
0.00
0 
B*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                                  0.1803     0.035     5.122  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*ECONOMY                                         -0.0053     0.037    -0.145  
0.88
5 




O*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                                            0.1971     0.030     6.553  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                         -0.2130     0.046    -4.641  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*HEALTH                                          -0.0886     0.044    -2.029  
0.04
2 




TION                
    0.2809     0.071     3.932  
0.00
0 
AA*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                                 -0.0692     0.020    -3.432  
0.00
1 




NEWS*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                  




ARKET                
    0.0959     0.024     4.050  
0.00
0 
OTHER*SOCIAL_POLICY                                                 0.2598     0.088     2.952  
0.00
3 
NB*FOREIGN_POLICY                                                  -0.2921     0.070    -4.165  
0.00
0 
OTHER*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                               0.3180     0.068     4.644  
0.00
0 
B*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                     0.1193     0.035     3.429  
0.00
1 
DEBATE*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                  0.2972     0.063     4.712  
0.00
0 
O*ECONOMY                                                           0.2894     0.041     7.101  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                     0.1294     0.016     7.982  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A*RELIGION                                               0.0590     0.019     3.100  
0.00
2 
DEBATE*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                                       0.4449     0.085     5.250  
0.00
0 
OE*FOREIGN_POLICY                                                   0.1692     0.025     6.847  
0.00
0 
B*SOCIAL_POLICY                                                     0.1039     0.029     3.568  
0.00
0 




ET                   
    0.1267     0.046     2.749  
0.00
6 




WITH_LINK*FOREIGN_POLICY                                            0.2175     0.054     4.029  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*ECONOMY                                               -0.0046     0.020    -0.230  
0.81
8 
POLITICIAN_C*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                            0.0575     0.025     2.269  
0.02
3 
POLITICAL NEWS*HEALTH                                               0.5249     0.092     5.705  
0.00
0 
I*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                          0.1951     0.019    10.186  
0.00
0 
DEBATE*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                0.4337     0.113     3.828  
0.00
0 
DEBATE*SOCIAL_POLICY                                                0.2897     0.077     3.757  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                                 0.1595     0.040     4.022  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_NB*HEALTH                                                1.0934     0.263     4.155  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                 -0.0373     0.029    -1.300  
0.19
4 
HATE_PROBABILITY*O                                                 -0.0614     0.003   -21.172  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*A                                                           0.0163     0.003     4.977  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*I                                                         0.1292     0.005    26.923  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*OE                                                          0.0372     0.003    12.145  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*A                                                        -0.0077     0.004    -2.036  
0.04
2 
POLITICIAN_B*O                                                     -0.1125     0.007   -15.376  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*I                                                      0.0211     0.003     7.953  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*B                                                 -0.0331     0.005    -7.058  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*C                                                         0.0798     0.008    10.599  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*A                                                      0.0152     0.003     5.504  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*A                                                  0.0022     0.005     0.449  
0.65
3 
POLITICIAN_V*OE                                                    -0.0829     0.007   -11.709  
0.00
0 




POLITICIAN_V*O                                                      0.0559     0.004    12.915  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*A                                                     -0.0493     0.007    -7.422  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*B                                                     -0.0820     0.008    -9.795  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B*V                                                     -0.1098     0.009   -12.475  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*V                                                         0.0778     0.004    18.977  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*AA                                                          0.0209     0.005     3.838  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*B                                                     -0.0118     0.003    -4.340  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*OE                                                  -0.0582     0.008    -7.451  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*A                                                0.0930     0.006    15.034  
0.00
0 
LOCAL NEWS*A                                                        0.0346     0.005     7.086  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*V                                                          -0.0482     0.003   -15.875  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*B                                                   -0.0574     0.010    -6.033  
0.00
0 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*I                                      -0.1287     0.021    -6.069  
0.00
0 
DEBATE*OE                                                          -0.0477     0.006    -8.236  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B*I                                                     -0.0544     0.008    -6.867  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*AA                                                    -0.0006     0.003    -0.202  
0.84
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*A                                                   -0.0322     0.008    -4.032  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A*I                                                     -0.0480     0.007    -6.764  
0.00
0 
DEBATE*B                                                           -0.0454     0.009    -5.175  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*C                                                          -0.0630     0.006   -10.936  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*AA                                                    -0.0692     0.011    -6.125  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*AA                                                       -0.0103     0.005    -1.925  
0.05
4 




POLITICIAN_I*OE                                                     0.0065     0.009     0.711  
0.47
7 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*OE                                               -0.0190     0.005    -3.571  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B*OE                                                     0.0214     0.008     2.766  
0.00
6 
WOMEN_ALL*O                                                         0.0735     0.003    22.664  
0.00
0 
LOCAL NEWS*OE                                                       0.0298     0.006     5.093  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*V                                                 -0.0492     0.004   -12.692  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*OE                                               0.0819     0.008    10.626  
0.00
0 
OTHER*B                                                            -0.0442     0.008    -5.418  
0.00
0 
ECONOMY*B                                                           0.2163     0.037     5.899  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*NB                                                        0.0569     0.014     3.992  
0.00
0 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH*I                                            0.1318     0.026     5.143  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_NB*B                                                    -0.1429     0.030    -4.779  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*AA                                                  -0.0330     0.010    -3.257  
0.00
1 
POLITICIAN_F*I                                                     -0.0439     0.008    -5.178  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B*C                                                     -0.0992     0.014    -7.167  
0.00
0 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*I                                                 0.1036     0.011     9.309  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_NB*OE                                                   -0.1257     0.030    -4.161  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A*V                                                     -0.0247     0.009    -2.619  
0.00
9 
POLITICIAN_I*O                                                      0.1474     0.007    21.175  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*NB                                                         -0.0352     0.009    -4.133  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_OE*V                                                    -0.0401     0.012    -3.305  
0.00
1 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*O                                                 0.1664     0.013    12.417  
0.00
0 




POLITICIAN_B*NB                                                    -0.1188     0.029    -4.153  
0.00
0 
BY_WOMAN*O                                                          0.0056     0.001     4.428  
0.00
0 
DEBATE*AA                                                          -0.0357     0.009    -4.094  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_OE*O                                                     0.0883     0.011     7.679  
0.00
0 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*NB                                                0.2694     0.063     4.274  
0.00
0 
LOCAL NEWS*O                                                       -0.0078     0.004    -2.019  
0.04
3 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*C                                          0.2505     0.034     7.378  
0.00
0 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH*B                                            0.1502     0.035     4.284  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*C                                                    0.0979     0.021     4.768  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B*A                                                      0.0486     0.009     5.586  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_AA*I                                                     0.1039     0.014     7.243  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*C                                                      0.0479     0.011     4.312  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_AA*O                                                     0.1196     0.015     8.046  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_OE*A                                                     0.0425     0.008     5.122  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*V                                               -0.0176     0.005    -3.615  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_AA*V                                                     0.0951     0.019     4.903  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_F*A                                                      0.0274     0.007     4.017  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*I                                               -0.0148     0.006    -2.429  
0.01
5 
POLITICIAN_V*I                                                      0.0984     0.007    14.424  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A*O                                                      0.0975     0.010     9.822  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_I*V                                                      0.0610     0.008     7.829  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*I                                                    0.0797     0.011     7.364  
0.00
0 




POLITICIAN_AA*A                                                     0.0578     0.013     4.372  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*O                         -0.2426     0.013   -18.283  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*O                     0.0572     0.021     2.772  
0.00
6 
GENERAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*V                         -0.2258     0.020   -11.290  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*HEALTH*O                                               0.2360     0.031     7.691  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*HEALTH*O                                                    0.1346     0.039     3.438  
0.00
1 
TABLOID*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*I                              -0.1228     0.036    -3.434  
0.00
1 
TABLOID*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*O                               0.0786     0.020     3.871  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*HEALTH*I                                                   -0.2274     0.064    -3.567  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*RELIGION*O                                            -0.0723     0.014    -5.355  
0.00
0 




O                     
   -0.0850     0.038    -2.216  
0.02
7 
POLITICIAN_V*ECONOMY*A                                             -0.2633     0.056    -4.697  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*SOCIAL_POLICY*O                                        0.1916     0.032     5.952  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*ECONOMY*O                                          0.2731     0.060     4.533  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*ECONOMY*O                                                -0.4147     0.063    -6.625  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_I*ECONOMY*I                                              0.1201     0.035     3.395  
0.00
1 
POLITICIAN_F*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*O                          -0.1811     0.032    -5.640  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_I*ECONOMY*OE                                            -0.3777     0.074    -5.078  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A*ECONOMY*V                                             -0.4081     0.111    -3.660  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A*ECONOMY*OE                                             0.2969     0.091     3.258  
0.00
1 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*OE                         -0.8563     0.183    -4.689  
0.00
0 




POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*B                           -0.7275     0.204    -3.559  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*AA                         -0.3713     0.150    -2.473  
0.01
3 
GENERAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*C                                     -0.2339     0.075    -3.102  
0.00
2 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*C                           0.9360     0.209     4.482  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*O                                      0.1066     0.024     4.436  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*I                            0.6312     0.152     4.142  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*RELIGION*A                                         0.1308     0.033     3.934  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*OE                     -0.0103     0.025    -0.418  
0.67
6 
GENERAL NEWS*RELIGION*I                                             0.2072     0.033     6.317  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*RELIGION*V                                                0.1392     0.027     5.242  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*RELIGION*I                                        -0.0874     0.038    -2.311  
0.02
1 
HATE_PROBABILITY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*C                       -0.3673     0.088    -4.187  
0.00
0 
HATE_PROBABILITY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*I                     -0.1201     0.041    -2.928  
0.00
3 




NEWS*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET*O                  
    0.2939     0.039     7.491  
0.00
0 




MINATION*OE          
   -0.2216     0.051    -4.387  
0.00
0 
DEBATE*RELIGION*I                                                   0.4017     0.095     4.226  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*B                                       1.8741     0.338     5.544  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*A                                       0.9598     0.221     4.337  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*AA                                      1.1762     0.288     4.086  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*OE                                      0.5062     0.202     2.501  
0.01
2 





*C                 
    2.0126     0.508     3.964  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_F*DOMESTIC_POLICY*O                                     -0.2884     0.080    -3.618  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*O                        -0.1066     0.039    -2.704  
0.00
7 
LOCAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*I                              0.2751     0.072     3.802  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*RELIGION*B                                             0.0788     0.030     2.632  
0.00
8 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*AA                        0.4761     0.121     3.938  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*OE                       0.6489     0.086     7.565  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*B                        0.3559     0.136     2.625  
0.00
9 
POLITICIAN_V*RELIGION*I                                            -0.1489     0.031    -4.769  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*I                         -0.2826     0.063    -4.475  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*HEALTH*V                                              -0.2318     0.069    -3.351  
0.00
1 




ET*O                 
    0.2980     0.071     4.193  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_B*FOREIGN_POLICY*OE                                      0.5468     0.154     3.546  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*ECONOMY*O                                            0.6890     0.130     5.315  
0.00
0 




T*OE                 
   -0.6533     0.168    -3.892  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*NB                                   2.4647     0.529     4.657  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*O                                    0.8149     0.134     6.060  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_C*FOREIGN_POLICY*AA                                     -1.9349     0.434    -4.462  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_V*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION*A                    1.0104     0.160     6.304  
0.00
0 
OTHER*CULTURE*I                                                    -0.8378     0.233    -3.595  
0.00
0 




DEBATE*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET*O                         0.6703     0.127     5.277  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS*O                       -0.3091     0.069    -4.486  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*ECONOMY*OE                                      -0.1364     0.157    -0.871  
0.38
4 
POLITICIAN_A*RELIGION*V                                             0.2719     0.065     4.178  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*ECONOMY*O                                              0.3333     0.037     9.023  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_C*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*OE                       0.3511     0.092     3.797  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*ECONOMY*V                                              0.1390     0.060     2.299  
0.02
2 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*V                               -0.2992     0.070    -4.285  
0.00
0 
TABLOID*HATE_PROBABILITY                                            0.0103     0.003     3.274  
0.00
1 
GENERAL NEWS*HATE_PROBABILITY                                      -0.0253     0.003    -9.366  
0.00
0 





TY        





ROBABILITY   
    0.2063     0.056     3.705  
0.00
0 




ABILITY             






    0.3118     0.081     3.844  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_OE*O*HATE_PROBABILITY                                   -0.1138     0.025    -4.577  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*RELIGION*V*HATE_PROBABILITY                            -0.2128     0.052    -4.092  
0.00
0 




NEWS*ECONOMY*OE*HATE_PROBABILITY                  
   -2.6375     0.516    -5.114  
0.00
0 
POLITICIAN_A*O*HATE_PROBABILITY                                    -0.0924     0.025    -3.763  
0.00
0 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*HATE_PROBABILITY                                 0.0376     0.005     6.849  
0.00
0 






TY    
   -0.1126     0.031    -3.601  
0.00
0 




_PROBABILITY     
    1.2377     0.317     3.904  
0.00
0 
GENERAL NEWS*ECONOMY*V*HATE_PROBABILITY                             0.3297     0.192     1.714  
0.08
6 
OMNIBUS:       5031.932   Durbin-
Watson:      
   1.883 
 
PROB(OMNIBUS):  0.000     Jarque-Bera 
(JB):   
8710.193 
 
SKEW:          -0.051     Prob(JB):               0.00 
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Appendix 8.8-SIC 
DEP. VARIABLE:    HOMOGENITY
_ALL   
  R-
SQUARED:          
   0.294   
 
MODEL:            OLS                Adj. R-
squared:     
   0.293   
 
METHOD:           Least Squares      F-statistic:           1745.   
 
DATE:             Tue  15 Oct 2019   Prob (F-
statistic): 
  
0.00     
TIME:             02:49:10           Log-
Likelihood:     
2.7158e+05 
 
NO. OBSERVATIONS: 239320             AIC:                -5.430e+05 
 
DF RESIDUALS:     239262             BIC:                -5.424e+05 
 
DF MODEL:             57                                            
 
COVARIANCE TYPE:  nonrobust                                         
 
                                                                             coef     std err      t     P>|
t|  
CONST                                                                        -0.2553     0.053    -4.772  
0.00
0 
REACTIONS_TOTAL^2                                                             0.5729     0.048    11.999  
0.00
0 
REACTIONS_TOTAL                                                               0.0718     0.073     0.979  
0.32
8 
REACTIONS_TOTAL^3                                                            -0.2220     0.025    -8.908  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL^2                                                                  -0.4482     0.023   -19.683  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL^3                                                                   0.2131     0.014    14.816  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*COMMENTS_TOTAL                                                     -0.5267     0.021   -24.906  
0.00
0 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                      0.2102     0.013    15.793  
0.00
0 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*REACTIONS_TOTAL                                               -0.2684     0.070    -3.818  
0.00
0 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                       0.9164     0.046    20.031  
0.00
0 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                                     -0.6750     0.048   -13.975  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL                                                                     0.8833     0.024    37.566  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                           -0.0710     0.013    -5.353  
0.00
0 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                               0.5635     0.025    22.308  
0.00
0 
COMMENTS_TOTAL^3                                                             -0.1210     0.056    -2.145  
0.03
2 




POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                              -0.3541     0.023   -15.316  
0.00
0 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*RELIGION                                                     -0.0078     0.014    -0.565  
0.57
2 
WOMEN_ALL*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                     0.5774     0.027    21.534  
0.00
0 
RELIGION                                                                      0.1334     0.011    12.008  
0.00
0 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                -0.0454     0.026    -1.713  
0.08
7 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                          0.1130     0.017     6.565  
0.00
0 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                 0.4152     0.041    10.192  
0.00
0 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION*RELIGION                                        0.4645     0.033    14.247  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*SAD_TOTAL                                                           0.2018     0.013    15.660  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                  0.0002  1.06e-05    17.109  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL*COMMENTS_TOTAL                                                      0.0162     0.065     0.249  
0.80
3 
SAD_TOTAL                                                                    -0.0605     0.068    -0.885  
0.37
6 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                                 0.1674     0.122     1.369  
0.17
1 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                   0.0289     0.016     1.817  
0.06
9 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                  0.3268     0.117     2.794  
0.00
5 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*ECONOMY                                                       0.1109     0.009    11.975  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL*REACTIONS_TOTAL                                                    -0.1907     0.020    -9.312  
0.00
0 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                        0.9600     0.033    29.125  
0.00
0 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION^2                                                   -0.3242     0.006   -51.715  
0.00
0 
LOVE_TOTAL*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                          -0.2292     0.069    -3.343  
0.00
1 
WOMEN_ALL*REACTIONS_TOTAL                                                    -0.2561     0.006   -42.463  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                           0.0003  2.69e-05    12.095  
0.00
0 




COMMENTS_TOTAL*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                    0.4756     0.059     8.040  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL^2                                                                   0.0737     0.010     7.120  
0.00
0 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*RELIGION                                            -0.0942     0.014    -6.592  
0.00
0 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                     -0.0485     0.031    -1.591  
0.11
2 
WOMEN_ALL*ECONOMY                                                             0.0633     0.015     4.325  
0.00
0 
DOMESTIC_POLICY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                      0.0830     0.024     3.519  
0.00
0 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*FOREIGN_POLICY                                                0.1192     0.007    18.165  
0.00
0 
SHARES*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                           -1.569e-05  5.37e-06    -2.923  
0.00
3 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*RELIGION                                         -0.1117     0.012    -9.292  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*RELIGION                                                  0.0002  9.54e-06    16.837  
0.00
0 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY^2                                                -0.1030     0.012    -8.286  
0.00
0 
LOVE_TOTAL*SAD_TOTAL                                                         -0.4135     0.084    -4.898  
0.00
0 




ET                  
    0.2078     0.034     6.114  
0.00
0 




ATION             
   -0.4867     0.096    -5.065  
0.00
0 
FOREIGN_POLICY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                       0.1237     0.021     5.972  
0.00
0 
RELIGION^2                                                                   -0.0371     0.005    -7.985  
0.00
0 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*HEALTH                                                         0.2264     0.060     3.742  
0.00
0 
HEALTH                                                                       -0.1913     0.058    -3.308  
0.00
1 
ECONOMY*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                      -0.0981     0.040    -2.433  
0.01
5 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                                      -0.0962     0.012    -7.716  
0.00
0 




DOMESTIC_POLICY*RELIGION                                                      0.2434     0.030     8.163  
0.00
0 
ECONOMY^2                                                                    -0.0756     0.015    -4.994  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*LOVE_TOTAL                                                          0.3722     0.022    17.071  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS*RELIGION                                     -0.1445     0.032    -4.546  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                               0.0001  1.05e-05    13.418  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                        -0.1027     0.012    -8.352  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                                             0.3075     0.024    12.896  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS*HEALTH                                        0.2503     0.063     3.961  
0.00
0 
LOVE_TOTAL*RELIGION                                                          -0.5107     0.062    -8.277  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                        -0.1121     0.020    -5.517  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                      -0.3217     0.021   -15.666  
0.00
0 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                              -0.3402     0.051    -6.640  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS^2                                            -0.4385     0.024   -18.478  
0.00
0 
ECONOMY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                             -0.0336     0.021    -1.600  
0.11
0 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                             -0.1176     0.021    -5.699  
0.00
0 
DOMESTIC_POLICY                                                               0.0800     0.014     5.802  
0.00
0 
LOVE_TOTAL*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT                                            0.8844     0.138     6.430  
0.00
0 
SOCIAL_POLICY*RELIGION                                                        0.0396     0.051     0.779  
0.43
6 
SAD_TOTAL*ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS                                                -0.0001  1.17e-05   -11.180  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                       0.4906     0.085     5.774  
0.00
0 
GENDER_EQUALITY_GENDER_AND_DISCRIMINATION*RELIGION                          -0.0108     0.030    -0.361  
0.71
8 
WOMEN_ALL*SHARES                                                          -6.038e-06  1.19e-06    -5.088  
0.00
0 




POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS*SOCIAL_POLICY                                -0.5440     0.053   -10.228  
0.00
0 
FOREIGN_POLICY^2                                                             -0.0803     0.010    -8.191  
0.00
0 
SHARES*FOREIGN_POLICY                                                         0.0001  1.81e-05     5.756  
0.00
0 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                           -0.4647     0.064    -7.293  
0.00
0 
DOMESTIC_POLICY*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                  -0.1234     0.028    -4.378  
0.00
0 




D_DIGITALIZATION   
   -0.8583     0.138    -6.210  
0.00
0 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                   -0.3811     0.054    -7.047  
0.00
0 
SHARES*HEALTH                                                             -2.834e-05     1e-05    -2.832  
0.00
5 
ECONOMY*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                                      -0.1277     0.027    -4.662  
0.00
0 
SHARES*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                    -4.488e-05  1.69e-05    -2.657  
0.00
8 
EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                                               0.0760     0.019     3.906  
0.00
0 




NTEGRATION        
   -0.3603     0.038    -9.406  
0.00
0 




CRIMINATION     
   -0.2486     0.063    -3.938  
0.00
0 
CULTURE*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                                       0.3259     0.091     3.587  
0.00
0 
SHARES*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY                                        -5.153e-05  8.63e-06    -5.970  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL*CULTURE                                                             0.2294     0.051     4.477  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL*SOCIAL_POLICY                                                      -0.0629     0.041    -1.521  
0.12
8 
LOVE_TOTAL*COMMENTS_TOTAL                                                    -0.4505     0.113    -3.971  
0.00
0 
ECONOMY^3                                                                     0.0252     0.007     3.433  
0.00
1 




REACTIONS_TOTAL*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                                       -0.0200     0.012    -1.730  
0.08
4 
LOVE_TOTAL                                                                   -0.0108     0.123    -0.088  
0.93
0 




N                 
    0.1719     0.073     2.366  
0.01
8 
WOMEN_ALL*EVERYDAY_LIFE_AND_CONSUMPTION                                       0.0736     0.009     8.303  
0.00
0 





   -0.5535     0.078    -7.067  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION                                           -0.4800     0.031   -15.553  
0.00
0 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                      -0.5842     0.123    -4.747  
0.00
0 
CULTURE*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                        -0.4124     0.091    -4.529  
0.00
0 
SOCIAL_POLICY*HEALTH                                                          0.1234     0.046     2.672  
0.00
8 
SAD_TOTAL*FOREIGN_POLICY                                                     -0.2415     0.050    -4.786  
0.00
0 
SHARES*ECONOMY                                                            -8.695e-05  1.24e-05    -6.992  
0.00
0 
LOVE_TOTAL^2                                                                  0.6687     0.078     8.608  
0.00
0 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION^2                                              -0.2759     0.024   -11.415  
0.00
0 
SOCIAL_POLICY^2                                                              -0.0233     0.007    -3.298  
0.00
1 
REACTIONS_TOTAL*SOCIAL_POLICY                                                -0.0485     0.024    -2.003  
0.04
5 
RELIGION^3                                                                    0.0037     0.001     5.030  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                       -0.0001  3.57e-05    -4.006  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET                                     0.1131     0.019     6.052  
0.00
0 
GENDER_EQUALITY_GENDER_AND_DISCRIMINATION^2                                   0.1526     0.020     7.535  
0.00
0 
CULTURE*EVERYDAY_LIFE_AND_CONSUMPTION                                         0.2250     0.060     3.723  
0.00
0 




CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*SOCIAL_POLICY                                        -0.5735     0.120    -4.788  
0.00
0 
LOVE_TOTAL*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION                                     -0.4334     0.136    -3.197  
0.00
1 
LOVE_TOTAL*ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS                                               -0.0001  1.44e-05    -7.873  
0.00
0 
CULTURE*HEALTH                                                                0.1971     0.060     3.285  
0.00
1 
FOREIGN_POLICY*EVERYDAY_LIFE_AND_CONSUMPTION                                 -0.4096     0.082    -4.990  
0.00
0 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS^3                                             0.1351     0.008    16.456  
0.00
0 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT^3                                                     0.0103     0.003     3.843  
0.00
0 
SOCIAL_POLICY                                                                 0.1363     0.020     6.669  
0.00
0 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*HEALTH                                           -0.1769     0.028    -6.253  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS^2                                                     -1.235e-08  5.05e-10   -24.423  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS^3                                                      6.441e-13  3.18e-14    20.231  
0.00
0 
LOVE_TOTAL*GENDER_EQUALITY_GENDER_AND_DISCRIMINATION                      -0.6042     0.156    -3.885  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*DOMESTIC_POLICY                                        3.568e-05  1.56e-05     2.291  
0.02
2 
WOMEN_ALL*ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS                                              6.962e-05  3.32e-06    20.974  
0.00
0 
WOMEN_ALL*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH                                              0.0932     0.019     5.034  
0.00
0 
SHARES^3                                                                   7.291e-16  4.16e-16     1.752  
0.08
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*CULTURE                                                7.126e-05  1.55e-05     4.610  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*ECONOMY                                                  -0.0002  2.53e-05    -8.667  
0.00
0 
LOVE_TOTAL*REACTIONS_TOTAL                                                    0.1315     0.042     3.128  
0.00
2 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION^3                                               0.0185     0.005     4.110  
0.00
0 
SAD_TOTAL*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS                                    -0.9453     0.098    -9.620  
0.00
0 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS*SOCIAL_POLICY                                         -3.764e-05  1.78e-05    -2.110  
0.03
5 
OMNIBUS:       46298.449   Durbin-
Watson:      
   1.872  
 
PROB(OMNIBUS):  0.000      Jarque-Bera 




SKEW:           1.141      Prob(JB):               0.00  
 






OLS Regression Results 
 
DEP. VARIABLE:    INITIAL_DISAGREE_ALL   R-SQUARED:             0.321   
   
MODEL:            OLS                    Adj. R-squared:        0.320   
   
METHOD:           Least Squares          F-statistic:           829.5   
   
DATE:             Sat  19 Oct 2019       Prob (F-statistic):   0.00     
  
TIME:             14:03:04               Log-Likelihood:       92812.   
   
NO. OBSERVATIONS:  98523                 AIC:                -1.855e+05 
   
DF RESIDUALS:      98466                 BIC:                -1.850e+05 
   
DF MODEL:             56                                                
   
COVARIANCE TYPE:  nonrobust                                             
   
       
 
       




CONST                                                             0.7372     0.053    
13.993 
 0.000     
0.634 
    
0.840 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS                    
    0.1749     0.004    
47.781 
 0.000     
0.168 
    
0.182 
WOMEN_COMMENTS^2                                                 -0.2284     0.028    -
8.085 
 0.000    -
0.284 
   -
0.173 
WOMEN_COMMENTS                                                    0.0829     0.011     
7.257 
 0.000     
0.061 
    
0.105 
HOMOGENITY_ALL                                                   -0.1233     0.017    -
7.198 
 0.000    -
0.157 
   -
0.090 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*B                  
    0.5915     0.021    
28.382 
 0.000     
0.551 
    
0.632 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*POLITICAL NEWS                                  0.1059     0.006    
17.386 
 0.000     
0.094 
    
0.118 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*POLITICAL NEWS                           0.0635     0.014     
4.501 
 0.000     
0.036 
    
0.091 
WOMEN_COMMENTS^3                                                  0.1298     0.020     
6.427 
 0.000     
0.090 
    
0.169 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*POLITICAL NEWS     
   -0.1278     0.009   -
14.260 
 0.000    -
0.145 
   -
0.110 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*POLITICAL NEWS                                 0.0408     0.010     
4.256 
 0.000     
0.022 
    
0.060 
WOMEN_REACTIONS^3                                                -0.1276     0.031    -
4.166 
 0.000    -
0.188 
   -
0.068 
WOMEN_REACTIONS^2                                                 0.2127     0.048     
4.478 
 0.000     
0.120 
    
0.306 
WOMEN_REACTIONS                                                  -0.1560     0.023    -
6.878 
 0.000    -
0.200 
   -
0.112 
LOVE_TOTAL*POLITICAL NEWS                                         0.2658     0.038     
7.071 
 0.000     
0.192 
    
0.339 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*B                                           -0.0190     0.018    -
1.074 
 0.283    -
0.054 
    
0.016 
LOVE_TOTAL                                                        0.5720     0.023    
25.199 
 0.000     
0.527 
    
0.616 
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B                                                                -0.2218     0.015   -
14.649 
 0.000    -
0.251 
   -
0.192 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY                                              0.2093     0.012    
17.863 
 0.000     
0.186 
    
0.232 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*POLITICAL NEWS                                    -0.5914     0.048   -
12.308 
 0.000    -
0.686 
   -
0.497 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*B                                                 0.0814     0.015     
5.518 
 0.000     
0.052 
    
0.110 
SAD_TOTAL                                                        -0.5808     0.021   -
27.330 
 0.000    -
0.622 
   -
0.539 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*TABLOID                                            0.0185     0.012     
1.536 
 0.125    -
0.005 
    
0.042 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*TABLOID                                           0.0208     0.014     
1.518 
 0.129    -
0.006 
    
0.048 
TABLOID                                                          -0.0729     0.009    -
8.221 
 0.000    -
0.090 
   -
0.056 
LOVE_TOTAL*GENERAL NEWS                                           0.2902     0.021    
13.620 
 0.000     
0.248 
    
0.332 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY^2                                           -0.2449     0.021   -
11.806 
 0.000    -
0.286 
   -
0.204 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*F                  
    0.7054     0.029    
24.549 
 0.000     
0.649 
    
0.762 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*TABLOID                                            0.1884     0.042     
4.530 
 0.000     
0.107 
    
0.270 
SAD_TOTAL^2                                                       1.7051     0.104    
16.432 
 0.000     
1.502 
    
1.909 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*TABLOID            
    0.0283     0.016     
1.719 
 0.086    -
0.004 
    
0.061 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*A                  
    0.6417     0.019    
34.085 
 0.000     
0.605 
    
0.679 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*B                                                  0.0433     0.010     
4.202 
 0.000     
0.023 
    
0.064 
COMMENTS_TOTAL                                                   -0.5380     0.064    -
8.453 
 0.000    -
0.663 
   -
0.413 
V                                                                 0.3727     0.032    
11.653 
 0.000     
0.310 
    
0.435 
COMMENTS_TOTAL^2                                                 -0.4839     0.048   -
10.124 
 0.000    -
0.578 
   -
0.390 
COMMENTS_TOTAL^3                                                  0.4963     0.060     
8.321 
 0.000     
0.379 
    
0.613 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*V                                                 -0.0171     0.034    -
0.495 
 0.621    -
0.085 
    
0.051 
SAD_TOTAL^3                                                      -1.4656     0.119   -
12.272 
 0.000    -
1.700 
   -
1.232 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*C                                                 -0.9550     0.037   -
25.585 
 0.000    -
1.028 
   -
0.882 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*LEFT LEANING NEWS                                 -0.2888     0.091    -
3.181 
 0.001    -
0.467 
   -
0.111 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*C                  
   -1.0429     0.038   -
27.207 
 0.000    -
1.118 
   -
0.968 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*V                                                  0.0370     0.008     
4.679 
 0.000     
0.022 
    
0.053 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*GENERAL NEWS                                      -0.0166     0.005    -
3.169 
 0.002    -
0.027 
   -
0.006 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*V                                           -0.0399     0.016    -
2.426 
 0.015    -
0.072 
   -
0.008 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*O                                                 -1.0219     0.036   -
28.015 
 0.000    -
1.093 
   -
0.950 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*I                                                 -1.1775     0.039   -
30.209 
 0.000    -
1.254 
   -
1.101 
ANGRY_TOTAL*V                                                     0.1339     0.037     
3.585 
 0.000     
0.061 
    
0.207 
 324 
ANGRY_TOTAL*A                                                    -0.3452     0.026   -
13.468 
 0.000    -
0.395 
   -
0.295 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*AA                                                 0.4351     0.075     
5.835 
 0.000     
0.289 
    
0.581 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*A                                                  0.7159     0.062    
11.571 
 0.000     
0.595 
    
0.837 
SAD_TOTAL*A                                                      -0.3272     0.058    -
5.605 
 0.000    -
0.442 
   -
0.213 
HATE_PROBABILITY                                                  0.0755     0.010     
7.833 
 0.000     
0.057 
    
0.094 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*SPORT                                             -0.1005     0.013    -
8.004 
 0.000    -
0.125 
   -
0.076 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*LEFT LEANING NEWS                             -0.0029     0.015    -
0.191 
 0.848    -
0.033 
    
0.027 
ANGRY_TOTAL^3                                                     0.0995     0.053     
1.891 
 0.059    -
0.004 
    
0.203 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*FTF                                               -0.1989     0.054    -
3.651 
 0.000    -
0.306 
   -
0.092 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*LEFT LEANING NEWS                              0.0055     0.019     
0.288 
 0.773    -
0.032 
    
0.043 
SAD_TOTAL*LOCAL NEWS                                              0.0778     0.015     
5.166 
 0.000     
0.048 
    
0.107 
LOVE_TOTAL*DEBATE                                                 0.4587     0.070     
6.518 
 0.000     
0.321 
    
0.597 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*LEFT LEANING NEWS                        -0.1141     0.025    -
4.654 
 0.000    -
0.162 
   -
0.066 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*GENERAL NEWS                                 0.0581     0.008     
7.054 
 0.000     
0.042 
    
0.074 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*B                                                  0.3706     0.081     
4.563 
 0.000     
0.211 
    
0.530 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*LO                                                 0.3126     0.098     
3.205 
 0.001     
0.121 
    
0.504 
NB                                                                0.2998     0.014    
21.042 
 0.000     
0.272 
    
0.328 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*F                                           -0.0986     0.022    -
4.554 
 0.000    -
0.141 
   -
0.056 
LOVE_TOTAL^2                                                     -1.8337     0.151   -
12.123 
 0.000    -
2.130 
   -
1.537 
ANGRY_TOTAL^2                                                    -0.2372     0.055    -
4.321 
 0.000    -
0.345 
   -
0.130 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*O                                                  0.0412     0.016     
2.605 
 0.009     
0.010 
    
0.072 
ANGRY_TOTAL*OE                                                   -0.4777     0.030   -
15.820 
 0.000    -
0.537 
   -
0.418 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*GENERAL NEWS                                  0.0086     0.006     
1.490 
 0.136    -
0.003 
    
0.020 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*C                                                 0.0375     0.016     
2.331 
 0.020     
0.006 
    
0.069 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*LO                                                -0.1772     0.017   -
10.449 
 0.000    -
0.210 
   -
0.144 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*C                                                 -0.1714     0.044    -
3.937 
 0.000    -
0.257 
   -
0.086 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*LO                                                0.0627     0.013     
4.710 
 0.000     
0.037 
    
0.089 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*AA                 
    0.5701     0.033    
17.114 
 0.000     
0.505 
    
0.635 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*O                                                -0.0026     0.024    -
0.108 
 0.914    -
0.050 
    
0.045 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*O                  
   -1.5223     0.083   -
18.423 
 0.000    -
1.684 
   -
1.360 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*C                                           -0.0847     0.021    -
4.095 
 0.000    -
0.125 
   -
0.044 
 325 
C                                                                 0.4357     0.042    
10.398 
 0.000     
0.354 
    
0.518 
F                                                                -0.2802     0.021   -
13.632 
 0.000    -
0.320 
   -
0.240 
SAD_TOTAL*F                                                      -0.2630     0.065    -
4.052 
 0.000    -
0.390 
   -
0.136 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*O                                           -0.0542     0.022    -
2.450 
 0.014    -
0.097 
   -
0.011 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*SPORT                                             0.0708     0.027     
2.575 
 0.010     
0.017 
    
0.125 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*OE                 
    0.4442     0.018    
25.077 
 0.000     
0.409 
    
0.479 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*GENERAL NEWS                                      0.0499     0.023     
2.195 
 0.028     
0.005 
    
0.094 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*RIGHT LEANING NEWS                                -0.5709     0.033   -
17.086 
 0.000    -
0.636 
   -
0.505 
HATE_PROBABILITY*V                                               -0.0266     0.008    -
3.350 
 0.001    -
0.042 
   -
0.011 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*SPORT                                              0.3654     0.211     
1.733 
 0.083    -
0.048 
    
0.779 
SAD_TOTAL*B                                                      -0.8474     0.061   -
13.817 
 0.000    -
0.968 
   -
0.727 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*O                                                  0.1109     0.060     
1.858 
 0.063    -
0.006 
    
0.228 
LOVE_TOTAL*INFOTAINMENT                                           0.2391     0.053     
4.479 
 0.000     
0.134 
    
0.344 
O                                                                 0.3024     0.056     
5.430 
 0.000     
0.193 
    
0.412 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*OE                                                 0.0549     0.012     
4.643 
 0.000     
0.032 
    
0.078 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*F                                                 0.0525     0.018     
2.994 
 0.003     
0.018 
    
0.087 
LOVE_TOTAL*RIGHT LEANING NEWS                                    0.1265     0.065     
1.957 
 0.050    -
0.000 
    
0.253 
HATE_PROBABILITY^2                                               -0.1467     0.030    -
4.903 
 0.000    -
0.205 
   -
0.088 
SAD_TOTAL*KØBENHAVN KOMMUNE                                      -0.1315     0.043    -
3.083 
 0.002    -
0.215 
   -
0.048 
LOVE_TOTAL*V                                                      0.0945     0.054     
1.753 
 0.080    -
0.011 
    
0.200 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*A                                                  0.0321     0.008     
4.158 
 0.000     
0.017 
    
0.047 
LOVE_TOTAL*LEFT LEANING NEWS                                     -0.3654     0.099    -
3.708 
 0.000    -
0.559 
   -
0.172 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*LOCAL NEWS                                0.0247     0.008     
3.142 
 0.002     
0.009 
    
0.040 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*AA                                                 0.1885     0.048     
3.952 
 0.000     
0.095 
    
0.282 
ANGRY_TOTAL*F                                                    -0.4214     0.040   -
10.612 
 0.000    -
0.499 
   -
0.344 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*I                                                -0.1954     0.016   -
12.341 
 0.000    -
0.226 
   -
0.164 
AA                                                               -0.3559     0.052    -
6.857 
 0.000    -
0.458 
   -
0.254 
LOVE_TOTAL*I                                                      0.1632     0.055     
2.983 
 0.003     
0.056 
    
0.270 
SAD_TOTAL*INFOTAINMENT                                            0.0273     0.021     
1.314 
 0.189    -
0.013 
    
0.068 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*KØBENHAVN KOMMUNE                                  0.1996     0.085     
2.351 
 0.019     
0.033 
    
0.366 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*FREDERIKSBERG KOMMUNE                          -0.5787     0.082    -
7.029 
 0.000    -
0.740 
   -
0.417 
 326 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*KØBENHAVN KOMMUNE                              -0.0499     0.013    -
3.975 
 0.000    -
0.074 
   -
0.025 
ANGRY_TOTAL*DEBATE                                                0.1094     0.018     
6.191 
 0.000     
0.075 
    
0.144 
HATE_PROBABILITY*NB                                              -0.0641     0.017    -
3.678 
 0.000    -
0.098 
   -
0.030 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*OE                                                -0.1045     0.009   -
11.943 
 0.000    -
0.122 
   -
0.087 
HATE_PROBABILITY^3                                                0.0795     0.023     
3.480 
 0.001     
0.035 
    
0.124 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*I                                           -0.0996     0.022    -
4.462 
 0.000    -
0.143 
   -
0.056 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*RIGHT LEANING NEWS                            0.0240     0.013     
1.876 
 0.061    -
0.001 
    
0.049 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*NB                                                -0.7999     0.055   -
14.640 
 0.000    -
0.907 
   -
0.693 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS                                                0.4126     0.042     
9.905 
 0.000     
0.331 
    
0.494 








COMMENTS_TOTAL*I                                                 -0.2519     0.043    -
5.801 
 0.000    -
0.337 
   -
0.167 
GENERAL NEWS                                                     -0.3757     0.023   -
16.366 
 0.000    -
0.421 
   -
0.331 
SAD_TOTAL*AA                                                     -0.1434     0.052    -
2.756 
 0.006    -
0.245 
   -
0.041 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*F                                                  0.6913     0.083     
8.293 
 0.000     
0.528 
    
0.855 
I                                                                 0.5201     0.042    
12.262 
 0.000     
0.437 
    
0.603 
LOVE_TOTAL*TABLOID                                                0.1495     0.031     
4.839 
 0.000     
0.089 
    
0.210 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*INFOTAINMENT                                 0.0782     0.016     
4.806 
 0.000     
0.046 
    
0.110 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*GENERAL NEWS                                       0.3708     0.024    
15.754 
 0.000     
0.325 
    
0.417 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*RIGHT LEANING NEWS                              -0.2741     0.046    -
6.008 
 0.000    -
0.364 
   -
0.185 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*OE                                          -0.1296     0.022    -
5.806 
 0.000    -
0.173 
   -
0.086 
SAD_TOTAL*I                                                      -0.7453     0.147    -
5.069 
 0.000    -
1.034 
   -
0.457 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*RIGHT LEANING NEWS 
   -0.3867     0.020   -
19.153 
 0.000    -
0.426 
   -
0.347 
ANGRY_TOTAL*AA                                                   -0.1781     0.047    -
3.791 
 0.000    -
0.270 
   -
0.086 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*DEBATE                                            -0.0224     0.006    -
3.468 
 0.001    -
0.035 
   -
0.010 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*LO                 
    0.2722     0.029     
9.448 
 0.000     
0.216 
    
0.329 
WOMEN_REACTIONS*FREDERIKSBERG KOMMUNE                         -0.0710     0.034    -
2.073 
 0.038    -
0.138 
   -
0.004 
ANGRY_TOTAL                                                       0.1257     0.014     
8.817 
 0.000     
0.098 
    
0.154 
INFOTAINMENT                                                     -0.0130     0.004    -
3.375 
 0.001    -
0.021 
   -
0.005 
COMMENTS_TOTAL*FREDERIKSBERG KOMMUNE                          0.1498     0.026     
5.731 
 0.000     
0.099 
    
0.201 









AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY*A                                           -0.1086     0.017    -
6.225 
 0.000    -
0.143 
   -
0.074 
ANGRY_TOTAL*B                                                    -0.2522     0.045    -
5.578 
 0.000    -
0.341 
   -
0.164 
WOMEN_COMMENTS*F                                                  0.0575     0.012     
4.796 
 0.000     
0.034 
    
0.081 
LOVE_TOTAL*A                                                     -0.2525     0.065    -
3.876 
 0.000    -
0.380 
   -
0.125 
HATE_PROBABILITY*A                                               -0.0297     0.008    -
3.532 
 0.000    -
0.046 
   -
0.013 
ANGRY_TOTAL*INFOTAINMENT                                          0.0590     0.013     
4.534 
 0.000     
0.034 
    
0.085 
LOVE_TOTAL^3                                                      1.1999     0.183     
6.559 
 0.000     
0.841 
    
1.558 
A                                                                -0.2294     0.013   -
18.165 
 0.000    -
0.254 
   -
0.205 
ANGRY_TOTAL*GENERAL NEWS                                          0.0221     0.005     
4.438 
 0.000     
0.012 
    
0.032 
LOVE_TOTAL*O                                                      0.3022     0.056     
5.416 
 0.000     
0.193 
    
0.411 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*V                  
   -1.3065     0.026   -
49.430 
 0.000    -
1.358 
   -
1.255 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*LEFT LEANING NEWS  
    0.1895     0.027     
7.113 
 0.000     
0.137 
    
0.242 
LEFT_WING_COMMENTS_INV*LEFT_WING_REACTI
ONS*KØBENHAVN KOMMUNE  
    0.1251     0.029     
4.374 
 0.000     
0.069 
    
0.181 
HOMOGENITY_ALL*V                                                 -1.1278     0.027   -
41.582 
 0.000    -
1.181 
   -
1.075 








OMNIBUS:       14517.273   Durbin-
Watson:      
   1.872  
   
PROB(OMNIBUS):  0.000      Jarque-
Bera (JB):   
24668.
320 
   
SKEW:           0.984      Prob(JB):           0.00  
   
KURTOSIS:       4.462      Cond. No.           8.35e+
15  






The table shows the adjusted coefficients for Figure 8.8. The coefficients are normalized 
by the mean of the values for the given variable it belongs to. Some variables are in the 
range 0 - ∞ while others are only 0 – 1. The normalization makes it easier to compare the 
importance of each coefficient to all coefficients in the same model. The adjusted 
coefficients are sorted based on their absolute value such that the strength of coefficients 
can be compared regardless of whether they are negative or positive. 
 
PARAMETER COEFFICIENT ADJUSTED_COEFFICIENT 
ANGER_AND_HARSHNESS 0.04950 0.64790 
WOMEN_ALL -0.08114 -0.40233 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.19610 0.05739 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS 0.23889 0.03267 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION 0.24401 0.03260 
SAD_TOTAL -0.10560 -0.03028 
COMMENTS_TOTAL -0.00003 -0.03016 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.07168 0.02650 
REACTIONS_TOTAL 0.00000 0.01916 
RELIGION 0.09200 0.01838 
ECONOMY 0.09048 0.01765 
SOCIAL_POLICY 0.08873 0.01100 
EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.05475 0.00686 
FOREIGN_POLICY 0.06202 0.00639 
DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.02513 0.00607 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT 0.07431 0.00551 
HEALTH 0.03145 0.00496 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH 0.04946 0.00487 
EVERYDAY_LIFE_AND_CONSUMPTION 0.04698 0.00267 





The table shows the adjusted coefficients for Figure 8.12. The coefficients are normalized 
by the mean of the values for the given variable it belongs to. Some variables are in the 
range 0 - ∞ while others are only 0 – 1. The normalization makes it easier to compare the 
importance of each coefficient to all coefficients in the same model. The adjusted 
coefficients are sorted based on their absolute value such that the strength of coefficients 
can be compared regardless of whether they are negative or positive. 
 
PARAMETER COEFFICIENT ADJUSTED_COEFFICIENT 
COMMENTS_TOTAL -0.35315 -0.33923 
HOMOGENITY_ALL -0.79889 -0.06938 
WOMEN_ALL -0.09663 -0.04541 
LEFT_WING_ALL -0.08240 -0.04404 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY 0.12017 0.02363 
LOVE_TOTAL 0.37174 0.00618 
V 0.10244 0.00445 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.15990 0.00438 
A 0.08589 0.00403 
O 0.13116 0.00353 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.11507 -0.00346 
SAD_TOTAL -0.12411 -0.00322 
B 0.10412 0.00311 
F 0.10176 0.00265 
POLITICAL NEWS 0.07378 0.00257 
TABLOID -0.02959 -0.00211 
OE 0.07630 0.00207 
AA 0.10473 0.00207 
I 0.04852 0.00162 
C 0.06195 0.00158 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS 0.09785 0.00145 
ANGRY_TOTAL -0.02058 -0.00141 
CULTURE -0.09371 -0.00116 
HEALTH -0.08453 -0.00115 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS 0.03382 0.00102 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION -0.10971 -0.00100 
ECONOMY 0.04181 0.00091 
LEFT LEANING NEWS 0.04007 0.00083 
LOCAL NEWS -0.00743 -0.00056 
GENERAL NEWS 0.00190 0.00056 
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NB 0.15529 0.00051 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH -0.05187 -0.00050 
RELIGION 0.02772 0.00048 
SPORT -0.09536 -0.00046 
FREDERIKSBERG KOMMUNE 0.09092 0.00041 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT 0.03284 0.00026 
BUSINESS -0.02529 -0.00011 
BRØNDBY KOMMUNE -0.11185 -0.00011 
FTF 0.01353 0.00010 
LIFESTYLE -0.02274 -0.00010 
DEBATE 0.00195 0.00004 
RANDERS KOMMUNE -0.06075 -0.00004 
SILKEBORG KOMMUNE -0.03189 -0.00003 
OTHER -0.00213 -0.00002 
HØRSHOLM KOMMUNE -0.06098 -0.00001 





The table shows the adjusted coefficients for Figure 8.15. The coefficients are normalized 
by the mean of the values for the given variable it belongs to. Some variables are in the 
range 0 - ∞ while others are only 0 – 1. The normalization makes it easier to compare the 
importance of each coefficient to all coefficients in the same model. The adjusted 
coefficients are sorted based on their absolute value such that the strength of coefficients 
can be compared regardless of whether they are negative or positive. 
 
PARAMETER COEFFICIENT ADJUSTED_COEFFICIENT 
COMMENTS_TOTAL -0.19024 -0.18585 
REACTIONS_TOTAL -0.04887 -0.03767 
AGG_HATE_PROBABILITY -0.15062 -0.03259 
WOMEN_COMMENTS 0.07166 0.03244 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.20427 -0.00629 
ANGRY_TOTAL 0.04029 0.00389 
O -0.06966 -0.00332 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.08570 0.00317 
V -0.08025 -0.00275 
A -0.08514 -0.00261 
TABLOID 0.01890 0.00241 
OE -0.09536 -0.00218 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS -0.16733 -0.00216 
LOVE_TOTAL -0.13504 -0.00193 
B -0.11401 -0.00177 
I -0.06579 -0.00166 
F -0.08950 -0.00159 
CULTURE 0.11824 0.00146 
POLITICAL NEWS -0.06363 -0.00137 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS -0.02201 -0.00134 
HEALTH 0.09044 0.00132 
AA -0.07878 -0.00129 
LEFT LEANING NEWS -0.05804 -0.00128 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION 0.10295 0.00116 
LOCAL NEWS 0.01820 0.00116 
EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.08214 0.00095 
DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.03467 0.00073 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH 0.08544 0.00072 
ECONOMY -0.03859 -0.00060 
SAD_TOTAL 0.01893 0.00056 
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RELIGION -0.02443 -0.00051 
INFOTAINMENT 0.01290 0.00038 
GENERAL NEWS 0.00114 0.00038 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT -0.05627 -0.00033 
DEBATE -0.01830 -0.00032 
SPORT 0.08656 0.00028 
FREDERIKSBERG KOMMUNE -0.06632 -0.00027 
LO 0.03346 0.00027 
NB -0.09425 -0.00024 
C -0.01484 -0.00022 
FTF -0.02352 -0.00020 
BRØNDBY KOMMUNE 0.10965 0.00012 
CHARITY 0.05120 0.00005 
RANDERS KOMMUNE 0.11176 0.00003 
RINGKØBINGSKJERN KOMMUNE 0.07623 0.00003 





The table shows the adjusted coefficients for Appendix 8.3-SI. The coefficients are 
normalized by the mean of the values for the given variable it belongs to. Some variables 
are in the range 0 - ∞ while others are only 0 – 1. The normalization makes it easier to 
compare the importance of each coefficient to all coefficients in the same model. The 
adjusted coefficients are sorted based on their absolute value such that the strength of 






O -0.04839 -0.01575 
WOMEN_ALL*O 0.07354 0.01247 
TABLOID 0.05958 0.01089 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.25397 0.00912 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.17011 -0.00671 
HATE_PROBABILITY*O -0.06140 -0.00641 
MESSAGE_LEN 0.00000 0.00563 
WOMEN_ALL*V 0.07780 0.00419 
WOMEN_ALL*I 0.12923 0.00418 
POLITICIAN_V -0.11367 -0.00405 
GENERAL NEWS 0.00877 0.00390 
WOMEN_ALL 0.00643 0.00329 
GENERAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.22396 -0.00288 
O*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.18957 -0.00276 
GENERAL NEWS*HATE_PROBABILITY -0.02530 -0.00273 
I -0.03266 -0.00273 
WOMEN_ALL*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.13747 -0.00234 
TABLOID*O -0.02871 -0.00231 
HATE_PROBABILITY -0.00861 -0.00221 
HEALTH 0.16117 0.00210 
B -0.03199 -0.00206 
HATE_PROBABILITY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.14210 0.00183 
CULTURE 0.15510 0.00178 
OE -0.01271 -0.00178 
POLITICIAN_B -0.10530 -0.00158 
AA 0.03114 0.00148 
POLITICIAN_I -0.06592 -0.00137 
BY_WOMAN -0.00308 -0.00137 
HATE_PROBABILITY*V -0.04920 -0.00131 
ECONOMY -0.12025 -0.00129 
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V -0.01145 -0.00124 
GENERAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*O -0.24256 -0.00116 
LOCAL NEWS 0.03765 0.00114 
GENERAL NEWS*RELIGION -0.12710 -0.00111 
GENERAL NEWS*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS -0.33016 -0.00111 
POLITICIAN_OE -0.07297 -0.00110 
POLITICIAN_A -0.05975 -0.00109 
GENERAL NEWS*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.08207 0.00108 
TABLOID*V -0.04819 -0.00101 
GENERAL NEWS*A 0.01517 0.00099 
HATE_PROBABILITY*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.09260 0.00098 
POLITICAL NEWS -0.08821 -0.00097 
EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET -0.08408 -0.00093 
TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION 0.09501 0.00092 
WOMEN_ALL*RELIGION -0.06532 -0.00091 
WOMEN_ALL*SOCIAL_POLICY 0.12634 0.00090 
DEBATE -0.06159 -0.00089 
POLITICIAN_F -0.05368 -0.00088 
BY_WOMAN*O 0.00558 0.00084 
WOMEN_ALL*CULTURE -0.12764 -0.00077 
WOMEN_ALL*C 0.07977 0.00077 
GENERAL NEWS*I 0.02106 0.00077 
A 0.00544 0.00074 
A*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.20893 0.00074 
TABLOID*OE 0.03725 0.00071 
POLITICIAN_V*O 0.05588 0.00070 
GENERAL NEWS*HEALTH 0.12358 0.00069 
HATE_PROBABILITY*RELIGION 0.06823 0.00066 
O*ECONOMY 0.28943 0.00066 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*HATE_PROBABILITY 0.03759 0.00064 
FOREIGN_POLICY 0.07500 0.00063 
GENERAL NEWS*FOREIGN_POLICY -0.14391 -0.00062 
POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS -0.06102 -0.00061 
V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.15801 -0.00061 
TABLOID*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.15174 -0.00061 
TABLOID*RELIGION -0.15953 -0.00060 
WOMEN_ALL*B 0.01849 0.00058 
RELIGION -0.02004 -0.00058 
WOMEN_ALL*A -0.00767 -0.00058 
POLITICIAN_AA -0.07042 -0.00057 
SOCIAL_POLICY -0.05206 -0.00056 
C 0.02568 0.00053 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.12937 0.00053 
TABLOID*HATE_PROBABILITY 0.01032 0.00053 
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GENERAL NEWS*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*O 0.12501 0.00050 




O*FOREIGN_POLICY -0.14616 -0.00046 
I*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.19509 0.00046 
WOMEN_ALL*ECONOMY*O -0.41466 -0.00044 
O*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.14140 0.00042 
GENERAL NEWS*A*HATE_PROBABILITY 0.02932 0.00041 
HATE_PROBABILITY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*O 0.05715 0.00041 
TABLOID*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*O -0.19697 -0.00040 
TABLOID*A 0.01626 0.00040 
WOMEN_ALL*HEALTH -0.04612 -0.00038 
DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.02378 0.00038 
GENERAL NEWS*B -0.01177 -0.00038 
O*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.02015 -0.00038 
GENDER_EQUALITY_GENDER_AND_DISCRIMINATION 0.07158 0.00037 
POLITICIAN_C -0.03993 -0.00037 
GENERAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.06881 0.00037 
JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*I -0.12865 -0.00036 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.22406 0.00034 
GENERAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*V -0.22582 -0.00034 
GENERAL NEWS*CULTURE 0.07797 0.00033 
GENERAL NEWS*SOCIAL_POLICY 0.08593 0.00031 
A*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.07967 -0.00031 
POLITICIAN_V*I 0.09840 0.00031 
LEFT LEANING NEWS -0.02385 -0.00031 
WOMEN_ALL*I*HATE_PROBABILITY -0.04317 -0.00031 
TABLOID*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*O 0.07856 0.00030 
GENERAL NEWS*HEALTH*O 0.23598 0.00030 
I*ECONOMY -0.15487 -0.00030 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH 0.04412 0.00029 
GENERAL NEWS*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET*O 0.29389 0.00028 
POLITICIAN_I*O 0.14744 0.00028 
O*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH 0.19712 0.00028 
HATE_PROBABILITY*DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.07513 0.00027 
POLITICIAN_NB -0.16975 -0.00027 
HATE_PROBABILITY*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.09586 0.00026 
HATE_PROBABILITY*ECONOMY -0.11596 -0.00026 
OE*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.06462 -0.00026 
WITH_LINK -0.02056 -0.00026 
WOMEN_ALL*AA -0.01033 -0.00025 
POLITICIAN_B*O -0.11251 -0.00022 
GENERAL NEWS*ECONOMY*O 0.33334 0.00022 
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I*RELIGION 0.10392 0.00022 
WOMEN_ALL*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS -0.04843 -0.00022 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*A 0.09304 0.00022 
V*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS -0.20536 -0.00022 
C*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.26936 -0.00021 
A*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS -0.15757 -0.00021 
WOMEN_ALL*ECONOMY -0.04901 -0.00021 
LOCAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.20570 -0.00020 
SPORT 0.10643 0.00020 




TABLOID*C -0.06302 -0.00020 
LOCAL NEWS*A 0.03458 0.00019 





A*HEALTH -0.09047 -0.00019 
GENERAL NEWS*RELIGION*O -0.07231 -0.00018 
WOMEN_ALL*RELIGION*V 0.13916 0.00018 
B*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.07557 -0.00018 
TABLOID*FOREIGN_POLICY -0.21757 -0.00018 
A*RELIGION 0.06829 0.00018 
HATE_PROBABILITY*ECONOMY*O 0.27312 0.00017 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS -0.00385 -0.00017 
OE*FOREIGN_POLICY 0.16921 0.00017 
GENERAL NEWS*SOCIAL_POLICY*O 0.19161 0.00017 
POLITICIAN_A*O 0.09749 0.00016 
OTHER*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.47229 -0.00016 
WOMEN_ALL*NB 0.05689 0.00016 
V*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.04028 0.00016 
TABLOID*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*O*HATE_PROBABILITY 0.18386 0.00015 
LO 0.05600 0.00015 
POLITICIAN_V*B -0.08203 -0.00015 
DEBATE*OE -0.04774 -0.00015 
POLITICIAN_V*A -0.04929 -0.00015 
GENERAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*O 0.10658 0.00015 
OE*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.03587 0.00014 
O*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT 0.24730 0.00014 
B*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.05445 -0.00014 
TABLOID*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS -0.21300 -0.00014 
GENERAL NEWS*RELIGION*I 0.20717 0.00014 
AA*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.11415 -0.00014 
REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*C 0.25052 0.00014 
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POLITICIAN_B*V -0.10984 -0.00014 
V*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.15105 0.00013 
TABLOID*HEALTH*O 0.13465 0.00013 
POLITICIAN_OE*O 0.08827 0.00013 
V*HEALTH 0.10380 0.00013 
POLITICIAN_V*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION 0.28852 0.00013 
OE*ECONOMY 0.08080 0.00013 
CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT -0.03207 -0.00013 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*OE 0.08185 0.00012 
ECONOMY*B 0.21634 0.00012 
WOMEN_ALL*RELIGION*B -0.08221 -0.00012 
WOMEN_ALL*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS*O -0.08503 -0.00012 
TABLOID*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.08933 0.00011 
NB 0.01634 0.00011 
LIFESTYLE 0.05534 0.00011 
POLITICAL NEWS*OE -0.05815 -0.00011 
GENERAL NEWS*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.02489 0.00011 
O*RELIGION 0.00921 0.00011 
V*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH 0.15699 0.00010 
POLITICIAN_I*ECONOMY*I 0.12010 0.00010 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH*I 0.13178 0.00010 
OE*DOMESTIC_POLICY -0.04245 -0.00010 
HATE_PROBABILITY*RELIGION*A 0.13080 0.00010 
POLITICIAN_I*V 0.06102 0.00009 
O*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH*HATE_PROBABILITY -0.23256 -0.00009 
POLITICIAN_B*I -0.05444 -0.00009 




WOMEN_ALL*RELIGION*V*HATE_PROBABILITY -0.21275 -0.00009 
OE*CULTURE 0.06087 0.00009 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*OE -0.01897 -0.00009 
TABLOID*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS*O -0.30912 -0.00009 





DEBATE*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS 0.35370 0.00008 
LOCAL NEWS*OE 0.02980 0.00008 
LOCAL NEWS*O -0.00778 -0.00008 
POLITICIAN_B*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS 0.21614 0.00008 
POLITICAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.17579 -0.00008 
POLITICIAN_V*RELIGION 0.04881 0.00008 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*V -0.01758 -0.00008 
AA*HEALTH -0.08982 -0.00008 
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POLITICIAN_A*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.13787 0.00008 
HATE_PROBABILITY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*I -0.12013 -0.00008 
POLITICIAN_I*ECONOMY 0.05137 0.00008 
TABLOID*AA 0.02093 0.00008 
TABLOID*ECONOMY 0.12835 0.00008 
V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT -0.16057 -0.00007 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*O 0.16637 0.00007 
POLITICIAN_B*ECONOMY 0.31351 0.00007 
POLITICIAN_OE*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS 0.14200 0.00007 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT -0.29201 -0.00007 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*O -0.10663 -0.00007 
B*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.18030 0.00007 
EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH*B 0.15019 0.00007 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*I 0.10359 0.00007 
OTHER*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS -0.74402 -0.00007 
DEBATE*RELIGION -0.16977 -0.00007 
HATE_PROBABILITY*A 0.00216 0.00007 
I*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET -0.07815 -0.00006 
B*HEALTH 0.07899 0.00006 
V*SOCIAL_POLICY 0.06756 0.00006 
AA*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.10838 0.00006 
AA*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.04625 0.00006 
POLITICAL NEWS*B -0.05737 -0.00006 
TABLOID*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*I -0.12284 -0.00006 
AA*DOMESTIC_POLICY -0.06923 -0.00006 
V*FOREIGN_POLICY -0.06720 -0.00006 
LOCAL NEWS*RELIGION -0.23134 -0.00006 
POLITICIAN_B*A 0.04858 0.00006 
POLITICAL NEWS*I 0.07968 0.00006 
TABLOID*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.00757 -0.00006 
B*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION 0.11928 0.00006 
GENERAL NEWS*RELIGION*I*HATE_PROBABILITY -0.28680 -0.00006 
POLITICIAN_V*AA -0.06920 -0.00006 
OTHER*B -0.04419 -0.00006 
POLITICIAN_C*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT -0.31098 -0.00006 
POLITICAL NEWS*A -0.03224 -0.00006 
POLITICIAN_OE*O*HATE_PROBABILITY -0.11383 -0.00006 
POLITICIAN_OE*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.08382 0.00006 
B*SOCIAL_POLICY 0.10394 0.00006 
HATE_PROBABILITY*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*C -0.36735 -0.00006 
POLITICIAN_B*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.03606 -0.00006 
POLITICIAN_A*ECONOMY -0.09172 -0.00006 
HATE_PROBABILITY*RELIGION*I -0.08741 -0.00006 
POLITICIAN_F*A 0.02740 0.00006 
 339 
A*SOCIAL_POLICY -0.02939 -0.00005 
POLITICIAN_OE*A 0.04248 0.00005 




DEBATE*B -0.04540 -0.00005 
C*RELIGION 0.09254 0.00005 
C*DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.13284 0.00005 
TABLOID*HEALTH -0.02053 -0.00005 
TABLOID*NB -0.03519 -0.00005 
DEBATE*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.29724 0.00005 
AA*ECONOMY 0.07256 0.00005 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*I -0.28263 -0.00005 
POLITICIAN_OE*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY -0.08915 -0.00005 
DEBATE*HEALTH 0.62011 0.00005 
POLITICIAN_C*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION -0.79097 -0.00005 
NB*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.12294 -0.00004 
POLITICIAN_A*O*HATE_PROBABILITY -0.09242 -0.00004 
POLITICIAN_B*C -0.09921 -0.00004 
OTHER*DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.31805 0.00004 
DEBATE*AA -0.03569 -0.00004 
GENERAL NEWS*ECONOMY*V 0.13905 0.00004 
POLITICIAN_AA*O 0.11955 0.00004 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*OE 0.64893 0.00004 
POLITICAL NEWS*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.41118 0.00004 
POLITICIAN_F*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*O -0.18110 -0.00004 
POLITICIAN_AA*I 0.10391 0.00004 
POLITICIAN_B*OE 0.02142 0.00004 
O*HEALTH 0.01142 0.00004 
POLITICIAN_C*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.05749 0.00004 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*I -0.01478 -0.00004 
DEBATE*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH 0.44493 0.00004 
POLITICIAN_A*EDUCATION_AND_RESEARCH 0.15948 0.00004 
AA*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT -0.07456 -0.00004 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*V 0.10497 0.00004 
POLITICIAN_I*ECONOMY*OE -0.37766 -0.00004 
OTHER 0.00359 0.00004 
LOCAL NEWS*ECONOMY 0.21692 0.00004 
O*SOCIAL_POLICY 0.01132 0.00004 
TABLOID*HEALTH*I -0.22742 -0.00003 
POLITICIAN_V*C 0.04791 0.00003 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*V -0.29924 -0.00003 
WITH_LINK*FOREIGN_POLICY 0.21747 0.00003 
POLITICIAN_V*ECONOMY*A -0.26328 -0.00003 
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LEFT LEANING NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION -0.08256 -0.00003 
DEBATE*GENDER_EQUALITY_GENDER_AND_DISCRIMINATION 0.28087 0.00003 
POLITICAL NEWS*AA -0.03302 -0.00003 
POLITICIAN_A*V -0.02470 -0.00003 
POLITICAL NEWS*HEALTH 0.52489 0.00003 
POLITICIAN_I*FOREIGN_POLICY -0.24090 -0.00003 
TABLOID*RELIGION*I 0.13863 0.00003 
POLITICIAN_B*FOREIGN_POLICY 0.14851 0.00003 
POLITICIAN_F*DOMESTIC_POLICY -0.07429 -0.00003 
POLITICIAN_B*ECONOMY*B -0.38971 -0.00003 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*V 0.34429 0.00003 
POLITICIAN_A*RELIGION 0.05898 0.00003 
POLITICAL NEWS*ECONOMY 0.12930 0.00003 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY -0.03732 -0.00003 
POLITICIAN_NB*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY 0.36087 0.00003 
NB*ECONOMY 0.61257 0.00003 
DEBATE*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION 0.43373 0.00003 
GENERAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*C -0.23388 -0.00003 
NB*FOREIGN_POLICY -0.29211 -0.00003 
POLITICIAN_AA*A 0.05777 0.00003 
A*ECONOMY -0.01610 -0.00003 
B*RELIGION 0.00811 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*HEALTH*V -0.23183 -0.00002 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT -0.38727 -0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*TECHNOLOGY_AND_DIGITALIZATION*A 1.01042 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*B 1.87414 0.00002 
POLITICAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*O 0.81489 0.00002 
OTHER*CULTURE -0.27236 -0.00002 
POLITICIAN_C*A 0.03400 0.00002 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*HEALTH -0.08856 -0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*ECONOMY 0.02492 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.02724 0.00002 
DEBATE*SOCIAL_POLICY 0.28967 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_OE*V -0.04008 -0.00002 
B*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS 0.03117 0.00002 
C*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT 0.18261 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*RELIGION*I -0.14891 -0.00002 
POLITICAL NEWS*ECONOMY*O 0.68902 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_NB*RELIGION 0.10461 0.00002 
DEBATE*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.10648 0.00002 




POLITICIAN_AA*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.12666 0.00002 
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POLITICIAN_F*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION 0.01776 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*B 0.35593 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_A*ECONOMY*V -0.40808 -0.00002 
DEBATE*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET*O 0.67027 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_AA*V 0.09510 0.00002 
NB*HEALTH 0.34070 0.00002 
POLITICAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY 0.09193 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_A*ECONOMY*OE 0.29686 0.00002 
GENERAL NEWS*ECONOMY*V*HATE_PROBABILITY 0.32973 0.00002 
POLITICAL NEWS*C 0.09786 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_C*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET -0.14163 -0.00002 
POLITICIAN_OE*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET*O 0.29803 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*OE -0.85625 -0.00002 
OTHER*SOCIAL_POLICY 0.25982 0.00002 
POLITICIAN_F*DOMESTIC_POLICY*O -0.28839 -0.00002 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*ECONOMY*OE*HATE_PROBABILITY -2.63751 -0.00002 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*A 0.95976 0.00002 
GENERAL NEWS*AA -0.00064 -0.00002 
NB*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET 0.39494 0.00001 




GENERAL NEWS*ECONOMY -0.00465 -0.00001 
POLITICIAN_C*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*OE 0.35111 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*I 0.63117 0.00001 
LOCAL NEWS*REFUGEES_AND_INTEGRATION*I 0.27506 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_NB*B -0.14287 -0.00001 
POLITICIAN_C*FOREIGN_POLICY -0.23565 -0.00001 
POLITICIAN_B*FOREIGN_POLICY*OE 0.54675 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*JUSTICE_AND_SECURITY_POLICY*AA 0.47613 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_C*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET*OE -0.65329 -0.00001 
OTHER*CULTURE*I -0.83784 -0.00001 
POLITICAL NEWS*ECONOMY*V 0.73618 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_B*NB -0.11884 -0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*RELIGION*B 0.07879 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_NB*OE -0.12571 -0.00001 
OE*RELIGION 0.00337 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*B -0.72752 -0.00001 
POLITICIAN_NB*HEALTH 1.09345 0.00001 
DEBATE*RELIGION*I 0.40166 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_C*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*A 0.45180 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*EMPLOYMENT_AND_THE_LABOR_MARKET -0.01918 -0.00001 
POLITICIAN_I*OE 0.00647 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*AA -0.37125 -0.00001 
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POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*AA 1.17623 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_A*RELIGION*V 0.27190 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*CLIMATE_AND_ENVIRONMENT*C 0.93599 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*B*HATE_PROBABILITY -1.94338 -0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*HEALTH -0.02312 -0.00001 
POLITICIAN_OE*POLITICAL_GAMES_AND_REFERENDUMS*C 2.01258 0.00001 
V*ECONOMY 0.00527 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY*OE 0.50624 0.00001 
POLITICIAN_C*FOREIGN_POLICY*AA -1.93485 -0.00001 
LEFT LEANING NEWS*NB 0.26937 0.00000 
POLITICAL NEWS*DOMESTIC_POLICY*NB 2.46473 0.00000 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*ECONOMY*OE -0.13639 0.00000 
POLITICIAN_V*FOREIGN_POLICY -0.00996 0.00000 
RIGHT LEANING NEWS*ECONOMY -0.00533 0.00000 
 
 
